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The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence
Policy. 1945-1964 
Ian Andrew Speller
This thesis examines the factors that determined the role of
amphibious warfare in British defence policy between 1945 and
1964. In particular, it concentrates on the attitude of the Royal Navy
towards amphibious capabilities and on the position of the Royal
Marines. The thesis establishes how the Navy's wartime experience
influenced its view of post war amphibious requirements and the
effect that this had on the higher direction of policy. It analyses how
changing strategic reality affected Service attitudes towards
amphibious warfare. In addition the thesis details the amphibious
policy in effect during this period and examines the provision of
men, material and equipment for amphibious warfare and the
employment of amphibious forces.
In the decade following the 1945 the theory and practice of
amphibious warfare in Britain was based on the wartime experience
of raiding and of large scale assault operations on the model of the
Normandy landings. Ambitious plans were made for a large
peacetime amphibious training organisation with a nucleus assault
fleet. However, the requirement to restrict defence expenditure
caused these plans to be abandoned in the late 1940s.
During the 1950s changing defence priorities transformed
approaches to amphibious warfare. With less emphasis placed on
major war in Europe the requirement to prepare for large scale
assault operations was abandoned in favour of the provision of small
forces readily available for operations in cold and limited war. For
the first time the Royal Marines were given primary responsibility
for amphibious warfare. The Admiralty developed a strategy for
overseas intervention based on amphibious seapower supported by
aircraft carriers. This brought it into conflict with the RAF who had
developed their own strategy of intervention. The resulting dispute
reflected the desire of the three Services to maintain their own core
capabilities while meeting the requirements of national strategy.
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An amphibious operation is a landing or embarkation involving the
integration of sea and land forces. 1 Amphibious warfare has historically
played an important part in British strategy. For reasons of geography
strength at sea has always been vital to British security and military
expeditions from Britain have always been required to cross the sea.
Historically weak on land, England, and from 1707 Britain, was
frequently able to concentrate enough maritime power to strike a blow
against its enemies at some point away from their main forces, where a
limited military commitment could achieve the greatest result. "Conjunct
expeditions" as they were known in the eighteenth century were
frequently employed as raids designed to inflict loss in men, ships and
stores upon the enemy. Drake's raid on Cadiz in 1587, the burning of
eighty French sail at St. Malo in 1758, and the landings at Copenhagen in
1807 and Walcheren in 1809 are examples of this type of operation,
striking at the maritime power of the enemy. Amphibious raids could
also be employed as diversions to support an ally hard pressed on the
Continent. The aborted landing at Rochefort in 1757 provides an
example of this. The mere threat of such landings could force an enemy
to divert men and resources to coastal defence. That amphibious force
could achieve more permanent results was demonstrated by the capture of
Gibraltar in 1704, of Quebec in 1759, and of Cape Town in 1795.
Although more frequently used for raids and diversions, amphibious
power could be exploited to seize and hold important bases and to
establish and support colonies. Enemy colonies seized by amphibious
forces were valuable bargaining counters in peace negotiations, helping to
counter the continental gains of Britain's European rivals. Amphibious
warfare was an offensive tool of seapower which could be used either to
further the war at sea by attacking enemy shipping and seizing bases, or
to support or initiate a land campaign. The 1801 landing at Aboukir Bay
which resulted in the expulsion of the French from Egypt is an example
of the latter.
The deployment of amphibious power developed from the freebooting
activities of Elizabethan sailors such as Drake, Raleigh, and Hawkins in
the late sixteenth century, to the successful campaigns in India, America,
and the West Indies during the Seven Years War and the model landing at
1• Definition taken from DEFE 2/1760, Amphibious Warfare Handbook No.4
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Aboukir Bay in 1801. Amphibious landings, conducted at the junction
between naval and military spheres of responsibility, were difficult
operations and resulted in a number of fiascos. Two notable failures
were the 1702 expedition to Cadiz, and the 1809 landing at Walcheren.
Success in amphibious operations depended on careful planning and close
co-operation between naval and military commanders. The strict
requirement of the naval commander to maintain the integrity of his fleet
against enemy squadrons and the threat of bad weather often conflicted
with the need to keep in close contact with the landing force. Failures at
Rochefort in 1757, St.Cast Bay in 1758, and Cadiz in 1800 were largely
attributable to the threat of late summer weather and the inability of the
navy to guarantee orderly landing or safe re-embarkation.
In the mid-nineteenth century the adoption of steam propulsion gave
added potential to the strategic deployment of amphibious power.
Steamships provided a mobility and a versatility denied to ships
dependent on sail. They could keep station in adverse weather and
maintain passage even if becalmed. It was now possible to maintain a
large force on a hostile shore without the same threat posed to sea
communications by adverse weather conditions that had dogged earlier
operations. Steam propulsion enabled the Franco-British fleet to land a
force of 50,000 men in the Crimean peninsula in 1854, and it ensured
their supply and reinforcement up to a quarter of a million men. In the
past amphibious forces had had only a limited ability to meet strong
enemy forces. Previous operations had concentrated on attacking weakly
held colonies or on raids where withdrawal was intended before the
arrival of enemy reinforcements. In exploiting the advantages of steam
propulsion during the Crimean War the allies maintained their armies
despite a supply line that was effectively 3,000 miles long. In doing so
they were able to defeat a more numerous enemy army in a year long
battle of attrition. 2 The utility of maritime forces in exploiting riverine
communications was demonstrated during the American Civil War. 3 The
adoption of steampower in many ways countered the added mobility
given to land forces by the construction of railways. Although railways
2. R.Gardiner, Steam, Steel, and Shellfire. The Steam Warship 1815-1905, (London:
Conway Maritime Press, 1992) Introduction and chapters 1 + 2. Andrew Lambert, The Crimean
War. British Grand Strategy, 1853-1856, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990)
passim.
3. William M.Fowler, Under Two Flags. The American Navy in the Civil War, (New York:
W.W.Norton + Co., 1990) passim. Peter J.Parish, The American Civil War, (New York: Holmes
and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975) Chapter 14.
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provided for the first time a quick and efficient means of land transport,
giving continental armies the ability to challenge the mobility of
seapower, ships remained the most satisfactory means of transporting
large forces over any great distance.
Naval power provided the basis of British security throughout the
nineteenth century. Between 1815 and 1906 Britain's deterrent was based
on a maritime threat built on the battlefleet and reinforced by the proven
capacity for extensive naval and maritime power projection operations.
Although forced to meet an occasional naval challenge, such as that posed
by the French between 1852 and 1865, the British battlefleet generally
lacked a serious rival. In these conditions the Royal Navy was able to
concentrate on developing the equipment and skills required to exploit
maritime power to the full. The Navy developed a powerful coastal
capability which made it possible for it to destroy enemy fleets inside
their fortified harbours, thus perfecting command of the sea.
Amphibious forces were an integral part of this capability, whose
efficacy was proven in operations in the Baltic during the Crimean War.4
This capability exerted a considerable deterrent effect on all the major
powers of the era. Even the Germans developed a "Copenhagen
complex". 5 The Royal Navy provided the war-fighting and deterrent
strength which sustained Britain's position in the world. It protected
Britain and the Empire from direct enemy action and deterred such
action by threatening to destroy the fleet and bases of any opponent, to
cut their maritime trade and destroy their finances while denying them
the ability to do anything in response.6
Despite the experience gained by the British in amphibious operations
during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries the subject
received relatively little attention from naval historians. The two most
influential nineteenth century writers on naval strategy, Phillip Colomb
and Alfred Thayer Mahan, both stressed the over-ridding importance of
securing command of the sea. Mahan considered that as the enemy's fleet
was the controlling factor in a campaign its destruction was the true
objective of naval warfare, the best way to secure ulterior objectives
4. Lambert, The Crimean War, passim.
5. Andrew Lambert, "The Royal Navy, 1856-1914: Deterrence and the Strategy of World Power", in
Keith Neilson and Elizabeth Errington, Navies and Global Defence: Theories and Strategy,
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995) p.86.
6. Ibid p.69-92.
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being the destruction of the force that threatened them. Mahan
emphasised the role of decisive battles in naval warfare. In his most
famous work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783,
published in 1890, Mahan emphasised that it was by judicious use of
seapower that Britain was able to expand trade, seize colonies and thwart
the plans of her enemies. He never discussed the role that amphibious
warfare played in Britain's success. To Mahan, Hanava was taken in
1762 by the use of seapower and not specifically by amphibious forces.7
This fostered the erroneous view that successful amphibious operations
were an inevitable by-product of securing command of the sea, and not
necessarily an end in themselves. Mahan was not interested in the
numerous amphibious raids that were launched against the coast of
France during the Seven Years War, explaining that, "No particular
mention will be made of these operations which had but little visible
effect upon the general course of the war".8
Mahan made little reference to the coastal warfare experience of the
British in the nineteenth century. He favoured an American strategy of
hemispheric defence which he supported with selected evidence taken
from British history. His main interest was in providing the United
States with a modern battlefleet able to secure command of the sea.
Mahan's work had less relevance, but no less impact, in Britain than in
his native America. At the turn of the century and during the First
World War securing command of the sea was not a major problem for
the Royal Navy, who still maintained a margin of superiority over their
most likely rivals. The most pressing requirement was for an
understanding of how to successfully exploit the command that already
existed. In this respect Mahan's work was of limited value.
Like Mahan, Phillip Colomb tried to show the decisive importance of
securing command of the sea. He asserted that "The primary aim of
naval war is the command of the sea", and that "....nothing can be done
of consequence in naval war till one side secures control of the water
area". However, he was anxious to demonstrate the advantages that such
command could bring. In Naval Warfare published in 1891, Colomb
devoted over half of the book to the subject of attacks on territory from
7. A.T.Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, (Boston: Little Brown
+ Co., 1890) p.315.
8. Ibid. p.296.
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the sea. He gives numerous examples of successful amphibious
operations, claiming that
If the strength of the land defences is properly
estimated, if sufficient troops are employed,
landed clear of the fortifications of the enemy,
and supplied and supported from the fleet,
there appears to be , so far as we have yet
come, no reason to doubt the fall of any place
attacked, provided relief does not come to it
over sea.9
Once the enemy's fleet was neutralised one could deploy the full offensive
potential of seapower, implementing blockades, launching invasions and
amphibious raids, or conducting naval bombardments. Nevertheless, the
central message of Colomb's work was that securing command of the sea
was the first and most important task in naval warfare.
Unfortunately, while interest in naval affairs grew in the final years of
the nineteenth century, more attention was paid to the problems of
securing command of the sea than what would be done with it once this
had been achieved. It appears that the Navy accepted the Mahanite view
that once command was secured all else would naturally follow. The
offensive potential of amphibious warfare was neglected and remained
firmly in the shadow of the new steam battlefleets. In 1897 the
Commander-in-Chief of the army, Sir Garnet Wolseley, was moved to
write:
We still have to convince the Navy that they
can't win a war by themselves and that we are
not trying to nab the money they ought to have
but want to make our power what it must be to
be effective - Amphibious.10
Amphibious operations were not entirely ignored. Writing at the turn of
the century, Charles E.Callwell of the Royal Artillery became a
recognised authority on the theory of small wars and of amphibious
warfare. Callwell called for specialist training and equipment to prepare
British forces for amphibious operations." Of more significance was the
9. Rear-Admiral P.H.Colomb, Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice
Historically Treated, (London: Allen + Co., 1891) p.278.
10. DEFE 2/1900, A Short Review of the History and Development of British
Amphibious Warfare.
11 • C.E.Callwell, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Operations Since
Waterloo, (London: William Blackwell and Sons, 1897) also, C.E.Callwell, Military Operations
and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and Interdependence, (London: William
Blackwell and Sons, 1905). Callwell retired from active service in 1909. In 1914 he was recalled to the
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work of the influential naval historian Sir Julian Corbett. Corbett viewed
combined military and naval operations as the normal expression of the
British method of waging war. He saw naval operations in the wider
context of a maritime strategy combining all arms. He rejected the
exclusive concentration on fleet encounters favoured by many supporters
of a "blue-water" strategy. He fully appreciated the value of landings to
seize territory or raids designed to disturb an enemy or help an ally.
According to Corbett decisive results in warfare could only be achieved
if seapower was used in conjunction with land power. In 1911 he wrote:
Since men live on land and not upon the sea,
great issues between nations at war have
always been decided - except in the rarest
cases - either by what your army can do
against your enemy's territory and national
life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it
possible for your army to do.I2
Corbett believed that Britain, its safety assured through command of the
sea, had always been able to achieve success in a series of wars through
the exploitation of a combination of blockade, economic support to allies,
and the application of limited military power through amphibious
warfare. By exploiting seapower Britain could gain the maximum
benefit from limited military resources at a fraction of the cost of a
major campaign on the Continent. He quoted Napoleon as saying:
With 30,000 men in transports at the Downs
the English can paralyse 300,000 of my army,
and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-
class power.I3
Corbett clearly appreciated the deterrent value of amphibious forces.
That Britain's amphibious potential manifestly failed to reduce France to
the rank of a second class power seems to have been ignored.
Amphibious projects gained much currency in the Navy prior to the First
World War. An influential body within the Admiralty, headed by
successive First Sea Lords Sir John Fisher and A.K.Wilson, believed that
the British Army should be used in amphibious diversions near the heart
active list, being appointed Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office. As such
he was involved in the preparation of various plans for organisation of the Dardanelles campaign, an
operation with which he was not in sympathy. Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930.
12 • Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London: Longmans + Co., 1911)
p.14.
13 . Ibid. p.66.
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of enemy power, or in the flank and rear of Germany's main forces.14
Strongly influenced by Corbett, Fisher was an ardent believer in the
"traditional" British strategy of using amphibious forces to exploit the
mobility of seapower. One of his favourite quotations was that "The
British Army is a projectile to be fired by the Navy". 15 The Army
General Staff was not convinced. They believed that the Army should be
committed to the decisive theatre where maximum pressure could be
brought to bear against Germany. They were not interested in any
amphibious schemes the Navy might develop. 16 Thus, when the Germans
invaded Belgium and France in 1914 the British Army was sent to fight
alongside the French. This initial commitment grew in 1915 with the
decision to create a mass army and devote the majority of British
manpower to the western front.
Despite Fisher and Wilson's interest in amphibious schemes, the Royal
Navy remained heavily influenced by Mahan. It was a big ship navy
whose resources were devoted to winning command of the sea by defeat
of the enemy's capital ships. Little time or energy was devoted to
subsidiary tasks such as coastal operations, anti-submarines warfare or
amphibious warfare. The deterrent potential of amphibious and coastal
forces was neglected. Fisher's reorganisation of the Navy in 1904
allowed the Admiralty to concentrate resources on the modern fleet by
scrapping old, obsolete vessels which would be of little or no use for
contesting control of the sea with enemy battleships and cruisers. At the
same time it removed from the order of battle the sort of second line
vessels suitable for undertaking vital work in support of coastal and
amphibious operations.
The difficulties of amphibious landings were discussed at the Staff
Colleges before 1914, while in 1904 a large force of 11,700 men, 2700
horses, 61 field guns and 315 vehicles had conducted a landing across the
14. Arthur J.Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher
Era, 1904-1919. Volume 1, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) p.383-394. and Volume 2,
p.176-191. Barry M.Gough, "Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher", and Nicholas A.Lambert, "Admiral
Sir Arthur Knyvett Wilson", in Malcolm Murfett, The First Sea Lords from Fisher to
Mountbatten, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995).
15. Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume 1, p.385.
16. John Gooch, The Plans of War. The General Staff and British Military Strategy
1900-1916, (London: Routledge + Keegan Paul, 1974) chapter 9. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond,
"Amphibious Warfare in British History", in Historical Association Pamphlet No.119, 1941
p.27.
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beach at Clacton. 17 At Prime Minister Balfour's insistence a sub-
committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence was instituted in 1905,
to decide on the practicality of various plans for combined military and
naval action and for working out these plans in detail. Unfortunately
Army opposition ensured that the sub-committee fell into abeyance after
a few years and was only re-established in July 1914 , at the suggestion of
the Admiralty War Staff. 18 With the bulk of Britain's forces devoted to
the Western Front, amphibious operations played only a small part in the
course of the war. The only large scale landings, conducted during the
Gallipoli campaign in 1915, resulted in bloody failure.
Following the First World War the military analyst Basil Liddell-Hart
argued that there has historically been a distinct "British way in warfare"
which had enabled the country to gain success in war with far fewer
losses than were associated with "Continental" methods of waging war.
Liddell-Hart developed and synthesised the ideas of Mahan and Corbett's'
He argued that from the sixteenth century Britain had avoided costly
military campaigns on the Continent and had achieved success by relying
on a maritime strategy. In this way Britain had enriched itself and
crippled its enemies by capturing their trade, seizing their colonies and
blockading their ports. Continental military expeditions had only played
a small role in British strategy. To Liddell-Hart, Britain's seapower
enabled it to deploy limited military force where it was least expected and
could be most effective. He viewed the major Continental commitment of
British troops to France in the First World War as an aberration. The
carnage and stalemate on the western front was a result of sending a
conscript army to fight alongside the French instead of adopting a
traditional "British" strategy relying on the offensive and defensive
strength of amphibious seapower.20
Liddell-Hart's theory had an enduring appeal. Stephen Roskill portrayed
the Allied victory over Germany in the Second World War as a victory
for the "British way in warfare". According to Roskill:
17. Major-General Sir George Aston, Letters on Amphibious Wars, (London: John Murray, 1920)
p.117.
18. Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume 1, p.383.
19. David French, The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).
Brian Bond, Liddell-Hart: A Study of His Military Thought, (London: Cassell + Co., Ltd,
1977) chapter three.
20. B.H. Liddell-Hart, The British Way in Warfare, (London: Faber and Faber, 1932).
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During the three centuries or so of our history
as a world power it has several times happened
that a far stronger continental coalition has
pitted its might against Britain and her allies,
has won a series of resounding victories on
land only to find itself brought up against a
method of waging war which its leaders could
not grapple and of which they had no clear
understanding. Yet, ultimately, our maritime
strategy, founded on centuries of experience of
the sea, brought our enemies to utter defeat.
He acknowledged that Britain only adopted a maritime strategy in 1940
once the Continental one had failed, and that the main attrition of German
strength occurred on the eastern front. However, he considered that the
offensive and defensive strength of seapower, including the ability to send
valuable supplies to the Soviet Union , had played a decisive role in the
war.21
Britain's security problems were not solved by victory in 1945. The
balance of power in Europe was shattered. The Soviet Union occupied
much of central and eastern Europe and possessed a huge army which
Britain could not hope to match. The development of the atomic bomb
threatened to further erode security which had already been undermined
by the development of the bomber and the submarine. The Royal Navy
alone could no longer protect Britain from defeat in a war against a
powerful Continental adversary. Britain had to provide armies of
occupation in Germany and Austria, and had to maintain garrisons in an
empire now threatened by the growth of nationalism. In addition to this
Britain was exhausted by six years of total war. Unable to maintain the
balance of power in Europe without American help, the need to tie the
United States firmly into the European security system became a central
plank of British foreign policy. In February 1945, at the Yalta
Conference, President Roosevelt had stated that United States forces
would leave Europe within two years of the end of the war. In order to
demonstrate European resolve and encourage American participation in
Europe Britain concluded the Treaty of Dunkirk with France in 1947,
and the Brussels Pact with France and the Benelux countries in 1948.
This, plus increasingly belligerent action by the Soviet Union, convinced
the United States of the need to become committed to the security of
21 . Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume 1 Part 1, (London: HMSO, 1961)
1)-1.
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Europe, resulting in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) in April 1949.
The original NATO agreement had not committed Britain to maintaining
any troops in Europe. However, in 1954, following the debacle over the
European Defence Community, Britain signed the Paris Agreement
whereby it agreed to maintain four army divisions and a tactical air force
in Germany. This was the first time in two hundred and fifty years that
Britain had agreed to maintain major ground forces on the Continent of
Europe in peacetime. The Continental commitment was not entirely
without precedent. Throughout history Britain had resorted to security
arrangements with allies on the Continent. Indeed, Britain was never
able to entirely ignore developments in Europe and frequently deployed
large military forces there to fight alongside allies. According to
Michael Howard:
A commitment of support to a Continental ally
in the nearest available theatre, on the largest
scale that contemporary resources could
afford, so far from being alien to traditional
British strategy, was absolutely central to it.
The flexibility provided by seapower certainly
made possible other activities as well 	 but
these were ancillary to the great decisions on
land and they continued to be so throughout
two world wars.
Howard noted that when Britain did turn to a purely maritime strategy,
as in 1940 or 1803, it was a result of force majeure, a strategy of
survival rather than of victory. 22 Strength at sea offered strategic options
and diplomatic choices that were not available to other powers, but
Britain could never afford to ignore the Continental balance of power.
Post-war British foreign and defence policy was not entirely Eurocentric.
In 1945 Britain still possessed a world-wide empire and even following
the independence of India in 1947 there was no desire to relinquish this
responsibility. When a growing tide of nationalist opinion in the colonies
forced successive governments in the 1950s and 1960s to press the pace
of decolonisation, a series of defence agreements and a more general
feeling that Britain still had a world role caused the maintenance of
22 . Michael Howard, The Causes of War and other essays, (London: Temple Smith, 1983)
p.180.
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military commitments outside Europe. 23 Initially these commitments
were met by a traditional defensive combination of static army garrisons
and limited naval and air forces. During the 1950s it became clear that
the future tenure of overseas bases was at best doubtful. This, and the
shift to smaller, all regular armed forces announced in the 1957 Defence
White Paper, brought a move to develop mobile intervention forces, able
to deter aggression by exploiting the flexibility of seapower and airpower
in bringing military force to bear. This was perceived by many to be a
return to a more traditional strategy where Britain could exploit her
strength at sea to maintain a world role.
The study of post-war amphibious warfare from 1945 to 1964 is
particularly enlightening in this context. Amphibious capabilities were
deployed both in support of the European commitment, and, later, as part
of a maritime strategy of intervention in the Indian Ocean. Following the
war amphibious warfare was viewed along the lines of the major
European operations of 1943 and 1944. Unable to match Soviet land
power, in the late 1940s both Britain and the United States planned to
evacuate their occupation forces in Germany to the United Kingdom and
the Mediterranean if attacked by the Soviets in Europe. Allied offensive
strength would then be built up while their air forces conducted a major
bombing campaign prior to a return to the Continent.24 In essence this
was a return to the strategy employed by Britain after 1940. A limited
peacetime amphibious capability was maintained in order that Britain
would not have to develop from scratch the equipment and techniques
required to effect a return to the Continent following expulsion by a
superior force. This was not a maritime role. As had been the case in
World War Two, amphibious warfare was a tool by which Britain could
deploy a major land force to Europe, not a small force to act as a
diversion in support of an ally, but the largest land force Britain could
afford to maintain. The Navy would be operating in support of the
Army. The possibility of maintaining powerful amphibious forces as a
deterrent to Soviet aggression did not receive serious consideration.
In the 1950s the development of the hydrogen bomb and the increasing
availability of weapons of mass destruction placed in doubt the viability
23. Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968, (London: Oxford
University Press, 1973) passim.
24. Michael Dockrill, British Defence Policy Since 1945, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988)
p.32.
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of large scale amphibious assaults, and the whole idea of a conventional
war in Europe. In the general review of strategy that followed priority
shifted away from preparing for war in Europe towards a reliance on
nuclear weapons to keep the peace on the Continent, and the development
of mobile forces designed to meet limited war and cold war contingencies
elsewhere. With the traditional role of defending the sea lanes in a major
war now receiving only a low priority the Admiralty had to find new
ways of justifying a large peacetime navy. In a major shift of policy the
Royal Navy developed plans for a powerful intervention capability in the
Indian Ocean. Amphibious warfare was central to this capability and in
the early 1960s it became a major naval priority for the first time in
peace. New amphibious shipping was built and the Navy based its case
for a new generation of aircraft carriers on the need to support
amphibious task forces east of Suez.
This thesis examines the position of amphibious warfare in British
defence policy between 1945 and 1964, and in particular the relationship
it had with the Royal Navy. It will start by establishing how the Navy's
wartime experience influenced its view of post-war amphibious
requirements. The possibility of amphibious forces being exploited as a
traditional maritime counter to Soviet military strength will be discussed.
It will show how changing defence priorities and strategic reality
transformed approaches to amphibious warfare and the impact this had
on the three Services. The changing roles and responsibilities of the
Royal Marines will be examined. The development of amphibious
material and the construction and conversion of specialist assault shipping
will be discussed within the context of wider defence policy and
priorities. In addition a comparison will be made between British
developments in the field and advances being made in the United States.
The thesis includes a study of the only major amphibious operation
undertaken by Britain during this period, the assault on Port Said in
1956. By examining the operation from a specifically "amphibious
warfare" angle it aims both to provide a new perspective on military
operations at Port Said, and to illustrate the effect that post-war defence
policy had on Britain's ability to intervene overseas. The last three
chapters are devoted to an examination of the changing role of the Royal
Navy in general, and the important part that amphibious warfare played
in the new Navy that resulted. A key part of this examination will be a
16
study of the conflicting Navy and RAF plans for intervention east of
Suez, and of the aircraft carrier controversy up to 1964.
The end date of 1964 was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, on a
practical level, the thirty years rule has meant that the primary sources
required to carry this research further have not yet been made available
for public viewing. More importantly, 1964 represents a logical
finishing point for the thesis. By 1964 all the major decisions on the
future of Britain's amphibious lift had been made. The commando
carriers HMS Bulwark and Albion had been commissioned, two new
assault ships were on order, and the first of six new logistic landing ships
was approaching completion. In addition a decision had been made to
build a new aircraft carrier in order to support the limited war role in
the Indian Ocean. In July 1964 the influential Chief of Defence Staff,
Lord Mountbatten, retired and earlier in the year, on 1 April, the
Ministry of Defence was reorganised, giving the central office increased
powers and reducing the independence of the three Services. In the same
year the ruling Conservative administration was replaced by a Labour
government under Harold Wilson. The Wilson administration was to be
responsible for profound changes in Britain's foreign and defence policy.
However, the shape and size of the Royal Navy's amphibious force had
been set in the early 1960s and with the exception of the commando
carriers which were paid off in the 1970s, they have been maintained at
the same level into the 1990s. It is therefore logical to end this study of
amphibious warfare when the change of administration occurred in
October 1964.
The term "amphibious warfare" was not officially adopted by the
Services in Britain until February 1951. Prior to that the official British
term for this mode of warfare was "combined operations". In order to
avoid confusion I use the term "amphibious warfare" throughout the
thesis except when referring to a specific post or organisation prior to
1951, when quoting directly from another source, or when use of the
term "combined operations" is clearly more appropriate. The Combined
Operations Organisation, established in 1940 to promote the study and
practice of amphibious operations, was frequently referred to simply as
"Combined Operations", likewise the renamed Amphibious Warfare
Organisation was often called "Amphibious Warfare". Where the terms
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are used with capitals the official organisation is being referred to, when
lower case is used then the reference is to the mode of warfare.
For ease of reference standard United States nomenclature has been used
for landing ships and craft. This system was not adopted in Britain until
1942. Prior to that Landing Craft Tank were known as Tank Landing
Craft; Landing Craft, Mechanised were known as Mechanised Landing
Craft; and Landing Craft, Assault were known as Assault Landing Craft.
Within the Mediterranean theatre they were known as A Lighters, B
Lighters, and C Lighters respectively. A comprehensive list of all
amphibious warfare ship and craft designations is given at Appendix One.
A list of all abbreviations is given at Appendix Two, and a list of the key




Amphibious operations did not play a large part in the Allied victory
in the First World War. They were to be central to victory in the
Second. The first amphibious operation in the earlier conflict, the
landing of British and Indian troops at Tanga in German East Africa
in November 1914, was a hopeless fiasco completely failing to secure
the town. 1 The only major amphibious operation of the war, the
assault on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915, failed to break through the
Turkish defences and became stalemated close to the shore. Only with
the Zeebrugge raid of April 1918 did amphibious operations achieve a
measure of success, although even that operation largely failed in its
aim to close the use of the port to enemy submarines. 2 In the Second
World War Britain and the United States developed a strong
amphibious capability which they employed successfully in Europe
and the Pacific. New ships and craft were produced and techniques
were developed which allowed assaulting forces to overcome even the
most entrenched opposition. By 1945 amphibious warfare had
provided the western Allies with a major strategic weapon, offering
the ability to land a modern army on an enemy coastline and to
support it in an offensive Continental campaign.
The First World War demonstrated that amphibious techniques had
not kept pace with the increasing defensive power of infantry
weapons. Machine guns, rifles and rapid fire artillery meant that
entrenched opposition would have to be effectively suppressed before
assaulting troops could hope to establish themselves ashore. Prior to
the Second World War the equipment to do this did not exist. The
landings at Cape Helles in April 1915 were supported by the fire of
the fleet, including the modern battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth..
However, close range low-trajectory fire from the battleships failed to
dislodge the defenders. Flat trajectories meant that shells fell short or
skimmed over the skyline. The technical equipment available was not
1 . Sir Julian Corbett, Naval Operations - Volume 1, (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1920) p.374
2• Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations,
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1943) p.54-55.
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good enough to allow warships to lay miles offshore and lob shells at
the enemy without the risk of hitting their own troops. The ships were
hampered by a lack of suitable fire support equipment, fuses and
explosives. Lying in their entrenchments the Turks emerged to bring
their machine guns into action as soon as the naval fire was withheld
to allow the assault to go forward. To counter such defences shallow
draught close support craft capable of putting down devastating fire
on the shore line were required. In 1915 no such craft existed.3
An additional problem was the lack of modern landing craft. Troops
landing in 1915 were put ashore in cutters and whalers in much the
same way as Redcoats had been two centuries earlier. Towed inshore
by steam pickets and other small craft these boats had to be rowed the
last few hundred yards, providing a slow and vulnerable target for the
defenders. One ship, the collier River Clyde , was converted into a
landing ship. Sally ports were cut into its sides and gangways fitted.
Carrying 2,000 men and towing a steam hopper and lighters the plan
was to run the ship aground, the hopper and lighters acting as a bridge
to the shore. The troops were supposed to issue out of the sally ports,
down the gangways, over the improvised bridge and stream ashore in
minutes. In practice they were gunned down by the unsuppressed
defenders as they debarked, few reached the shore. 4 A number of
specialist landing craft were employed in the landing at Suvla Bay in
August 1915. These large flat bottomed craft could each carry 500
men and proceed under their own power to the shore. Drawing little
water forward and seven feet aft, troops could be landed dry shod on
a steep beach by means of a long ramp. Although primitive in
comparison to the sophisticated modern craft employed thirty years
later, these vessels represented a significant improvement on warships
cutters.5 The landings at Suvla Bay were unopposed so the craft were
not tested under fire.
3. Admiral T.H. Binney, "Gallipoli and Normandy", in RUSI Journal, 1945.
4. Brian Friend, "Landing Craft Through the Ages - Part Two", in Warship, Volume 46, April
1988, p.32-47. C.F.Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations - Gallipoli, Volume 1,
(London: William Heineman Ltd, 1929) p.234.
5. Brian Friend "Landing Craft Through the Ages - Part 2" p.32-33. Sir Roger Keyes, The Naval
Memoirs of Admiral of the 'Fleet Sir Roger Keyes. The Narrow Seas to the
Dardanelles, 1910-1915, (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd, 1934) p.380.
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Attitudes towards amphibious warfare in the inter-war period were
heavily influenced by the failure of the Gallipoli campaign. It was
taken by many to show that amphibious landings against defended
beaches were at best diversionary sideshows and at worst suicidal
folly. 6 As late as 1943 Roger Keyes, Chief of Staff to the three
successive Naval Commanders-in-Chief at the Dardanelles, wrote that
daylight assaults against a defended shore were not feasible. 7 In the
inter-war period naval policy and operational doctrine was dominated
by the requirements of the decisive fleet action. Staff College
discussions were centred largely on re-fighting Jutland and the
problems of major encounters with the Imperial Japanese Navy. The
primary concerns of the Admiralty were the maintenance of an
effective battlefleet and the struggle for control of the Fleet Air Arm.
Budgetary pressure meant that the Navy had to concentrate on
maintaining the core capability, the ability to control the sea, at the
expense of the ability to exploit that control once it was achieved.8
Amphibious warfare was not entirely ignored prior to 1939. The
report of the Madden Committee in August 1924 recommended that
the Royal Marines should provide lightly armed amphibious striking
forces capable of seizing forward bases and of raids along an enemy
coast. The Admiralty concluded that there were insufficient funds to
allow for the creation of such a force but the idea itself was not
rejected and the concept of striking forces was included in the 1927
Instructions for Royal Marine Divisions. In the 1930s the threat of
war with Italy during the Abyssinian crisis highlighted the
vulnerability of Britain's bases in the Mediterranean. An inter-
Service force was sent to defend the base at Alexandria and after the
crisis had subsided a nucleus of Marines was maintained as the Mobile
Naval Base Defence Organisation (MNBDO). The MNBDO went
some way towards providing for the defence of forward bases.
6. David MacGregor, "The Use, Misuse, and Non-Use of History: The Royal Navy and the
Operational Lessons of the First World War", in The Journal of Military History, Volume
56, October 1992, p.606-607.
7. Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, passim.
8• Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars - Volume 1, (London: Collins, 1968)
and Volume 2, (London: Collins, 1976); also Arthur J.Marder, From the Dardanelles to
Oran - studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, (London: Oxford University Press,
1974).
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Unfortunately, its functions did not extend to the seizure of such bases
and it contained no amphibious warfare elements.9
Following the First World War staff college discussions and exercises
were incorporated in an updated version of the pre-war Manual of
Combined Naval and Military Operations. At the suggestion of the
War Office a committee was set up to complete a draft chapter on
combined operations based on a report of the 1919 staff college
exercises. The inter-departmental Committee on Combined
Operations first met in June 1920 and published its revised chapter in
1922. An official Manual of Combined Operations was published in
1925 and revised in 1931 and 1938. The Manual was not widely
distributed throughout the Services but did provide a useful starting
point for the study of combined operations. The study of amphibious
warfare was not entirely of a theoretical nature. Joint exercises and
military exercises were conducted in Home waters, the Mediterranean,
and off the coast of India, although these tended to be limited in scope
and the result of ad hoc local arrangements. Amphibious training was
neither vigorous nor general throughout the Army.10
The Admiralty was aware from experience in the Dardanelles
campaign that it needed to improve the accuracy of naval
bombardment. Offshore bombardment was practised at a number of
bombardment ranges, including the range at Cape Wrath. Firing
practice was conducted with the fall of shot corrected by forward
observation posts and by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm. A
Bombardment Manual was produced and issued to the three Services.
According to Admiral Sir Frederick Dreyer, this preparation paid
good dividends in the Second World War, laying the foundations for
the successful application of naval firepower against shore targets.11
As Vice-Admiral commanding the Battle Cruiser Squadron in 1928,
9. Donald F.Bittner, "Britannia's Sheathed Sword: The Royal Marines and Amphibious Warfare in
the Inter-War Years - A Passive Response", in The Journal of Military History, Volume 55,
July 1991, p.345-364.
10. Rear-Admiral L.E.H.Maund, Assault from the Sea, (London: Metheun, 1949) p.3-4.
Kenneth J.Clifford, Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from
1920-1940, (New York: Edgewood Inc., 1983) p.31-41. Bernard Fergusson, Watery Maze -
The Story of Combined Operations, (London: Collins, 1961) p.36. Fergusson served as a
Director in COHQ under Robert Laycock. In preparing this book he was given complete access to
the files of COHQ.
11. Admiral Sir Frederick Dreyer, The Sea Heritage. A Study of Maritime Warfare,
(London: Museum Press Ltd, 1955) p.263.
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Dreyer had participated in a combined naval and military landing
operation carried out in the Moray Firth. Troops from the 2nd
Battalion, Queens Own Cameron Highlanders were landed from the
battlecruisers HMS Hood, Renown and Repulse and from four
accompanying destroyers. Naval artillery support was provided by
the warships in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.12
One clear lesson highlighted by combined exercises was the need for
specialist landing craft. 13 In the 1920s an inter-Service Landing Craft
Committee was established to study the design and number of craft
required to conduct a landing on a hostile shore. 14 Their first attempt
at a landing craft was the Motor Landing Craft (MLC(1)) completed
in 1926. This craft was not a success and was followed in 1928 by the
MLC(10). Like the earlier unsuccessful design, MLC(10) was a flat
bottomed craft powered by a water jet. It could embark 100 men or a
twelve ton tank and discharged them onto the beach over a steep bow
ramp. The water jet gave the MLC a low speed of around five knots
and the blunt bow and shallow draught made it somewhat
unseaworthy. Reportedly the craft was faster if driven backwards.
By 1930 the Royal Navy had received three MLC. Six more were
ordered as a result of the Abyssinian crisis although these were not
delivered until the winter of 1938.15
It was not until the establishment of an Inter-Service Training and
Development Centre in 1939 that amphibious operations were subject
to constant and detailed study. Following pressure from the War
Office the Chiefs of Staff (COS) agreed to set up an inter-Service
committee to study and make recommendations on the problems
associated with inter-Service operations. It was also to keep under
review the existing Manual on Combined Operations . The new
committee, a sub-committee of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee,
was known as the Inter-Services Training Sub-Committee (DCOS(IT))
and consisted of the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, the Assistant
Chief of the Air Staff, and the Director Military Operations and
Intelligence. As a result of recommendations originating from the
12. ADM 203/89, Combined Naval and Military Landing Operations.
13. ADM 203/74, Combined Exercise, Kasid Beach 1925.
14 • ADM 203/73, Requirements for Landing Craft.
15 . Friend, "Landing Craft Through the Ages - Part 2" p.39-41.
23
Royal Navy staff college at Greenwich the committee was instructed to
consider the question of establishing a training and development centre
for the study and development of the materials and techniques
required for inter-Service operations. DCOS(IT) first met in March
1938. Final recommendations for the establishment of a training and
development centre to be based at the Royal Marine establishment at
Eastney (Portsmouth) were submitted to the COS in July 1938. The
COS approved the report and consequently the Inter-Service Training
and Development Centre (ISTDC) was established alongside the
MNBDO at Fort Cumberland, Eastney. The centre had a naval
commandant and an Army and RAF representative.I6
The ISTDC was to study the development of material, technique and
tactics for all inter-Service operations and did not confine itself to
opposed landings although amphibious operations played a large part
in the work of the ISTDC from the outset. Not until September 1940,
when it was under the Directorate of Combined Operations, did the
ISTDC become concerned solely with amphibious operations. The
centre studied practical and theoretical problems associated with
amphibious operations. A broad theory for assault across the sea was
established and ships were earmarked for conversion to fast
amphibious transports. The Centre secured £30,000 for the
construction of prototype landing craft, and further funding was
found by halting construction of a number of improved "X" lighters
designed in 1937 on the lines of the craft used in the 1915 Suvla Bay
landing. I7 Amphibious warfare was not yet universally recognised as
an important part of British defence policy. The ISTDC was
temporarily disbanded at the time of the Munich crisis and was again
disbanded on the outbreak of war in September 1939. The naval and
RAF members returned to their respective Services although the
Army member, Major Macleod, remained at Fort Cumberland. The
decision to disband the ISTDC was myopic. It appears all the stranger
as at that time the Joint Planners were investigating plans for the
16. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare, p.65-72. DEFE 2/782A, Early History and Events,
ISTDC and DCO, p.1-2. History of the Combined Operations Organisation 1940-
1945, (London: Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 1956) p.9-10. This book is the post war staff
history of Combined Operations. A copy is held at the Public Records Office, file number DEFE
2/1773 and also at the Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Branch.
17. DEFE 2/1790, History and Development of the Experimental Section in COHQ,
p.2. Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.40-43.
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capture of the Italian Dodecanese islands by amphibious assault. The
decision was so clearly misguided that in November the ISTDC was
reformed.18
Following the fall of France in 1940 the first practical step towards
the adoption of an offensive amphibious strategy was the appointment
by the COS in June 1940 of the Adjutant-General, Royal Marines,
Lieutenant-General Bourne, to head a Directorate of Combined
Operations. Bourne was appointed Commander of Raiding Operations
on coasts in enemy occupation and Adviser to the COS on combined
operations. According to the directive issued to General Bourne,
dated 17 June 1940, the object of raiding operations; "will be to harass
the enemy and cause him to disperse his forces, and to create material
damage, particularly on the coast line from Northern Norway to the
western limit of German occupied France". Bourne was given
discretion in the choice of objectives and the scale of operations,
subject to available resources and to the direction of the COS. The six
independent companies raised by the War Office for guerrilla
operations in Norway plus the new irregular Commandos then being
formed were placed under his operational 'command for raiding. He
was also to receive a number of parachutists, although these in fact
never came under his command.19
In his capacity as Adviser on Combined Operations (ACO), Bourne
took command of the ISTDC and was to report to the COS on the
organisation required for opposed landings. He was responsible for
supervising the technical training of all troops earmarked for
combined operations and for the development and production of
special craft and equipment. He was not, however, given authority for
the planning or conduct of combined operations beyond the level of
raids. That task would fall to the Service departments and their
designated commander. ACO was to maintain close links with the
Joint Planning Staff (JPS) who were required to consult Bourne
whenever they received a combined operation project to examine
18. Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.43. Maund, Assault from the Sea, p.16-21. Also see DEFE
2/783, DEFE 2/784, and DEFE 2/178.
19. History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.12.
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which implied a landing on a hostile shore. He had direct access to the
COS Committee.20
Due to a lack of landing craft and equipment the Directorate was
mainly concerned with drawing up requirements for landing craft and
obtaining ships in order to modify them for landing operations.21
After a couple of minor pin-prick raids Churchill replaced Bourne
and appointed Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as Director of
Combined Operations (DCO) on 17 July. 1940. Bourne had been
appointed by the COS without reference to Churchill. The Prime
Minister considered that the post warranted an officer with more
authority who would be able to stand up to the Chiefs.22
Keyes, veteran of Gallipoli and hero of the 1918 Zeebrugge raid,
seemed an obvious choice for the post. Throughout his life he had
shown a dash and offensive spirit that lent itself well to the concept of
raiding operations. He had first hand experience of combined
operations and was a popular public figure. However, the
appointment was unpopular with the COS. First Sea Lord (1SL)
Dudley Pound told Admiral Andrew Cunningham, "Roger Keyes
intrigued himself into the position of Director of Combined
Operations in spite of the protests of the Chiefs of Staff" •23 Pound
had been Keyes's subordinate on a number of occasions, most recently
in the 1920s when Keyes was Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.
As Member of Parliament for Portsmouth North Keyes had been an
outspoken critic of the Admiralty's conduct of the war. He was a man
more noted for his fighting spirit than for his tact or intellect. 24 As
head of an organisation which by its very nature trespassed into
territory which both the Army and Navy regarded as their own this
was to cause difficulties.
One of Keyes's first steps as DCO was to move his headquarters out of
the Admiralty and to set up Combined Operations Headquarters
(COHQ) in a separate building in Richmond Terrace, Whitehall.
213 • COS (40) 468, Directive to General Bourne, 17 June 1940; CAB 80/13.
21 . DEFE 21782A , p.19.
22 • Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.51.
23. Phillip Ziegler, Mountbatten. The Official Biography, (London: Collins, 1985) p.154.
24. Cecil Aspinall-Oglander, Roger Keyes. The Biography of the Admiral of the Fleet
Lord Keyes of Zeebrugge and Dover, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1951) passim.
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Opinion is divided on the merits of this move. Rear-Admiral Maund
considered that it was regrettable as it led to a physical and
psychological separation from the Admiralty. 25 On the other hand
this was precisely Keyes's intent. COHQ was an independent
organisation and amphibious warfare was an inter-Service matter. It
is difficult to see how COHQ could have flourished as an independent
inter-Service organisation if it remained physically and
psychologically bound to the Navy. As Commodore Submarines
between 1913 and 1915 Keyes had acted very much as a free agent, to
the point of blatantly disregarding orders. 26 The Admiralty had good
reason to be suspicious that Keyes would try to establish his own
private navy. The move of COHQ to new premises did nothing to
alleviate such fears.
Keyes had an expansive view of what his position as DCO entailed. He
had not been issued with a new directive on taking up his appointment
and this was to lead to some confusion. Keyes took the title of DCO to
mean just that. He saw himself as solely responsible to the Minister of
Defence on combined operations matters. The COS on the other hand
considered DCO to be responsible to them on all matters except minor
raids. Keyes was obstinate and arrogant in his dealings with the COS
and frequently tried to circumvent their opposition by direct appeals
to Churchill. He was constantly agitating for offensive action and felt
that he was being thwarted by craven Whitehall committees and
bombarded Churchill with notes to this effect. During the winter of
1940/1941 he devised a scheme for the capture of the Mediterranean
island of Pantelleria. The COS had severe reservations about this
operation and the scheme was eventually abandoned, much to the
indignation of the DC0.27
Under a new directive issued in March 1941 the position of DCO was
somewhat clarified. The DCO retained his responsibilities for
training and development of technique and equipment and his advisory
functions. As regards the conduct of operations, he was responsible,
under the general direction of the Minister of Defence and the COS,
25. Maund, Assault from the Sea, p.74.
26. Aspinall-Oglander, Roger Keyes, p.99-101.
27. Ibid. p.400. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.154-155. Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.74-75.
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for the initiation, planning and execution of operations by Special
Service troops, reinforced where necessary by small forces not
normally under his command. For larger operations he was merely
to consult and advise. 28 The new directive did not bring an end to the
differences and misunderstandings between DCO and the Service
Ministries. Keyes was reluctant to surrender any authority and his
conception of his position remained as it had been before.
Matters came to a head in autumn 1941 when the Vice Chiefs of Staff
recommended a change in the functions of DCO. Their proposal
represented an attempt to further limit the authority of COHQ, with
DCO downgraded to the position of Adviser on Combined Operations.
Keyes objected and launched a personal appeal to the Prime Minister.
Churchill backed the COS and Keyes, who was unable to accept this,
was relieved of his appointment on 4 October to be replaced by the
young Lord Mountbatten. Without blaming his successor, Keyes
remained bitter. He reputedly told Mountbatten, "Dickie, the trouble
is that the British have lost the will to fight	 The Chiefs of Staff are
the greatest cowards I have ever met" . 29 Dudley Pound on the other
hand was pleased to be rid of his former boss, writing "He never had
much brain and what he has got left is quite addled".30
Captain Louis Mountbatten was in the United States waiting to take
command of the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious when he was
ordered back to Britain. Mountbatten took up his new post on 27
October 1941. 31 Under a new directive dated 17 October,
Mountbatten was appointed Adviser on Combined Operations (ACO).
Under the general direction of the COS he was to:
Act as technical adviser on all aspects of, and at all
stages in, the planning and training for combined
operations.
Be responsible for co-ordinating the general training
policy for Combined Operations for the three Services.
You will command the Combined Training Centres
and Schools of Instruction.
28. COS (41) 166, 14 March 1941; CAB 80/26.
29. John Terraine, The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten, (London: Hutchinson and
Co.Ltd, 1968) p.84.
30 • Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.154-155.
31 • Terraine, Life and Times, p.83.
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Study tactical and technical developments in all forms
of combined operations varying from small raids to a
full scale invasion of the Continent.
Direct and press forward research and development in
all forms of technical equipment and special craft
peculiar to combined operations.
Only in "raids on a very small scale which are carried out by Special
Service troops only" was Mountbatten to appoint the force
commander and be responsible for detailed planning. His executive
powers were restricted to the training of amphibious forces and the
mounting of small raids. The position of ACO in relation to the COS
and to force commanders was clearly established.32
Keyes left a legacy of bitterness behind him. The COS viewed COHQ
with distrust; accepting its existence only in a subordinate role with
limited powers and ambitions. There was a lingering belief that
Combined Operations was unnecessary, untidy and irregular.
Mountbatten, now advanced to the rank of Commodore, was a
relatively junior officer replacing an elderly Admiral of the Fleet.
His appointment had been on the initiative of Churchill rather than the
COS. The Chiefs were sceptical but did not openly oppose the
appointment. Pound in particular had serious reservations and was
keen to ensure that the ACO did not trespass into what was properly
the preserve of the Royal Navy.33
On 9 December Mountbatten was issued with a revised directive which
acknowledged the dual nature of his responsibilities. He was to retain
the title of ACO when acting in his advisory role. When exercising
his executive function he was to use the title Commodore Combined
Operations. These executive functions included the command of all
Combined Operations establishments and Special Service troops in the
British Isles. They also encompassed the command of all the specialist
assault ships and craft in Britain, except those placed under the
command of a force commander for a specific operation. 34 It was as
Commodore Combined Operations that Mountbatten was responsible
32. COS (41) 629, 17 October 1941; CAB 80/31.
33. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.157-158.
34. COS (41) 732, 9 December 1941; CAB 80/32. Also see, COS (41) 731, 9 December 1941;
CAB 80/32.
29
for preparing the ships and craft under his command for the opposed
landings that they would eventually have to undertake.
When Mountbatten took over COHQ the total staff amounted to only
23, including typists and messengers. There were no active service
naval officers, no regular air force officers and no signal officers.35
This was clearly inadequate and is indicative of Keyes's failure as an
administrator. As Vice-Admiral Hughes-Hallet commented, Keyes's
vision of COHQ did not extend beyond planning for "a bigger and
better Zeebrugge-type raid" •36 Mountbatten quickly set about
expanding the staff of COHQ. In line with the new directive the staff
was divided into Operations and Administrative Groups. The latter
consisting of a Naval Administrative Staff under Rear Admiral Horan,
appointed as Rear Admiral Landing Craft and Bases (RALB), was
divided into Personnel, Material, and Ships and Craft sections. The
sections of the Operations Group were inter-Service and consisted of
Intelligence, Training and Planning sections. Both groups had
communications sections. 37 Mountbatten was at great pains to stress
that COHQ was an inter-Service organisation. Those who worked in
COHQ were not considered representatives of their own Service and
any attempt to behave as such was discouraged. Deeply entrenched
attitudes of Service loyalty and inter-Service rivalry were bound to be
difficult to overcome. It appears that the Naval members of COHQ
were the worst offenders in this respect.38
Within six months the staff of COHQ grew to over 400. Inevitably
with such a rapid expansion there was some extravagance and waste.
Economy was not a word generally associated with Mountbatten.
There were also allegations of nepotism. This is probably a little
unfair. Under Mountbatten COHQ developed into a capable
organisation. However, one or two appointments were undoubtedly
suspect, that of the Marquis of Casa Maury outstandingly so. A
playboy friend of Mountbatten, Casa Maury was appointed head of
intelligence at COHQ. The failure of his intelligence branch to assess
accurately the strength of German defences at Dieppe contributed to
35 . History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.18.
36 • Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.160-161.
37. Ibid. p.161. History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.20.
38. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.161.
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the bloody failure of Operation Jubilee in August 1942. The original
naval commander for Jubilee, Vice-Admiral Baillie-Grohman, wrote
of Casa Maury, "I was soon to find him utterly useless" .39 This
experience can hardly have convinced the Navy of the value of an
independent COHQ.
Before 1939 there had been no inter-change of information about
amphibious operations between the United States and Britain. Even
prior to American entry into the war contacts between the Services of
these two countries became more regular. In 1941 a British Joint
Services Mission (BJSM) was established in Washington. In order to
maintain liaison with the Americans, COHQ sent Captain Knox to the
Washington in April 1942 as Combined Operations Liaison Officer
(COLO) where he joined the BJSM with a small staff. In March 1943
the title was changed to Chief of Combined Operations Representative
(CCOR) and the post was to continue under this nomenclature after
the war.40 The Americans appear to have been impressed by the
inter-Service nature of COHQ. After visiting COHQ in April 1942
General Marshall agreed to the attachment of United States officers to
the organisation. Thus, with the arrival of nine American officers in
May, COHQ became the first integrated Allied headquarters in
London.4i
On 4 March 1942 Mountbatten was summoned to see Churchill and
was informed that he was to be Chief of Combined Operations (CCO)
with the acting ranks of Vice-Admiral, Lieutenant-General, and Air
Marshal. He would sit as a full member of the COS whenever major
issues were in question or when combined operations or any special
matters with which he was concerned, were under discussion. The
established Chiefs were somewhat nonplussed by this rapid promotion.
Both Pound and Brooke made it plain that they were against the
decision. Within Combined Operations the move was met with
jubilation.42 At the age of 41 Mountbatten had been made an Admiral
two years earlier than had Nelson. The decision highlighted both the
39 . Ibid, p.161.
40 • Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.150. History of the Combined Operations
Organisation, p.31.
41. Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.150.
42. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.168-170.
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increasing importance of combined operations to Allied war plans and
Churchill's approval of Mountbatten's conduct of affairs. The
decision to appoint Mountbatten to equivalent ranks in all three
Services illustrated the inter-Service nature of his appointment.
On becoming a full member of the COS Committee Mountbatten
instituted a Combined Operations Joint Planner (COJP) in order to
influence the JPS and thereby shape the plans being submitted to the
COS. Brigadier Macleod was the first COJP, but was replaced due to
injury after the Casablanca conference by Brigadier Anthony Head.43
The Director of Plans agreed to allow the COJP to sit as a fourth
member of the JPS whenever they were preparing papers with a
combined operations aspect. In the opinion of the post-war staff
history:
This arrangement worked well because it meant that
the Combined Operations Joint Planner was able to see
practically all papers destined for the Chiefs of Staff at
their formative stage. The influence of COHQ was
thus greatly increased and there was a reduction in
friction and disagreement at all levels.
In order to deal with the increased workload at COHQ, Mountbatten
created an Executive Committee made up of the naval, air, and
military staffs within COHQ.45
When Keyes assumed the position of DCO there were only two
existing combined operations establishments, excepting the ISTDC.
Northney Camp, a peacetime holiday camp on Hayling Island, had
been requisitioned and subsequently commissioned on 15 June as HMS
Northney as a base for landing craft then being built. Improvised
raids in June 1940 highlighted the need for properly trained landing
craft crews. Consequently a six week course of basic naval training in
the handling and maintenance of landing craft was inaugurated at HMS
Northney. On completion naval personnel transferred to the landing
craft and raiding base, HMS Tormentor at Warsash, Southampton.
Advanced training with Special Service Troops was given at HMS
43. Anthony Head was later to become Minister of Defence for a short period in 1956/1957.
44. History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.67.
45. Ibid. p.60.
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Dorlin , Archarcle. Later training and raiding bases were set up at
Brightlingsea and Dartmouth.46
With the fall of France it became apparent that there was a
requirement for large scale amphibious landings and that therefore
combined training facilities would have to be established so that
soldiers and sailors could train in the conduct of combined operations.
In July 1940 Inverary at the head of Loch Fyne was chosen as the site
of the first Combined Training Centre (CTC) where landing craft
flotillas could complete their training and Where Army training could
be carried out on a large scale. Under DCO, Vice-Admiral Hallet
assumed command of the CTC with the title Vice-Admiral Combined
Training centre (VACTC) on 1 September. The naval wing of the
CTC was commissioned as HMS Quebec on 15 October.47
The CTC at Inverary was expanded during the summer of 1941 and
CTC Castle Toward was opened nearby. Naval and combined training
was the responsibility of VACTC Hallet, assisted by Major General
J.S.Drew, his Army representative. Initially their headquarters was at
Inverary but was later transferred to Largs where the headquarters of
the expeditionary force created for the projected landings in the
Canary Islands was based. The first full scale combined exercise,
"Leapfrog", on 10 August 1941, highlighted the requirement for a
central authority to coordinate the training of amphibious forces.
Consequently the Hollywood Hotel, Larg g was taken over and used
throughout the war as the headquarters for both the expeditionary
force (HQEF) and for officers controlling all combined operations
activities on the west coast of Scotland and the firth of Clyde. The
Hollywood Hotel operated a small training staff and courses for
selected officers of all three Services were instituted. Largs was
regarded from the Combined Operations point of view as a Staff
College. The close proximity of HQEF to the major training
establishments and the staff of the Senior Officer Assault Ships and
Craft (same building) did much to foster cooperation and
understanding, although initially some difficulty was experienced as
46. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare, p.128-129. History of the Combined Operations
Organisation, p.12+92.
47. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare, p.129. Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.57. History of the
Combined Operations Organisation, p.13+92-93.
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the requirements for craft for the expeditionary force conflicted with
the long term need to build up and train crews.48
From 1941 the Combined Operations Command expanded rapidly.
By Spring 1942 there were ten training establishments in the United
Kingdom, Table One
Table One: Combined Operations establishments. spring 1942
1. Headquarters Combined Training	 Largs
2. C.T.0
	 Inverary
3. C.T.C.	 Auchengate, Troon
4. Combined Signal School
	 Auchengate, Troon
5. C.T.C. for Royal Armoured Corps	 Castle Toward
6. Initial Training Centre for Naval Hayling Island
personnel and combined operations
training for South-Eastern Command
7. Raiding craft training centre and Warsash
combined operations training for
Southern Command.
8. Parent ship for raiding craft and Brightlinksea
combined operations training for Eastern
Command.
9. LCT training base.	 Bo'ness
10. Special Training Establishment	 Archaracle
Officer training gave cause for anxiety as facilities at the RNVR
Training Establishment at Hove were not sufficient to cope with the
increased requirements. Consequently it was decided that Combined
Operations should train their own officers and from August 1942 until
the end of the war the naval officers required for Combined
Operations were trained at the old Army Battle School at Lochailort.
The officers course lasted six weeks. With increased duties VACTC
became Vice-Admiral Combined Training in April 1942. In July he
adopted the title of Director of Combined Training and moved his
staff from Largs to Montague House adjacent to COHQ in London.
Here he set up a separate office and staff with responsibility for all
combined training under CC0.49
As the requirement for combined operations grew so did the world-
wide requirement for training. In line with the expansion of facilities
in Britain, by 1943 there were a total of twelve overseas training
establishments concerned with combined operations. These facilities
48 • History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.94-95.
49 . Ibid, p.95.
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included large CTCs in India, Australia, Canada, and Egypt. COHQ
was not responsible for the overseas facilities except in an advisory
capacity.50
Once the CTC at Inverary had been established the ISTDC
relinquished the responsibility for training and concentrated on
developing technique in combined operations. With work increasingly
centred on the problems of full-scale invasion the ISTDC was unable
to meet demand and on 13 April 1942 it was split into two separate
parts. One section was brought to COHQ and came under Captain
T.A.Hussey (RN) who became Coordinator of Experiments and
Developments (CXD). CXD had officers from the three Services and
civilian scientists assigned to him. In August the title of CXD was
changed to the Director of Experiments and Staff Requirements
(DXSR). The remainder of the old ISTDC stayed at Portsmouth and
became the Combined Operations Development Centre. On 2 August
1942, due to the steadily increasing volume of experimental work, the
Combined Operations Experimental Establishment (COXE) was set up
in the Westward Ho-Bideford area. The region boasted a wide variety
of beach conditions, vital for experimental work. From August 1942
COXE studied, developed and tested virtually every item of equipment
of possible use in combined operations. Two permanent composite
flotillas, one of major and one of minor landing craft, were kept by
COXE to aid them in their work.5i
Prior to the outbreak of war prototype Landing Craft, Assault (LCA),
Landing Craft, Mechanised (LCM), and Landing Craft, Support (LCS)
were built.52 An ISTDC report of April 1939 prompted an order for
18 LCA, 12 LCM and two LCS. However, production of landing
craft lagged behind requirements. Only four LCA, one LCM and five
old Motor Landing Craft were employed in the disastrous Norwegian
campaign. They did sterling work but were all lost. Similarly the
nine LCA and four LCM employed at Dunkirk performed well but
suffered heavy losses. At the end of that operation the specialist
513 • Clifford, Amphibious Warfare, p.130.
51. DEFE 2/1790. Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.149+192-193. History of the Combined
Operations Organisation, p.31+156-163.
52. Brian Friend, "Landing Craft Through the Ages - Part 2"p.32-47. L.E.H.Maund, "The
Development of Landing Craft", in RUSI Journal, February-November 1945, p.213-217.
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amphibious lift in Britain consisted of only four worn out LCA and
one LCM.53
In summer 1940 orders were placed for 199 LCA, 31 LCM and eight
LCS; the maximum that could be produced within the confines of
dockyard space and engine production. By March 1941 an order for a
further 104 LCA had been placed. In order to supplement British
production 135 "R" craft (later Landing Craft, Personnel (Large)
(LCP(L)) were ordered from the Eureka Tug Boat Company of New
Orleans. Three 10,000 ton fast Glen class passenger carrying cargo
ships were converted to Landing Ship, Infantry (Large) (LSI(L)) with
accommodation for 1,000 troops and these became the first of a series
of conversions of merchant ships for combined operations purposes.
Design details for the first Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) were worked
out during the summer of 1940 and trials of the first LCT(1) were
conducted in November. Production and development pressed on.
Before the end of 1940 preliminary designs for a Landing Ship, Tank
(LST) capable of carrying twenty 25 ton tanks had been undertaken.54
Britain could not construct all the landing ships and craft it needed
from its own resources. British shipyards were working to capacity.
Even the order for the first LSTs, three LST(1), had resulted in the
cancellation of nine corvettes. 55 In September 1941 Admiral Dorling,
the Admiralty Supply Representative at the BJSM in Washington,
received a list of Navy requirements for the spring of 1943. These
included the provision of 1,300 sea going craft for tanks and vehicles.
This list was superseded by another requesting 2,250 of these craft. In
November COHQ sent a mission to the United States headed by
Captain Tom Hussey from the ISTDC and accompanied by
representatives from the Navy and the Director of Naval
Construction. Their task was to gain the maximum support from the
53 . DEFE 2/1294, The Evolution and Development of Combined Operations
Technique and Material.
54For details on landing ships and craft see Allied Landing Craft of World War Two,
(London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985). This booklet is a reproduction of the wartime United
States Navy, Division of Naval Intelligence Manual ON! 226. Also see, DEFE 2/1327; ADM
239/242; ADM 239/357; DEFE 2/764. Useful secondary sources include J.D.Ladd, Assault from
the Sea 1939-1945; The Craft, The Landings, The Men, (London: David and Charles,
1976); Brian Friend, "Landing Craft Through the Ages" in Warship Volume 45 and 46, and the
relevant chapter in Robert Gardiner (ed.), The Eclipse of the Big Gun: The Warship 1906-
1945, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992).
55 . ADM 239/242.
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as yet unmobilised resources of America. Negotiations were under
way when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour. On 7 January 1942
President Roosevelt approved all the items requested by COHQ. The
alliance with the United States was to prove highly lucrative for
Combined Operations. By April 1944, Britain had received from its
ally four Landing Ship, Dock (LSD), 84 LST, 168 Landing Craft,
Infantry (LCI), in addition to numerous LCTs, LCMs and small craft
"beyond compute" •56
The ships and craft that took part in the major landings of World War
Two were designs that had been undertaken and completed in the
demanding conditions of wartime. There was no time to build
prototypes; lessons had to be learnt by bitter experience. The assault
craft were required in a hurry and were built with the methods and
materials that were readily available at the time. The LCT(2) was
powered by an unsatisfactory aero-engine as this was all that was
available. In all British LCTs prior to the LCT(8) the ramp door was
operated by inefficient hand winches as there were insufficient
powered winches. The LCTs had originally been intended to operate
only in fair or mild weather. This did not prove to be the case. Early
types stood up well to the rough treatment they received but with the
lighter, shallower LCT(4) the stresses began to tell. Designed solely
for cross channel work, a number of LCT(4) were required to sail to
the Mediterranean under their own power to participate in the Sicilian
landings. All encountered trouble due to their light construction.
Some broke their backs and one broke in half in the straits of
Gibraltar.57
By their very nature these shallow draught vessels were difficult to
handle. This was made worse in the LCTs, which were fitted with
propellers which both turned in the same direction. The assault fleet
was crewed largely by Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) or Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) officers and Hostilities Only ratings.
Conditions aboard the early landing craft were primitive and posed
special problems for young inexperienced officers denied the comfort
and privacy of the normal wardroom and officer's accommodation.
56. Fergusson, Watery Grave, p.110-118.
57. DEFE 2/1327 + ADM 239/242.
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While it is true that conditions aboard submarines were more
cramped, few of the early LCT crews had the spur of operations and
the esprit de corps that the submariners had. Nor did they have a
depot ship to return to in harbour. 58 Under such conditions it was
difficult to maintain traditional approaches to dress and discipline. In
April 1942 Admiral Ramsey reported to Mountbatten that he was
unhappy with the state of discipline among landing craft crews. 59 It
may have been difficult for regular Naval officers to appreciate the
difficulties facing these men. Fortunately living standards in ships and
major craft did improve. The LST(3) actually boasted better living
conditions than its American predecessor. 60 Although some
deficiencies in training did manifest themselves during the North
African and Sicilian landings, this was only to be expected from a new
and expanding force. The crews of the assault fleet were to prove
their worth during the Normandy campaign.
The assault fleet made heavy demands on naval manpower. In order
to help meet these demands and to provide manpower for additional
Commandos the Royal Marine Division was disbanded in the summer
of 1943. In a major break with tradition, Royal Marine officers were
allowed to command major landing craft. By 1944 500 officers and
12,500 other ranks Royal Marines were manning landing craft
alongside 5,500 RNVR and 43,500 Hostilities Only men.61
In December 1941 COHQ had taken over the administrative
responsibility for landing ships and craft. By June 1943 it controlled
an armada that included 113 landing ships and 3,979 barges and
landing craft. The Admiralty now wanted them back, claiming that
the assault fleet had grown too large to be dealt with by Combined
Operations Command. 62 The desire to control what threatened to
become a private navy may also have played a part in the decision. In
58. Peter Lund and Harry Ludlam, The War of the Landing Craft, (London: W.Foulham,
1976) p.31.
59. Rear Admiral W.S.Chalmers, Full Cycle - The Biography of Admiral Sir Bertram
Home Ramsey, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954) p.136.
6°. DEFE 2/1327 + ADM 239/242. Brian Macdermott, Ships Without Names: The Story
of the Royal Navy's Tank Landing Ships of World War Two, (London: Arms and
Armour Press, 1992) p.86-87.
61 . History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.67-69. Ziegler,
Mountbatten, p.205-206.
62 • Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.206. DEFE 2/782A.
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November 1942 the COS accepted the principle of the Admiralty case.
Talks began with the Admiralty on 29 December 1942 although it was
not until August 1943 that the hand over of the invasion fleet and its
bases was complete.63
In January 1943 the Casablanca conference decided to establish a
Combined Staff to take over planning for d return to the Continent. It
was too early to elect a supreme commander or his deputy, but
Lieutenant-General Morgan was selected to fill the position of Chief
of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) (COSSAC).
Morgan took up his post on 13 April 1943. Mountbatten had wanted
to be designated as one of the authorities responsible for the
preparation of the invasion plan. However, not being one of the force
commanders his responsibility was confined to the provision of
technical advice on all aspects of the assault. It was inevitable that
with the appointment of COSSAC the role of COHQ in preparing for
the invasion of France would be gradually eclipsed and in August
Mountbatten left COHQ to take up another important post, that of
Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. He was replaced by
Brigadier Robert Laycock, an army officer with wide experience of
amphibious operations. 64 COHQ had carried the burden of developing
amphibious warfare from its humble position in 1940 to the point
where it represented a war winning instrument.
The two distinct types of amphibious operation undertaken during the
war were large scale operations conducted as a preliminary to major
land campaigns and amphibious raids. Britain has a tradition of
amphibious raiding dating back to Roman times. From the sixteenth
century raiding forces had frequently been landed either to destroy
enemy facilities and shipping, or to draw forces away from another
front. During the First World War the British launched raids against
enemy submarine facilities at Zeebrugge and Ostend, with mixed
results. The idea of amphibious raiding appealed to Churchill's
aggressive instincts. Following the fall of France he remarked:
63. History of the Combined Operations 0.rganisation, p.67-69. Ziegler,
Mountbatten, p.205-206.
64. Laycock was an impressive personality, the heroic character Blackhouse in Evelyn Waugh's
Officers and Gentlemen was based on him. Selina Hastings, Evelyn Waugh: A Biography,
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We have got to get it out of our minds the idea that the
Channel ports and all the country between them are
enemy territory 	 Enterprises must be prepared with
specially trained troops of the hunter class, who can
develop a reign of terror down these coasts.65
It was appreciated from the outset that amphibious raiding would
require specialist troops. No existing formed unit could be spared
from the pressing requirements of home defence so new units were
created. Commandos, named after the Boer Commandos of the South
African War, were raised from the various Army commands within
Britain. Ten Commandos, each of 500 men, were to be formed by
selecting suitable volunteers and from the Independent Companies
raised by the War Office for operations in Norway. In autumn 1940
the Commandos and Independent Companies were reorganised into
five Special Service Battalions, each consisting of two 500 man
companies. The five battalions made up the Special Service Brigade
under Brigadier J.C.Haydon who was appointed to the post on 9
October. The Special Service Battalion organisation proved
cumbersome and on the initiative of Haydon it was abandoned in
Spring 1941 in favour of the original Commando concept, with twelve
Commandos.66
Despite having an obvious role to play in amphibious warfare the
Royal Marines played little part in such operations in the early stages
of the war. A Royal Marine Brigade was raised for operations in
Norway but was not ready in time for action. It was dispatched to
Dakar for the projected landing there but was again frustrated when
that operation was aborted. In August 1940 it was decided to raise a
Royal Marine Division of three brigades. This too saw no action.
Mountbatten regarded the Division as a ready source of manpower for
the Commandos. He gained Admiralty permission to raise a Royal
Marine Commando which came into being in February 1942 at Deal
in Kent. A second Royal Marine Commando was raised later in the
year and these became No.s 40 and 41 (RM) Commandos. In July
1943 the Royal Marine Division was disbanded. Mountbatten secured
the agreement of the 1SL that the manpower released should be
65 • Terraine, Life and Times, p.83.
66 . History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.110.
40
employed in combined operations. Many of the men went to man
landing craft, others formed new Commandos. On 1 August 1943 six
new Royal Marine Commandos were formed and the first, No.43,
moved to the Commando depot at Achnacarry to undergo the
Commando course. Unlike the Army Commandos these units did not
consist of volunteers, but were drafted straight from the old Royal
Marine Division. The Army Commandos, fiercely proud of their
skills and achievements, were initially resentful of these new units,
considering them unworthy of the title "commando" •67
Raids varied in size and character from the landing of a handful of
men armed only with small arms to the major assault on Dieppe by the
2nd Canadian Division and three Commandos in August 1942. The
first major raid was in May 1941. The Norwegian island of Lofoten
was attacked by No.3 and No.4 Commandos. They spent six hours
ashore destroying eleven factories, 800,000 gallons of fuel and five
ships, bringing back 225 prisoners and 314 Norwegian volunteers.68
Other notable raids include an attack on the Norwegian island of
Vaagso by two Commandos on 27 December 1941, in conjunction
with a second raid on Lofoten; and the seizure of secret German
equipment from a radar station at Bruneval near Le Havre in a raid in
February 1942. Operation Jubilee , the assault on Dieppe on 19
August 1942, was the largest raid of the war. The attack itself was a
bloody failure resulting in the death of 1,000 Canadians and the
capture of 2,000 more. 69 Following Jubilee it was agreed to set up a
naval force permanently organised for raiding. The result was Force
J which established its headquarters under the command of Captain
Hughes-Hallet at the Royal Yacht Squadron at Cowes, renamed HMS
Vectis . Dieppe was the last major raid of the war. Although minor
raids continued to be conducted after August 1942 the emphasis
shifted towards preparation for large scale operations. The ever
present need to divert resources to preparations for full-scale invasion
67. Charles Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, (London: William Kimber, 1985)
p.122-123+173. Brigadier Durnford-Slater, Commando: Memoirs of a Fighting
Commando in World War Two, (London: Greenhill Books, 1991) p.171.
68. For lively first hand accounts of the Norwegian raids see Durnford-Slater, Commando, and
Peter Young, Storm from the Sea, (London: William Kimber, 1958).
69. Hunt and Schurman, "Prelude to Dieppe: Thoughts on Combined Operations Policy in the
Raiding Period, 1940-1942", in Gerald Jordan (ed), Naval Warfare in the 20th Century:
Essays in Honour of Arthur Marder, (London: Croom Helm, 1977) p.186-209. Ziegler,
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prejudiced the requirements for raiding. In May 1943 Force J,
mercilessly plundered of its ships and craft, had virtually ceased to
exist. Hughes-Hallet left to take up a post as COSSAC's principle
British naval staff officer.70
In November a major reorganisation of the Commandos took place.
With the requirement for raiding giving way to larger scale
amphibious assaults and more sustained operations, changes were
required. Lightly equipped units were not suited for the sustained
infantry operations they were likely to have to conduct. Operation
Ironclad , the assault on Madagascar, indicated that in future the main
role of the Commandos would be to act as the spearhead of major
assaults. The Special Service Brigade was replaced by a Special
Service Group, commanded by Major-General Sturges. Under it the
eight Army and eight Royal Marine Commandos were grouped into
four Special Service Brigades. In addition an Operational Holding
Commando was set up to facilitate the easy reinforcement of
Commandos operating in the field. In order to alleviate Army
Commando antipathy towards the Royal Marines Sturges combined the
two varieties within the Special Service Brigades. Operational
experience soon taught the Army Commandos that the Royal Marine
Commandos were worthy of the title.71
The Commando idea was not universally accepted. These units tended
to hog the limelight and poach the best officers, NCOs and men from
existing units. Field Marshal Alanbrooke believed that the
Commandos should never have been raised as an independent force.
His successor as Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, General Sir
Bernard Paget, shared the belief that Commando operations could
have been better done by a unit of the field army.72 Brigadier
Durnford-Slater recalled that as commander of No.3 Commando his
unit experienced constant obstruction from the Army, and he
contrasted this with the help and understanding offered by the Navy.73
Army antipathy towards the Commandos demonstrated an ignorance
of the requirements of amphibious raiding. The kind of quick raids
70. Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.184-196.
71. History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.110.
72. Messenger, The Commandos, p.60.
73. Durnford-Slater, Commando, p.34-36.
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and specialist operations undertaken by the Commandos throughout
the war required intense training, not only in military skills but also in
boatwork and the art of rapid and silent disembarkation on unknown
shores, often in the dark. By their very nature Commandos were
called upon to perform tasks beyond the capabilities of conventional
infantry.
In theory the dual functions of preparing for invasion and of raiding
were complementary but in practice they competed for limited
resources and training facilities. Raiding was considered by some to
be a futile diversion of effort. Although small raids could not change
the course of the war, raiding helped to maintain the offensive spirit
amongst British troops and civilians when little was going well for the
Allies. The vulnerability of the European coastline forced the
Germans to divert to its defence men and resources that could have
been better used elsewhere. Raiding provided practical experience in
the problems of amphibious warfare. It also provided a valuable tool
for special operations such as the attack on St. Nazaire or the seizure
of radar equipment from Bruneval.
The North African landings of November 1942 were followed in 1943
by major Allied landings at Sicily in July and Salerno in September.
These landings involved the use of an ever increasing variety of
special craft and equipment and demonstrated a growing competence
in the techniques of amphibious warfare. Operation Overlord , the
invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, was the largest amphibious
operation of all time. The magnitude of the task faced by the planners
was reflected by the size of the naval orders issued by Admiral
Ramsey, Naval Commander-in-Chief for Neptune , the naval side of
Overlord . In 1915 Admiral de Robeck's naval orders for the
Gallipoli landings covered 30 pages of foolscap and were believed to
have covered every conceivable subject. 74 Admiral Ramsey was first
called to Norfolk House in London to study the problem of a return to
the Continent in 1942. The orders he issued for Neptune ran to
nearly 1,000 pages.75
74. Keyes, Naval Memoirs, p.281.
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Chapter One: Table Two 
Ships and Craft Participating in Operation Neptune
Type British U.S. Other Total
Warships
Battleships 4 3 7
Monitors 2 - 2
Cruisers 17 3 3 23
Fleet Destroyers 46 34	 . 6 86
Hunt class
Destroyers 21 4 25
Midget Subs 2 2
Sloops 14 - 14
Frigates and
Destroyer escorts 53 6 4 63
Corvettes 63 - 8 71
Patrol Craft - 18 18
ASW Trawlers 60 - 60
Minelayers 4 4
Minesweepers 262 25 287
Coastal Craft 360 111 24 495
Seaplane Carriers 1* - 1




Attack Transports - 10 - 10
LSI 55 - 55
LSD+LSE 12 12
LST 130 143 236
LCA 448 54 502
LCC/LCH 11 15 26
LCI 130 118 248
LCT 607 230 837
LCG 9 16 25
LCS 85 36 121
LCT(R) 36 - 36
LCP(Smoke) 106 48 154
Misc small craft
and barges - 1,850
* - employed as a floating workshop
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The number and variety of ships and craft employed for Overlord
was unprecedented, see table two. 76 Air support was provided on a
massive scale and the initial assault was covered by the fire of six
battleships, 23 cruisers and around 100 destroyers. Five divisions
were landed in the initial assault, supported by two airborne divisions,
dropped prior to the seaborne landing. By midnight on D-Day 75,200
troops had been landed from the sea in the British sector and 57,000
in the American. With the 23,000 men of the airborne force this
made a total of approximately 156,000. The Eastern (British) Task
Force alone had landed 900 tanks and armoured vehicles, 240 field
guns, 280 anti-tank guns and 4,300 tons of stores. 77 To compensate
for the lack of harbour facilities, two artificial harbours, Mulberries
were constructed, one at Arromanche and the other at Saint-Laurent.
The Arromanche Mulberry was completed by 20 July and had soon
exceeded the designed handling ability of 6,000 tons of stores a day.78
Amphibious operations on this scale were truly inter-Service
activities. Only by working together closely could the Army, Navy
and Air Force provide the necessary level of forces to bring success.
During World War Two amphibious warfare developed from a
largely neglected activity into a major strategic capability. It gave the
maritime powers a powerful new weapon: the ability to deploy and
support large modern armies on an enemy coastline at a time and
place of their own choosing. It was by exploiting the capabilities of
amphibious warfare that the Anglo-Americans were able to launch
successful assaults on the mainland of Europe in 1943 and 1944,
sealing the fate of the Wehrmacht, which had already been weakened
by the pounding it had received in the Soviet Union. This represented
something of a triumph for the British way in warfare ; certainly
Stephen Roskill portrayed it as such. 79 However, it should be
remembered that a maritime strategy was only adopted in 1940 after
German success in western Europe ejected the British from the
Continent, ruling out any other approach. Furthermore, had it not
76. S.W.Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945. Volume 3, Part 2, The Offensive,
(London: HMSO, 1961) p.19.
77. Ibid. p.53. Chalmers, Full Cycle, p.231.
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1967) p.226.
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been for the exhausting struggle on the eastern front the Anglo-
American armies could not have established themselves in Nazi
occupied Europe so easily.
Amphibious warfare played an important role in the Allied strategy
against Germany, it was central to the war against Japan. Once the
tide of war had turned against the Japanese at the battles of the Coral
Sea and Midway, the American launched an amphibious drive across
the south and central Pacific. Beginning at Guadalcanal in the
Solomons the Americans launched a series of amphibious assaults
culminating in the hard fought victories at Iwo Jima and Okinawa in
February and April 1945. 80 This was largely a maritime war with
marines supported by naval gunfire and carrier based aircraft seizing
forward bases. For the United States Navy amphibious assaults were
conducted to further the war at sea. The Royal Navy's experience was
different. In Europe major amphibious operations were conducted as
a prelude to land campaigns; campaigns which were vital for Allied
victory but which could have only an indirect effect on the war at sea.
The Navy was essentially operating in support of the Army,
transporting and landing troops and supporting them once ashore.
Admiral Ramsey was aware that it was his job to land the troops
where and when they wanted. 81 The Navy was a means of allowing
Britain to return to a Continental strategy, where the soldiers in
France represented the main war effort. This was a necessary task but
not a glamorous one and not one which the Navy saw as its defining
mission.
It took years of preparation to provide the amphibious capability
required to conduct the successful European landings of 1943 and
1944. One could no longer rely on troop 's landed from warships in
ships boats to defeat a modern enemy. A specialist capacity was
required to succeed in amphibious warfare. Combined Operations
began to resemble something of a fourth Service, requiring a high
level of manpower and a considerable amount of resources. There
was an independent Combined Operations Headquarters, the CCO sat
on the COS Committee when relevant subjects were discussed, and
80. Philip A.Crowl + Jeter A.Isley, The US Marines and Amphibious War - Its theory,
and its practice in the Pacific, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951) passim.
81. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, p.763-767.
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there was a Combined Operations representative on the JPS. The
Admiralty was suspicious of the Combined Operations organisation.
The mistrust and suspicion that Keyes aroused when DCO was never
entirely laid to rest. Both Sir Phillip Vian and Rhoderick McGrigor
were considered by Churchill as possible replacements for
Mountbatten as CCO. It is indicative of the Admiralty's attitude
towards COHQ that both officers were warned that if they valued
their careers they should refuse the appointment. 82 Admiral Manley
Power believed that Andrew Cunningham "took against" Mountbatten
when he was promoted to CCO; prior to this they had got on wel1.83
Such suspicion was inevitable. Amphibious warfare made greater
demands on the Navy than it did on the other two Services. By
October 1943 the Royal Navy had grown from a complement of
127,000 officers and men at the outbreak of war to 750,000 men and
over 55,000 women. Nevertheless the Navy was faced with severe
manpower shortages and by the end of 1943 had decided to lay up the
battleships Resolution, Ramillies , Revenge, and Malaya in an attempt
to alleviate these difficulties. 84 The tens of thousands of men manning
landing ships and craft could have been employed profitably within
the conventional Navy. The support of amphibious operations placed
demands on an already overstretched fleet. The Navy had to strip all
other commands to the bare minimum and stop the Arctic convoys in
order to provide the necessary support for the Normandy landings.
Amphibious operations had little positive effect on the war at sea prior
to the invasion of Italy, which led to the surrender of the Italian fleet.
One exception was the raid on St. Nazaire which destroyed the only
dock on the French Atlantic coast large enough to accommodate the
Tirpitz . However, amphibious operations could have a negative
effect. They took men and resources which could otherwise have been
devoted to the fleet. It is therefore not entirely surprising that after
the war the Admiralty was at best luke-warm in its support of
amphibious capabilities.
82 • Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.293.
83. MANP, Memoirs of Admiral Sir Manley Power. Churchill Archives Centre,
Cambridge.
84. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, p.771.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE TORCH OF COMBINED OPERATIONS 
Post-war attitudes towards amphibious warfare in Britain were
heavily influenced by recent wartime experience. In the aftermath of
the Normandy landings the Services accepted the need to be prepared
to conduct large scale amphibious operations in the future. The
possibility of giving the Royal Marines primary responsibility for
amphibious warfare was raised and rejected. Large scale amphibious
operations on the Normandy model required the participation of all
three Services and not one small specialist corps. The maintenance of
a permanent, independent, inter-Service Combined Operations
organisation was approved and plans were laid for an extensive
training organisation. The decision not to give the Royal Marines a
statutory responsibility for amphibious warfare removed one reason
for Admiralty support for amphibious capabilities. Such
responsibility would have facilitated Naval control of Combined
Operations and would have provided a distinct and unique role for the
Marines, promoting their institutional survival. With amphibious
warfare the responsibility of an independent organisation, under the
existing concepts of future amphibious operations the Admiralty could
expect to receive only a series of demands for manpower and
construction that would take resources away from the main fleet.
This was something the Admiralty repeatedly sought to avoid. Facing
a series of cuts in both finance and manpower the Admiralty devoted
the maximum possible resources into maintaining the conventional
fleet.
Prior to the Normandy landings 1SL, Sir Andrew Cunningham, had
raised the possibility of giving the Royal Marines greater
responsibility for amphibious warfare. In a paper submitted to the
COS on 11 May 1944 he called for the Marines to be given a definite
and statutory responsibility for the provision, training and technical
development of all special assault forces in the future.' In discussion
with the COS, Cunningham argued that the Royal Marines should be
the source of amphibious expertise. He accepted the requirement for
an inter-Service organisation responsible to the COS Committee for
1 . COS (44) 414(o), 11 May 1944, memo by the 1SL; DEFE 2/1178.
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the inter-Service aspect of combined operations but visualised the
CCO of the future being a Royal Marine officer with a "divided"
responsibility. It appears that Cunningham envisaged a CCO whose
allegiance was split between the Admiralty and Combined Operations.
The COS agreed to set up an inter-Service committee to look into the
matter.2
As a result on 19 May the Committee on Inter-Service Responsibility
for Amphibious Warfare was appointed. Better known as the RAW
Committee it was chaired by the DCAS, Air Marshal Sir Norman
Bottomley, and consisted of the DCIGS, Lt-General Sir Ronald
Weeks, Vice-Admiral G.L.A. Miles, CCO Major-General Laycock
and the GOC Royal Marines, Sir Thomas Hunton. The Committee
was issued with the following terms of reference:
To consider future inter-Service responsibility for
amphibious warfare with particular reference to the
employment of the Royal Marines; it being recognised
that the retention of a Combined Service element on
the lines of that already existing in COHQ will be
essential to any future amphibious warfare
organisation.3
The inter-Service nature of amphibious warfare was stressed from the
outset, which was hardly surprising considering that the three Services
were currently working closely together in the build up to Overlord.
The report of the RAW Committee was submitted to the COS on 29
June 1944, 23 days after the Normandy landings.4
The Committee worked from the premise that it was their first duty to
ensure that in future there would be no recurrence of the situation at
the start of the War when there had been neither the equipment,
personnel or knowledge required to conduct even small scale raids.
Preparation for amphibious warfare had to be regarded as a
permanent commitment. The Committee approved of the existing
system where CCO was the central advisory body, the Service
Ministries were the executive authorities responsible for the provision
of equipment and personnel, and commanders-in-chief and force
2. COS (44) 161 mtg, 18 May 1944; DEFE 2/1178.
3. COS (44) 164 mtg, 19 May 1944; CAB 79/74.
4. COS (44) 166, Report by Committee on Inter-Service Responsibility for




commanders were responsible for actual operations. They considered
that it would be a mistake to set up a self-contained amphibious
warfare organisation with both advisory and executive functions. The
Committee thus recommended retention of a permanent, central,
independent, inter-Service amphibious warfare organisation. They
rejected the suggestion that a permanent nucleus of the staff of the
central organisation should be provided by the Royal Marines.
Amphibious warfare was an inter-Service responsibility and officers
from each of the three Services should have an important contribution
to make. COHQ as currently organised fulfilled their essential
requirements so the Committee recommended it's maintenance as the
permanent central organisation for amphibious warfare. They
considered that CCO should continue with basically the same
responsibilities and that he should continue to be subject to the
direction of the COS, be available to attend the COS Committee and
be responsible to the Minister of Defence.
The RAW Committee reflected current thinking on amphibious
warfare, based on recent experience in Europe. Amphibious assaults
were viewed as the prelude to a wider land campaign and not as an
end in themselves:
An assault force must be ready to treat the assault
phase merely as a preliminary to fighting a land battle.
It must learn amphibious technique as but one of the
other techniques required in the rest of the campaign.5
Specialist amphibious capabilities were to be devoted primarily to the
problem of conducting large scale assaults prior to a major land
campaign.
As the three Services would provide the assault forces in war a
standing, specialist assault force was not required. They therefore
ruled out the creation of a specialist amphibious corps along the lines
of the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Such a corps would not
fit into the framework of post-assault operations which would be
undertaken primarily by the Army supported by the RAF. In addition
Britain was unlikely to be able to maintain a large enough force
devoted primarily to the assault phase and so army units would still
need to be trained to supplement it in the amphibious assault. The
possibility of creating a permanent amphibious brigade of Royal
Marines was investigated. This had the advantage of providing an
amphibious striking force for use in "emergencies short of war" .
However, the proposal was rejected as it did not fit the existing
concept of amphibious operations outlined above. The Committee
conceded that the availability of an amphibious striking force to deal
with minor disturbances short of war was attractive but concluded that
in such circumstances the requirement to assault strongly defended
beaches was doubtful and it should therefore be possible simply to
employ the nearest Army unit. In their view:
There is no escaping the conclusion that the Army
itself must be ready to find the assault force required
in war.
In order to prepare the three Services for amphibious operations it
was proposed to train at least one division each year, along with
appropriate naval and air force units. The Committee envisaged the
basic training of brigade groups at CTCs, with the collective training
of the division taking place during an annual amphibious training
season. To ensure effective combined training in peacetime a
permanent Naval Assault Force would be maintained under Admiralty
control, to be made available to CCO during the training season. In
addition, a number of specialist units would be retained in order to
help with training and to form the nucleus of special units required in
war. Such specialist units were to consist mainly of Royal Marines
and would include a small Special Service Group consisting of a
headquarters, two Commandos and a Small Operations Group.
The Naval Assault Force proposed would be able to lift one division.
The majority of this force would only be manned during the Army
collective amphibious training season but a proportion would need to
be permanently manned and available. The Committee stressed that
without properly fitted assault shipping, realistic and effective
amphibious training in peace-time would be impossible. In addition to
providing realistic collective training the Naval Assault Force would
provide a nucleus upon which to expand in war. This force would
consist of a total of 64 landing ships, 135 major landing craft and 256
minor craft ,see table one.
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Table One: The Naval Assault Force
Ships Major Craft
LSH(L) 1 LCT(8) 48
LSH(S) 3 LCI(L) 36
LSI(L) 6 LCH 3
LSF 1 LCG(M) 24
LST 36 LCS(R) 24




LC Parent Ship 1
LS Maint. Ship 1
Total 64
Plus a total of 256 minor craft.
The total manpower requirement for the force was 16,250 men; a
very large total for what was essentially a peacetime cadre. Unless
amphibious warfare was to be accorded a very high priority in the
peacetime defence organisation these demands could not be met.6
The RAW Report was subjected to detailed discussion by the COS.7
Admiral Cunningham established a small committee under the chair of
Rear-Admiral R.M.Servaes to assess the report. 8 The findings of this
committee were reflected in an Admiralty memorandum submitted to
the COS on 22 July. 9 While accepting many of the Committee's
recommendations, the Admiralty took issue with some key points.
They rejected the requirement for a permanent Naval Assault Force
of the size recommended. Such a large force would prejudice the
maintenance of an adequate post-war fleet. More fundamentally, the
Admiralty could not agree with the requirement for a central,
independent, inter-Service organisation on the model of COHQ. The
1SL noted that under the present (and proposed) system of
responsibility advice to the COS on amphibious warfare was divorced
from the responsibility for the provision of personnel and resources
and the planning and execution of operations. The former was the
responsibility of COHQ, the latter of the Services. Therefore the
Admiralty could be open to pressure to provide manpower and
resources from an outside body divorced from executive
responsibility.
6. Ibid.
7. COS (44) 226 mtg(o), 7 July 1944; CAB 79/77.
8. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare, p.189-191.
9. COS (44) 132, 22 July 1944 memo by Admiralty; CAB 80/44.
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Cunningham revived proposals first raised in 1943 for the Combined
Operations Organisation to be run as an inter-Service committee
within the COS organisation along the lines of the JPS. Members of
this committee would remain responsible to their parent Service.w
Laycock strongly rejected this proposal, doubting whether an inter-
Service committee "representing as it would the views of the three
Service Ministries" would monitor combined operations policy as
impartially as an independent organisation. He also doubted the
ability of such a committee to effectively administer all the Combined
Operations establishments and units.11
Laycock was accurate in his assessment of post-war decision making
when he suggested that:
....it would be demanding a utopian degree of
impartiality if we adopted a system which, if it is to
work, relies on the voluntary acceptance of
considerable sacrifice and inconveniences by an
individual service for the good of a combined
technique.12
Neither the Army nor the RAF would support the Admiralty
proposals and the Report by Committee on Inter-Service
Responsibility for Amphibious Warfare was approved in principle by
the COS on 29 July. 13 It was agreed that COHQ should continue in its
present form for the duration of the war and that its organisation in
the post-war period would depend upon what machinery was
established to handle defence matters in peacetime. A new directive
was issued to Laycock, based upon that recommended by the RAW
Committee.14
The tri-Service requirements for post-war training in combined
operations were discussed at an inter-Service meeting held in COHQ
on 18 October 1945 and following this, in November, Laycock
outlined his proposals to the COS. 15 Echoing Army proposals, he
10. Ibid.
11. COS (44) 133,24 July 1944, memo by CCO; CAB 80/44.
12. Ibid.
13. COS (44) 252 mtg(o), 29 July 1944; CAB 79/78.
14 • COS (44) 157, 31 August 1944; CAB 80/44.
15 . Folio 51, docket CR 251/45; DEFE 2/1315. COS (45) 299, 24 November 1945 memo by
CCO; CAB 79/42.
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based his scheme on the principle that training in combined operations
would be accepted as part of the normal training commitment of each
Service. 16 In addition to the existing COXE and Combined
Operations Signal School (CUSS), he recommended setting up a
school of combined operations as a centre for study, instruction and
staff training in the tactics, doctrine and technique of combined
operations. It was proposed to situate both the school and COSS at
Bideford near COXE, where suitable and favourable beach conditions
existed within easy reach of the landing craft base at Appledore. For
unit and formation training Laycock concurred with the Army view,
proposing to set up Combined Training Establishments (CTEs) in the
three main areas where British forces were concentrated; Europe, the
Middle East and the Far East. 17 Laycock's proposals were considered
by the COS in January 1946. 18 The Chiefs approved the creation of a
central combined operations training school and the retention of
COSS, if possible in the Bideford area. However, in both cases the
governing principle was that they be maintained at the minimum level
necessary to keep combined operations technique alive and for
experimental purposes.19
The RAW Committee had recommend the creation of a post-war
Naval Assault Force. As early as September 1945 Laycock called for
the Admiralty to submit definite proposals for the shape and size of
this force. 20 The COS agreed that the JPS rather than the Admiralty
should examine and report on this issue. 21 Accordingly, the JPS
examined the requirement for post-war .naval assault forces and
submitted their report to the COS on 26 January 1946. 22 Keeping in
line with the RAW Committee, the JPS did not consider that there was
any peacetime operational requirement to maintain assault forces.
They foresaw no need to carry out an opposed landing against
entrenched opposition in any situation short of war. However, they
considered it important that amphibious training and development of
technique should continue in peacetime. Should amphibious forces be
needed for Imperial policing duties then these forces could be drawn
16 • Folio 30, docket CR 251/45; DEFE 2/1315.
17 • DEFE 2/1315. COS (45) 277 mtg, 28 November 1945; CAB 79/42.
18. COS (46) 5 mtg, 10 January 1946; CAB 79/43.
19. Ibid.
20. COS (45) 228, 22 September 1945, memo by CCO; CAB 80/50.
21. COS (45) 233 mtg, 25 September 1945; CAB 79/39.
22 • jp (45) 259, Post War Naval Assault Forces, 26 January 1946; CAB 84/75.
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Chapter Two: Table Two
JP(45)259 -Assault Training Force.
LSH(C)	 -	 1
LSI(L)	 -	 1
LST(3)	 -	 11 (including 2 LST(Q))
LST(A)	 -	 8
MS (LS)	 1














from those maintained for training. The JPS appreciated that
financial and manpower considerations made it unlikely that their
recommendations could be acted upon in the near future. They were
recommending a force for the period when the armed forces had
stabilised in their peacetime roles.
The JPS outlined a requirement for an Assault Training Force which
was necessary to provide training facilities for all the services, beyond
those which could be provided within CTEs and the schools. They
considered that it was not possible to preserve the whole technique of
amphibious warfare at anything below brigade group level.
Consequently, they recommended an Assault Training Force able to
carry 6,000 troops and 750 vehicles on the basis of a brigade group
and a beach group carried on exercise at assault scales. This
represented a considerable reduction on the divisional lift
recommended by the RAW Committee. Nevertheless the force was
still a considerable one, see table two. The total Naval and Marine
manpower requirement for the Assault Training Force was 6,348
men. 23 Once the need for landing craft and ships for the CTEs and
schools had been catered for the manpower requirement reached
10,214, enough men to man twelve Town class cruisers.24
The COS discussed the report in February. Andrew Cunningham was
in general agreement with the report but considered the manpower
requirement to be "somewhat lavish" . It was decided that in order to
reduce the dollar expense of the force the requirement for lend-lease
ships and craft would be restricted to one LSD and one LCH. It was
also agreed to drop the requirement for the LSI(L), ostensibly because
American developments in launching craft from LSTs put in doubt the
requirement for this ship. With these provisos the Chiefs approved
the Assault Training Force, as set out by the JPS as an "ultimate
target" . However, Cunningham stated that it would probably take
three or four years to reach this target.25
Facing severe economic difficulties following the Second World War,
Prime Minister Attlee adopted the basic premise that economic needs
would have to take priority over defence requirements. With no
23 . Ibid.
24 • Town class cruisers had a complement of around 850 men:
25 . COS (46) 18 mtg, 1 February 1946; CAB 79/44.
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immediate threat the post-war structure of forces was to be driven by
economic rather that strategic imperatives. Attlee informed the First
Lord, A.V.Alexander, that "it was not necessary in present
circumstances to have a large fleet ready for instant action, as there
was no one to fight" • 26 Defence policy was to be founded on three
assumptions: that Britain would not have to fight a major war for two
or three years; that in any future conflict the USA would probably
side with Britain and would certainly not combine against it; and that
no fleet capable of endangering the security of the United Kingdom
would exist for the next few years. 27 The Royal Navy was still the
second largest navy in the world. The demise of German, Italian and
Japanese seapower had removed the only serious threats to British sea
control. Although dwarfed by the United States Navy (USN), the
Royal Navy was considerably larger and more capable than any
potential rival. At this time the threat posed by a growth in Soviet
seapower was potential rather than immediate. In the early post-war
period the Soviet Union did not possess a serious naval force and
Soviet naval forces only rarely sortied from coastal operating areas.28
According to the COS Britain needed forces to provide for initial
defence in war and a nucleus around which to mobilise the country's
full resources. In addition, forces were required to meet security and
occupational commitments overseas. The COS declared that:
The first task of the Armed Forces in war will be the
defence of the United Kingdom, the main support
areas and the communications between them. In
addition to purely defensive forces this will call for the
provision of certain offensive forces which will act as
a deterrent to war breaking out and will limit the
striking power of the enemy should it do so.
As a long warning period could not be relied upon, the minimum
forces required to fulfil these roles would have to be maintained in
peacetime.29
26. Julian Lewis, Changing Direction. British Military Planning for Post-War
Strategic Defence, 1942-1947, (London: The Sherwood Press, 1988) p.250.
27. Ibid. p.250-251.
28. Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power. Challenge for the 1970s, (New York: Crane,
Russak and Co. Ltd, 1974) p.21-22.
29 • COS (46) 307(o), 30 December 1946, note by the Minister of Defence; CAB 80/103.
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In this climate the Royal Navy had to establish certain priorities.
Cutbacks were required in all areas and only those projects considered
vital by the Admiralty could expect its backing. In March 1946 the
First Lord, A.V.Alexander, reported to Parliament that since VE Day
727 vessels ranging in size from 'fleet carrier downwards" , had been
cancelled. 30 Within the framework set by the COS the Admiralty saw
its prime role as defence of the sea communications between the
United Kingdom and "the main support areas". In essence this was a
return to the kind of duties it had undertaken during the War when
the Navy's greatest trial had been the battle against the U-boats. The
Admiralty was more concerned with ensuring the safety of sea
communications than with exploiting the deterrent value of more
offensive uses of seapower. This was in spite of the fact that the COS
had decided that no fleet capable of endangering the security of the
United Kingdom would exist for a number of years.
The atomic bomb was not believed to have changed the fundamental
importance of this role. According to Alexander:
Our experience in the last war demonstrated once more
that if we ever neglected the security of our
communications we should be at the mercy of any
aggressor. He would have no need to incur the
hazards of using the atomic bomb. He would simply,
surely and swiftly destroy us by cutting our arteries at
se a. 3 I
This role had a familiarity about it with which the Navy and public
alike could identify. It was traditionally one of the Navy's core tasks.
It called for a wide range of vessels including aircraft carriers,
cruisers, destroyers and frigates. It did not, however, require landing
craft. There was no precedent for the retention of large numbers of
landing craft in peacetime. With resources scarce, a strong fresh case
had to be made if these craft were to be retained.
Facing the need for defence cuts, in December 1946 the new 1SL
Admiral Sir John Cunningham was questioned in the COS on possible
reductions by the Admiralty. Combined Operations was only one of a
number of areas he identified where cuts might be possible. Naval
Aviation, coastal forces, fuel reserves and ships trials were all
30 • Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), fifth series, volume 431 column 552.
31 . Ibid.
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identified as potential victims. 32 Like combined operations, none of
these were central to the core task of defending the sea lanes.
Cunningham pointed out that the reduction of Naval personnel,
following the contraction of the Naval estimates, would have the effect
of reducing the light fleet carrier establishment and would also result
in the paying off of a submarine depot ship and nine submarines. He
did, however, recommend particularly drastic cuts in the Combined
Operations organisation. He suggested that it be reduced to an
experimental basis and that the landing craft being maintained in
reserve for the brigade lift should be scrapped. 33 Cunningham
believed that this would create a manpower saving of some 4,500
officers and men. The landing craft base at Appledore could still be
maintained and any landing craft required for Army exercises in the
near future could be provided from there. An alternative course of
action which the Admiralty was prepared to accept was the retention
of sufficient ships, craft and personnel to accommodate a Commando
brigade. This represented a saving of 18 ships, 52 major craft, 177
minor craft and some 1,500 officers and men on current
requirements.34
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal
Montgomery, strongly opposed these proposals. In view of the
unsettled state of world affairs, he supported the decision reached by
the COS on 2 January 1946 to maintain the assault lift for an infantry
brigade. 35 The issue was brought before the Minister of Defence,
A.V.Alexander, who was inclined to suppcirt the Army in defence of
Combined Operations. Aware of the need to present as strong a front
as possible, despite the weakness of the British defence establishment,
he noted the deterrent value of amphibious capabilities:
Combined Operations have been proved during the
War to be a vital factor in modern war and to reduce
them to an experimental basis, with the attendant
publicity which would be given to such a decision,
would be to weaken our position in the eyes of the
world.36
32. Between 1946 and 1953 the title Naval Aviation was substituted for the more familiar name,
Fleet Air Arm .
33. COS (46) 190 mtg, 31 December 1946; CAB 79/54.
34. COS (47) 3 mtg, 3 January 1947; DEFE 4/1.
35. COS (46) 18 mtg.
36. COS (47) 5 mtg, 6 January 1947; DEFE 4/1.
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The Admiralty remained on the offensive. Accepting that amphibious
warfare would remain important to the three Services, Cunningham
resurrected the idea of replacing the central organisation with an
inter-Service committee. The 1SL claimed that COHQ's status as an
independent organisation tended to confine inter-Service cooperation
on combined operational matters to that actually conducted by COHQ
itself. He claimed that its existence militated against the growth of full
and direct cooperation between the three Services in this area, and he
proposed to replace COHQ with a two-fold organisation. A joint
Inter-Service Combined Operations Planning Staff would be set up
within the COS organisation. Each senior member of this planning
staff would be responsible for co-ordinating all combined operations
activities within his own department and act as a link with other
Service departments. In addition a combined operations school was
required, whose activities would be extended to include the study and
development of the technique of combined Operations.37
Laycock was unimpressed by this suggestion. He pointed out that it
was not a question of organisation, but rather a case of limited finance
that prevented more fruitful co-operation in the sphere of combined
operations. 38 Within COHQ the Admiralty was denounced for
persistently plotting against Combined Operations. The suggestion
that COHQ was responsible for limiting inter-Service co-operation
was rejected:
They produce no evidence to support this charge; we
know that the only foundation lies in the persistence
with which the Admiralty have not merely refused to
play, but have been actively anti-playing. Examples
of this are that they seldom send proper
representatives to meetings, and those who do come
are never empowered with any authority.39
The feeling within COHQ was that the Admiralty was trying to
sabotage what it saw as a nuisance organisation which would draw
funds away from the fleet.
37. COS (47) 55(o), 14 March 1947, memo by the 1SL; DEFE 5/3.
38. COS (47) 48 mtg, 2 April 1947; DEFE 4/3.
39 , Memo of 29 July 1946 by the Director of Combined Operations (Air) L.K.Barnes, folio 2;
DEFE 2/1647.
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The Army remained keen on amphibious warfare and supported
COHQ against the Admiralty. The Army and Air Force did not
equally share the burden that amphibious warfare placed on the Navy.
Montgomery, supported by Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Tedder,
rejected the Admiralty proposals. Outnumbered by his COS
colleagues, Cunningham was forced to accept that for the time being
COHQ should continue to be responsible for policy, training and
technique of combined operations under the general direction of the
COS 40 General Hollis, secretary to the COS Committee, noted that
the Admiralty "complained bitterly" that the lion's share of the cost of
Combined Operations fell to them while the War Office were the
principle users.41
Army interest in amphibious warfare was demonstrated in May 1947
when Montgomery initiated Exercise Spearhead at Camberley. The
object of the exercise was :
To study the technique of opposed landing at the end
of a long sea voyage carried out by British land forces
mounted in the United Kingdom.42
The exercise was organised for the benefit of senior officers from the
three Services and included representatives from the Dominions and
the United States. The officer in charge of preparing the exercise was
General Sir John Crocker. Crocker had commanded 1 British Corps
at Normandy. Exercise Spearhead shows how clearly the experience
of the last war affected thinking about future combined operations.
The war setting was 1949 and dealt with an invasion of the Italian
mainland by British forces. The enemy was taken to be the Axis
forces of World War Two. The Pacific technique employed by the
Americans in their conquest of isolated island strongholds was
specifically ruled out as unsuitable for European conditions and the
type of assault studied was modelled on the European landings of 1943
and 1944. The need for the maximum degree of surprise was
stressed. Air support was to be provided by land based aircraft. The
enemy was assumed to have a supply of atomic bombs, of which it
might be able to spare four or five for use against an amphibious
assault. The exercise concluded that although atomic weapons could
40 • COS (47) 48 mtg.
41. Folio 534; DEFE 11/276.
42. WO 216/202, War Office Exercise Spearhead.
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have potentially devastating results, the danger could be overcome by
employing flexibility and dispersion to the maximum possible degree
and by maintaining air superiority.43
It is hardly surprising that only three years after D-Day the Services
should plan the major assaults of the future along the lines of those
which had recently proven so successful. During 1946 COHQ
undertook a major evaluation of combined operations: the "Study of
the Conduct of Future Combined Operations". The object of this
study was to examine the lessons of the 1939-1945 war and then make
recommendations for an assault technique upon which training could
be based and development work could proceed. The study centred
around the problem of landing a military force of one infantry
division and an armoured brigade with the associated naval and air
forces in support. 44 While the effort to study the last war and to
avoid making the same mistakes again was commendable, their
immediate relevance to Britain in the late 1940s was limited. It was
already clear that the Admiralty would find great difficulty
maintaining sufficient lift for one brigade group during peacetime, let
alone an entire division. Neither Spearhead nor the COHQ study
addressed the issue of amphibious landings in emergencies short of
war. They reflected the extent to which amphibious warfare was
viewed in terms of large scale assaults in a major war on the basis of
previous experience of similar operations in Europe.
At this time amphibious warfare was still viewed as a means of
allowing Britain to return to a Continental. campaign after the Army
had been forced from the European mainland by superior enemy
force. Unable to match the Soviet army in Europe, before the
establishment of NATO in 1949 both Britain and the United States
planned to evacuate their occupation forces from Germany to the
United Kingdom and the Mediterranean if attacked on the Continent.
They then intended to build up strength prior to a return to Europe,
while allied air forces conducted a major bombing campaign. In
essence this was a return to the strategy employed by Britain in
43. WO 216/202. Copy also held at the Mountbatten archives, University of Southampton;
MBUN79.
44. Study of the Conduct of Future Combined Operations;DEFE 2/1727.
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1940.45 Amphibious warfare was a means of returning the Army to
a Continental campaign where it would become Britain's main war
effort.
In his final address to Exercise Spearhead Montgomery called for
maintenance in peacetime of sufficient craft to lift a brigade group.
He forcefully re-affirmed his commitment to combined operations:
The Army considers that the torch of Combined
Operations must be kept alight; it will back the
Combined Operations HQ one hundred per cent, and
will play its full part in ensuring an efficient
organisation for training and development.46
Montgomery believed that it was essential that sufficient ships and
craft to lift a brigade group should be available on the outbreak of
war. In addition, he considered that it was important to keep available
in peacetime enough craft to train forces in the use of all types of
assault and support craft. With the support of Laycock, he pushed
these requirements in the COS Committee.' Neither Tedder nor Vice-
Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor (speaking for the 1SL) could foresee
any requirement for large scale assault landings in the early stages of
a war. However, both agreed to accept Montgomery's proposal for
planning purposes. Thus on 4 June 1947 the COS accepted that
provision should be made for a brigade group lift with its full
complement of supporting arms and craft to be made available
immediately on the outbreak of war. 47 As was the case with the
Assault Training Force agreed in January 1946, this did not actually
commit the Navy to any action and McGrigor was on record as calling
the brigade group lift an "ideal requirement" that was "unrealistic"
48
In January 1946 Laycock had been asked to explore the possibility of
setting up CTEs in Europe and the Middle East in 1947. 49 According
to COHQ the object of a CTE was: to fun courses for individual
45. Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988) p.32.
C;J;Bartlett, The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy 1945-
1970, (London: Macmillan, 1972) chapter two.
46. WO 216/202.
47. COS (47) 70 mtg, 4 June 1947; DEFE 4/4.
48. Ibid.
49. COS (46) 18 mtg.
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officers and NCOs from the three Services who would then act as
instructors in their own units; to train beach groups and other
specialist beach organisations; and to assist units in combined
operations training at battalion level and to help in running large scale
exercises in conjunction with the Assault Training Force. 513 The
requirement for landing craft to serve the CTEs could be divided into
two stages. For the individual training of officers and NCOs only
small nucleus flotillas were required, consisting of one LCT, six LCA,
and two LCM. 51 It was hoped these could be set up in 1947 to
coincide with the anticipated opening of the CTEs. For unit training a
mobile flotilla would be formed in 1948 and would rotate between the
CTEs. This mobile flotilla of four LST(A), two LCT(8), one LCH,
and 18 LCA would be available as an operational reserve in an
emergency. 52 The Admiralty, however, were reluctant to commit
themselves to the provision of manpower for combined operations. In
October 1946 they announced that the Assault Training Force would
not be manned before 1952. They hoped to be able to provide
manpower for one CTE in 1949 and for another in 1952 but made no
firm commitment.53
The search for suitable sites for European and Mediterranean CTEs
resulted in the selection of Eckernforde on the Baltic coast of
Germany and of Famagusta in Cyprus. These CTEs were to be
constructed at a cost of £49,000 and £346,000 respectively. The
original estimated cost of £1,000,000 for the European CTE was
substantially reduced by the decision to convert existing torpedo
depots. The CTEs at Eckernforde and Famagusta were to be
established in 1947 and 1948 respectively. However, financial and
manpower difficulties forced the postponement and then cancellation
of both projects. Early proposals for a CTE in India or the Far East
were not taken up.54
Following Exercise Spearhead, in June 1947 Laycock recirculated a
paper first submitted to the COS in March 1947. The paper, entitled
"An Appreciation of our Capabilities and a Review of Our
50. Folio 10, docket CO.128/47; DEFE 2/1471. COS (46) 164 mtg, 18 November 1946; CAB
79/53.
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Requirements in Combined Operations" , outlined his hopes for the
future of Combined Operations. 55 Questioning whether a sufficient
proportion of the national vote was being spent on combined
operations, Laycock noted that the current provision of landing ships
and craft was inadequate and called for the construction of new LST
and LCT. Laycock accepted that an Assault Training Force on the
scale approved in 1946 was beyond the Admiralty's resources.
Nevertheless, he believed that a reduced amphibious force was
required to conduct effective training and called for this to be made
available in 1949 and not in 1952 as the Admiralty wanted.
Laycock assumed that there was a requirement to maintain an
operational assault force in peacetime. He. proposed a Naval Assault
Operational Force capable of carrying 6,000 men and 750 vehicles,
see table three.
Table Three: Naval Assault Operational Force
No.Required No.available
in commission  
Remarks
LSH(C) 1 Ship to be converted.
LST(3) 6 3 Balance in reserve.
LST(A) 15 - To be converted from
LST(3)
LSD 1 To be built.
LCH 3 1 2 to be built.
LCT(8) 12 4 Balance in reserve.
LCM(7) 12 12 in reserve and 18
commissioned for
training.
LCA 120 120 in reserve and 23
commissioned for
training.
LCN 2 To be built.
LCP(L) 2 36 in reserve and 8
commissioned for
training.
M/T Ship 1 - To be taken when
needed.
Coasters 2 To be taken when
needed.
P/B Units 8 In reserve but requiring
extensive refit.
This force required the construction of an LSD and two LCH,
conversion of 15 LST(3) to LST(A) and of the ship Keren to LSH.
55 . COS (47) 129(o), An Appreciation of our Capabilities and a Review of Our
Requirements in Combined Operations, 14 June 1947; DEFE 5/4.
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To expect the Navy to accept this programme in the existing financial
climate was hopelessly overoptimistic. Before the force could be
made ready, Laycock suggested that as a temporary measure the
Army accept one battalion assault loaded and the remainder of the
Brigade group carried in whatever White and Red Ensign shipping
that was available. 56
If Laycock's proposals for future combined operations requirements
were far too grand for the existing financial climate, his suggestions
for how to fund his proposals were equally unrealistic. Noting the
current dearth of resources, he outlined three possible courses of
action. Firstly, one could simply accept the present low ebb of
amphibious potential. Alternatively, one could ask the Army to accept
a greater burden of the responsibility for Combined Operations by
reallocating money and manpower from the Army estimates to the
Admiralty in order to help it to meet the requirements of the Army
for Combined Operations. Laycock's final suggestion was that the
Navy could accept the risk of a reduction in its ability to retain
control of the seas and in this way reallocate funds to Combined
Operations.57
The latter suggestion was not likely to find favour with the Navy,
although the idea was not as unreasonable as it might at first seem. It
had been agreed by the COS that the United States would never allow
Britain to be isolated in a future war. 58 The only feasible threat to
Britain's control of the sea lanes came from the Soviet fleet. Despite
the rundown of the Royal Navy there was still little realistic prospect
of enemy surface raiders challenging British command of the sea.
The Soviet Navy had been somewhat neglected and any indications
that this was about to change could not alter its immediate inferiority
in major surface vessels. There could be little doubt that the
combined Anglo-American navies could counter any Soviet threat.
However, Laycock's suggestion cut across the accepted wisdom of
generations and entirely ignored the Navy's post-war preoccupation
with control of the sea lanes and the increasing emphasis being placed
on anti-submarine forces. The Admiralty were determined not to run
the risk of losing sea control in any future war. As a result
56 . Ibid.
"Ibid.
58 . COS (47) 70 mtg, 4 June 1947; DEFE 4/4.
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manpower and resources were concentrated on the ships required to
maintain sea control and other less immediate tasks, such as
amphibious warfare, were given lower priority.
In March 1947 the Admiralty had written to all Naval Commanders-
in-Chief and also to CCO to comment on an additional cut of 9,500 in
naval personnel. It was clearly stated that every endeavour would be
taken to ensure that this did not interfere with Naval Aviation or lead
to a reduction in the seagoing fleets. Consequently "virtually the
whole of it will have to be borne by a further contraction of technical
training establishments, schools and base staffs both at home and
abroad" .59 Commenting on Laycock's overall proposals a
memorandum by the Admiralty described the suggestion as "basically
unsound and utterly inadmissible" , going on to add:
Nothing could be more unsound than to risk our
ability to gain and maintain control of sea
communications, by which alone can the movement of
our fighting forces to the points where they can be
most effectively used be ensured, in order to provide
the actual means, i.e. the ships and craft, of carrying
out these movements.60
This was classic maritime strategy. The above passage could almost
be a direct quote from Mahan. As an Army officer Laycock may
have under-estimated the strength of feeling within the Navy on this
issue.
The proposals to re-allocate manpower from the Army were rejected
as missing the point. The Royal Navy's manpower was restricted by
the rate of intake of regulars counter-balanced by the number of
trained National Servicemen due to be released. Naval manpower was
thus governed by the recruitment of Naval regulars and was set to
decline during 1947-1950. During the low ebb of 1948-1950 it would
be impossible to allocate more than 4,600 trained men to Combined
Operations. In any case, according to the Admiralty, the Assault
Training Force could not be manned before 1952 at the earliest, and it
still remained only an "ultimate target" . Certainly no "Operational
Assault Force" existed as yet. Therefore, the Admiralty asserted, the
59 . Folio 26, docket CO 824/48; DEFE 2/1695.
60• COS (47) 157(o), 6 August 1947, memo by Admiralty; DEFE 5/5.
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compromise solution suggestion by Laycock (now styled Chief of
Combined Operations Staff (COCOS)) would have to be accepted.61
The COS approved the creation of a School of Combined Operations
(SCO) in January 1946. Based at Fremington, near Bideford, the
School was to study the principles, tactics and technique of Combined
Operations and to teach these to senior and staff officers of all three
Services. 62 The first commandant of the SCO was Brigadier
Wildman-Lushington (RM) and the first course began on 19 August
1946. In addition to teaching British officers the school also taught
allied and Dominion forces. In August 1949 a Foreign Officers
Course was attended by 22 officers from ten different countries. As
well as teaching at Fremington the School sent teams to teach at Staff
Colleges in Britain and overseas and was to establish a close liaison
with it's American counterpart at Quantico.63
An Amphibious School, Royal Marines was formed following the
closure of the minor landing craft base at HMS Rosneath in 1948.
Minor landing craft training was moved to the Portsmouth area and
came under the control of Major General, Royal Marines Portsmouth.
The Amphibious School was formed to incorporate this training and
to absorb a small number of inter-Service Combined Operations units,
which had been so reduced in strength that they could no longer
administer themselves. The School was organised into a headquarters
and three functional wings: the Minor Landing Craft Wing, the Beach
Wing, and the Small Raids Wing. Each wing was responsible for
training personnel in its own particular field. Commando training
was conducted at the Commando School, Royal Marines after the
completion of basic infantry training.64
At a meeting held within COHQ on 19 January the Services agreed to
the creation of a Combined Signal School in order to keep alive the
communications technique in combined operations. 65
 The Combined
Signal School (CSS) was established at Fremington in late 1946. In
the directive to its commandant the object of the CSS was defined as
61. Ibid.
62. COS (46) 5 mtg, 10 January 1946; CAB 79/43.
63. See DEFE 2/1452. DEFE 2/1561, DEFE 2/1739, DEFE 2/1579.
64. Folio22+27, docket CO 793/34; DEFE 2/1619.
65 • Folio 3, docket CO 1062/46; DEFE 2/1745.
66
"to ensure continuity in the development of inter-Service signal
technique, and training for combined operations". The CSS's
responsibilities included the provision of instruction and
demonstrations for students at the SCO, including the operation of a
dummy LSH. The CSS was responsible . for training all specialist
beach signal units and a limited number of signal personnel from the
three Services. It was to act as parent and holding unit for Army and
RAF signal personnel assigned to Combined Operations and was to
encourage the development of signal technique and equipment.66
COXE was set up in the Westward Ho area in August 1942 to carry
out trials and experiments with combined operations equipment.67 In
line with the recommendations of the RAW Committee, COXE was
maintained in its original site after the war. The commandant was
responsible to CCO via the Director of Combined Operations (Naval)
at COHQ. In addition to advising CCO on the details of staff
requirements for all types of equipment appropriate to the amphibious
assault and the disembarkation of Army and RAF equipment, COXE
was "to carry out investigations, experiments and trials as directed, on
all combined operations problems in con. nection with the assault,
follow up and build up" •68
COXE remained based at Westward Ho, ten miles away from the CSS
and SCO at Fremington, until 1949. In May 1948 COHQ
recommended to the Ministry of Defence that in order to obtain
economical administration and efficient control and also to reduce
land requirements to a minimum, the Combined Operations
establishments should be concentrated at Fremington. The proposed
regrouping was approved by the War Office as it would result in
economies and release requisitioned properties. 69 Accordingly,
COXE headquarters was moved from Torridge House, Westward Ho
to Fremington. The transfer was completed on 10 May 1949. The
workshops and stores of COXE remained at Westward Ho, although
Service accommodation followed the headquarters and moved to
Fremington. The grouping of CSS, SCO 'and COXE was given the
title Combined Operations Centre, North Devon and was under the
66 • The Combined Signal School Standing Orders, 20 February 1947, docket CO
947/48; DEFE 2/1680.
67 • See chapter one, page 35.
68 • Folio 3A, docket CO 488/49; DEFE 2/1644.
69. Note from the Secretary of State for War to COHQ, 15 June 1948, folio 91; DEFE 2/1563.
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command of COCOS via Commandant, Combined Operations Centre,
North Devon.70
The possibility of taking the opportunity of changing the title
"combined operations" to "amphibious warfare" was raised but
rejected. It was noted that this might cause confusion as in American
usage the term "amphibious" had a narrower definition than the
British "combined operations" and that until this difference was
removed it would be premature to change a well recognised name.
COCOS also noted that such a change would have to be brought
before the COS and he was reluctant to bring unwarranted attention
on his command at a time when the Chiefs were desperate to reduce
expenditure. 71 The term "combined operations" continued in use
until February 1951 when "amphibious warfare" was finally
substituted in order to standardise nomenclature with the USA and
Canada. 72 Henceforth, COCOS was styled Chief of Amphibious
Warfare (CAW), COHQ changed title to Amphibious Warfare
Headquarters (AWHQ), SCO became the School of Amphibious
Warfare (SAW), CSS became the Amphibious Warfare Signal School
(AWSS) and COXE became the Amphibious Warfare Experimental
Establishment (AWXE).
By the summer of 1947 Britain's worsening economic position forced
the Minister of Defence, A.V.Alexander, to order the COS to
undertake a complete review of the post-war organisation of forces.
Central to this re-examination was the fact that a ceiling of £600
million was to be established for an indefinite period. Pointing to the
need for an economic and industrial recovery Alexander argued that
a balance had to be achieved between the danger of appearing too
weak, and thereby encouraging aggression,' and the possibility that by
spending too much on the armed forces, the "whole structure of our
economy might collapse" .73 In addition to the £600 million spending
limit Alexander imposed two further constraints on the COS:
1.It must be accepted that the risk of a major war is
ruled out during the next five years, and that the risk
70. DEFE 211563, DEFE 2/1564, DEFE 2/1565.
71. Docket CO 561/1/50; in DEFE 2/1565.
72. COS (51) 47, 1 February 1951, note by the War Office; DEFE 5/57. COS (51) 28 mtg, 9
February 1951; DEFE 4/40.
73. COS (47) 105 mtg, 19 August 1947; DEFE 2/1438,
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will increase only gradually during the following five
years. This risk will vary with our visible offensive
strength. If attacked we must fight with what we
have.
2.It must be accepted that the financial limit imposed
may prevent us having the defence forces hitherto
considered necessary on the outbreak of war. It will
therefore be necessary to build up only the forces
which give us the best chance of survival, and to
avoid dissipating our resources. This will mean
taking serious risks.74
There were four principles which were to govern the composition of
British forces:
1.Priority should be given to forces in peace which
gave the best visible show of strength and thus have
the best deterrent value.
2.Long term research and development should have
priority in expenditure.
3 .Provision must be made for minimum forces
necessary for essential overseas garrisons and
stations.
4.No additional provision should be made for forces
for the United Nations.75
A strong seaborne striking force based around powerful amphibious
forces and supported by aircraft carriers could have provided just
such a visible show of strength. However, the emphasis on long term
research and development and the decision to provide only minimum
forces for overseas garrisons and no additional forces for UN
operations undermined the need for amphibious intervention
capabilities. For the Admiralty the major naval priority was to be
defence of Britain's sea communications against submarine and air
attack. Other naval tasks, such as combined operations, could be
downgraded since they would not be required in the early stages of a
war.76 The Navy sought to base its re-assessment on the necessity of
providing essential foreign stations commitments, proper training, and
a nucleus to expand at the outbreak of war. 77 In order to help the
Navy achieve cuts totalling £13,750,000 drastic cuts were suggested
for Combined Operations. Alongside reductions in other areas, in
September 1947 the 1SL proposed, "to maintain a comparatively small
cadre in order to keep alive the art of Combined Operations", The
74. COS (47) 173(o), 23 August 1947; DEFE 2/1438.
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reduction he envisaged, "would render it impossible to stage combined
operations for several years, or even to land and maintain the smallest
force over beaches".78
The Navy was not being unreasonably obstructive. The rundown in
the operational strength of the fleet in 1947 had been startling. By
December a combination of economic crisis and manpower problems
had reduced the Home Fleet to one light .cruiser, a few destroyers,
frigates and submarines.79 The manpower provision for Combined
Operations was cut from 4000 in July 1946 to a temporary low of
1,000, 600 short of the accepted bare minimum necessary to meet
training and other commitments. 80 As a further cost cutting measure
Cunningham suggested moving the Combined Operations
establishments in North Devon to the Portsmouth area, to be housed in
existing Service accommodation. He requested an inter-Service
committee to examine the issue.81
The possibility of a limited move to Portsmouth had been raised
within COHQ in 1947. It was suggested that COXE would profit
from being nearer dockyard facilities, the main naval and military
trials and development organisations and the major centres of Service
activity in general. The proposals came to nothing. It was considered
that COXE was better off close to the SCO at Fremington and the
excellent beach conditions in the Bideford area. 82 COCOS was
equally opposed to the move of the SCO and CSS, believing that
accommodation difficulties, beach conditions and the inability to
expand the site in wartime ruled out Portsmouth. 83 The Principle
Administrative Officers' Committee were invited by the COS to
investigate the 1SL's proposal. The resulting report recommended
that the schools and COXE remain at Fremington as the move to
Portsmouth could only take place if fresh construction was
undertaken. It was not considered that such construction was
justified.84
78. COS (47) 184(o), 1 September 1947; DEFE 5/5.
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In the aftermath of the 1947 convertibility crisis Britain's economic
position was dire. The Treasury continued to press the armed forces
for cuts which the Services were equally determined to resist. In
December 1947 Alexander was forced to strengthen the new ten year
rule. It had to be accepted that there was no risk of war before 1952,
and then a gradually increased risk through to 1957. 85 Forces were
to be maintained at the minimum possible level consistent with
providing for the bare essentials and the best possible show of
deterrent strength. According to Eric Grove the ten year rule was in
fact driven as much by strategic analysis as economic pressure and it
had a generally beneficial effect on strategic planning before it was
abandoned during the Korean re-armament. 86 Whether or not this is
the case is beyond the scope of this study. However, the rule was to
have a deleterious effect on a Combined Operations organisation seen
as a luxury by a Navy desperate to reduce expenditure.
The COS appointed a working party under Admiral E.G.Harwood in
December 1948 to draft proposals for ministers based on annual
defence expenditure of £700 million from April 1950. The resulting
Report of the Inter-Service Working Party on Size and Shape of the
Armed Forces (Harwood Report) was submitted in February 1949.
Based on the assumptions embodied in the "ten year rule" , the report
sought to assess the best forces that could be provided within the
defence ceiling, rather than to calculate the forces necessary to
support a given policy. The results were predictably hard on the
Services. The Report proclaimed that "Our aim must be to produce
compact, well-equipped modern forces rather than larger, obsolescent
forces living beyond their means" .87
Under the Harwood scheme the Royal Navy was to receive the
smallest individual share of finance. The working party
recommended annual Naval estimates of around £166 million a year,
requiring a drastic reshaping of the Navy. Naval manpower was to be
cut down to 90,000 in 1952-53 from a proposed 120,000 in 1950.
The stress was to be on a carrier and small ship force devoted in
85. COS (47) 263(o), 11 December 1947, report by the Minister of Defence; DEFE 5/6.
86. Eric Grove, "The Post War Ten Year Rule - Myth and Reality" in RUSI Journal, Vol.129
No.4, December 1984, p.48-53.
87. Misc/P(49)6. 28 February 1949, Report of Inter-Service Working Party on Size and
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wartime to the protection of Britain's sea communications. It was
assumed that the United States would be at war with Russia practically
simultaneously with Britain and that the allies would possess a
substantial naval preponderance. It was therefore concluded that
Britain should seek to complement the American capability rather
than merely add to the areas where the two nations were already
dominant.
Harwood saw little place for Combined Operations in his peacetime
force structure. The working party identified a need to be prepared
to mount small scale raids of up to 300 men on an enemy held
coastline and to continue training in clandestine operations. Research
and development of raiding and clandestine activities were also to
continue, as was the study of the technique of larger operations,
relying where necessary on American help. In view of this reduced
role it was proposed to cut the existing organisation. Although the
schools were to be retained the working party recommended replacing
COHQ with a sub-committee of the COS under the Minister of
Defence. A small inter-Service permanent staff would also be
necessary.
The report went further. It suggested that the Navy could not afford
to support the Royal Marine Commandos who performed an Army
role in peace. It was therefore recommended that the Commandos
should be abolished and the Royal Marine Corps disbanded, or
retained as a regiment within the Army. The 1SL reacted strongly to
this suggestion, stating plainly that it was unacceptable. 88 COCOS was
equally firm in the defence of his organisation, reporting to the COS
that implementation of the Harwood proposals would mean that
Britain would be no better prepared for combined operations in the
next war than it had been in the last one. He felt justified in pointing
out that the current Combined Operations organisation cost the
country less that £1,000,000 a year. Existing manpower was only
1,100 (mainly naval) out of a total eventual naval strength of 90,000.
It was, he believed, a modest price to pay for keeping alive the ability
to deploy fighting forces across the sea.89
88. COS (49) 143, 23 April 1949, memo by the 1SL; DEFE 5/4.
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Eric Grove has written that the COS were secretly delighted with the
Harwood proposals as they enabled them to highlight to their political
masters the dire results that would be associated with the £700 million
defence ceiling. 90 Certainly it is true that the COS reported to the
Cabinet Defence Committee that the Harwood Report, though a
"valuable analysis" , was unacceptable. The report, they claimed,
proved that £700 million was an inadequate sum to carry out foreign
and colonial policy in peace and the requirements of strategy in war.
It was noted that the Harwood proposals for Combined Operations
would result in an inability to take effective amphibious action in
force in the early part of a war. 91 The Chiefs were supported in their
opposition to Harwood by the Minister of Defence and consequently it
was decided in July 1949 to set up another working party, this time
under Sir Harold Parker, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of
Defence. The Harwood Report was dropped.92
Combined Operations did not get much of a respite. Facing the need
for further economies the Admiralty once again attacked COHQ. In
July 1949 the 1SL, Lord Fraser of North Cape, proposed an assault
lift sufficient for a brigade group for the war fleet of 1957, one third
of a brigade lift for the peacetime fleet, with the remaining two thirds
in Category C reserve (i.e. at more than three months notice). COHQ
would be abolished and the control of training vested in the Army for
the shore side, and the Navy for the sea side, through a sub-committee
of the COS.93
The requirement for the provision of sufficient lift for a brigade
group with supporting arms at the start of war had been agreed in
June 1947. However, this had only been accepted as an ideal target
for planning purposes, and then only reluctantly by the Navy. The
Admiralty had conveyed their view to COHQ that the brigade lift was
only a "yardstick" .94 To them the requirement was for the
maintenance of sufficient ships and craft to lift a brigade group,
although not at assault scales. COCOS Wildman-Lushington was
dismayed by this opinion, fervently believing in the need to maintain
90 • Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.49.
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the ability to conduct brigade group operations at the outset of war.95
In April 1949 he had reported to the COS that destruction of this lift
"would virtually deny us power to develop any offensive amphibious
operations in force for the first two years of a war" •96 He accepted
that the maintenance of the ships and craft necessary to lift a balanced
force of approximately one third of a brigade group represented a
valuable training unit. Nevertheless, he pointed out, such a force bore
no resemblance to any recognised military fighting formation and for
operational purposes was inadequate for amphibious operations, other
than token assaults on neutral island territories.97
As part of the continuing review of the defence establishment, on 12
August 1949 the Minister of Defence approved the setting up of an
inter-Service committee to review Combined Operations. The
committee, appointed under the Chair of Air Commodore F.W.Long,
was established with the following terms of reference:
To review the headquarters and other Combined
Operations establishments and to recommend what
changes should be made and how reductions in the
present cost can best be achieved.98
Taking into account the report of the RAW Committee and the need to
maintain an effective liaison with the United States, the Long
Committee were satisfied that the duties of COHQ could not be
effectively discharged by an inter-Service committee within the COS
organisation. COHQ was to remain in London along existing lines but
was to be drastically reduced and to transfer many duties to the
establishments at Fremington. It was suggested that COHQ effect a
reduction of officers from 40 to 13 and achieve a 50 per cent
reduction in civilian staff and other ranks which would yield a total
saving of about £48,000 a year. Reductions and reorganisation at
Fremington could yield a further saving of between £5,000 and
£6,000. The committee strongly recommended the retention of
sufficient amphibious lift for a brigade group.99
95. Folio 4, docket CO 1648/49; DEFE 2/1721.
96. COS (49) 144, 23 April 1949, memo by COCOS; DEFE 2/1710.
97. Folio 3, docket CO(o) 1639/49; DEFE 2/1710. 	 .
98. COS (49) 336, 11 October 1949; DEFE 5/17.
99. Ibid.
74
While discussing the Report of the Long Committee, Lord Fraser
expressed the opinion that COHQ should be placed under the
command of the Commandant General, Royal Marines (CGRM).100
The Commandos were already a Royal Marine responsibility, as was
the Amphibious School, Royal Marines at Eastney. According to
Fraser:
By dove-tailing the staff of the Royal Marine Office
and COHQ it should be possible to effect an overall
reduction in staff, and also prevent any overlapping
between the Combined Operations School at
Fremington and the Amphibious School.
At this stage he believed that the post of COCOS could not be merged
with that of the CGRM as the work load of . the latter was already very
heavy. Fraser suggested that previous objections, based upon the fact
that COHQ was an inter-Service responsibility and under such a
system would lose its direct links to the COS and Minister of Defence,
could be overcome by giving COCOS the right to approach the COS
on matters of policy. '01
Fraser submitted detailed proposals to the COS on 9 March 1950.102
He now advocated vesting primary responsibility for amphibious
warfare with the Royal Marines. CGRM would be given the
additional title of COCOS, in which capacity he would be adviser to
the COS on amphibious warfare. His directive would be issued by the
Admiralty after approval by the COS and Minister of Defence. Royal
Marine Headquarters would be re-organised as a tri-Service
headquarters with an Army officer acting as Chief of Staff (Combined
Operations). The Admiralty would continue to be responsible for the
Royal Marines and thus for Combined Operations. Details of the
financial provision for Combined Operations would be given in the
Navy estimates and these would not be varied without the concurrence
of the Minister of Defence. Fraser believed that his proposals would
bring an overall manpower saving of 110 Service personnel and 20
civilians plus a financial saving of £70,000 per annum. In addition to
these considerations, the Admiralty favoured the proposals as they
promised to "clean up" responsibility for amphibious warfare and
M. COS (49) 182 mtg, 8 December 1949; DEFE 4/27.
101. Ibid.
102. cos (50) 87, 9 March 1950, memo by 1SL; DEFE 11/277.
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would broaden the outlook of the Marine Corps by more fully
integrating them with the Army and Air Force.
Both the Long Report and Admiral Fraser's proposals were
considered at a COS meeting on 22 March 1950. Wildman-
Lushington outlined his opposition to the Long Report. He believed
that the proposed cuts went too far and were based on unsound
principles, namely that COHQ should transfer the bulk of policy to
Fremington. He had several objections to Fraser's proposals. Despite
the safeguards the CGRM and his Marine and Naval staff would still
owe primary allegiance to the Admiralty. He was concerned that
insufficient attention would be devoted to combined operations, unless
the organisation was independent of any one Service. He also doubted
that the Royal Marines had sufficient experience in the full range of
issues to undertake the responsibility for combined operations.
COCOS disputed the Admiralty claims that 00,000 could be saved by
the proposed integration of staffs, pointing out that this saving
included cuts in Royal Marines headquarters which would go ahead
whether or not the merger with COHQ was undertaken. In reality the
reductions suggested by Fraser would be in the order of only
£22,000.103
Far from being supported by the CAS, Sir John Slessor, Combined
Operations was subjected to an even more vigorous attack. Slessor
proposed to leave the study of technique for opposed landings entirely
to the United States, arguing that if Britain could leave the long-range
air bombardment to the United States then it should also be possible to
leave to them the responsibility for the study and development of
technique for major landing operations. The Army once again came
to the rescue. CIGS Sir William Slim emphasised that the study of the
technique of landing a brigade group and larger was important and
need not be expensive. Although in a future war Britain might not be
ready to conduct large amphibious assaults at the outbreak, it might
well be necessary to conduct operations similar to the Madagascar
landings which took place in the last war. He echoed Corbett, saying:
Small operations of this nature were traditionally
British and there was no reason to believe that in the
event of another war, we should still not be required
103 • COS (50) 47 mtg, 22 March 1950; DEFE 4/30.
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to mount this type of operation as we had done in the
past.
Slim was strongly of the opinion that Combined Operations should
remain an independent organisation. If, however, it was to fall under
the authority of one Service, he considered that that Service should be
the Army. Faced once more with the opposition of the Army, Fraser
backed down. The COS agreed that COHQ should remain an
independent organisation along the lines suggested in the Long Report,
although the staff should be reduced by only 40 per cent.104
In the period since 1944 the Admiralty had made six separate attempts
to undermine the independent status of COHQ or to have it abolished
entirely. This is indicative of the Admiralty's attitude towards
amphibious warfare. The Navy was unwilling to divert resources to
amphibious warfare as they saw it as a distraction from their main
mission. 105 Under the existing concepts of amphibious operations the
Navy's role was to support the army in large scale operations intended
as a prelude to a land campaign. In the post-war environment, where
there were not enough resources to maintain an adequate fleet, it was
not surprising that this inter-Service role was accorded a very low
priority. A note written in July 1946 by a member of the executive of
COHQ, Commodore G.R.C.Allen, is worth quoting at length:
By tradition and teaching, the Admiralty is responsible
for keeping open the trade routes, which is a defensive
role in warfare. The development and provision of
materials suitable for carrying and landing the Army in
time of war is a responsibility shared between the
Admiralty and the Ministry of Transport. It is an
offensive role; but nevertheless, has always been
regarded as secondary to the Navy's principle role of
keeping open the trade routes. The money allotted to
Combined Operations must therefore, necessarily be at
the expense of conventional navy ships. That is the
root of the Admiralty's reluctance, in the past, to make
adequate provision for Combined Operations; and that
is the danger which must be guarded against.
Allen also noted that under his directive CCO was charged with
"initiating demands" and "stimulating action" from the Admiralty.
No government department likes being "stimulated" by an outside
104. Ibid.
105 W.J.Crowe, The Policy Roots of the Modern Royal Navy, 1946-1963,
(University Microfilms Inc, An Arbor, Michigan, 1965) p.77-79.
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authority and this was another reason for the desire to abolish
C 0 H Q .106 Andrew Cunningham disliked COHQ precisely for this
reason. He considered that it held power without responsibility.
According to Laycock:
Our views were nearly always conflicting since I spent
most of my time arguing that we ought to build flat
bottomed landing ships and craft, to the detriment of
the programme for producing conventional men-of-
war, which he, as Chief of Naval Staff, obviously
favoured. 107
Operational experience in command in the Mediterranean during
World War Two meant that both Andrew and John Cunningham were
well aware of the demands which major amphibious operations placed
on the fleet, and that no such operations could be contemplated before
control of the sea was secured With Combined Operations under the
wing of the Royal Marines or represented by a committee along the
lines of the JPS, the Admiralty would have been able to control the
demands and stimuli which it received, reducing the impact on the
rest of the Navy and allowing it to concentrate resources on the
traditional tools of sea power.
The immediate threat posed by the Soviet fleet in 1945 was limited.
However, following the War Stalin initiated a naval building
programme and between 1945 and 1950 five light cruisers and two
heavy cruisers were completed and the first of fourteen 19,200 ton
Sverdlov class cruisers was laid down. The greatest potential threat
was posed by the growth in Soviet submarine strength. In 1945 the
Soviets had come into possession of a number of advanced German
Type XXI U-boats. This led to fears that new German technology
would be incorporated in future Soviet submarines, greatly enhancing
their capabilities. By 1948 both the Royal Navy and the USN were
convinced that the Soviets were building a substantial submarine fleet
which, in conjunction with land based aircraft, could threaten sea
communications. 108 In April 1948 the Admiralty were predicting
that by 1949 the Soviet Union would be able to mount a substantial
106 . Folio 3; DEFE 2/1647.
107 • Oliver Warner, Cunningham of Hyndhope. Admiral of the Fleet, (London: John
Murray, 1967) p.227-228.
108 • Crowe, Policy Roots, p.116-119.
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maritime force against Britain. 109 The implications of this appeared
to confirm the need to concentrate resources on the ability to fight a
future battle of the Atlantic and the relegation of other roles to a
much lower priority. From 1947 the Services were planning for
future conflict ten years ahead. By 1957 235 Whiskey class
submarines had been built and with the addition of Zulu and Quebec
class boats the Soviet Union produced an estimated 300 advanced
submarines between 1950 and 1958.110
Soviet submarine capabilities in the 1940s and 1950s did not live up to
the worst fears of Western planners. The medium range Whiskey
class submarines were uncomplicated boats, easy to produce and
simple to operate. They were not copies of the German Type XXI,
being based on a wartime Soviet design.. The larger, longer Zulu
class did incorporate German design features but only 26 such boats
were built. The third post-war submarine design, the Quebec class,
was a coastal vessel unsuitable for an Atlantic raiding role. The
quality of the Soviet submarine fleet improved considerably from the
late 1950s with the introduction of the Romeo and Foxtrot class
boats. However, far from causing undue concern in the Admiralty,
this coincided with a decision to reduce the emphasis being placed on
anti-submarine warfare within the Royal Navy."
There is some doubt whether these boats were intended to operate in
an offensive or a defensive role. Certainly Stalin's concepts of
maritime strategy were based on defending the Soviet Union's coastal
regions from attack by enemy forces. 112 The main emphasis of
Soviet naval strategy appears to have been that of countering a
perceived threat posed by Anglo-American amphibious forces, and it
is in this context that the huge submarine force may best be
explained. 113 In this sense one could claim that the maintenance of
strong amphibious forces could have exercised a powerful deterrent
effect on the Soviet Union. Such forces would have exploited the
109 • Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.40.
110 • Polmar, Soviet Naval Power, p.26.
111 • Norman Polmar + Jurrien Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies,
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flexibility and mobility of allied seapower, threatening to strike
against a variety of coastal targets, throwing the Soviet Union on the
defensive in the war at sea. The strategic potential of amphibious
forces had recently been demonstrated in Normandy and the Pacific.
The Admiralty chose a different interpretation. They perceived the
Soviet naval build-up as essentially offensive and acted accordingly.
Facing the possibility of an attack on Britain's sea communications by
a large fleet of submarines they decided to concentrate resources on
meeting this threat. This approach can be criticised as over cautious.
However, given the parlous state of the post-war fleet it was inevitable
that the Navy would concentrate on the "core task" of securing
command of the sea before it attempted more ambitious undertakings
such as amphibious operations. To have done otherwise would have
been to risk defeat at sea and a successful blockade of the British Isles.
The post-war organisation for amphibious warfare was established in
the immediate aftermath of the Normandy landings. It is therefore
not surprising that the agreed concept of operations and the
organisation decided upon should have been designed to prepare
Britain for the same kind of large scale assaults that had recently been
conducted. This called for an independent, inter-Service, centralised
headquarters responsible for amphibious policy and technique, and for
a large scale training organisation backed up by a naval assault
training force able to prepare the three Services for future assault
operations. While the Army remained keen to maintain amphibious
capabilities after the War, the Navy, the Service which bore the brunt
of expenditure on these capabilities, was less enthusiastic. Although
amphibious warfare was an offensive tool of seapower, under the
existing concept of operations it was devoted mainly towards a
military role, that of returning the Army to the Continent of Europe.
The Royal Marines had no specific responsibility for amphibious
warfare which was a drain on Admiralty resources, a constraint
rather than an opportunity. Instead of exploiting the potential
deterrent value of amphibious seapower the Admiralty chose to
concentrate on the traditional core task of securing the sea lanes.
It is interesting to note the role of atomic weapons in the fate of
Combined Operations. Large scale amphibious assaults against
defended beaches require a concentration of force that would be an
ideal target for atomic attack. Nevertheless, atomic weapons were not
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believed to have made such assaults untenable. Both Exercise
Spearhead and The Study by COHQ expressed the opinion that the
vulnerability to atomic attack could be avoided by greater use of
dispersion and by securing air superiority. 114 Although there was an
appreciation of the potentially devastating results which could be
achieved using atomic weapons against conventional amphibious
assaults, it was believed that the limited availability of these weapons
would preclude large scale use against such targets. 115 One should
remember that the Soviet Union did not possess any atomic weapons
before 1949. The radical change in the nature of warfare implied by
the existence of these weapons did not begin to be fully appreciated
until the development of hydrogen bombs and the expansion of atomic
arsenals in the early 1950s. It was appreciated that Britain would be
unable to launch major amphibious assaults in the early stages of any
future war, but this was because Britain could not maintain in
peacetime the resources necessary for such assaults rather than the
result of a new assessment of the risk of atomic counterattack.
114. WO 216/202. DEFE 2/1727. DEFE 2/1608.




CINDERELLA OF THE SERVICES
In 1944 and again in 1949 the Admiralty proposed placing the
organisation for combined operations under the specific control of the
Royal Marines. This was ruled out by the existing perception of
amphibious warfare as a strictly inter-Service matter and by a pre-
occupation with large scale Overlord type operations. It was
accepted that while the Royal Marines should provide troops for small
scale raids, larger operations would have to be conducted by the
regular Army supported, where necessary, by specialist units. During
the 1950s the increasing availability of atomic weapons and the
development of the hydrogen bomb put in doubt the future ability to
launch large scale amphibious assaults against first rate opposition.
The emphasis in amphibious warfare shifted from large scale assaults
on the Overlord model to small scale raiding and the use of
amphibious capabilities to discharge supplies through war damaged
ports and anchorages. In the changed strategic environment it was no
longer considered necessary to train the entire Army for amphibious
operations. Amphibious warfare could now become the realm of the
specialist. The Admiralty were keen to ensure that the Royal Marines
should assume this responsibility, giving them a distinct and separate
role from the Army and supporting their institutional survival as an
integral part of the Navy.
Following the War the Royal Marines shrank from a high of 74,000
men to about 13,000 by 1948. Of these 13,000 only 2,000 were at sea
on board ships. 1 Only three Commandos were retained, numbers 40,
42 and 45, formed into 3 Commando Brigade at Hong Kong. 2 In
1948 the 1SL outlined the characteristics and roles of Royal Marine
Commandos to the COS. These included keeping alive the commando
technique; providing a nucleus for expansion in war; and, "the
provision of highly mobile and lightly equipped units for Imperial
policing and internal security duties". In war they were to conduct
raiding; seize strategic points; assist in large scale assaults; and, if
necessary, act as conventional infantry. 3 Too often shortage of Army
I . J.L.Moulton, The Royal Marines, (Eastney: The Royal Marine Museum, 1981) p.111.
2. Robin Neillands, By Sea and Land. The Story of the Royal Marine Commandos,
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units meant that Commandos were allotted to Army policing tasks
which allowed little or no scope for amphibious training and which
represented an inefficient use of elite troops. From Hong Kong the
Commando Brigade moved to Malta in 1948 to become the mobile
reserve for the Middle East and Mediterranean. Twelve months later
they returned to Hong Kong and in 1950 the Brigade began a two year
tour of duty fighting the Communists in Malaya. Operating in the Far
East in an army role allowed the Commandos no time to practice
amphibious warfare.4
The use of the Marines in this role laid them open to the charge that
they were no more than expensive conventional soldiers. The
Harwood Report concluded that as the Corps performed an army role
in peacetime it should either be disbanded or transferred to the Army.
In July 1950 the new CGRM, General Hollis, noted that there was a
danger that the Corps could be considered unbalanced and
uneconomical and that "one possible line of reasoning" was that the
Corps was redundant in its present role. He advocated retaining the
Commandos and attaching amphibious striking forces to the main
fleets in order to emphasise the unique nature of the Corps. 5 By
seeking to give the Royal Marines special responsibilities for
amphibious warfare the Admiralty sought to reinforce the distinct and
special nature of these troops and thus to protect them from either
disbandment or amalgamation into the Army. 6 Nevertheless, in 1953
the Admiralty was considering a major cut in the strength of the
Royal Marines including the loss of two out of three Commando units
as part of the Radical Review of defence policy. The CGRM,
General Westall, reacted strongly to these suggestions, claiming that
the Commando Brigade was not viable with only one unit and that if
the brigade could not be maintained then "the only logical answer"
would be to abolish the Corps. 7 In the event the Commando Brigade
was not cut, although the episode would seem to confirm Major-
General Moulton's opinion that "if the Board had the choice between a
new ship and a Commando, they would go for the ship every time" .8
4. Neillands, By Sea and Land, chapter 8.
5. CGRM Hollis to the Second Sea Lord, 24 July 1950; ADM 205n5.
6. VCNS to 1SL, 10 November 1950; ADM 205/75.
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In August 1950 Admiral Joy (USN), commander of UN Naval forces
in Korea, requested a small raiding force to operate against
Communist lines of communications. The Commando Brigade was
unavailable as it was fully occupied in Malaya. As a result a new unit,
41 (Independent) Commando, was raised in the United Kingdom from
various Royal Marine establishments. Supplemented by a draft on its
way to 3 Commando in Malaya, the unit arrived in Japan in
September 1950. In conjunction with the Americans the Commando,
under Lieutenant-Colonel D.B.Drysdale, conducted a number of small
scale raids against enemy communications during October before
distinguishing itself in operations alongside the US 1st Marine
Division in the retreat to the coast from the Chosin Reservoir. In
May 1951 the Commando took part in a demonstration off Choda, an
island off the east coast. Transported in an American LSD and APD
the Marines landed unopposed in American LVTs and withdrew after
eight hours, having blown up a railway line. In July the unit occupied
some islands off Wonsan from which small raids were periodically
conducted. The Commando, now under Lieutenant-Colonel
F.N.Grant, handed over their base at Wonsan to South Korean
Marines in December 1951 and withdrew to Japan before returning to
Britain to be disbanded at Plymouth on 22 February 1952.9
41 Commando was not a full Commando, consisting of only 200 to
300 men. Once in Japan it was joined by a tiny unit known as
Poundforce , raised from volunteers from the Far Eastern Fleet. It is
significant that Britain's existing amphibious spearhead and specialist
raiding force, 3 Commando Brigade, could not be employed in Korea.
The fact that Drysdale managed to raise 41 Commando in only two
weeks and that it gave such a good account of itself is a credit to the
Commando organisation as a whole. That the existing Brigade was
unavailable is a reflection on the low priority accorded to the need to
maintain an amphibious force readily available for operations
anywhere in the world. Even had 3 Commando been available the
Royal Navy could not have provided it ' with its own assault lift
9 . D.B.Drysdale, "41 Commando", Marine Corps Gazette, August 1953 p.28-32. Anthony
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without bringing the necessary ships and craft out of reserve, or
converting merchant ships to LSI(M).10
The experience of Korea did not have a profound influence on the fate
of amphibious warfare in the United Kingdom. Royal Navy warships
and aircraft conducted numerous bombardments of coastal targets and
participated in the support of amphibious operations." However, no
British amphibious warfare ships or craft .took part in operations in
Korea and the British initiated no major landings. The American
landing at Inchon and the diversions and raids served merely to
confirm the basically World War Two mindset of AWHQ, which
concentrated on raiding in the early stages of war with the possibility
of large scale operations later. It was acknowledged that Britain could
not maintain in peace the ships and craft required to conduct an
operation of the size of Inchon. What Inchon did prove was that
amphibious landings were still viable. The landings, which reversed
the tide of the Korean War and led to the collapse of the North
Korean offensive, could hardly have been more difficult. The port of
Inchon had a tidal range of over 30 feet and was protected by banks of
mud which were exposed at low tide. There were no beaches as such
to land on, only a seawall which could have proven a hazard to the
assault and the disembarkation of vehicles and stores. A fortified
island, Wolmi-Do, dominated the harbour. . That such a landing could
be successfully conducted may have encouraged those who still saw a
role for amphibious operations but its immediate relevance to Britain
was not thought to be great. The Admiralty considered that Korea
provided "very little in the way of sound experience" . 12 Despite the
success of amphibious operations in Korea, and the Navy's experience
of limited war, the first priority remained control of the sea lanes in a
war against the Soviet Union.
In March 1950 the COS had requested that Wildman-Lushington carry
out a survey of the ships and craft required to be maintained in
peace. 13 The difference of opinion with the Admiralty over the
proposed brigade group lift had yet to be resolved. The report was
complete in August 1950, although agreement with the Admiralty
10. Ibid.
11. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.142-143 + 146-147.
12. Ibid. p.150.
13 • COS (50) 47 mtg, 22 March 1950; DEFE 4/30.
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could not be reached and it was not until March 1951 that the COS
endorsed a revised version which subsequently became the approved
policy regarding ships and craft. 14 The purposes for which
amphibious ships and craft might be required in peacetime and during
the early months of war were agreed to be:
A. raiding operations in Western Europe and the
Mediterranean.
B. peacetime training and elementary training in war.
C. the strategic mobility of the Army
D. the Royal Navy Rhine Flotilla.
E. the maintenance of a force over beaches when port facilities
are not available.
F. withdrawal of a force overseas.
G. the emergency discharge of cargoes in the United Kingdom
owing to damage to ports.
H. small scale amphibious assault operations which may
include;
1. the seizure of small strategic objectives in the face of light
opposition.
2. operations on the seaward flank of the Army.
3. operations in support of the United Nations before the
outbreak of general war.
Of these it was considered that A,B,C,D and H could be met
simultaneously. The ships and craft required for H, the brigade group
lift, would alternatively be available for E,F or G depending on
requirements.
The peacetime shipping requirement remained for an Assault Training
Force on brigade group scale, see Table One.
Chapter Three: Table One
LSI(L) 3 LST(3) 11
IST(Q) 1 LST(C) 2
LCT(8) 24 LCM(7) 14
LCA 90 LCP	 . 10
LCN 4 LSH 1
LSH(S) 2 LCH 2
MS(LC) 1 MS(LS) 1
LSM(R) 2
The minimum requirement was for battalion lift in commission with
the remaining craft held in Category A reserve. Ships and craft
beyond those required for brigade group lift were to be held in
14 . COS (51) 146, Combined Operations Ships and Craft Required to be Maintained
in Peacetime, 19 March 1951, memo by CAW; DEFE 5/29.
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Category C reserve. It was recognised, however, that the Navy would
be unable to provide the necessary manpower to achieve these levels
of readiness. The situation had advanced little in five years. In 1946
the provision of the ships and craft necessary to lift a brigade group
was agreed as an ultimate target. At the same time it was appreciated
that there was no immediate prospect of reaching this target. In 1951
the brigade group lift at the outbreak of war was accepted as a matter
of policy, but at the same time it was recognised that this policy could
not be fully implemented due to manpower shortages. The provision
of a mere 500 extra men would have met the full manpower
requirements for this lift.' 5 The failure to provide these men indicates
a general lack of urgency. The Navy at this time maintained a large
fleet in reserve ready to be manned upon mobilisation. In this respect
the amphibious lift was no different from the rest of the Navy.
Nevertheless, sufficient lift for a brigade group was approved as the
minimum necessary in peacetime and the failure of the Admiralty to
make the necessary manpower available illustrates the low priority
they accorded amphibious capabilities.
In 1952 the COS initiated a review of British foreign and defence
policy. A series of high level inter-Service discussions resulted in the
Global Strategy Paper which laid down the broad principles that were
to govern defence policy. The paper predicted that a future war
would begin with a short period of great intensity including atomic
attacks which would be followed by a phase of "broken-backed"
hostilities involving surviving forces. The emphasis in defence policy
was to be placed on the forces required for the intense opening period
and those which offered best deterrent value. Effectively, Britain was
to concentrate on its atomic weapons capability. It was recognised
that atomic and new hydrogen bombs had altered the nature of
warfare. 16 There would be no place for large vulnerable assaults
against defended coastlines in the early stages of a future war.
With Britain increasingly committed to the Continent after the
formation of NATO in 1949 and fears abou.t the possible disruption of
port facilities, the supply and maintenance of British forces in Europe
began to dominate thinking about amphibious warfare. The ability to
conduct small scale amphibious assault operations was now at the
15. COS (51) 146
16. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.84-85.
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bottom of the list of requirements for amphibious ships and craft.17
By November 1952 that role was no longer listed by CAW amongst
the tasks necessary to prepare for in the early stages of a global war.18
Although there was still a requirement for raiding forces, the main
emphasis had shifted to the provision of sufficient craft and trained
personnel to provide for the emergency discharge of cargo across
beaches. In April 1952 CAW, now Major-General V.D.Thomas,
called for the ships and craft of the brigade group lift to be made
available within two months of mobilisation in order to meet the
wartime requirement for the supply and withdrawal of British forces
in Northwest Europe. 19 He anticipated the early degradation of
conventional supply and shipping facilities due to atomic attack and
devised Plan Teak to supply and maintain British forces on the
continent using LSTs landing at pre-prepared hards.20
A Territorial Army unit, 264 (Scottish) Beach Brigade, was formed
in Scotland in 1947. Its tasks included the maintenance and evacuation
of British forces over beaches and the working of damaged ports.
The provision of beach groups for amphibious assault operations,
although originally a major part of the unit's rationale, was accorded
a very low priority by 1952. 21 The Brigade practised the emergency
discharge of cargo into Britain following an atomic attack. In 1951 it
conducted Exercise Overside to examine the possible role of the
brigade in running an anchorage port after the major West Coast
ports had been attacked with atomic weapons. In Exercise Swansong
the Brigade investigated the problems of supplying a Glasgow
devastated by atomic attack through the minor ports of Troon, Irvine
and Ardrossan. It was recognised that the Beach Brigade was well
equipped to operate alternative or damaged ports in wartime, and that
it would be the only unit available to do so.22
The increasing interest in beach maintenance and discharge via
damaged ports did not mean that AWHQ was no longer interested in
maintaining the technique of amphibious assault. CAW reiterated the
17. COS (51) 146.
18. COS (52) 649, 29 November 1952, report by CAW; DEFE 5/43.
19 • COS (52) 234, 30 April 1952, report by CAW; DEFE 5/39.
20• COS (52) 391, 30 April 1952, memo by CAW; DEFE 5/40.
21. COS (52) 645, 25 November 1952, note by the War Office; DEFE 5/42. A Short Review
of the History and Development of British Amphibious Warfare, 23 August 1954;
DEFE 2/1900.
22. Docket 28/2/53; DEFE 2/1802.
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importance of conducting exercises on brigade group scale in order to
give the necessary scope to the planning staffs and the minimum
training to individuals. 23 The need to have raiding forces available at
the outbreak of war continued to be stressed. The requirement for
raiding forces was discussed at an inter-Service meeting held in
COHQ on 27 June 1947. It was agreed that while the Service
Ministries were to retain responsibility for conducting raids and for
training and equipment, COHQ should be responsible for coordination
and should act as the central advisory authority. In order to ensure
close cooperation between the various responsible organisations the
COS established the Inter-Service Committee on Raiding Operations, a
permanent committee on Assistant COS level, with COCOS as its
chairman.24
In April 1949 the Committee reported to the COS:
We consider that in the opening stages of a future war it is
probable that the enemy will be dispersed on a broad front
with long and vulnerable lines of communication. We also
consider that the situation would be fluid and therefore
favourable for the execution of raids before the enemy has
had time to consolidate his position.
It was considered that in order to take advantage of this favourable
situation, Britain should be ready to launch seaborne raids
immediately on the outbreak of war. 25 The only existing force
specifically designated for carrying out seaborne raids was the
Commando Brigade which was currently based in the Mediterranean.
The COS appreciated that the need for raids in the early stages of war
might arise and directed the JPS to investigate.26
The raiding requirement formulated by the JPS was for the provision
of one Commando Brigade for raiding operations in the
Mediterranean at the outbreak of war. This was to be followed by the
formation of three Commandos in the United Kingdom for raiding
operations by D+3 months and a further three Commandos by D+6
months. Working on the assumption that the ships and craft required
for one Commando raid at a time were needed both in the
23. COS (52) 649.
24. Minutes of a meeting in COHQ, 27 June 1947; DEFE 2/1449. COS (47) 93, 7 August 1947,
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Mediterranean and the United Kingdom, the agreed shipping
requirement was for three LSI(M), eight LCP, 15 LCA and one LCN
in each theatre. 27 Due to a shortage of . manpower the Admiralty
could not anticipate meeting the agreed timetable for the provision of
Commandos before 1957 when an increase in National Service intake
would provide the necessary trained reserve. Prior to 1957 reduced
availability of Commando units would have to be accepted.28
The requirement for raiding operations in Western Europe was
considered by the JPS in 1951 and approved in its final form by the
COS in March 1952. 29 The report anticipated that Allied forces
would be heavily outnumbered in the opening phase of a war in
Europe. Small raiding forces could achieve results far beyond
anything that similar sized orthodox units might be able to do.
Operations against enemy lines of communication and their command
and headquarters facilities were considered. The value of raids in
boosting Allied morale was noted as was a requirement for
intelligence and reconnaissance in force. The use of raids as part of
strategic deception was anticipated. It seems that little had changed
since the War. Commando units in the 1950s were to be used in
almost exactly the same kind of operations as had the original
Commandos in World War Two.
Unfortunately the necessary shipping and equipment was lacking. In
his Progress Report of April 1952 CAW Thomas reported that neither
the manpower nor the equipment for the raids outlined by the JPS
were available. 30 He suggested that a joint Belgian/Dutch/British
Commando force be prepared for raiding operations in war. This
suggestion, foreshadowing the United Kingdom/Netherlands
Amphibious Force created in 1973, was resisted by the Admiralty as it
represented a manpower commitment in the early stages of war that
Britain might not be able to meet. 31 Raiding stores were inadequate,
there having been no replacement of equipment and stocks since 1945.
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1951; DEFE 4/40. COS (51) 735, 10 December 1951, memo by 1SL; DEFE 5/35. COS (51) 205
mtg, 17 December 1951; DEFE 4/50.
29 • COS (51) 758, 18 December 1951, note by the secretary of the COS Committee; DEFE 5/35.
COS (52) 45 mtg, 31 March 1952; DEFE 4/53. COS (52) 192, Policy for Raiding, 1 April
1952; DEFE 5/38.
30• COS (52) 234, 30 April 1952, report by CAW; DEFE 5/39.
31 . COS (52) 69 mtg, 19 May 1952; DEFE 4/54.
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In 1952 stocks of canoes and inflatables were 30 per cent below
entitlement and the £37,000 allocated by the Admiralty for 1953/54 to
purchase raiding stores was considered by CAW to be insufficient.32
Although some progress was being made with the replacement of
minor craft, little actual production was being undertaken. The Inter-
Service Committee on Raiding Operations reported in March 1953
that the provision of raiding equipment was inadequate and that the
forces available to carry out raiding operations in the early stages of
war were too few.33
In 1951 CAW Thomas recommended that the ships and craft allocated
for training purposes should be formed into an Amphibious Training
Squadron. It was thought that this might raise the morale of the crews
and provide at least the nucleus of an amphibious force in being.34
The Admiralty accepted the proposal and so the Amphibious Warfare
Squadron (AW Squadron) was formed. The AW Squadron was to
have sufficient lift for a battalion group, for which three LSTs and
four LCTs were required. However, there was an immediate
deficiency of an LST and two LCT. 35 The AW Squadron was
deployed to the Mediterranean in 1952 and in 1953 the missing LST
and LCTs were sent to join the squadron in case of possible operations
against Egypt.
It had originally been intended to include amphibious training in the
normal routine of the post-war Army. However, with the cancellation
of the planned CTEs and the failure to create an Assault Training
Force this ideal was never achieved. The best that could be hoped for
was occasional exercises involving Army formations, with instruction
given to officers at the School of Combined Operations. The Army
was able to conduct very little amphibious training. In autumn 1947
combined training was conducted at Flensburg and Eckernforde in
Germany between units from the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR)
and amphibious vessels, including the LSTs Suvla, Reggio and four
LCTs. The exercise was prepared at short notice at the request of the
Army. Training included dry shod embarkation and landing of
32. COS (52) 649, 29 November 1952, report by CAW; DEFE 5/43.
33. COS (53) 151, 24 March 1953, report by the Inter-Service Committee on Raiding Operations;
DEFE 4/45.
34. COS (51) 601, 22 October 1951, report by CAW; DEFE 5/34.
35. JP (52) 1, 14 March 1952, report by the JPS; DEFE 6/20. COS (52) 45 mtg, 31 March 1952;
DEFE 4/53.
91
vehicles, infantry trials in LCA, the beaching of ships and craft and
wading of waterproofed vehicles. Duplex Drive tanks, Neptune
amphibians and DUKWS were loaded and unloaded in deep water.
No attempt was made to carry out exercises on a large scale. 36 In
1948 one battalion of the Guards Brigade practised landing in an
exercise in the Tripoli area and a similar exercise was planned for
1952, although this had to be abandoned due to the worsening political
situation in Egypt. 37 In Autumn 1950 a Combined Operations
Training Squadron based around LST(3) Suvla toured the
Mediterranean. At Trieste Suvla was joined by a second LST and
participated in a landing with the 24th Infantry Brigade. Landings
took place over two nights and 1525 men with 274 vehicles and 22
guns were successfully landed across the beach.38
Isolated and small scale combined exercises could not provide Britain
with an amphibious army. Although useful in acquainting officers
and men in the problems of embarkation and in maintaining at least
some awareness of the problem of seaborne assault, irregular
exercises involving a handful of ships and craft were no substitute for
regular and systematic training. The benefits of training the
occasional battalion or brigade were short-lived because National
Service brought a rapid turnover of men. The hope of 1944 and 1945
to have the entire Army trained in amphibious warfare proved to be
unrealistic. The only Army unit to receive regular amphibious
training was the Beach Brigade. The Royal Marines were more
fortunate. Arriving in Malta from Malaya in the summer of 1952, 3
Commando Brigade was able to conduct a series of amphibious
exercises with the AW Squadron. and the Mediterranean Fleet. The
commanding officer of 3 Commando, James Moulton, relished the
opportunity for his brigade to train with the AW Squadron. He was
in no doubt about the necessity to undertake regular training and
exercises in order to maintain proficiency in amphibious warfare:
A few theoretically trained staff officers dotted here and there
through an amphibious force or landing force will not achieve
success unless exercises and operations are kept to the most
obvious and elementary projects. To go beyond this and,
indeed, to tackle with confidence even elementary projects, a
36. Folio 15, docket 547A/47; DEFE 2/1557.
37. DEFE 2/1900.
38. Folio 17; DEFE 2/1698. Folio 118; DEFE 2/1699.
92
large number of people of various ranks and various coloured
uniforms have got to know what they are about.39
The amphibious exercises ended in 1954 when 42 Commando
returned to the United Kingdom and the rest of the Brigade was
posted on internal security duties in Cyprus.
Approved policy for the employment of amphibious forces was solely
concerned with training and the early stages of global war. In order
to set a policy for the employment of such forces in cold war, in May
1951 the War Office were invited to submit an appreciation of
requirements for 1952. They nominated the JPS to conduct this
investigation and the report was submitted in March 1952.40
The JPS noted that recent disturbances in the Middle East had
demanded assault shipping sufficient to lift a brigade group. Although
it was acknowledged that this requirement could arise again, it was not
deemed sufficiently likely in 1952 to be given a high priority, without
which the Admiralty would be unable to maintain the necessary ships
and craft. The target was thus the ability to lift a battalion with
elements of supporting arms. This was the smallest formation that
could operate tactically in the assault while remaining within the
capacity of the Admiralty to supply the necessary shipping: three
LSTs and four LCTs. The JPS saw no cold war operational
requirement in Home Waters and Northwest Europe, although the
unsettled conditions within the Middle East and Africa could require
landings across beaches or the transport of troops and heavy
equipment not possible by air. As such they recommended that the
AW Squadron be moved to the Mediterranean where it would be
centrally placed for cold war tasks as well as for training. They also
saw a requirement for an amphibious force adequate for battalion lift
to carry out cold war tasks in the Far East. They suggested that an
immediate reserve of 1 LST(A), 2 LCT(8) and 6 LCA be established
there in order to undertake minor landings pending the arrival of the
AW Squadron from the Mediterranean. 41 The Admiralty vetoed the
latter proposa1.42
39 . JLM [J.L.Moulton], "Amphibious Training in the Mediterranean, 1952-1954", Naval Review
November 1954, p.464-472.
40• COS (51) 83 mtg, 21 May 1951; in DEFE 4/42. COS (51) 88 mtg, 28 May 1951; DEFE
4/43. JP (52) 1.
41.jp (52) 1.
42. COS (52) 45 mtg, 31 March 1952; DEFE 4/53.
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The COS approved the decision that the long term cold war
requirement was for sufficient amphibious craft to lift one battalion.
Once again, however, they were forced to note that naval manpower
shortages meant that there was no prospect in the immediate future of
meeting this requirement without altering naval priorities. It also
agreed that the AW Squadron should be sent to the Mediterranean for
a period, where it would be at the disposal of the COS to meet cold
war requirements. 43 In his progress report of April 1952 CAW
Thomas reiterated the need for the extra LST and LCTs to bring the
Squadron up to full strength.44 The Navy stressed that the question
would have to remain in abeyance until March 1954 due to a gradual
reduction in manpower.45
In response to a request by the COS the VCIGS, Lieutenant-General
Sir Neville Brownjohn, was instructed to prepare a report on
amphibious warfare policy. Taking it to be his objective to discover
any possible reductions in the Amphibious Warfare organisation,
Brownjohn believed that as the organisation had been examined by
numerous committees over the last ten years there would be very little
room for "further pruning" . He believed that a substantial reduction
would only be achieved by a drastic reorganisation which effectively
meant either maintaining the present organisation or disbanding the
AWC at Fremington. He estimated that between £100,000 and
£150,000 out of a total running cost of £250,000 a year could be
saved if the AWC was disbanded (except for AWXE), with the signals
and artillery elements transferred to Service Schools and a Mobile
Instructional Team replacing SAW. If this option were adopted,
Brownjohn concluded that it would no longer be possible to develop
the technique of amphibious warfare. Also, in time, training would
tend to become academic and cooperation between the Services and
with allies would be prejudiced.46
When the COS discussed Brownjohn's note on 10 February 1953 the
1SL Roderick McGrigor resurrected the proposal to amalgamate the
Amphibious Warfare organisation with the office of CGRM. While
43. Ibid.
44. COS (52) 234, 30 April 1952, report by CAW; DEFE 5/39.
45. COS (52) 431, 12 August 1952, note by Admiralty; DEFE 5/40.
46. COS (53) 69, 5 February 1953, note by VCIGS, docket AW(o)7/52/53; DEFE 2/1845.
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accepting that it was important to keep the technique of amphibious
warfare alive, he considered that it would be more economical to turn
the whole organisation over to the Royal Marines. He did not believe
that it was necessary to maintain a separate headquarters. Although
amphibious warfare would thus become the responsibility of one
Service in peacetime, there would be inter-Service representation on
the Royal Marine Staff. The Army viewpoint remained that if the
organisation was going to be maintained, it should remain firmly
inter-Service. The Admiralty was invited to submit detailed proposals
and Brownjohn was instructed to revise hispaper.47
Brownjohn submitted his revised paper on 18 May 1953. Once again
he considered the possibility of disbanding the AWC and replacing
SAW with a Mobile Instructional Team and once again the idea was
rejected as without the School it would be impossible to develop the
technique of amphibious warfare. The only other way that
Brownjohn could see to save money was to amalgamate AWHQ with
some other organisation. He suggested amalgamation with either the
CGRM or of AWHQ with SAW. The former he did not discuss as it
was subject to an Admiralty investigation. He argued that the latter
was not worthwhile as the saving would be small and because the
distance between SAW and London would considerably detract from
the ability of CAW to advise the COS and the Services.48
The Admiralty proposals were in essence a return to those made by
Admiral Fraser in 1949. CGRM was to assume the additional title and
role of CAW. In this capacity he would be adviser to the COS on
amphibious warfare. The existing Royal Marines Office would be re-
organised within the Admiralty and would have an integrated tri-
Service staff. CGRM, in his capacity as CAW, would submit periodic
reports to the COS Committee via the 1SL and would be invited to
attend meetings when his directive was discussed. The directive
would remain essentially unchanged but would be issued to him by the
Admiralty after agreement by the COS and the Minister of Defence.49
Under these proposals it was quite clear that the Admiralty would
retain full responsibility for the Royal Marines. The Marines, and
47. COS (53) 21 mtg, 10 February 1953; DEFE 4/60.
48. Note by VCIGS, 18 May 1953, given at appendix to COS (53) 374; DEFE 5/47.
49. COS (53) 357, 22 July 1953, report by Admiralty; DEFE 5/47.
95
therefore CAW, would remain under the authority of the Admiralty
and rely on the Board for all administrative and financial support.
Details of the financial provision for amphibious warfare would be
provided in the Navy Estimates, although the Admiralty could not
bind themselves to allocate any particular sum to that area. CGRM
would require officers from AWHQ in order to preserve the inter-
Service nature of amphibious warfare but the Admiralty hoped that an
overall manpower saving of 14 officers and 26 other ranks could be
achieved. The financial saving was estimated at £34,000 annually.
The AWC would move to Poole, amalgamating with the ASRM under
a Royal Marine officer. ASRM would become the Landing Craft
School to differentiate itself from SAW, which would continue along
present lines, albeit with a reduced staff. AWXE and AWSS would
move to Poole with the rest of the AWC and continue with reduced
staffs, AWXE merging with the Landing Craft School. The financial
saving was estimated at £131,000 annually.50
Even prior to the forwarding of detailed proposals AWHQ was
sceptical of the value of amalgamating with the Royal Marines.
Problems concerning access to the COS were anticipated as CAW
could only have direct access to the Chiefs on matters concerning his
directive. On other matters he could only approach through the Chief
or Vice Chief of the Naval Staff which would effectively mean that his
advice would always be in accordance with Admiralty policy.
Periodic reports submitted through the 1SL would have the same
drawback. Essentially CAW and his staff would no longer be an
independent organisation representing the inter-Service needs of
amphibious warfare. CGRM and his Naval and Marine staff would
owe their primary allegiance to the Admiralty. AWHQ also
concluded, in line with the Brownjohn recommendations, that the
interests of amphibious warfare would best be served by keeping
AWC intact. In 1950 the CGRM and COCOS had set up a working
party to investigate the possible combination of CSS and the Signal
School, Royal Marines and it had recommended that the two
organisations remain separate. 5i In January and February 1953 they
had also discussed the possibility of amalgamating AWXE and ASRM.
Again both CAW and CGRM had agreed that such an amalgamation
was undesirable. Noting that the directives of CAW and CGRM were
50. Ibid.
51. Docket AW 1031/53; DEFE 2/1863.
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widely divergent they anticipated that the amphibious outlook might
tend to be swamped by the domestic requirements of the Royal
Marines 52
When the Admiralty proposals came up for discussion before the
COS, CAW Thomas strongly emphasised his view that they would
lead to a loss of efficiency. CIGS Sir John Harding stated the War
Office opinion that the organisation must remain on an inter-Service
basis and not be subjected to the fluctuating financial policy of an
individual Service Ministry. After discussion the Committee accepted
that CAW must remain directly responsible to the COS and as such his
duties could not be merged with those of CGRM. A working party
was set up under Sir Harold Parker in order to carry out a
comprehensive examination of the present Amphibious Warfare
organisation and to advise the COS on any economies that could be
effected without undue loss of efficiency.53
The Parker Working Party submitted their report on 29 October
1953. 54 The report began by identifying Amphibious Warfare as the
"Cinderella of the Services" that may at times "have to be content
with what is left on the plate" . They believed that there was a malaise
within the organisation stemming from a lack of understanding of the
potentialities of amphibious warfare and of what was being done to
foster and develop the technique. It was their opinion that without
attempts to revive it, the organisation would tend to deteriorate
gradually.
The working party recommended that AWHQ should remain in the
Whitehall area. No major cuts would be possible unless AWC was
reorganised. If this was done (as recommended) then economies in
AWHQ would follow. They recommended that AWSS and SAW
combine, with a more restricted list of courses. The possibility of
replacing the Schools with travelling teams based at Fremington was
considered but rejected as inadequate. The proposal to move the
Schools to Poole to be accommodated alongside the ASRM was also
52. Correspondence between COCOS and CGRM in DEFE 2/1830. Assumption by CGRM of
the Functions of CAW, AWHQ internal paper, folio 21, docket AW(o)7/52153; DEFE 2/1845.
53. COS (53) 374, Interdepartmental Working Party on the Amphibious Warfare
Organisation, 1 August 1953; DEFE 5/47. COS (53) 93 mtg given at appendix to COS (53)
374.
M. COS (53) 527, 29 October 1953, report by Working Party; DEFE 5/49.
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rejected as this would cause accommodation difficulties and would
require heavy capital expenditure. In preference to this the working
party recommended that the Schools should move (as a combined
establishment) to Old Sarum where the School of Land/Air Warfare
was situated. They could either remain functionally separate or be
fully integrated with the School to form a new amphibious warfare
wing in a renamed School of Land, Air and Amphibious Warfare.
This latter option was recommended as it offered the greatest
opportunity for economy and eliminated the possibility of the duties
of the two Schools over-lapping. In conjunction with the move the
working party recommended a reduction in the AWSS/SAW
establishment from 22 instructors to 15. The fact that Old Sarum was
land locked did not worry the working party. They did not believe
that a coastline was necessary for instruction, and if demonstrations
should prove necessary it was "only" 40 miles to Poole or Eastney.
They acknowledged that for reasons of tidal conditions and other
factors it was not practical to move AWXE from North Devon. They
did believe, however, that it was possible to secure a 25 percent
reduction in the establishment and that its manning could be largely
civilianised, leaving nine officers, five other ranks and 97 civilians.
The workshops and stores were to redeploy from Westward Ho to
Instow to operate alongside the Fording Trials Branch. An increase
of 100 per cent in the annual grant for the purchase of materials and
equipment was also recommended (from £750 to £1,500).55
CAW agreed with many of the conclusions of the Parker Report but
was hostile to the suggested break-up of AWC and the move of the
Schools. The proposals were condemned as liable to lead to decreased
efficiency both in peace and on the outbreak of war and to the
lowering of the prestige of SAW. Detailed examination of the
proposals by CAW showed them to be less financially desirable than
the working party claimed. 56 A final decision on the
recommendations was delayed until after the JPS had undertaken a
study of the operational requirements for amphibious warfare.57
55. Ibid.
56. COS (53) 579, 25 November 1953, memo by CAW; DEFE 5/50. COS (54) 110, 6 April 1954,
report by CAW; DEFE 5/52. DEFE 2/2061.
57. COS (54) 110.
98
The JPS submitted their report on the operational requirements for
amphibious warfare in March 1954. 58 The report specifically ruled
out the requirement to conduct large scale assaults either in cold war
or in the early stages of hot war. Interest in the large scale assault
was to be limited to research and development of craft and special
equipment, with the technique kept alive by study at staff level only,
in collaboration with the United States. In the early stages of hot war
amphibious operations would, of necessity, be limited to small scale
raids. Although the JPS could foresee no operational requirements
for amphibious forces in Northwest Europe or the Far East, they
considered that a small amphibious force was required in the Middle
East. The AW Squadron and the Commando Brigade, both currently
based in the Mediterranean, could fulfil this role. Should a need for
amphibious shipping arise in the Far East then the necessary lift could
be transferred from the Middle East. Because of this requirement the
JPS recommended that training in small scale amphibious operations
and raiding should continue. However, for reasons of economy,
training and trails should be restricted to the AW Squadron, the Royal
Marines and the Beach Brigade.
This conclusion directly contradicted the accepted wisdom of the
previous decade. Preparation for amphibious warfare was to be the
exclusive province of a few specialist units, although the JPS did
concede that minor exercises by Army units up to battalion strength
should not be ruled out. This change was brought about by the
increased emphasis on small scale operations and raiding. There was
no need to train large Army formations to conduct large scale assaults
that would be impossible in the early stages of a major war and were
unnecessary in cold war. The development of the hydrogen bomb and
the increasing availability of atomic weapons put in doubt the viability
of large scale landings, even in the latter stages of a conflict. Under
these conditions what one needed were small specialist amphibious
forces capable of reacting promptly to a situation as it arose. The
COS discussed the report on 11 March and in approving its
conclusions they directed that it should be taken into account when
considering the future of the Amphibious Warfare organisation.59
58. Issued in its final form as COS (54) 79, Amphibious Warfare - Operational
Requirements, 12 March 1954, report by the JPS; DEFE 5/51.
59. COS (54) 27 mtg, 11 March 1954; DEFE 4/69.
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As a result, in April the COS directed that in order to keep alive the
technique of amphibious warfare the SAW, AWSS, and AWXE,
together with ancillary units, should remain in the Fremington area.
In rejecting the proposed move to Old Sarum the COS noted that it
was not financially desirable. All other aspects of the Parker Report
were accepted and thus the Amphibious Warfare organisation was
subjected to another round of cuts.60 In June 1954 the COS approved
the terms of reference of a working party to carry out a
comprehensive review of the future role of amphibious warfare,
given the changing strategic environment. The guiding principle of
the appreciation was to be that Britain, the Soviet Union and the
United States all possessed hydrogen bombs, and that global war was
unlikely within the next four or five years. The working party was
established under VCNS Vice Admiral W.W.Davis with
representatives from the three Services, the Ministry of Defence and
AWHQ.6i
The Davis Working Party report, submitted on 9 July 1954, built on
the position established by the JPS in March. 62 The peacetime
requirement for amphibious forces remained that of sufficient lift for
a battalion with supporting arms. The advent of the hydrogen bomb
meant that in hot war the offensive wartime requirement was now
limited to raiding. Amphibious training in peace could be limited to
the study of the staff work and techniques necessary for the mounting
of a brigade group assault, and to amphibious exercises up to the
strength of a battalion with supporting arms. The working party
noted that should a requirement arise for a large scale amphibious
assault then it would have to be sponsored by the United States.
The working party felt itself unable to give firm recommendations
about the future of the Amphibious Warfare organisation but argued
that the inter-Service nature of the organisation should be maintained.
However, despite this they believed that the time was right for the
Royal Marines to play the leading role in amphibious warfare. They
recommended that the AWC should move from Fremington to the
ASRM at Poole. The new CAW, Major-General C.F.Phillips, agreed
with the recommendation to close the AWC and to centre all training,
6°. COS (54) 44 mtg, 14 April 1954; DEFE 4/69.
61. COS (54) 207, 23 June 1954; DEFE 5/54.
62. COS (54) 228, 9 July 1954, report by working party; DEFE 5/53.
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instruction and experiments at Poole. In his view Fremington was too
distant and too large. He believed that the move could produce
considerable reductions in overheads and would be to the benefit of
both organisations. The COS Committee agreed. It was announced
by the COS that there "was no requirement for the Army as a whole
to be trained in amphibious warfare" .. The Chiefs endorsed the
conclusions of the working party that although the inter-Service
nature of Amphibious Warfare should be maintained, the Royal
Marines should be the parent arm. Retention of CAW was still
regarded as essential, although his role regarding the control and
direction of the Amphibious Warfare organisation required further
investigation.63
In November 1954 Major-General Phillips reported that in his
opinion the controlling authority for amphibious warfare should
remain based in London along the lines of the existing AWHQ.
However, he suggested a reduction in personnel of 46 percent. CAW
saw little need to change his existing directive. He supported the
continuing responsibility to study the technique of landing a brigade
group as this was the minimum level at which a properly balanced
view could be maintained.64
Phillips regarded the proposed move of the AWC to Poole as "an
eminently practicable proposition from which nothing but good can
result". However, complete integration of SAW with ASRM was not
possible due to the different functions of the two. He believed that the
move could be completed before the end of 1956 and that it would
result in a saving of £92,000 in personnel costs, half of which would
be an absolute saving on civilian wages. Capital expenditure of
£131,500 would be required at Poole, less £20,000 if it proved
possible to accommodate the headquarters of the Amphibious
Observation Regiment at Portsmouth. This expense was offset as War
Office proposals to spend £365,000 on new construction in North
Devon could be reduced by £180,000 if the move took place. 65 The
COS were pleased with Phillips's report and endorsed his proposals.66
63 • COS (54) 82 mtg, 14 July 1954; DEFE 4/71.
64. COS (54) 339, 28 October 1954; report by CAW; DEFE 5/55.
65. Ibid.
66 • COS (54) 126 mtg, 25 November 1954; DEFE 4/74.
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The AWC officially closed on 1 October 1956. Even before this
closure the SAW had adapted its teaching in light of the new
conditions outlined by the JPS in 1954. 67 A Joint Services
Amphibious Warfare Centre (JSAWC) was formed at Poole by
amalgamating the ASRM and SAW. The ASRM became the Assault
Training Wing of the JSAWC and the SAW became the Staff Training
Wing. The latter remained under the control of CAW, via the
Commandant, for all policy matters. 68 The headquarters of the
Amphibious Observation Regiment moved to Poole in spring 1957.69
The break-up of the AWC at Fremington meant that there was no
establishment, planned or existing, for the training of Army units in
amphibious warfare in wartime. In 1950 the War Office had agreed
that there was a requirement for a Combined Operations Training
Centre to be set up in wartime and proposals were submitted to the
three Service Ministries for the setting up of such a centre at
Inv erary. 711 In April 1952 CAW Thomas was able to report that
Inverary had been accepted by the War Office and Admiralty as the
site of a wartime Amphibious Operations Training Centre (AOTC),
for the wetshod training of individual Army units.71
It was unlikely that the centre at Inverary could be established and
made ready for training in the opening stages of a war. The AOTC
was planned to be available from D+12 months. There was,
therefore, a requirement for a temporary AOTC to operate until
Inverary was operational. The AWC at Fremington represented the
only suitable and available location. With landing ships and craft
based at Milford Haven, Fremington could train Army formations as a
makeshift AOTC, albeit with some limitations. 72 It was partly for this
reason that AWHQ was strongly opposed to the proposals to break up
AWC contained within the Parker Report.73
By amalgamating AWC with the ASRM in Poole the possibility of
conducting any effective training of Army formations within the first
twelve months of war was removed. Neither Poole nor Portsmouth
67. AWHQ Information Letter No.5 1955; DEFE 2/1912.
68. COS (56) 322, 24 August 1956; DEFE 7/1455. Also, DEFE 7/1455.
69. DEFE 2/1914 + DEFE 2/1915.
70. COS (50) 159 mtg, 2 October 1950; DEFE 2/1574.
71. COS (52) 234. Folio 5, docket CO(o)438/5; DEFE 2/1849.
72. Folio 5, docket CO(o)438/5; DEFE 2/1849. Folio 52; DEFE 2/2062.
73. Folio 52; DEFE 2/2062. COS (53) 579.
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possessed the facilities or the room for Army formation training.
However, in December 1953 the CIGS had stated that there was
effectively no chance of any Army formations being available for
amphibious training in the first six months of war and so the facilities
of an AOTC would not be required for this period. In November
1954 CAW Phillips accepted the War Office view that there was no
peacetime requirement for plans to be drawn up for the AOTC at
Inv erary. 74In any future major war Britain would be in the same
position regarding facilities for military amphibious training that it
had been in 1940, with none either existing or planned.
Placing the main responsibility for amphibious warfare in the hands
of the Royal Marines was a progressive step. The role of amphibious
warfare in defence planning had changed . since 1944. The priority
was now for small scale raiding operations, which would require the
capabilities of amphibious specialists. There was no longer any need
to plan for the amphibious training of the Army as a whole. Since
1945 amphibious capabilities had suffered from being the
responsibility of no single Service. By making the Royal Marines
responsible for amphibious warfare, their own independent existence
was bolstered as they acquired a distinct role separate from the Army,
and this gave the Admiralty a stake in the maintenance of amphibious
capabilities. The lesson from across the Atlantic certainly seemed to
indicate that amphibious warfare would prosper if it was the definite
responsibility of one Service.
The belief that amphibious warfare might fare better if it was the
prime responsibility of one Service may have encouraged Phillips in
his advocacy of the Davis Report; certainly American commentators
had long supported this view. 75
 On 1 December 1954 CAW Phillips
delivered a lecture to an audience at the Royal Naval College,
Greenwich in which he somewhat enviously noted that the Americans
had a different outlook towards amphibious warfare and the
application of seapower. He explained that amphibious warfare was a
naval responsibility and as such came under the Secretary of the Navy.
Although intimately connected to the navy and administered by the
same department, the USMC was, in fact, a fourth Service and the
74. COS (54) 126 mtg.
75. For example see the article by Lt-Colonel Thompkins, a former USMC representative at AWC,
in the December 1948 issue of Marine Corps Gazette p.10-21.
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Commandant held equal rank to the Chief of Naval Operations.
AWHQ were well aware that the USMC could devote far greater
resources to the study of amphibious warfare than could the British.
The USN Atlantic and Pacific Fleets each contained amphibious forces
sufficient to lift, land and support a one divisional assault by the
marine division and marine air wing which were integral to each
Fleet.76
The British maintained close liaison with the Americans on defence
matters after the War and amphibious warfare was no exception. As
was the case throughout Anglo-American contacts the close wartime
relationship weakened somewhat after 1945. However, the post of
CCOR was maintained as part of the BJSM in Washington, and
beginning in 1946 a USMC representative was assigned to
Fremington. This officer's responsibilities were later broadened to
include duty as a liaison officer at AWHQ.77
Particularly close relations were maintained with the Canadian Army.
A Combined Operations team visited the Canadian Army Staff
College, Kingston in 1947 and again in 1948. These visits were
deemed to have been a great success by both participants and Canadian
Army Headquarters were to request repeat visits on an annual basis.78
In June 1948 Brigadier Perowne at the SCO received an invitation
from the Commandant, USMC Schools, Quantico for the SCO team to
give a demonstration there during it's scheduled trip to Canada in the
autumn. 79 Perowne was glad to accept the invitation but was forced to
add the "somewhat embarrassing condition" that the trip could not
involve any dollar expenditure. 80 It is an unfortunate comment on
Britain's position in the late 1940s that Canada and the United States
were forced to meet the cost of the visiting instructional teams.
The Americans were clearly impressed by the short demonstration
they had been given in 1948. Rear Admirhl Thomas B.Inglis (USN)
extended an invitation for another visit to Quantico in 1949 upon the
76. Transcript of lecture given on 1 December 1954; DEFE 2/1900.
77. Fergusson, Watery Maze, p.128-130. British Post-War Representation in the
United States; DEFE 1/1346.
78. Folio 1, docket CR 607/47; DEFE 2/1576. COS (48) 30, 24 March 1948; DEFE 5/7.
79. Folio 43, docket C0607/47; DEFE 2/1576.
80. Folio 48, docket C0607147; DEFE 2/1576.
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completion of the SCO visit to Kingston. 81 A third visit to Quantico,
planned for November 1950, had to be abandoned due to the partial
mobilisation of the Marine Corps Reserve in response to the war in
Korea. Nevertheless, the visit to Canada went ahead and there was
American participation in the general discussion. 82 The practice of
sending instructional teams to Quantico and Fremington on alternate
years began in 1951 with a visit by the USMC to the AWC.
COHQ/AWHQ was kept well informed of developments in the United
States. Monthly reports from the CCOR in Washington were
supplemented by the growing liaison with the USMC from 1948 and
the first visit of the SCO team to Quantico. By the early 1950s there
was USMC representation at AWHQ and Fremington, and British
representation on the directing staff at Quantico.83
The Combined Operations organisation maintained contacts with the
armed forces of a number of other countries. Britain had played a
major part in the development of amphibious warfare during the
Second World War and had much to offer its Commonwealth and
European friends and allies in this field of warfare. The French
requested British help in order to set up their own School of
Combined Operations at Arzew near Mers el Kebir in Algeria.84
Allied and Commonwealth officers attended courses at the AWC while
Combined Operations instructional teams' paid occasional visits to
promulgate British techniques. For example, in 1951 a group of
between thirty and forty Belgian commandos visited the United
Kingdom to learn more about amphibious warfare. CAW was invited
to send an instructional team to the NATO Defence College and a
team from the USMC visited Fremington. 85 In November 1950
representatives from COHQ attended amphibious exercises at Karachi
and Quetta. 86 However, with the exception of the United States,
Britain had little to learn from liaison with other countries. No other
country had done so much to develop the technique and equipment of
amphibious warfare. The doctrine adopted by other countries
reflected that laid down by Britain and America. COCOS was against
81 . Folio 26 + 99A, docket 607/4; DEFE 2.1577.
82• Folios 11,71,77 and 84, docket C0606/50; DEFE 2/1578.
83. DEFE 2/1900.	
.
84. ADM 1/21179, Collaboration with France, 1947-1948.
85 • COS (51) 41 mtg, 15 March 1951; DEFE 4/40. COS (51) 152 mtg, 28 September 1951; DEFE
4/47.
86• COS (50) 122 mtg; 2 August 1950; DEFE 4/34. COS (50) 142 mtg, 4 September 1950; DEFE
4/35.
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foreign attendance at some courses and exercises as this might
prejudice the willingness of the Americans to keep the British fully up
to date with new techniques and equipment.87
Differences in British and American technique were not great.
American doctrine was heavily influenced by their wartime
experience in the Pacific. COHQ attributed this largely to the fact that
responsibility for the formulation of doctrine was vested in the Navy
and Marine Corps:
Their outlook is undoubtedly coloured by their island-
capturing operations of the Pacific war. They make less use
of the means of achieving a very rapid initial penetration and
a quick build up such as is required in a Continental
operation. I refer particularly to the use of tanks, artillery and
sufficient engineer effort to avoid delays in the early phase of
the assault. These are brought in much later than is the case
in our method. The assault is brought in by infantry,
supported by thin skinned LVT. The swimming tank is not
used at al1.88
Apart from the more widespread use of LVTs and the lack of
swimming tanks and specialist engineer vehicles for beach clearance
work, the only major differences in technique were those of command
structure, beach organisation and naval gunfire support. 89 The key
difference between the United States and Britain was that of resources,
and nowhere was this more apparent than with the development of
helicopters for assault operations.
Britain undertook little or no development of rotary wing aircraft
during the War, In 1945 a small number of Sikorsky Mk.4 and Mk.6
helicopters were procured from the United States. With the end of
the Lend-lease arrangement it was found impossible to retain and
service these aircraft and all but a small number, kept for experiment
and development work, were returned. The potential use of
helicopters in amphibious operations was anticipated in Britain as
early as 1945, although initially their role was expected to be limited
to evacuation of casualties, transport of urgently required equipment
87 . ADM 1/21178.
88 • COS (49) 177, 4 April 1949, report by COCOS; DEFE 5/13.
89• Ibid. COS (47) 11 mtg, 15 January 1947; DEFE 4/1. DEFE 2/1850 + DEFE 2/1900. Also see
Marine Corps Gazette, particularly Lt-Colonel Tompkins, /'British Combined Operations"
December 1948; Lt-Colonel A.J.Stewart, "Strengthen the Beach Assault", August 1949; Lt-Colonel
Tompkins, "Urgent - Land the Tanks", March 1951.
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and reconnaissance and communication duties. %) The limitations of
the aircraft available to Britain in the 1940s led both the Admiralty
and COHQ to underestimate the potential of helicopters in the assault.
In May 1946 the Admiralty position was that:
In the present state of their development, their Lordships are
doubtful whether the use of helicopters in combined
operations would be economical on account of the space
required for their stowage in landing ships 	  Their
Lordships also think it problematical whether the use of
helicopters for landing personnel and stores would be worth
while as the occasions on which they would be required to
supplement or replace water transport would probably be
rare.9 I
In April 1948, when discussing a paper prepared by the Policy Group
in COHQ, the Executive decided that the unloading of stores during
the assault by using helicopters "could not be regarded as a feasible
proposition within the foreseeable future" •92
Meanwhile, the United States was pressing ahead with the development
of helicopters and their use in the assault. In June 1948 COHQ
received a report from CCOR of an exercise held in May which had
envisaged the landing of a Regimental Combat Team flying from
aircraft carriers in 184 helicopters. Five helicopters were available
for the exercise, which was the first of its kind. They flew from the
escort carrier USS Palau . CCOR noted that more research was
required before a satisfactory design was achieved but he was
optimistic that current helicopters could play a useful role in
resupplying urgent stores and in casualty evacuation. 93 In 1947 the
first United States Marine helicopter Squadron HMX-1 was formed
under Colonel E.C.Dyer. Tactical tests by HMX-1 proved the
viability of the helicopter as a weapon of amphibious warfare. In
May 1949 a group of about 40 Congressmen were treated to a
demonstration landing by a platoon of Marines in eight HRP-1
helicopters at Quantico. It was explained to the distinguished guests
9°. A Note on Helicopters, loose minute in docket CR 1479/45; DEFE 2/1697. Folio 1,
docket CR 1479/45; DEFE 2/1697.
91. Folio 10, docket CR 1479/45; DEFE 2/1697.
92. Use of Helicopters During Assault, paper by Policy Group, COHQ, folios 3+4, docket
CO 855/48; DEFE 2/1697. 13th Meeting of the Executive, docket CO 855/48; DEFE 2/1697.
93. Folio 1, docket CO 1206/48; DEFE 2/1641.
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that helicopters were faster, more versatile and might prove less
vulnerable than landing craft.94
The USMC, like the Combined Operations organisation in Britain, had
undergone a period of doubt and uncertainty following the War.
Facing problems of credibility in the shadow of the atomic bomb, the
Marines turned to helicopters as a means of bringing speed, dispersion
and flexibility to amphibious warfare. While their British
counterparts were struggling to maintain the viability of the remains
of the wartime assault fleet, those charged with studying amphibious
warfare in America were pressing ahead with radical new techniques.
Exercises with helicopters in 1948 and 1949 proved their potential
and in 1951 the Marines received their first Sikorsky HRS troop
carrier, the first helicopter acquired by the USMC in large numbers.
Further investigations by the Marine Corps brought proposals for
specialist helicopter carriers, able to operate helicopters in the assault.
Operations in Korea proved that helicopters could make a valuable
contribution in war. Although in 1951 the Chief of Naval Operations
allowed the marine proposals to be evaluated by the Atlantic Fleet, it
was not until 1955 that a conversion of an existing ship to a helicopter
carrier was undertaken.95
In May 1955 the mothballed 10,000 ton escort carrier Thetis Bay was
towed to the Philadelphia naval shipyard for conversion.
Recommissioned in July 1956, the ship could accommodate a 1,000
man battalion in addition to its own crew of 500. Thetis Bay could
normally operate 20 HRS type helicopters and was designated CVHA-
1 (HA for helicopter assault). Conversion of the 11,000 ton escort
carrier Block Island began in 1957, although this was never
completed as funds were redirected to purpose built amphibious ships.
Work on the new Iwo Jima class LPH began in April 1959.96
Displacing 18,000 tons full load and 592 feet long, the Iwo Jima
could embark 2,000 soldiers and up to 30 HRS type helicopters. In
order to fill an immediate requirement for helicopter carriers in the
Far East three wartime Essex class carriers, Boxer, Princeton and
94. Lt Roy L.Anderson, "The Marine Corps and the Helicopter", Marine Corps Gazette,
August 1948 p.13-19.
95. Robert B.Asprey, "The Fleet Marine Force in the early 1950s", in Merrill L.Bartlett, Assault
from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1983) p.354-359. Polmar + Mersky, Amphibious Warfare, chapters 15 + 16.
96 • In LPH, L was the prefix for all large landing ships, P indicated personnel and H represented
helicopter capacity.
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Valley Forge, were hastily converted for helicopter operations.
Tarawa operated as a helicopter carrier bui was never redesignated as
LPH. These ships were not as efficient in the LPH role as the purpose
built vessels but remained in this role until sufficient Iwo Jima class
ships were available,97
AWHQ were fully aware of the increasing interest of the Americans
in helicopter operations. In May 1951 CAW Thomas reported that
the development of helicopters in America and their operational use in
Korea was being studied. By October 1951 he saw a requirement for
heavy load carrying helicopters for transporting assault troops and the
carriage of stores. 98 Thomas's successor as CAW, Major-General
Phillips, was keen for the Commandos to conduct training with
helicopters and his enthusiasm was shared by the CGRM, Lieutenant-
General J.C.Westall and Brigadier Moulton at 3 Commando Brigade.
Phillips hoped to be able to provide training for 3 Commando with
No.845 Squadron, which was equipped With S.55 helicopters. He
sought the support of the naval Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean,
Admiral Mountbatten, for helicopter training, preferably from
aircraft carriers. Despite the goodwill of the 1SL and his own
personal approval, Mountbatten and his successor, Sir Guy Grantham,
were unable to provide such training. Helicopter resources within the
Navy were limited and what was available was devoted to anti-
submarine warfare or air-sea rescue. Fear of wearing out the limited
supplies of engines and restrictions on the use of American supplied
helicopters, ruled out their use in amphibious training.99
British use of helicopters in a counter-terrorist role in Malaya further
highlighted the utility of these machines, and further restricted their
availability. In December 1954, in response to a request from CAW,
the RAF reported that due to commitments in Malaya there was little
chance of RAF participation in any helicopier training for amphibious
warfare. 100 Although CCOR kept CAW informed of American
helicopter activities and developments, he was anxious that Britain
should not have to rely entirely on the Americans for doctrine. ml In
97. Ibid. David Steigman, "Amphibious Forces" in Robert Gardiner (ed), Navies in the Nuclear
Age: Warships Since 1945, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1993) p.110-120.
98. COS (51) 268, 4 May 1951, report by CAW; DEFE 5/31. COS (51) 601.
". Folio 1+2, docket AW 502/4/55; DEFE 2/1891. DEFE 2/1890 + DEFE 2/1891 passim. COS
(54) 372, 2 December 1954, report by CAW; DEFE 5/55.
°. COS (54) 132 mtg, 15 December 1954; DEFE 4/74.
MI . COS (54) 372.
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1955 two platoons from 42 Commando conducted a landing in nine
helicopters from 705 RN Air Squadron during Runa ground , an
annual amphibious demonstration conducted by the Royal Marines at
Portsmouth. m2 This demonstrated interest in the use of helicopters
for amphibious operations, but serious training would not be
undertaken for another year.
The acceptance of the proposals of the Davis Working Party brought
to an end the concept of amphibious warfare as primarily an inter-
Service responsibility. AWHQ continued in existence until the early
1960s but from 1955 the Royal Marines assumed the main
responsibility for amphibious warfare. In the early post-War years
thinking within the Combined Operations organisation had still been
very much influenced by the wartime experience in Europe. The
organisation recommended by the RAW Committee in 1944, and
reflected in postwar proposals for CTCs and the Assault Training
Force, was based upon the need to provide large scale training
facilities in order to prepare the Army as a whole for major assaults
as the prelude to a Continental land campaign. Financial crises and
the need to run down forces in the late 1940s caused combined
operations requirements and aspirations to be toned down but did not
bring an immediate reassessment of their primary role. In the 1950s,
with continued pressure on the defence budget and the changed
strategic environment following the development of the H-bomb,
there was an increasing preoccupation with the problems of supply
and maintenance under conditions of nuclear attack and with raiding
and the small scale assault. Under these circumstances it made little
sense trying to maintain an amphibious warfare organisation that had
its roots in the large scale landings of the last war.
Although representing a fundamental reversal of previous policy and
ideas, the move to make amphibious warfare essentially a single
Service responsibility was not as revolutionary to British practice as
may at first seem the case. Indeed, the RAW Committee had
considered the possibility of placing the main responsibility for
combined operations in the hands of the Royal Marines and only
rejected it as this did not fit into the preconceived requirement it had
for operations on the Overlord model. The main reason why the
102• "Demonstration Runaground" in Globe and Laurel, August 1955.
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Committee had rejected the notion of a specialist corps, such as the
USMC, had been that such a corps would become redundant following
an assault as it would be unable to fit into the framework of
operations which had to be undertaken by the Army supported by the
RAF. 103 If, however, the assault was only to be a raid or similar
operation, then this objection was no longer valid and the Marines
would in fact be able to bring a level of readiness and expertise to
amphibious warfare that could not be matched by the Army. By
giving the Royal Marines prime responsibility for amphibious warfare
their specialist nature was reinforced, weakening any claim that they
should be incorporated into the Army. This gave the Admiralty an
interest in maintaining and promoting amphibious capabilities. This
interest was to grow in the late 1950s as the further ramifications of
Britain's changing strategy were felt. With less emphasis placed on
the ability to fight a conventional war in Europe, the Admiralty was
to turn to amphibious warfare as one means of justifying a large
capable fleet.
Since 1945 the amphibious warfare organi gation had tried its bests to
maintain and develop amphibious techniques. However, like the
equipment those techniques were rooted in past practice. Although
aware of the revolutionary application of helicopters in the assault
being developed in the United States, AWHQ and the AWC remained
spectators of, rather than participants in, these new developments. In
June 1955, when Britain's amphibious warfare potential still rested on
the ageing ships and craft of the AW Squadron, AWHQ received a
report from the CAW's representative at the BJSM, which illustrates
how far behind America Britain had fallen:
The amphibious methods of World War Two have been
completely abandoned as no longer practicable. By escaping
from, so to speak, conventional progress, they have been
able to make a fresh start in all aspects of amphibious warfare
to suit the nuclear age; as an example they no longer worry
about tank flotation problems, but are much more concerned
with helicopter air to ground missiles.104
When the need for an amphibious landing arose in 1956 the effect of a
decade of neglect would be starkly illustrated.
103 • See chapter two, page 49.
104. Folio 42, docket AW 502/4/55; DEFE 2/1891.
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Chapter Four: Table One
Admiralty Green List for 3 September 1945
Ships, Craft and Barges
LSC 1I LCF(3) -111 L. r r•A.L.A._,i-t 1 '7 on
LSD 4 LCF(4) 15 LCA(HR) 35
LS E(LC) 5 LCG(L)(3) 15 LCA(OC) 8
LSE(LS) 2 LCG(L)(4) 16 LCC 1
LSF 1 LCG(M) 48 LCE 4
LSG 3 LCH 18 LCM(1) 307
LSH(L) 4 LCI(L) 170 LCM(3) 382
LSI(M) 4 LCI(S) 27 LCM(7) 109
LSI(S) 3 LCQ 21 LCN 60
LSI(H) 3 LCS(L)(2) 5 LCP(L) 165
LSS 1 LCT(1) 4 LCP(SY) 6
LST(1) 2 LCT(2) 21 LCP(R) 286
LST(2) 94 LCT(3) 167 LCP(M) 56
LST(3) 40 LCT(4) 475 LCP(S) 145
MS (LC) 1 LCT(5) 113 LCS(M)(3) 135
MS (LC) 1 LCT(6) 2 LBE 2
LCT(8) 1 LBF 2
LCT(E) 18 LBK 1
LCT(R) 39 LBO 35
LCV 147 LBV(1) 11









A wide variety of specialist amphibious vessels were developed during
World War Two and many of these were deployed in large numbers
by the British. Britain had pioneered the development of many key
ships and craft, notably the LST, the LCT, the LCM, the LSI and the
LSH. Despite a surplus of amphibious resources in 1945, deficiencies
soon began to appear in Britain's post-war amphibious forces. The
constant need for economies in the defence budget caused a series of
planned construction projects to be shelved and then abandoned. Lack
of priority doomed all but the most modest projects to failure. In
these circumstances it was inevitable that Britain's amphibious fleet
would begin to show signs of wear and tear, and would eventually
become obsolete. The efforts of COHQ/AWHQ ensured that the issue
of the replacement and modernisation of existing amphibious vessels
was constantly before the COS, but without adequate finance and with
the Royal Navy at best apathetic towards the issue, relatively little
could be achieved.
At the time of the official Japanese surrender on 3 September 1945
Britain had an impressive array of amphibious vessels. The
Admiralty Green List for that day lists over 5,000 ships, craft and
landing barges of all varieties and over 100 amphibious vehicles, see
Table One.' A number of these were new vessels built for planned
operations in the war against Japan. These, including the LST(3),
LCT(8) and LCM(7) had seen little or no action and were to form the
nucleus of the post-war amphibious fleet. However, others, notably
the earlier LCTs and LSTs as well as many of the small craft, had
seen very extensive use and were unfit for post-war service. Many
craft were scrapped or left to rot in low priority reserve. A number
of ships, including the LSIs and LSHs, had been converted from
merchant ships and were now required back in trade. In addition a
very large number of vessels, including the LST(2)s, LSDs, LCIs and
numerous small craft were American built and loaned to Britain
1 . Admiralty Green List for 3 September 1945; ADM 210/17.
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under the terms of Lend-Lease. Under this agreement these vessels
had either to be returned or paid for. With dollars scarce in post-war
Britain, it was inevitable that the vast majority would be returned to
the United States.
In 1944 the RAW Committee anticipated maintaining enough ships
and craft in peacetime to lift a division. The requirement for
peacetime lift proposed by the JPS and agreed by the COS in January
1946 was less ambitious. As a planning target the COS outlined a
requirement for sufficient lift for a brigade group. 2 At the time the
report was submitted all the necessary ships and craft existed under
British control. However, the force recommended included a number
of American Lend-Lease vessels, most notably two LSD and six LCH,
and also an LSH and LSI(L), both of which the Ministry of Transport
had hoped to return to trade. In view of the cost of keeping Lend-
Lease ships, the COS agreed that they should only be retained if
absolutely essential. They decided that the requirement could be
limited to only one LSD and one LCH. In addition, while the LSH
was considered a definite requirement, it was agreed to dispense with
the LSI, as new developments in launching assault craft from LSTs
appeared to put the requirement for this ship in some doubt.3
In view of the special characteristics of LST, the COS agreed to retain
all available British LST, pending a full review of Imperial
requirements. 4
 At the end of the war Britain had 136 LST operating
in their original role. Of these two were obsolete LST(1), 94 were
LST(2) and the remaining 40 were LST(3). 5
 The LST(2) were
American built Lend-Lease ships. Britain had received a total of 115
LST(2) from the United States and this class had formed the backbone
of all Allied landings after their operational debut in 1943. 6 By
autumn 1946 all LST(2) had been returned to the United States where
they were either paid off or transferred to the navy.7
2• COS (46) 18 mtg, 1 February 1946; CAB 79/44. For shipping required to lift a division or a




6• DEFE 2/1327, Landing Craft - Notes on Development of.
7 . Macdermott, Ships Without Names, p.92 and chapter 14.
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In December 1943 Britain ordered 45 new LST from British yards
and a further 35 from Canada to supplement the allocation of LST(2)
from the United States. The staff requirement for this ship, the
LST(3), had been for a vessel with the same beaching characteristics
as the LST(2) but with a higher speed, slightly larger bow doors and a
greater height between decks. Unfortunately, with wartime resources
stretched, the result was something of a compromise. The only
available engines were steam reciprocating engines, originally
designed for frigates. Although providing the LST(3) with greater
speed than its American counterpart these engines were unsuitable due
to their excessive weight and the implications this had for draught. As
early as December 1945 the Director of Combined Operations
Material (DCOM) at the Admiralty was noting that the LST(3) was to
some extent a makeshift design built under wartime conditions. It was
pointed out that it did not meet the original staff requirements in
respect of draught or speed and that therefore a new improved LST
was required. 8
 Neither British nor Canadian shipyards were equipped
for producing all welded ships and the need to use riveting added
weight and thus draught. The detailed design was not completed until
January 1944. Towards the end of 1944 a repeat order for 36 ships
from Canada was issued, although the end of the war saw that order
cancelled. The first LST(3)s were completed in Spring 1945. In total
25 British and 16 Canadian built ships were delivered to the Royal
Navy before the end of the war with 10 British and 10 Canadian built
vessels delivered after its end, see figure one.9
Originally called a "Transport Ferry" , the LST(3) was powered by
twin screw steam reciprocating engines. At full power when loaded it
could manage over 13 knots. Endurance was 8000 miles at 11 knots
or 1000 miles when loaded for a landing. Extreme length was 345
feet ten inches and the beam was 54 feet. When loaded for beaching,
displacement was 3,065 tons with a draught for'd of four feet seven
inches and 11 feet six inches aft. The ship carried either two LCAs or
two boats on gravity davits and three LCAs could be carried on the
upper deck, hoisted on board by 15 ton derricks, one either side of the
bridge superstructure. Two 24 feet pontoon causeways could be
carried, one on either side of the ship, which was fitted with bars
welded to the sides for this purpose. In addition to the LCA, 15
8. R.C.Todhunter to COHQ, 2 December 1945, folio 15 docket co.413/45; DEFE 2/1341.
9. Macdermott, Ships Without Names, p.86-87. Folio 32; DEFE 2/1327.
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lorries could be carried on the upper deck. The lower deck had space
for 15 forty ton tanks or 27 three ton lorries with a maximum height
of 16 feet. A ramp leading from the upper deck to the tank deck
replaced the elevator used in the LST(2). The vehicles could be
launched through bow doors over a 25 foot ramp capable of bearing
65 tons with both ends supported. With a crew of five officers and
120 ratings, the LST(3) could accommodate 150 soldiers and their
officers. 10
A number of LST(3) were converted to enable them to operate in
specialist roles. Two ships were equipped to operate as Landing Ship,
Tank (Carrier) (LST(C)) and two more were adapted to operate as
administrative and parent ships of an assault force (LST(Q)), see
figures two and three. In the LST(Q) the function of landing ship
lapsed completely, as the vessel was primarily an administrative
headquarters ship. The requirement for LST(C) grew out of the
wartime shortage of carriers of small craft. This ship could carry
five LCM on rails above its upper deck. These LCM could be hoisted
out by derrick in seven hours. As such the ship was unsuitable for
operations. A swell as low as one foot made the procedure dangerous
to personnel as well as to the craft and the mother ship. In 1948
COCOS Wildman-Lushington reported that although one each of the
LST(C) and LST(Q) were immediately available, the other two ships
were employed on special service and would require reconversion in a
dockyard before operating in their intended role."
The JPS report of January 1946 anticipated the use of LST as infantry
carriers. It introduced a requirement for the conversion of 10
LST(3) to Landing Ship, Tank (Assault) (LST(A)) able to
accommodate 240 men on the top deck. It was estimated that four
LST(A) would provide the equivalent personnel lift of one LSI(L).
The 1SL, Admiral John Cunningham, considered that the Assault.
Training Force would need 12 LST(A) to operate on brigade scale,
bringing the overall LST requirement for the force to 33. He
recommended that the LST(3) allocated to the CTEs and School of
Combined Operations should also be converted to LST(A), producing
an overall requirement of 17. In anticipation of approval by the COS,
I Q Details of Combined Operations Landing Ships, DEFE 2/764. Amphibious
Warfare Ships and Craft, October 1954; DEFE 2/1799.
11 . Ships Cover CD 739 at the National Maritime Museum, Woolwich. DEFE 2/764 + DEFE






Figure Four. Landing Craft, Tank (Eight).
IS OUT MOW
the Navy had already allocated 33 LST to the Assault Training Force
for planning purposes.12
As a result COHQ, in conjunction with the War Office, prepared staff
requirements for a conversion to LST(A). After discussion with the
Admiralty it was estimated that in fact five LST(A) should replace one
LSI(L), meaning that a total of 15 were required for the Assault
Training Force. I3 The staff requirements as agreed between COHQ,
the War Office and the Admiralty described the LST(A) as follows:
The function of the LST(A) is to carry assault troops
on an ocean passage and to land them in the landing
craft carried on board. Five LST(A) are required to
carry an assault battalion and appropriate ancillary
units.
Accommodation was to be provided for 26 officers and .329 other
ranks in addition to the ship's company. Carrying six LCA and two
LCP (as ship's boats) on davits the LST(A) was to retain the ability to
beach and land cargo directly onto the shore.14
Another key part of Britain's post-war amphibious fleet was the
LCT(8). At the end of the War the Royal Navy deployed 783 LCT.
Of these over half were old LCT(4), unsuited for an ocean passage.15
Designed for long range operations against Japan, the LCT(8) had just
begun to be delivered by the end of the War. At 225 feet the LCT(8)
was 38 feet longer than the LCT(4), although it drew only 45 inches
of water. Accommodation and supplies for one week's passage was
provided for 45 troops in addition to the ciew of 22. Six LCA could
be embarked in calm weather by flooding the tank space. The whole
process of flooding, embarkation and pumping out took about three
hours. With a maximum speed of 12 knots the LCT(8) could travel
2,500 miles at 10 knots, see figure four. 16
 According to the JPS,
Britain required a total of 25 LCT(8). 17 The Royal Navy had 30 such
craft which left an adequate safety margin. The non-ocean going
12. COS (46) 128,11 June 1946, memo by 1SL; CAB 80/54.
13. CD 739(A) at the National Maritime Museum, Woolwich. Conversion of LST(3) to
LST(A); DEFE 2/1612.
14.Staff Requirements for LST(A), November 1946; in DEFE 2/1612.
15. ADM 210/17.
16 • Ladd, Assault from the Sea, p.104-6. General Information Book on the LCT(8),
ADM 234/529.








Figure Five. Landing Craft, Mechanised (Seven).
LANDING CRAFT, MECHANIZED (MARK 7) LCM (7)
wartime craft were disposed of, although a small number of LST(4)
were retained for use by a naval flotilla on the Rhine.I8
The third major component of Britain's post-war amphibious forces
was the LCM(7). Like the LST(3) and LCT(8), the LCM(7) was
developed towards the end of the War and was an enlarged version of
the earlier LCM(3). Capable of embarking a 35 ton tank, the LCM(7)
weighed 28 tons unloaded and as such was too heavy to be carried on
davits. With a maximum speed of nine knots the LCM(7) had an
endurance of 150 miles at 7 knots and so required a carrier for ocean
voyages. The craft had a loaded draught of three feet eight inches, see
figure five.I9
All the amphibious ships and craft operated by the Royal Navy after
the War had been built to wartime specifications to meet specific
wartime needs. The reality of war meant that very often inferior
materials and techniques had to be employed in ship building and this
affected the amphibious fleet as it did the wider navy. Lack of
welding facilities meant that a number of LCT(8) had riveted hulls.
The riveted LCT(8) was about 30 tons heavier than the all welded
craft and this added over an inch and a half to draught. 20 In June
1947 CCO reported that "nearly all" Britain's specialist assault
shipping was either obsolete or obsolescent, and that even the ships
and craft built towards the end of the War were constructed under
emergency conditions and failed to meet staff requirements. He called
for the construction of a prototype vessel capable of launching the
heaviest army vehicle when equipped with flotation devices and also
of beaching and discharging vehicles without the use of a port. 2I In
June 1946 he had informed the COS that without an LSI(L) there
would be no assault lift available until the LST(3) had been converted
to LST(A). 22
 He now called for the conversion of LST(3) to LST(A)
to be given high priority and pressed for the provision of an LSH and
the construction of an LSD in line with the recommendations for the
Assault Training Force approved the previous year.23
18 . jp (48) 123, 18 December 1948, given at annex to COS (48) 177 mtg, 10 December 1948;
DEFE 4/18.
19 • Allied Landing Craft of World War Two. DEFE 2/1799.
20. ADM 234/529.
21. COS (47) 129(0), 14 June 1947, memo by CCO; DEFE 5/4.
22 • COS (46) 96 mtg, 21 June 1946; in CAB 79/49.
23 . COS (47) 129(o).
117
The JPS laid down the requirement for headquarters ships and craft
for the brigade group lift as one LSH(Command) and 6 LCH. There
were 16 LCH available but as these were all Lend-Lease vessels the
COS agreed that only one would be retained. 24 LCH No.243 was
purchased for instructional duties at the Combined Signal School at a
cost of $95,000. The LCH was considered by both the Admiralty and
COHQ to be vital for future combined operations instruction and
development. It was estimated that it would take at least three years to
design and construct an alternative British craft. 25 The operational
role of the LCH was to act as tactical headquarters for a battalion in
the assault. Unfortunately LCH No.243 was a wartime craft and was
rapidly deteriorating. It was soon considered unfit for use in bad
weather or for an ocean crossing.26
The LSH(C) was to accommodate force commanders and their staffs
on the scale of an assault by division and to provide them with all the
necessary facilities for exercising command and control excluding Air
Defence Control, which was the responsibility of RAF shore bases or
of an Air Defence Control Ship. Of the two available wartime LSH,
Bulolo and Keren , it was eventually decided to convert the latter to
LSH(C) at an estimated cost of £875,000. The decision was approved
by the COS on 25 September 1946. It was anticipated that if taken in
hand in April 1947 Keren could be completed at Devonport by April
1948. 27
 Despite pressure from COHQ, this conversion was not
undertaken. In April 1948 the 1SL recommended that Keren be
disposed of. He noted that the ship had seriously deteriorated and that
even with an increased care and maintenance party this deterioration
would tend to increase. A new LSH would eventually be required
whether or not Keren was retained and in any case the ship could not
be manned before 1952 at the earliest. The Navy felt that the
retention of this 18 year old ship could not be justified. Whilst
regretting the loss of valuable training and the experience to be gained
from operating such a ship, COCOS was reluctantly forced to agree
with the Admiralty.28
24 • COS (46) 18 mtg.
25 • COS (46) 260, 23 November 1946, memo by 1SL; CAB 80/55.
26 . Folio 3; DEFE 2/1601.
27 • Summary of past policy, minute 11; DEFE 2/1642. Also see DEFE 2/1648.
28 • Letter dated 7 November 1947 from COHQ to Admiralty, folio 15; DEFE 2/1642. COS (48)
39, 2 April 1948, memo by 1SL; DEFE 5/7. COS (48) 52 mtg, 14 April 1948; DEFE 4/2.
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•Although agreeing to the disposal of Keren ,COHQ pressed for a
substitute. It was suggested that a frigate suitably fitted out as an
LSH(S) should be brought into commission for the battalion lift then
under consideration by the COS. Two further frigates could be
earmarked specifically for Combined Operations and brought forward
from reserve in an emergency. 29 In reply the Admiralty noted that
three River class frigates converted to LSH(S) during the War had
been so earmarked but that manpower considerations prevented their
being commissioned. 30 In the event the frigate HMS Meon was
refitted as LSH(S) to act as a force commander's headquarters during
a small scale assault and in 1951 commissioned into the AW Squadron.
Another River class frigate, HMS Waveney , was also refitted but
spent the next decade in reserve. The third ship was not converted.31
During the War the Royal Navy had operated four American built
LSD. 32
 The JPS recommended the retention of one of these for the
post war Assault Training Force. This would be sufficient to maintain
the craft of the force and would in addition be able to lift and
administer the LCM and certain ancillary units. The LSD was the
only vessel able to transport minor landing craft in any quantity (20
LCM and 38 LCA) and its loss would mean the provision of extra
LST and transport ships. 33
 The COS agreed that it would be desirable
to purchase an LSD from the United States. The Americans wanted
£750,000 for HMS Ocean way , the desired ship. The Admiralty
preferred to build a new ship, estimating that to build a new British
LSD would cost only £650,000 and that this vessel could be ready by
1952, the time at which they believed it could be manned. This option
was especially desirable as by 1952 HMS Oceanway would be over
seven years old and in need of refit and large supplies of American
spare parts. 34
 The COS endorsed the Admiralty decision. Admiral
McGrigor stated that on normal priority it would take three years to
29 • Folio 15, DEFE 2/1642.
30• Folio 17, DEFE 2/1642.
31. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.181.
32. History of the Combined Operations Organisation, p.173.
33. Landing Ship, Stern-Chute, Landing Ship, Carrier and Landing Ship, Gantry could all transport
LCM in large quantities. However, these wartime conversions of merchant ships were all returned
to trade. Although the LST(C) could carry LCM on its upper deck it could only unload them in
ideal conditions and did not provide the repair facilities of an LSD.
34. COS (46) 18 mtg. COS (46) 260.
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build this vessel, and on highest priority it might be constructed in
two.35
Accordingly, the Admiralty included one £690,000 LSD in the 1947/8
New Construction Programme. 36 Although Laycock included one
LSD in his 1947 proposals, the Combined Operations organisation was
no longer convinced that the LSD was a necessity.37 With the planned
LST(A) able to carry and launch LCA, the main rationale for the LSD
was its ability to transport and operate LCM in the assault. The use of
ocean going LCT(8) solved the problem of landing tanks and
armoured vehicles in the early stages of the assault. LCMs were
valuable for use in shallow and confined waters unsuitable for the
operation of LCT(8), and for this reason it was recommended that a
number be retained. However, a new LCM was not being designed as
it was hoped that the replacement for the wartime LCA would be able
to carry small vehicles.38
As the requirement for LCM lapsed then so did the requirement for
their assault carrier, the LSD. The Admiralty cancelled plans to build
this ship. 39
 Its value as a repair and • maintenance vessel was
recognised but not considered sufficient to justify its expense. In
reality it is unlikely that the LSD would have been built in any case.
The stringent economies forced on all three Services at this time
meant that only high priority construction projects had any real
chance of being completed. There is little reason to believe that plans
for an LSD would have fared any better than those for the LSH.
Plans to upgrade the LST fleet met with difficulties. In 1947 the
Admiralty reported that design work was under way for the
conversion of LST to LST(A). 40
 During that year COHQ produced
broad staff requirements for a new ship, the LST(4). The LST(4) was
to be diesel powered and capable of 14 knots. It was to be able to
carry twelve 70 ton tanks on its tank deck and have an upper deck
suitable for simple conversion into living accommodation. Maximum
•
35. COS (46) 173 mtg.
36. B616 in ADM 167/129.
37. COS (47) 129(o).
38. COHQ Policy Brief No.11, 23 August 1948; DEFE 2/1552. Impartial investigation into
the uses of the LCM in the future, docket CO 660/47; DEFE 2/1551.
39. B589 in ADM 167/133.
40• COS (47) 157, 6 August 1947, memo by Admiralty; DEFE 5/5.
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dimensions were to be consistent with the stated War Office maximum
dimensions for all vehicles until 1956. In addition to launching
amphibians and AFVs equipped with flotation devices, the ship was to
be capable of discharging vehicles into water within their wading
depth on the flattest beaches. 41 However, no action was taken. By the
early 1950s the Admiralty was still undertaking to design and
construct a prototype LST(4) but the project did not receive sufficient
attention and in the event this ship never progressed beyond the
drawing board.
By 1948 no action had been taken to convert any of the LST to
LST(A). Despite having some doubts as to the operational value of
LST(A), COCOS Wildman-Lushington recommended that one
LST(A) should be converted for initial trials and that at least five
(sufficient for battalion lift) should be earmarked for conversion
following this. He left the question of whether to convert the 17
agreed in 1946 to a later date. In the absence of LSI, these LST(A)
were "to satisfy peacetime training requirements and for operational
needs in the early stages of an emergency" .42 By 1949 it was looking
increasingly unlikely that the Admiralty would bear the cost of full
conversion to LST(A). The original proposal for full-scale
conversion of an LST(3) to LST(A) was deferred in May 1949.43
DCOM at the Admiralty suggested a more limited conversion be
accepted, and by September COCOS was being advised that full
conversion was unlikely to take place.44
COHQ were by no means convinced that the LST(A) was a good idea.
In a paper presented within the headquarters in November 1946 it was
demonstrated that this vessel was only a poor substitute for LSI(L).45
Reporting to the DCOM in 1948 COHQ concluded that "the LST(A)
can not be recommended for war, and is a second best for peacetime
training" .46 The LST was noted as being particularly unsuitable for
Commando use in raiding due to its relatively low speed. Contrary to
previous claims the use of LST to land infantry was against all known
41. Broad Characteristics of LST(4), 2 May 1947 docket CO 328/47; DEFE 2/1554.
42. DEFE 2/1612.
43. Director of Naval Construction to Director of Naval Equipment, 25 September 1949; DEFE
2/1612.
44. Policy Brief No.17, 8 August 1949; DEFE 2/1612.
45. Conversion of LST(3) to LST(A), report by Policy Group, COHQ; DEFE 2/1612.
46. DEFE 2/1612.
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United States practice. COHQ continued to press for LSI, but if these
could not be made available for peacetime training, then they
suggested limited conversions of LST to allow them to act as LST(A)
for training purposes only. These LST would be able to accommodate
troops for up to 72 hours only, under peacetime conditions.
Unsuitable for operational use these ships would be much less
expensive than LST(A) proper.47
A number of studies were conducted to examine the carriage of troops
in aircraft carriers. In December 1947 HMS Triumph conducted
Exercise "Marine Rumpus" which included the embarkation of
Commandos and vehicles from Malta. It was considered that a small
infantry battalion or Commando could be lifted in two light fleet
carriers and that a brigade consisting of three battalions and brigade
headquarters could be lifted if the carriers did not embark their air
groups. The main disadvantage in this arrangement, other than
impairing the carrier's role in operating aircraft, was the time taken
to embark and disembark troops. Proposals to convert operational
carriers by adding a stern ramp and heavy davits for craft and
equipment were not given serious consideration. One can only
imagine the response of a 1SL asked to expend money and shipyard
space converting his precious fleet of aircraft carriers for the benefit
of Combined Operations.48
In 1950 COHQ investigated the possibility of using redundant
Leviathan class aircraft carrier hulls as the basis for assault ships.
Three such hulls were available and it was anticipated that they could
fill the role of LSI. Again, the project received little priority.
COCOS Wildman-Lushington was determined that consideration of
this project should not be at the expense of the construction and
modification of "bona fide" amphibious ships and craft. 49 The
proposals to use aircraft carriers as landing ships were never likely to
receive much serious attention at a time when the available resources
in landing ships and craft were seen as adequate, or at least nearly so.
Even the Leviathan class ships, which were too small to operate
modern aircraft, were large ships with deep draught and a heavy
manpower requirement. It was not until the mid-1950s, after the
47 . Ibid.
48 • Transportation Craft, docket 730/46; DEFE 2/1620.
49 . Folios 5,6 + 8 docket 707/1/50; DEFE 2/1604.
122
potentialities of helicopters began to be recognised, that plans to
convert carriers for amphibious warfare duties aroused serious
interest in Britain.
Conventional warships could be used for the carriage of assaulting
infantry. Such ships had the dual advantage of a relatively high speed
compared to specialist amphibious ships and an appearance that would
not immediately cause an enemy to appreciate that a landing was in the
offing. However, unconverted warships were unable to carry the
assault craft required for successful landing operations and would
experience difficulties accommodating large numbers of troops for
anything more than very short periods. Operational experience in
World War Two had shown time and again the need for specialist
shipping.
As early as 1945 the Admiralty were considering the follow on craft
to the LCT(8). It was noted that the LCT(8) was a large and
expensive vessel and that in any future war this would cause
difficulties in manufacture and manning. 5 '3
 COHQ prepared broad
staff requirements for an LCT(9) in 1946. 51 Design work was
undertaken, although no craft were produced. The agreed staff
requirements of July 1949 stated that the LCT(9) was to be capable of
embarking four 75 ton tanks or equivalent and of landing them
directly onto the beach or launching them in deep water. With a
maximum speed of at least 12 knots the craft was to travel 5,000 miles
of ocean at 10 knots. The estimated cost of the vessel was £280,000
which was considered too expensive. It was thus suggested that a
proportion of the craft would not be equipped to launch amphibious
tanks, saving approximately £25,000 per vesse1. 52 The Admiralty
undertook to complete the design of the LCT(9). 53 In 1956 the
Director of Naval Construction reported to CAW that although it was
intended to produce detailed plans, actual construction of LCT(9)
would not be started until an emergency arose. 54 The craft would
therefore not be available until the advanced stages of a future
conflict. In October 1956 AWHQ appear to have believed that
513 • Folio 15 + 18 docket CO 413/45; DEFE 2/1341.
51. CR.907/46; DEFE 2/1552.
52. Agreed Staff Requirements for LCT(9), 24 July 1950, folio 8 docket 801/50; DEFE
2/1623.
53. COS (51) 602, 22 October 1951, report by CAW; DEFE 5/34.
54. Folio 4, docket AW 558/56; DEFE 2/1902.
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approval had been given for the construction of a prototype LCT(9),
however, as with the LST(4), this craft was never built.55
The Royal Navy was fortunate that in the LCT(8) it gained an
adequate craft in sufficient numbers for post war purposes. The
LCT(8) was superior to its wartime ancestors and had seen no
exhausting wartime service. Once the craft had been strengthened to
carry Centurion tanks they were deficient only in the ability to launch
modern Duplex Drive (DD) amphibious tanks. This shortcoming,
although important, was less serious given the fact that only
experimental Centurion DD equipment was produced. By the early
1950s some problems of availability were beginning to surface.
Three LCT(8) were temporarily converted to LCH and one was
converted for use by the Admiralty as an experimental
minesweeper. 56 The was result that the margin above the operational
requirement of 24 plus two for training was reduced to nil. Landing
craft are by no means indestructible and without new construction the
LCT(8) fleet was liable to fall below requirements.
The position regarding other amphibious vehicles was little better.
During the Second World War the majority of amphibians operated
by the British were of American design and build. In order to
supplement supplies from the United States, the War Office developed
their own vehicles, the Terrapin and the Neptune. Work on the four
ton Terrapin was initiated in October 1942. A small number were
produced but the design was not successful. Work began on the
Terrapin Mk.2 in September 1943 and four prototypes were built but,
as effective production in time for operations was impossible, the
production order was cancelled. The Neptune was undergoing
prototype trials when the War ended. However the design was
unsatisfactory, largely because of excessive weight and reliability
problems. 57 At the Admiralty work was initiated on an amphibian
intended primarily for the build-up. Despite War Office interest in
developing new wheeled and tracked amphibians, lack of priority and
consequent lack of funding meant that in the event no Army
55. Folio 25, docket AW 558/56; in DEFE 2/1902.
56. COS (53) 137, 12 March 1953, memo by the Admiralty; DEFE 5/45.
57. Folio 1 docket CO 307/47; DEFE 2/1458. Folio 1 docket 91A/47; DEFE 2/1459. Folio 4





Combined Operations considered that special support batteries of
75mm howitzers fitted in LCA was a particularly useful idea. Only in
small scale operations, where DD tanks and self propelled artillery
could not be landed would such a battery be justified. In situations
where the fire support provided by DD tanks and air cover had
proven inadequate it was not considered that one special support
battery would turn the tide.72
In view of the decision to scrap obsolete wartime support craft and the
reluctance of the Admiralty to provide rocket ships, the School of
Combined Operations considered that the provision of bombardment
charges for Royal Navy destroyers was important. The Director of
Gunnery and Anti-Aircraft Warfare at the Admiralty disagreed. He
pointed out that the essential function of the destroyer was to support
and screen the fleet units and their equipment was designed for this
purpose. The supply and storage of specialist ammunition for the
support of amphibious operations was considered logistically
undesirable, as was the fitting of the special fire control gear needed
to make such charges fully effective.73
In 1943 the Admiralty had issued staff requirements for a Landing
Craft Support (Rocket) (LCS(R)) to provide close support in the
assault by means of the mass use of high explosive, smoke and
incendiary rockets. 74 After the War renewed studies were conducted
into the provision of a Naval Rocket Ship. In November 1946 staff
requirements were formulated for a Landing Ship Support (Rocket)
(LSS(R)). Preliminary work showed that the full requirements for a
very accurate weapon could not be met with existing technology. Any
compromise solution adopted before advances in rocket technology
made possible the necessary improvements would not have been
greatly superior to the existing United States LSM(R) and so as an
interim measure it was suggested that this ship be procured.75
The LSM(R) was an American wartime conversion of the Landing
Ship, Medium. By decking over the hold, sealing the bow doors and
fitting a five inch gun and 20 continuous loading five inch rocket
72. DEFE 2/1656 + DEFE 2/1559.
73. Folio 1 + 3 docket 1100/48; DEFE 2/1656.
74. Proposed Improved Rocket Support Ship LSS(R), paper by COHQ; DEFE 2/1297.
75. Ibid. CO 604/47; in DEFE 2/1551.
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launchers the LSM(R) could fire 1,040 rockets in the first minute of
action. This represented the equivalent fire of four or five
destroyers, each armed with four 4 inch guns. It took forty-five
minutes to reload and the ship carried enough rockets for three full
salvos. The ships also carried four 4.2 inch mortars, two 40mm and
four 20mm twin anti-aircraft guns. With a crew of 6 officers and 137
men it could steam 3,000 miles at 12 knots. The LSM(R) saw action
in the Pacific theatre, providing fire support for the Okinawa
landings. Fifty-two were built or under construction by the end of the
War.76
In 1948 COHQ concluded that six LSM(R) were required to provide
support for the brigade group assault, on a basis of two per battalion
front. Consequently the Admiralty was requested to make six
LSM(R) available at short notice in an emergency and to provide the
training necessary to make effective use of this equipment. The
requirement was to lapse once a British rocket ship or craft was
available. The Admiralty was reluctant to accept this additional
responsibility. The USN had eight LSM(R) in commission with
another 36 in reserve. The ships in reserve were described by CCOR
as being in only "fair" condition and the ammunition situation was
poor. The Admiralty was aware of the value of these ships but in
view of the low priority they accorded the brigade group assault they
were unwilling to accept them as a definite requirement.77
In 1950 COHQ scaled down their requests, first to three LSM(R) to be
provided on mobilisation for use in the opposed assault, and then in
1951 to one LSM(R) in order that Britain might keep abreast of
developments. 78
 In 1951 the COS agreed that the possibility of
acquiring one LSM(R) from the United States should be
investigated. 79
 The Admiralty remained reluctant due to manning
difficulties and the issue remained unresolved. Rear Admiral Elkins,
representing the VCNS, told the COS Committee that the manpower
to bring an LSM(R) over from America could only be provided by
paying off a frigate. He considered this unacceptable. 80
 In May 1953
76. Ladd, Assault from the Sea, p.196. Allied Landing Craft of World War Two.
77. Dockets CO 549/47 and CO 277A/49; DEFE 2/1551.
78. COS (50) 295, 9 August 1950, report by COCOS; DEFE 5/23. COS (51) 601.
79. COS (51) 173 mtg.
80. COS (51) 463, 9 August 1951, memo by Admiralty;DEFE 5/32. COS (52) 154 mtg,
10 November 1952; DEFE 4/57.
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Figure Six. Landing Ship. Tank (Assault).
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the Admiralty reported that there was no LSM(R) in reserve in the
United States in sufficiently good condition to go straight into reserve
in Britain. The Chiefs accepted that no further action should be taken
in the matter of acquiring an LSM(R) until the outbreak of war. It
was noted that training might occasionally be possible with USN
LSM(R) allocated to the US Atlantic Fleet.81
The report of March 1951 outlined a requitement for three LST(3) to
be converted to carry six LCA at davits as makeshift LST(A). 82 By
March the following year no action had been taken but the COS
agreed that the requirement was urgent and should be carried out as
soon as possible. 83 In August the Admiralty reported that, although
one LST(3) (HMS Reggio ) had been converted by adding davits for
six LCA, all future action was being suspended until trials with the
new design LCA could be completed. 84 Work was eventually started
on two further LST, HMS Striker and HMS Anzio , and all three
LST(A) were ready in time for the Suez crisis.
The LST(A) provided accommodation for 20 officers and 40 troops
in cabins and enclosed messes. This could be increased by 120 men
sleeping on stretchers in the tank deck at the expense of some vehicle
lift. With no vehicles in the tank deck 260 men could be
accommodated there. Given good climatic conditions, an extra six
officers and 50 troops could be accommodated on the upper deck, or
six officers and 150 men for a trip of less than 24 hours. Thus, the
total maximum personnel lift of the LST(A) was 20 officers and 450
men. Twelve Centurion tanks or 27 three ton lorries could be carried
in the tank deck. The upper deck had room for four 3 ton lorries and
22 Champs (Jeeps), see figure six.85
For raiding operations, LSI(M) had proven the most useful ship
during the War. These ships, of the cross-channel steamer type,
combined suitable size with speed and manoeuvrability, making them
ideal for assaults where speed and surprise were at a premium. With
the allocation of a Commando Brigade for raiding in the
81 • COS (53) 206, 2 May 1953, memo by Admiralty; DEFE 5/46. COS (53) 60 mtg, 11 May
1953; DEFE 4/62.
82 . COS (51) 146.
83 • COS (52) 45 mtg, 31 March 1952; DEFE 4/53.
84. COS (52) 449, 19 August 1952, note by Admiralty; DEFE 5/41.
85 • Amphibious Warfare Handbook No.4A, The Battalion with Supporting Arms in the
Amphibious Assault, 1956; DEFE 2/1760.
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Mediterranean on the outbreak of war and plans for a similar brigade
to be formed in the United Kingdom some provision had to be made
for their assault shipping. CAW recommended that three LSI(M) be
made available in each theatre at the same time that the Commandos
would be available for operations. This meant that three LSI(M) (plus
their complement of 8 LCP, 15 LCA and 1 LCN) were required in
the Mediterranean on the outbreak of war.86
Although this target was approved by the COS, the provision of
LSI(M) gave some cause for concern. • In October 1951 CAW
reported that unless foreign flagged ships could be used then no more
than three or four ships would be available within three months.87
AWHQ pressed for the stockpiling of the necessary davits required
for three cross channel steamers to be converted to LSI(M) on the
outbreak of war. The Admiralty reported that full conversion to
LSI(M) would require six months, and only by stockpiling the
necessary equipment could a limited conversion be effected in two
months. 88 In October 1953 CAW was still pressing for three sets of
LCA davits (24 pairs) to be provided in order that the three ships
earmarked for limited conversion to LSI(M) could be ready within
two months of mobilisation. 89 In 1955 the Shipping Resources
Committee informed the COS that insufficient passenger ships existed
to meet the requirements of both essential trooping and the conversion
of ships to LSI(M). It was therefore agreed to cancel the provisional
earmarking of ships for conversion to LSI(M).90
The requirement for the LSD was revived in the early 1950s. In 1952
staff requirements were issued for both a new LCM (LCM(8)) and a
Landing Ship, Tank (Dock) (LST(D)). The function of the LST(D)
was to transport and discharge in the assault 10 LCM(8) preloaded
with 50 ton tanks, three American Landing Ship Utility (LSU), and as
many stores as possible. The ship was to have a maximum speed of 17
knots and an endurance of 7,400 miles at 15 knots, fully loaded. In
addition to crew, accommodation was required for 25 officers and
86. COS (50) 295.
87. COS (51) 601.
88. COS (52) 649, 29 November 1952, report by CAW; DEFE 5/43.
89. COS (53) 538, 30 October 1953, report by CAW; DEFE 5/49.
90 • COS (55) 24 mtg, 6 April 1955; in DEFE 4/76.
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250 other ranks. 91
 The change in attitudes had been prompted by the
decision that the Army might want to land individual tanks in LCM
during the assault. The landing of first priority tanks in LCT had the
disadvantage that it precluded dispersal, with four or five tanks in
each craft. This made the loss of one craft at sea much more serious
and raised the prospect of the lead tank in an LCT being immobilised
on the bow ramp and blocking in the remaining vehicles. Also, the
size of LCT(8) meant that they could not land in as shallow water as
an LCM. Previous policy had been for individual tanks to land using
the DD flotation system. The lack of DD equipment and the inability
to launch DD equipped tanks from the existing ships and craft had led
to this capability being allowed to lapse.92
In his progress report of April 1952 CAW Thomas requested that the
Admiralty proceed with the construction of a prototype LSD/LST(D)
and LCM in 1953. According to the accelerated Fraser Plan for naval
rearmament the LST(D) was not due to be laid down until 1956. By
1952 the Admiralty had given only preliminary consideration to the
project. 93
 Thomas was anxious that construction of this vessel should
go ahead and wrote to the Admiralty promoting the LSD as a valuable
member of the fleet train due to its repair and maintenance facilities.94
Nevertheless, the LST(D)/LSD fell victim to the 1953-1955 defence
cuts. In August 1952 the Admiralty reported that the project was in
abeyance. 95
 In October 1953 CAW was still unsuccessfully pressing
for construction of the LSD.96
 It was recognised that without the
LSD, tanks could only be landed in the assault given favourable beach
and weather conditions. A contract to design an LCM(8) along the
lines of the 1952 staff requirements had been issued to Vosper at
Gosport. This design was completed in 1955. However, the
cancellation of the LSD meant that there was no suitable ship available
to carry the craft and the project was shelved.97
91 • Draft Staff Requirements for LST(D), 12 March 1952, folio 3 docket CO 707/42/52;
DEFE 2/1871.
92 • Amphibious Warfare Ships and Craft sub-Committee, meeting held on 17 and 24 April 1952,
folios 8 + 11 docket AW 707/51/52; DEFE 2/1876.
93. Letter from DNC to AWHQ dated 29 May 1952, folio 9 'docket CO 707/42/52; DEFE 2/1871.
COS (52) 234, 30 April 1952, report by CAW; DEFE 5/39. COS (52) 69 mtg, 19 May 1952;
DEFE 4/54.
94. Letter of 19 June 1952, folio 14 docket AW(o) -1873/53/54; DEFE 2/1851.
95. COS (52) 448, 19 August 1952, note by Admiralty; DEFE 5/41.
96 • COS (53) 538, 30 October 1953, report by CAW; DEFE 5/49.
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figure Seven. Landing Craft, Assault.
Minor landing craft had been built by the thousand during the War.
Despite the heavy losses associated with their operational use, Britain
finished the War with a large surplus of craft. In 1946 Britain had
1,013 spare LCA after catering for national requirements.98 In these
circumstances it was inconceivable that there would be major building
programmes in the 1940s. However, deficiencies existed in some
areas. Landing Craft, Control were all Lend-Lease, and as such were
returned to the United States. Out of 200 a:vailable LCP(L) all but 30
were also Lend-Lease equipment.99 In 1951 CAW reported that
despite a surplus of LCA there was a deficiency of seven LCN and 44
LCP. The ten available LCP were suitable only for training and, due
to lack of spares, they were to be regarded as a wasting asset. Until
new LCN and LCP could be constructed, surplus LCA would be
required as a stopgap. However, even in this respect the situation was
unsatisfactory as many of the LCA in reserve were in a condition
beyond economical repair, see figure seven.m
Moves towards the replacement of minor landing craft had been
limited. The New Construction Programme of 1947-8 had included
only one LCP. 101
 In 1952 CAW reported that the Admiralty had
undertaken designs for a new LCA and that a new fast Landing Craft
Raiding (LCR) was being produced. He also noted that the wartime
minor craft were rapidly becoming unserviceable and invited the
Admiralty to make provision for their replacement in the next
financial year. In response the Admiralty pointed out that approval
had already been given for the construction of four new pattern LCA
and eight LCR. 102
 By October 1953 the situation was still
unsatisfactory. Although financial approval had been given in the
1952-54 Estimates for eight LCA and 12 LCP, no construction had
begun. Despite the fact that four LCP(M) were being built and a
prototype LCP(S) had been constructed there was still a backlog of
four LCP(M) and 7 LCP(S) on the total approved for 1952-54. Only
preliminary consideration had been given to the approved prototype
LCN. 103
 The gradual replacement of the old craft continued, within
98. JP (45) 259.
99. Ibid.
100. cos (so 146.
101.B589 in ADM 167/133.
102. COS (52) 234. COS (52) 69 mtg, 19 May 1952; DEFE 4/54. The new style LCA was larger
than the wartime original, being designed to carry a jeep. CD 829, National Maritime Museum,
Woolwich..
103. COS (53) 538.
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the limits imposed by financial restrictions. The first LCA was due to
complete in February 1955 and contracts had been placed for eight 40
foot LCR. Eight new type 27 foot LCP(M) had entered service by the
end of 1954 and a contract for four 20 foot LCP(S) had been placed.
By 1956 the first eight LCA(2) were in service and further
construction was underway. The four LCP(S) were also in service
and ten more were completed by 1957. No further production of
these craft was contemplated as they were to be replaced by Gemini
inflatables. Two of the eight LCR were completed as specialist
LCN.104
Clearly, without new construction amphibious capabilities were bound
to deteriorate. That the Admiralty were firmly opposed to expending
unnecessary manpower and finance on amphibious warfare, has been
shown in chapters two and three. The Admiralty were concerned
mainly with preserving the traditional tools of seapower, while the
main pre-occupation of post-war shipyards was the reconstruction of
the merchant fleet. Naval programmes were hampered by a lack of
finance and a shortage of technical design staff. Under these
circumstances, little work on new construction could be expected. No
naval building programme was drawn up for 1946. 105 The 1947
programme did include an LSD and an LCP. The LSD was cancelled
but projects which the Admiralty accorded a relatively high priority
also suffered. Cutbacks caused the suspension of all three Tiger class
cruisers in 1946 and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal ,which was laid
down in 1943, did not enter service until 1955. 106
 The project for the
LST(D) fell victim to defence cuts in the 1950s , but then so did
Admiralty plans for a new fleet carrier. 107
 The Admiralty, and
indeed all the Services, were forced to concentrate scarce expenditure
as far as possible on high priority projects. An inter-Service
responsibility regarded as a low priority by the Admiralty,
amphibious warfare suffered as a result. Walter Monckton, Minister
of Defence between December 1955 and October 1956, recalled that
in order to ensure defence cuts and to safeguard spending on the
nuclear deterrent, spending on conventional forces had to be cut to the
bone. This involved taking calculated risks, a good example of which
104.
 Cos (54) 372, 2 December 1954, report by CAW; DEFE 5/55. Also DEFE 2/1912-15.
1I35 . Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.21-3.
106. Conway's all the World's Fighting Ships, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1983).
107. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.99
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was his decision not to call for an increase in landing craft despite the
shortage of such equipment. Monckton accorded amphibious warfare
a very low priority, believing that Britain could rely on American
assistance in future operations.108
By 1955, apart from a number of newly built minor craft, Britain's
amphibious fleet was entirely made up of old war built vessels. It was
fortunate that the LST(3), LCT(8) and LCM(7) were practically
brand new in 1945 and were thus able to operate effectively until they
were phased out of service in the 1960s. Earlier types had less
satisfactory designs and, having seen extensive wartime use, would not
have stood up to the rigours of post-war service. One unfortunate
side effect of the existence of these relatively modern vessels was that
their availability reduced the urgency of calls for new construction
and provided an incentive for the Services to remain wedded to the
old style amphibious techniques for which they had been designed.
Had these vessels not existed new construction may have been given a
higher priority. New amphibious vessels could have been built,
conforming to peacetime standards of construction and designed to
incorporate advances in amphibious techniques. However, it is by no
means certain that any such construction would have been undertaken.
In view of the tight financial restrictions of the late 1940s it is more
likely that old, unsuitable, worn out war veterans would have been
pressed into service with new construction delayed as long as possible
or not undertaken at all. The failure to maintain and update the
amphibious fleet is a clear indication of the lack of priority it was
accorded.
The amphibious fleet in 1955 may have been of wartime vintage but it
was by no means simply a scaled down version of the great
amphibious armada that existed in 1945. In 1955 there was not the
range of equipment and capabilities that existed ten years earlier.
Unlike its wartime predecessor the amphibious fleet of the 1950s was
not a well rounded force. There was no LSH suitable for divisional
or even independent brigade group assaults. There were no LSD to
carry LCM. There was no specialist support craft or any ability to
land DD tanks. There were no LSI for the carriage of infantry or
LSI(M) for raiding. The inability to launch DD tanks or to carry
108
. Lord Birkenhead, Walter Monckton. the Life of Viscount Monckton of
Brenchley, (London: Weienfeld and Nicolson, 1969) p.306.
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LCM to the assault area led to the acceptance of an outmoded
technique, that of landing armour in LCT during the assault. Despite
strengthening the decks of LCT and LSTs the heaviest army
equipment (i.e. Royal Engineer armoured vehicle) could not be landed
in the assault. What ships, craft and amphibious vehicles that did exist
were old, slow and prone to obsolescence. It was with this
amphibious force that Britain was to undertake the assault on Port




On 26 July 1956 President Game! Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced
the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in retaliation for the withdrawal
of promised Western aid to build the Aswan High Dam. As he spoke
the offices of the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company were seized by
Egyptian troops. The political background to this action and the
diplomatic initiatives that followed it are beyond the scope of this
study. Both the British and French governments strongly opposed
Nasser's action and military intervention to reverse it was
contemplated from the first day of the crisis that followed. Over
three months after Nasser's declaration Operation Musketeer was
launched; an Anglo-French military operation designed to take
physical control of the Suez Canal, culminating in an amphibious
assault on Port Said on 6 November. This chapter will look at the
preparation for, and the actual conduct of, the amphibious operations
and assess the extent to which the previous decade of neglect affected
the final outcome.
On the day of Nasser's announcement Eden ordered the COS to
prepare contingency plans for intervention In Egypt. This move was
officially authorised by the Cabinet on 27 July. That same day the
Cabinet set up a special Egypt Committee, consisting of the Prime
Minister, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of
Defence. This committee was responsible for formulating policy
regarding the Suez crisis. The COS were to attend as necessary.' On
29 July the French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, flew to London with
his Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, and a team of military
advisers to discuss possible joint military action. On 30 July Amiral
Nomy, Chief of the French Naval Staff, met the Minister of Defence,
Walter Monckton, and 1SL Lord Mountbatten, offering them the full
support of the French armed forces to smash the Egyptian President.
1. EC (56) 1, 28 July 1956; CAB 134/1217.
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That same day Eden announced to Parliament that Britain and France
were taking "precautionary military measures".2
What was required was rapid and effective military intervention to
restore the Canal to international control before opposition to military
action had time to crystallise. Unfortunately, the armed forces were
in no position to provide an effective rapid response. On 26 July the
Royal Navy had only one aircraft carrier immediately available, HMS
Eagle. The light fleet carrier HMS Bulwark , engaged in flying trials
and training with a reduced complement, was available at short notice
in home waters, but did not arrive at Malta until 25 August. 3 Britain
had nine other aircraft carriers that could have conducted operations
against Egypt but of these, three were undergoing refit or
modernisation, two were in reserve awaiting an uncertain future and
four were employed in training and trials duties.4
The British amphibious capability in the Mediterranean was provided
by the AW Squadron. This consisted of the LST(A)s HMS Striker
and HMS Reggio with the LCTs Bastion and Redoubt , the LSH
Meon and a motor launch (ML 2583) acting as navigational leader.
Sufficient to lift only one Commando, the Squadron should have been
capable of lifting the full Commando Brigade at fourteen days notice.
However, the ships in reserve at Malta were old and in poor repair
and required time to be brought to a level of operational efficiency.5
The Parachute Brigade and two Commandos (40 and 42) were
stationed in Cyprus but both the red and green berets were engaged in
internal security duties and desperately needed refresher training in
their specialist roles.
Mountbatten was later to claim that on 26 July he told Eden that the
Fleet could sail from Malta within a few hours, pick up the
Commandos at Cyprus who could then occupy Port Said within three
of four days. In 1973 he wrote to Michael Howard:
2. Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez: The Double War, (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1979) p.14-15. Keith Kyle, Suez, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992) p.145. A.J. Barker,
Suez: The Seven Day War, (London: Faber and Faber, 1964) p.21.
3. Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A Graphic History of Carrier Aviation and its
Influence on World Events, (London: MacDonald, 1966) p.576. Grove, Vanguard to
Trident, p.186.
4. Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, p.576.
5. Vice Admiral M.Richmond, Naval Report on Operation Musketeer; in ADM 116/6209.
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The Royal Marines 	 could then seize Port Said
and the first twenty-five miles of theCauseway along
the Canal. All this they would hold very easily
without a shot being fired, with great political
impact.6
Mountbatten had a somewhat flexible relationship with the truth. The
records indicate that in fact he was against any such use of the Marines
as they would have had great difficulty maintaining their position
ashore. The CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, strongly
opposed putting ashore a lightly armed force that might have to face
enemy armour. With hindsight it is easy to assert that what was
required was a swift coup de main which would have rapidly restored
control of the canal to Britain and France. The reality is that due to
the failure over the last decade to create a mobile, flexible sea based
striking force Britain did not possess the forces required to carry out
such an operation successfully. At the Cabinet meeting of 27 July the
COS argued that the equivalent of three divisions would be required
to overcome the Egyptians and that preparations to mount any
operation would take several weeks.7
Based in Cyprus on anti-terrorist duties, the Commandos had not set
foot in a landing craft for eleven months. The brigade had no anti-
tank guns and had not conducted training with tanks, LVTs, naval
aircraft or gunfire support ships for over a year. 42 Commando had
been absent from the brigade for almost two years and was still at
cadre strength in the United Kingdom, operating in a training role.
The brigade was separated from the AW Squadron which was based at
Malta. The 16 Parachute Brigade was no better prepared. Since
January 1956 the 1st and 3rd battalions had been stationed in Cyprus.
These two battalions had not conducted any parachute exercises for
nine months. The 2nd battalion did not arrive in Cyprus until June
and it was August before the brigade headquarters and associated
support units arrived. There were not enough transport aircraft to
accommodate the Parachute Brigade in one lift and the aircraft that
were available were ill suited to parachute operations. Despite being
in the "Strategic Reserve" the 3rd Infantry Division based in the
United Kingdom was under strength and had had no opportunity to
6. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.537.
7. CM (56) 54th Conclusions, 27 July 1956; CAB 128/30(pt2). Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.538.
Kyle, Suez, p.136. Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1986) p.458.
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train with its armour. 8 The 10th Armoured Division was available in
Libya but was in reality at little more than brigade strength and its use
was in doubt from the outset. As early as 9 August the force
commanders ruled out the use of this unit across the Libyan border,
largely due to logistic and political difficulties.9
Much work was needed before the armed forces could be ready for
action. 40 and 45 Commando were moved from Cyprus to Malta,
where they were joined by 42 Commando on 16 August. The brigade
conducted intensive military and amphibious training and all drivers
received instruction in waterproofing and wading. During September
the brigade was joined by Air Control Teams, one to each
Commando, by teams of observers from 166 Amphibious Observation
Battery, and by battalion anti-tank platoons from 3 Infantry
Brigade. 10
 The brigade could not be considered ready for a serious
amphibious operation before September. Brigadier Madoc,
commanding officer of 3 Commando during Musketeer, was in no
doubt that the extended training period was vital for efficiency.11
The 1st and 3rd Parachute battalions were returned to the Parachute
Training School at Abingdon to conduct refresher training with the
pilots of their transports. The 3rd Infantry Division drew its
mobilisation stores and was brought up to strength.12
The situation regarding ships and craft was no better. Of the 19 ships
and craft that comprised the AW Squadron for Musketeer, 12 had to
be brought forward from reserve. The LST(3)s HMS Suvla, Salerno,
Puncher and Ravager were brought forward from reserve in the
Clyde as were the LST(3) Lofoten and the LST(A) Anzio at Malta.
Six LCT(8) were brought out from reserve: Parapet, Counterguard,
Sallyport and Buttress in the United Kingdom and Citadel and
Portcullis at Malta. A total of 20 LCA(1) were brought forward in
Britain for use by the LSTs from the Clyde. It was planned to fit
these ships with three sets 'of davits each and thus rapidly convert them
8• General H.C.Stockwell, Report by Commander 2 (Br) Corps on Operation
Musketeer; WO 288/77. Brigadier R.W.Madoc, 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines -
Operation Musketeer Report; ADM 202/455.
9. WO 288/77.
10. ADM 202/455, p.6-10. Lt-Colonel Gordon West, "Operation Musketeer" in Marine Corps
Gazette, July 1957.
11. ADM 202/455 p.6-10.
12. Barker, Suez, chapter 2.
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to LST(A). Unfortunately, there was not enough time to carry this
out and the ships sailed for the Mediterranean without full sets of
davits. 17 LCA were brought forward at Malta. The LCT Sallyport
was converted at Devonport to act as an LCH by embarking special
headquarters vehicles. HMS Rampart , the one LCT already in
commission in the United Kingdom, was used to train commanding
officers designate.13
The LCT(8) had been kept in Operational Reserve and were available
at relatively short notice. Ordered into commission on 31 July, the
four LCT in Britain sailed from Devonport on 20 August, arriving at
Malta eleven days later. The LST were all in Supplementary Reserve
which placed them at 28 days notice. Ordered forward on 2 and 3
August, all the LSTs from the Clyde had sailed from Devonport for
Malta within a month. Although these ships were made available for
action with commendable speed, they were all overdue for refit and
were not in any state to undertake operations. The requirement to
train that portion of the squadron brought out of reserve conflicted
somewhat with the need to make them fit for operations. Not until the
end of September were these vessels in an acceptable state of material
and training. Scarcity of waterproofing material contributed to the
difficulties. It was only possible for one Centurion to be disembarked
over a beach during the training period. The LCT Citadel had to be
withdrawn from service when her bow ramp was torn off during
preliminary loading at Malta. The full lift embarked by the AW
Squadron is given at Table One.14
Table One: Amphibious Warfare Squadron for Musketeer
Ships and Craft	 Total lift embarked
1 LSH(S)	 178 officers
3 LST(A)	 2,305 men
5 LST(3)	 51 tanks
9 LCT(8)	 16 LVTs
1 LCN	 10 17 pounder anti-tank guns





The Commandos and assault ships conducted individual and ship
training throughout September and October. Two major exercises,
SEPTEX 1 and SEPTEX 2, were carried out in September. SEPTEX
1 was a two day exercise culminating in an assault landing. SEPTEX
2 was conducted primarily so that air and seaborne support measures
could be tested by the Forward Observation Parties.15
The two headquarters ships used for Musketeer were inadequate for
their task. The Force Headquarters ship, HMS Tyne , was equipped
with a total of 16 transmitting and 22 receiving lines. This fell far
short of requirements. General Beaufre, the French military
commander, was sufficiently dissatisfied with arrangements on board
Tyne to shift his flag to a French ship. Lack of facilities on board
Tyne made it impossible to accommodate both the Joint Operations
Centre (JOC) and the Joint Fire Support Committee (JFSC) on this
ship and the latter was put on board the LSH(S) HMS Meon . Meon
had been designed to act as brigade headquarters ship in the divisional
assault in company with an LSH(L). As far back as 1950 AWHQ had
reported that it was inadequate as an LSH in its own right as it lacked
the necessary accommodation and equipment. 16 The separation of the
JOC and JFSC in two different ships was very unsatisfactory. With
Tyne sailing off Cyprus while Meon was still at Malta effective
liaison was very difficult to achieve. Signals traffic was so congested
that Operational Immediate messages were taking eight hours in
transit.17
The provision of amphibians was a considerable problem for the
British. Study of the beaches at Port Said showed that LCAs would
beach about 100 yards from the shore line. The beach itself was about
200 yards deep and troops assaulting from . LCAs would thus be very
vulnerable until the beach area was secured. For this reason it was
decided that LVTs, originally only to be used in the build-up, would
be employed for the initial wave. Only 16 obsolete Buffaloes could
be made available. For years AWHQ had pressed for the provision of
modern LVTs. In 1952 it had been reported that, although Britain
15 . Ibid.
16 • COS (56) 412, 19 November 1956, report by CAW; DEFE 5/72. Andre Beaufre, The Suez
Expedition 1956, (London: Faber and Faber, 1969) p.46-47.
17 . ADM 116/6209.
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had 37 LVTs, these were all obsolete World War Two types, unfit for
operational use. 18 In 1956 there was nothing else available.
There was no regular Army unit equipped with amphibians so No.!
Troop LVT, Royal Armoured Corps had to be formed with men from
the RAC Training Brigade. Under Captain P.S.Berry of the 7th
Royal Tank Regiment one officer and 32 men were ordered to
Fremington to learn to operate LVTs. They had only a few days to
master the vehicle's mechanics and learn the rudiments of seamanship
before being flown to Malta to join their vehicles. Within these few
days they demonstrated their proficiency by accidentally ramming the
Appledore lifeboat when an LVT went hard astern on both tracks.
The vehicles arrived at Malta in good condition but were short of boat
stores, various essential tools and spare parts. Repairs had to be
improvised. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that there was
no fitter available in Malta with experience of LVTs. Once at Malta 1
LVT Troop, RAC undertook extensive training with the Commandos
they were to land in the assault. Major Kenneth Macksey, the
historian of the Royal Tank Regiment, notes that it is fortunate that
the Commandos were so eager to cooperate with and help these novice
crews.19
LVTs were not the only amphibians that were in short supply.
Extraordinary lengths were gone to in order to acquire the necessary
vehicles. D.M.J. Clark, a reservist officer of the 95th Amphibious
Observation Regiment, recalled a fellow officer's surprise at the
arrival of a number of DUKWs at Fremington:
He was staring open-mouthed, in the direction of the
gateway to the camp 	 Edward's interest was
occasioned by the fact that this particular DUKW was
decorated in a manner reminiscent of a barber's pole,
in red, white and blue stripes. It passed close by us,
near enough for us to see painted on the gunwale the
name Saucy Sue, and on a notice board still attached
to the side, the legend "Long Trips on the Briny.
Adults 2s 6d. Children Half Price ".2.°
18. See chapter four, page 126-127.
19. Major Kenneth Macksey, The Tanks. The History of the Royal Tank Regiment,
1945-1975, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1979) p.126. ADM 202/455.
20. D.M.J.Clark, Suez Touchdown. A Soldiers Tale, (London: Peter Davis, 1964) .8-9.
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Lack of sufficient landing craft was a major limiting factor
throughout the planning process for Musketeer. The COS discussed
this problem as early as 30 July. It was noted that sufficient LCAs
existed to lift less than one Commando in the assault. 21 The use of
LVTs on 6 November mitigated somewhat the lack of LCAs. The
landing ships and craft both in commission and brought forward from
reserve were sufficient to allow an amphibious assault over the
beaches of two Commandos with few supporting arms. However, old
•
and worn out LCA(1)s had to be used in the assault alongside the new
LCA(2). The LCA(1)s brought out of reserve were in a poor state of
repair and this had a marked impact on training.22
The French were no better prepared for amphibious operations than
the British. According to General Beaufre, the officer who was to
command the French Amphibious Assault Group came straight from a
scientific office where he had been studying the ionisation of the
stratosphere. The Amphibious Centre at Arzew, which should have
been the source of amphibious specialists, had been disbanded to form
a Marine Brigade. The French had no equivalent of the AW
Squadron and thus had to start from scratch. The old LSD Foudre
had to sail from Saigon around the Cape. The first amphibious
exercise, held on 30 August, was a near catastrophe. The sea was
running high and one landing craft almost capsized. Beaufre recalled
that General Massu, the parachute commander he placed in charge of
the assault echelon, was in a mood to label all amphibious operations
as inventions of the devil. Troops previously engaged in counter-
insurgency operations in Algeria had to be retrained and had to
familiarise themselves with new equipment. The 10 Parachute
Division needed refresher parachute training, while the 7 Division
Mechanique Rapide had been dismounted and on reduced
establishment for six months. Much had to be done to prepare units
for possible operations in Egypt.23
Two battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment (RTR), the 1st and the
6th, were earmarked for operations in Egypt. There was considerable
confusion as to which battalion was to sail first. However, as the 6th
RTR embarked into naval LSTs at Plymouth while the 1st RTR
21. COS (56) 74 mtg, 30 July 1956; DEFE 4/89. COS (56) 293, 2 August 1956; DEFE 5/70.
22. ADM 116/6209.
23. Beaufre, The Suez Expedition, p.40-45.
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embarked into requisitioned civilian LSTs at Portsmouth, the 6th was
considered the most suitable for landing in the assault. Thus 6 RTR
sailed for Malta between 23 August and 2 September. 24 On arrival
the units attempted what training was possible at Malta, although the
narrow roads and restricted fields of that island made it unsuited for
this purpose. C Squadron practised loading into LCTs and conducted
a landing over the beach in Mellieha Bay.25
The first outline plan for military action against Egypt was submitted
to the Egypt Committee by the COS on 2 August. All thought of a
rapid coup de main was abandoned:
The concept of operations is based on poising a ring
of forces within striking range of Egypt. When this is
sufficiently far advanced, an ultimatum will be issued,
failing acceptance of which a maritime blockade and
air action will be instituted and - if this is still
necessary - an assault will be made to the northern end
of the canal and a threat posed to Alexandria.26
The Chiefs noted that the availability of landing craft was the limiting
factor to the strength of the first assault wave. LCAs could be made
available to land about 800 men. This could be increased if LCTs
were employed landing personnel, but this would be at the expense of
vehicle lift. As the assault forces which could land by sea were so
limited, the COS recommended that a heavy scale of air attack would
be required to ensure that the landings did not encounter serious
opposition. Similarly, it was recommended that the seaborne assault
be supported by the maximum possible parachute drop. Land
operations in the initial stages would be directed at seizing Port Said
with the Commandos. One British parachute battalion and possibly a
French parachute battalion could be dropped in direct support of the
amphibious landing. After Port Said had been seized, the remainder
of the Parachute Brigade group and an infantry brigade group would
be landed, followed by an infantry division less a brigade group.
These forces would break out of the beachhead, secure airfields,
occupy Suez and seize the bridges and ferries across the canal.
Further reinforcements would proceed as required and control would
eventually be extended throughout the Canal area and, if necessary,
24 . ADM 116/6209.
25 • Macksey, The Tanks, p.127-130.
26 . cos (56) 293.
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elsewhere in Egypt. The earliest date at which sufficient lift for two
Commandos could be provided, with one Commando in the assault
wave, was in six weeks time. The COS were aware that the assault
forces would require time for training and rehearsals before actual
operations could be undertaken.27
The COS invited each Service to appoint a commander for the
projected operations. The officers nominated by the Army, Navy and
RAF were, respectively: Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Stockwell,
Vice-Admiral M.Richmond, and Air Marshal D.H.F.Barnett. These
officers and their staffs assembled between 1 and 4 August in the
Montague House annex of the War Office. On 24 October Richmond
was succeeded by Vice-Admiral D.F.Durnford-Slater, a former
commandant of the Amphibious Warfare Centre. On 6 August the
first Joint Task Force Commanders meeting took place. Three days
later a meeting of the COS agreed that a single Allied Commander-in-
Chief should be appointed, nominating the Commander-in-Chief,
British Middle East Land Forces, General Sir Charles F.Keightley.
The French provided officers to act as deputies to their British
counterparts and to control their national forces during any
operations. Their Army, Navy and Air Force commanders were,
respectively: General de Division A.Beaufre, Contre-Amiral
P.Lancelot and General de Brigade R.Brohon. Vice-Amiral
D'Escadre P.Barjot was deputy to Keightley. Integrated planning
with the French began on 16 August.28
The first outline plan was directed specifically against the Suez Canal
area. Sir Hugh Stockwell and General Beaufre believed that a landing
at Alexandria would be more advantageous. They considered that
while a landing at Port Said would yield immediate control at the
entrance to the Canal and that coastal defences there were very light,
there were a number of key disadvantages. The beaches were very
shallow and muddy and unloading facilities in Port Said were limited.
This would ensure a difficult landing and slow build-up of forces.
The beaches were close to the town and this would inevitably result in
much damage to houses and civilian property. In addition, the town's
water supply could easily be cut off with severe consequences for the
27 . Ibid.
28 • DEFE 7/1081; Operations in Egypt - November to December, 1956, official
despatch by General Sir Charles Keightley.
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civilian population. It was important to capture airfields early, and
the most suitable airfield, Abu Sueir, was 50 miles from Port Said.
Any delays in reaching airborne forces dropped there could have
serious repercussions. The town itself was linked to the mainland by a
25 mile long causeway running along the canal. Enemy troops dug in
along this narrow causeway could delay any advance. According to
Stockwell: "Port Said was like a cork in.a bottle with a very long
neck "29
In contrast Alexandria had excellent harbour facilities and there were
good landing beaches nearby. The Egyptian forces in the area were
small and it was a considerable distance from any likely concentration
of Egyptian armoured forces. Coastal defences, although heavier that
at Port Said, could be knocked out and Dikheila airfield captured
immediately. The commanders considered that 80,000 men would be
required to invade Egypt. Of these, Britain could provide two-thirds,
including the 16 Parachute Brigade, 3 Commando Brigade, 3 Division
from the United Kingdom and 10 Armoured Division from Libya.
The force commanders' outline plan consisted of three phases,
preceded by two or three days and nights of bombing and ground
attack operations designed to destroy the Egyptian air force. The first
phase would consist of an assault by the Commandos on the beaches
close to, or inside, Alexandria harbour. This would follow the
neutralisation of the coast defences by air and naval bombardment just
prior to the assault. Simultaneously, two airborne assault operations
would be launched to capture the airfield and the causeway from
Alexandria. The leading brigade group of 3 Infantry Division would
then land in Alexandria harbour. The second phase consisted of the
extension of the bridgehead and build-up of 3 Infantry Division,
followed by a quick advance on Cairo via the desert to capture the
high ground west of that city. In the third phase, 10 Armoured
Division, 7 Division Mechanique and two infantry divisions would be
built up. There would then be an advance into the Cairo area before
moving off towards the Canal. It was assumed that the Egyptian
Army would be engaged in battle within fourteen days of landing and
that its defeat would prompt the fall of Nasser. The plan was
29 • Kyle, Suez, p.172.
147
approved as a basis for planning by the Egypt Committee on 10
August. The landing was originally scheduled for 15 September.30
The Alexandria plan was clearly influenced by the experience of
British and American landing operations in the Mediterranean in 1943
and 1944. First of all, the enemy airforce would be neutralised and
air superiority secured. Then a beachhead would be seized by
seaborne forces supported by the gunfire of the fleet, while
paratroops captured airfields and other valuable targets inland and
follow up troops secured the bridgehead. This would be followed by
an extended period, in which the forces were built up before breaking
out of the bridgehead and defeating the main force of the enemy. The
whole process was to be preceded by a period of intense preparation
and careful planning. Even the command structure adopted mirrored
that employed by the Anglo-Americans in World War Two.
A key problem for the planners was the lack of adequate bases in the
eastern Mediterranean. It soon became clear that neither Jordan nor
Libya would allow Britain to launch an attack on Egypt from bases
within their territory. Lack of adequate harbours, anchorages or
landing craft "hards" in Cyprus made it unsuitable as a base for
launching a seaborne assault. Only at Famagusta could ships berth
alongside, but capacity there was limited to five vessels of not more
than 5,000 tons each. At the other port, Limassol, there were no
wharfs and all loading was conducted by lighter. Malta had fine
facilities and an excellent harbour, but was over 900 miles from the
Canal; six days sailing time for a slow amphibious convoy. Cyprus
also lacked adequate stores, warehouses and airfields. At the outset of
the crisis only the island's civilian airfield at Nicosia was in operation,
and that was under reconstruction and not working to full capacity.
The RAF airfield at Akrotiri was still under construction and
Tymbou, the only other airfield, was merely an emergency landing
ground. Not until late October were these two airfields fully
operational.31
Throughout August Britain conducted preparations for military
operations. On 2 August the Queen signed a Royal Proclamation
ordering the recall of a limited number of reservists to the colours
30 • EC (56) 15, 10 August 1956, memo by the COS; CAB 134/1217.
31 • DEFE 7/1081. Barker, Suez, p.37.
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and the retention of those regular soldiers due for discharge. HMS
Bulwark sailed for the Mediterranean,. arriving at Malta on 25
August to add her three squadrons of Sea Hawks to the Eagle's mixed
complement of Sea Hawks, Wyverns, Sea Venoms, Skyraiders and
Gannets. A third aircraft carrier, HMS Albion , left the United
Kingdom for Malta on 15 September. Landing ships began to gather
at Malta and the Commandos and Paratroops assembled at Malta and
Cyprus respectively. RAF Transport Command and the Royal Navy
were stretched to transport the required men and equipment to the
Mediterranean. Civil airliners were chartered and ships were
requisitioned to meet the demand. Extra paratroops and the
headquarters of 16th Independent Parachute Brigade were brought to
Cyprus aboard the Training Squadron carriers Ocean and Theseus
and the cruiser HMS Cumberland •32
Musketeer was postponed from 15 September to the 19 and then 26
September as the political wrangling associated with the crisis
continued and Britain sought an excuse to intervene. In order to
begin operations on 26 September, a decision in principle was
required on 9 September and shipping was due to sail on the 15th.
However, both these dates passed without the necessary action being
taken. The further delays caused increasing problems. Vehicle
batteries and other equipment deteriorated as they lay idle in ships.
Troops became disgruntled as boredom set in and this was exacerbated
amongst some reservists by financial problems. Minor disturbances
began to occur amongst reservists during September and October.33
On 7 September the Minister of Defence circulated a paper to the
Egypt Committee setting out the implications of the postponement of
Musketeer. He noted the problems associated with maintaining men
and equipment at sea for appreciable periods. Musketeer could not
be delayed indefinitely. The onset of Winter threatened to cause
difficulties for any major assault landing. Operations from Tymbou
airfield could not be relied upon after mid-October and hence the use
of the French airborne troops could become problematical. It was
pointed out that the longer the delay, the stronger Egypt's defences
32. Fullick and Powell, Suez, chapter 5. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.186-187.
33. Barker, Suez, p.56-57.
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would become without any commensurate improvement in Allied
offensive capabilities.34
As an annex to this paper, General Keightley submitted an alternative
concept based primarily on the use of force by the Royal Navy and
RAF. The plan presumed that the 18 nations of the London
Conference would impose a financial Woad& on Egypt and that they
would pay no Canal dues to the Egyptians. Once the Egyptians
provided a suitable casus belli , Britain and France would initiate an
air offensive and naval bombardment directed against the Egyptian
armed forces and oil supplies. The offensive would continue until
Nasser was forced to capitulate. A land force, the equivalent of three
divisions, would then land at Port Said and occupy the Canal Zone.
The timing of this landing would depend on how long it took the air
offensive to reduce the Egyptians to the point where they were
incapable of organised resistance. Keightley considered that this
would prove a more economical operation than Musketeer , would
cause fewer civilian casualties and damage less property than an
assault landing at Alexandria. Being based on air power the plan
could be put on short notice and postponed indefinitely.35
On the morning of 7 September Anthony Eden discussed this new
concept with Monckton, Keightley and the COS and following an
acrimonious debate was eventually won over. 36
 The COS submitted
an outline plan to the Egypt Committee on 10 September and this was
approved by the Committee on 19 September. It was appreciated that
while much smaller forces would be required than for the Alexandria
plan, the possibility of an opposed landing could not be discounted.
There would be no Allied troops on Egyptian soil in the early stages
of the plan and the British and French governments could be open to
pressure to call off air operations. However, provision was being
made for a landing on Egyptian territory fairly early, providing that
the air offensive had been effective in bringing an end to organised
resistance.37
34. EC (56) 43, 7 September 1956, memo by the Minister of Defence; CAB 134/1217.
35. Ibid.
36 • Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden, p.507-509. EC (56) 25 mtg. 7 September 1956; CAB
134/1216.
37 . EC (56) 47, 10 September 1956, report by the COS; CAB 134/1217. EC (56) 30 mtg. 19
September 1956; CAB 134/1216.
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Chapter Five: Table Two
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	 jet fighter/strike aircraft
Sea Venom	 all weather jet fighter
Wyvem	 -	 turbo-prop strike aircraft
Skyraider	 American supplied AEW aircraft
The French aircraft carriers, Arromanche and Lafayette,
were equipped with a total of 32 Corsair and 12 Avenger
piston engined aircraft. These were obsolete Second World
War types.
The first date at which the revised Musketeer plan would be adopted
was 1 October. This was put back to 8 October to allow the crisis to
be placed before the United Nations Security Council. No decision
had been taken to activate the plan by 29 September, the date shipping
movement was due to commence and Musketeer was placed at ten
days notice. It was becoming apparent that a plan was needed which
could be held at extended notice and yet still provide the Allies with
military options during the approaching autumn and winter.
Accordingly, Keightley instructed the force commanders to draw up a
Winter Plan to allow for uncertain weather and using only those
forces available in the Mediterranean area. The plan was completed
by 12 October, although the writing of detailed operational orders
was left to a later stage. The Winter Plan was due to come into effect
on 21 October, but on 18 October Keightley signalled that Musketeer
Revise would remain in force indefinitely. The Winter Plan was put
in abeyance. 38 It had been left behind by political developments.
Secret negotiations between France, Britain and Israel culminated on
24 October in the secret Protocol of Sevres. It was agreed that on 29
October Israeli forces would launch an attack against the Egyptians in
the Sinai. The following day Britain and France would appeal for a
cease-fire and for the withdrawal of combatants to ten miles either
side of the canal. If Nasser refused, as he certainly would, the Allies
would have their excuse to intervene.39
Under cover of a communications exercise, Boathook , the
headquarters ship HMS Tyne sailed from Malta to Cyprus on 27
October carrying the naval and military commanders. Two days later
Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers, Vice-Admiral Manley Power, sailed
his three strike carriers from Malta in company with two cruisers and
sixteen destroyers. In order to carry the maximum number of strike
and ground attack aircraft, no Gannet anti-submarine squadrons were
embarked, see Table Two.40
On 29 October, as arranged, the Israelis launched their attack against
Egypt. The next day, Britain and France duly issued their ultimatum.
Egypt and Israel were called upon to withdraw their forces ten miles
from the Suez Canal, and Egypt was asked to accept a temporary
occupation of the Canal Zone to protect navigation of the waterway.
38. ADM 116/6209.
39. Kyle, Suez, p.312-331.
40. ADM 116/6209. "The Aircraft Carrier Aspects of Musketeer", in Naval Review, Volume 45,
1957 p.I24-130.	 r
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Map One. Port Said and Port Faud, 1956.
•As expected, the ultimatum was accepted by Israel and rejected by
Egypt.
The Allies opened hostilities on the evening of 31 October with high
level bombing raids on Egyptian airfields by RAF Canberra and
Valiant bombers. At dawn on 1 November both land based and
carrier based ground attack aircraft joined the offensive, conducting a
series of low level raids. The Egyptians put up no serious resistance
in the air and by 2 November the Egyptian Air Force had ceased to
exist as an effective fighting force. Collusion with Israel meant that
there was little time for extended air operations designed to break the
will of the enemy. It was decreed that air attacks would be confined
to military targets and to Cairo radio. Civilian lives and property
were to be guarded, although the aircraft were considerably hampered
in their attacks by the willingness of the Egyptian military to use
civilians as a shield.41
The plan was for a combined amphibious and airborne landing at Port
Said on 6 November. This date was set as the amphibious convoy
would take six days to steam from Malta and could not sail before the
expiry of the ultimatum. British paratroops were to seize Gamil
airfield, to the west of Port Said, thirty minutes after the Royal
Marines landed from the sea. French paratroops would seize two vital
bridges at Raswa and also seal off Port Faud, see Map One. Brigadier
Madoc described the seaborne assault thus:
It was intended to assault astride the Casino Pier with
two Commandos up. Assault troops were to be
carried in LVTs and LCAs with, on the left, 40
Commando RM and on the right, 42 Commando RM.
H hour for these landings was to 35 minutes after
sunrise. There were to be pre-H hoar air strikes and
gunfire support to destroy the beach defensive
positions and guns, and allied parachutists were to
drop half an hour after H hour.
The two Commandos would establish a small beachhead and,
strengthened by the arrival of tanks, they were to break out to the
south.42
41. Kyle, Suez, p.415. Report by Air Task Force Commander on Operation




One interesting aspect of Operation Musketeer was the inclusion of a
helicopter landing by 45 Commando. The use of helicopters in the
assault was entirely new to British practice. Aware of developments
in the United States, AWHQ had Pressed vigorously and
unsuccessfully to have the Commandos train with helicopters in the
vertical envelopment role. 43 Prior to the Suez crisis the Admiralty
had decided to convert the aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark to carry
helicopters for use in amphibious operations but there had not yet
been time to act on this decision.44 Although an accepted part of
American amphibious practice, employment of helicopters in the
assault was yet to be tested in combat.
As originally conceived, 45 Commando was to be dropped into the
Inner Basin at Port Said to seize the bridges at Raswa. As such, they
would be dropped into a known defended area and in the rear of the
main Egyptian forces at Port Said. On 31 October the force
commanders cancelled this drop. Instead, 45 Commando was to be
held as a floating reserve. The landings were cancelled for two
reasons. There were not enough helicopteis available to land a force
in one lift sufficient to meet the military threat at the objective. The
troops landed in the initial wave could be placed under intense
pressure before support arrived. Secondly, the use of helicopters in
such a role was an untried operation of war and there were doubts as
to whether a landing in, or close to, a defended area was
practicable.45
Two squadrons earmarked for the helicopter assault: the Joint
Experimental Helicopter Unit (JEHU), which was a joint Army and
RAF formation, and the Royal Navy's 845 Squadron. Like the
Commandos they were to carry, neither of these two squadrons had
ever practised in the assault role. During the first two weeks of
October, the squadrons conducted trials and training aboard the light
fleet carriers HMS Theseus and HMS Ocean in the Solent. These two
carriers had been operating as troop transPorts since July and work
had been undertaken to convert them to this role. Ocean was also
43. See chapter three, page 109-110.
44. See chapter six, page 170.
45. The account of operations at Port Said is based primarily on the operational reports of Brigadier
Madoc (ADM 202/455), Admiral Richmond (ADM 116/6209) and General Keightley (DEFE
7/1081).
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being equipped as a hospital ship. On 26 September the plans were
changed and these two ships were swiftly adapted to carry
helicopters.46 They practised deck handling, deck landing, formation
take offs and landings and mass formation flying. The training
resulted in the squadrons being fully integrated with the air divisions
of the carriers and becoming accustomed to the alien environment of
the aircraft carrier. In its twelve days of training between 1 October
and 12 October JEHU undertook 611 deck landings with a total flying
time of 163 hours. 47 	•
HMS Theseus arrived at Malta on 19 October, followed by Ocean on
the 31st. On 1 November limited operational training was carried out
with 45 Commando. All troops rehearsed enplaning and deplaning
and the Commandos experimented with the best stowage for different
types of ammunition and stores. Although only one full day of
training was carried out, it was not believed that this would cause a
problem. In his report on Musketeer the commander of the JEHU,
Lieutenant-Colonel J.F.T.Scott, noted that "The helicopter is a simple
means of transport and needs little rehearsal as far as the soldier is
concerned".48 In any case, a full dress rehearsal of the landing would
have been prejudicial to security. The two assault carriers left Malta
unescorted at 16.00 on 3 November and proceeded to the assault area
at 17 knots.
•
In light of the apparent weakness of Egyptian forces and the
increasingly severe criticism of Britain and France by the
international community, on 4 November it was decided to implement
Operation Telescope , a plan to conduct the parachute landing on 5
November, the day before the seaborne assault. This involved some
risk as the Egyptians were known to have armour in Port Said and the
paratroops would be without heavy support until it could be landed
from the sea. The airborne landings were entirely successful. The
French secured Port Faud and the objectives at Raswa while the
British paras took Gamil airfield and advanced to the edge of Port
46. Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation. The Evolution of the Ships and
their Aircraft, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1988) p.345.
47. Employment of the JEHU on Operation Musketeer, report by Lt-Col J.F.T.Scott,
commanding officer of JEHU; WO 288/76.
48. Ibid.
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Said, where they were held up by lack of ammunition and heavy
support weapons.49
Embarkation of the seaborne force at Malta was initially covered as a
loading exercise. The Commando Brigade completed loading on the
evening of 30 October and sailed for the assault area at midnight. The
convoy had planned to sail at six and a half knots, however the old
LSTs and LCTs managed to maintain eight knots despite a head wind.
On 4 November they received the signal that Telescope was to be
implemented. Due to its increased speed, the convoy could have been
off Port Said by 09.30 GMT on 5 November, and thus in a position to
launch its troops swiftly behind the paras. 50 Admiral Durnford-Slater
was made aware of this but preferred to stick to the original plan in
order to better co-ordinate the British and French assaults. A
seaborne landing on 5 November would have required a complete re-
writing of the fire support plan and would have had to be conducted at
dusk, further increasing the chances of confusion and costly mistakes.
Reportedly, Vice-Admiral Power suggested an immediate helicopter
landing of 45 Commando to support the paratroops. This too was
rej ected. 5 1
At 02.00 on 6 November the LCTs carrying the tanks of C Squadron
6 RTR, adopted the assault formation off Port Said prior to moving in
to the beaches. The three LST(A)s HMS Striker, Reggio and Anzio
accompanied an LST(3) to an inshore lowering position one and a half
miles off Port Said. Between 04.00 and 04.30 the LSTs lowered their
assault craft and disembarked their amphibians, loaded with the troops
and equipment of 40 and 42 Commando. 52 •
There were no special support craft or support amphibians available
for use at Port Said. The assaulting Commandos had to make do with
air strikes and gunfire support from the fleet. Fear of civilian
casualties brought an order on 4 November that the pre-assault
bombardment would be limited to guns of 4.5 inch calibre or less.
This ruled out the 6 inch guns of the British cruisers Jamaica and
49 . Fullick and Powell, Suez, p.129.
50 • ADM 116/6209. Anglo-French forces allocated to Musketeer used Greenwich Mean Time
which was two hours behind local time. All further times in the text are GMT unless otherwise
stated.
51 • Memoirs of Sir Manley Power, p.102.
52 . ADM 116/6209.
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Ceylon and the 15 inch guns of the French battleship Jean Bart. At
the last minute the force commanders were ordered to scrap the entire
bombardment. Such an order opened up the possibility of heavy
casualties for the assaulting Commandos and so, exploiting the
semantic difference between Naval Gunfire Support and
Bombardment, this order was effectively ignored.53
The destroyers HMS Decoy and HMS Chaplet provided support for
42 Commando while two Daring class destroyers fired in support of
40 Commando. They subjected the beaches to 45 minutes of
drenching fire, expending 920 rounds. The fire was effectively
controlled by Forward Observation Parties from the Amphibious
Observation Regiment in the assault craft and amphibians. As there
were no support craft to suppress the defenders, once the destroyers
lifted their fire, aircraft strafed the beach for the last ten minutes.
The preliminary bombardment was controlled and accurate, and the
Commandos got ashore against only minor opposition. However, that
is not to say that it would have been sufficient against a determined
enemy or prepared defences. Pre-assault air strikes had neutralised
coastal defence guns at Port Faud and on the breakwater at Port Said.
It was subsequently found that the emplacements on the breakwater
were still intact and, had their occupants possessed firmer resolve,
their twin 6 pounder mountings could have inflicted heavy casualties
on the Commandos.54
 The fleet remained on call after the landings
were effected but the only fire that was required was from HMS
Decoy and Chaplet which were given permission to silence SU 100
armoured vehicles which had opened fire.55
At 04.50 the leading waves of 40 and 42 Commando came ashore and
crossed the beach in their LVTs. 40 Commando landed on the beach
east of the Casino Pier (SIERRA RED) and 42 Commando landed to
the west (SIERRA GREEN). The second wave, landing in assault
craft, endured a 35 yard wade. Shortly after 05.00, the four LCTs
landed the 14 waterproofed tanks of C Squadron 6 RTR in four and a
half feet of water west of the breakwater. It took HMS Rampart only
eleven minutes to beach, land three Centurion tanks and an armoured
53. Clark, Suez Touchdown, p.63-64.
54. ADM 116/6209. ADM 202/455.
55. ADM 116/6209.
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recovery vehicle, raise the ramp and prepare to debark.56 Due to the
beach gradient, and in the absence of suitable craft, no other vehicles
could be landed across the beach except five Champs landed from
LCA(2)s. In order to ease the problems of ammunition supply which
this might have raised, tanks of C Squadron towed ashore seven one
ton trailers which they dumped at the back of the beach.57
It has already been noted that the LVTs employed were obsolete War
veterans. They were unarmoured and the need for pin on armour was
appreciated. Prior to 6 November Brigadier Madoc requested such
armour, but none arrived. In the event, the open-topped LVTs went
into the assault without armour, fitted machine guns or radios. As
such, they were vulnerable even to small arms fire. 58
 A Forward
Observer Bombardment attached to 42 Commando was less than
impressed with these vehicles:
Buffaloes! Motorised shoe-boxes would be an apter
name! Just imagine us packed like sardines, moving
slowly along the road, with no head cover and a
bastard in every window taking pot-shots at us and
dropping grenades.59
The LSTs carrying the LVTs were so old that they were unable to
flood down before launching their vehicles. At Malta the LVTs were
practised in launching dry into the sea, something previously thought
too dangerous, and this method was satisfactorily adopted in the
assault. The low speed of the LVTs while at sea, estimated at four
knots, necessitated the use of an inshore lowering position, which
would have been dangerous against more serious opposition.60
The LCTs Portcullis and Bastion , carrying the Commando's attached
anti-tank platoons, landed their cargoes directly into the fishing
harbour at 05.20. These LCTs were followed by others containing
the remaining tanks of C Squadron 6 RTR and at 08.30 the first LST
began to unload at Casino Wharf. The LST(3) ,HMS Puncher,
berthed at 09.18, commenced unloading and had completed by
56. ADM 53/144912, HMS Rampart, Ships Log.
57. ADM 202/455.
58. Ibid.
59. Clark, Suez Touchdown, p,92.
60. ADM 116/6209.
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10.03. 61 By nightfall a total of 14 LSTs had discharged men, stores
and vehicles at either the Casino pier or the fishing harbour.62
The French assault force of 1st Regiment Etranger Parachutists and
three Naval Commandos, supported by a squadron of AMX light tanks
in LCMs, landed at the beaches off Port Faud. The French had no
LST(A)s and landed their infantry in LVTs from LSTs and in LCMs
from Foudre . The French were fortunate in having an LSD as the
LCMs it carried were more suitable for landing vehicles in shallow
water than either LCAs or LCTs. The success of the French
parachute assault of the previous night meant that this landing was
unopposed.63
At 05.40 45 Commando was ordered to land within the Beach Area
already secured by the Marines. The 22 helicopters of the JEHU and
845 Squadron landed 425 men with 23 tons of ammunition and stores
in 89 minutes. Disembarking near the De Lessops statue, to the south-
east of the seaborne landings, the Commandos were established ashore
at 07.14. Their transport came ashore later in the day. That the
helicopter could absorb considerable damage and still fly was proven
by an incident immediately prior to the landing. A Whirlwind Mk.22
used to recce possible landing sites had the misfortune to land in a
sports stadium still occupied by Egyptian troops. The commanding
officer of 45 Commando, Lieutenant-Colonel Tailyour, had
disembarked with a small staff before the pilot realised what had
happened. The pilot was able to re-embark the Marines without
casualty but not before the aircraft was hit at least twenty times by
small arms fire. Hits to both the main and rear rotor blades failed to
ground the aircraft. 64
 The first operational use of helicopters to land
troops during a seaborne assault was a complete success. With the
makeshift helicopter carriers lying nine miles offshore, 45 Commando
was landed far more quickly than would have been possible by
conventional landing craft. The assault troops lift with weapons and
61 •
 ADM 53/143055, HMS Bastion, Ships Log. ADM 53/144884, HMS Portcullis,
Ships Log. ADM 53/144900, HMS Puncher, Ships Log. Barker, Suez, p.158.
62 • Barker, Suez, p. 158.
63. Ibid. p.155-156. ADM 116/6209.
64. Lt-Col R.D.Crombie, Employment of Helicopters in an Assault Role; ADM
202/455. Barker, Suez, p.152. Fullick + Powell, Suez, p.146-147.
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ammunition took one hour and twenty minutes to fly in, with the
remaining equipment transported during the next hour.65
Despite the success of the helicopter lift, those helicopters used were
unsuitable for the assault role. Two main types were employed: the
Whirlwind and the Sycamore. The Sikorsky Whirlwind was a slightly
better load carrier than the Westland version which could carry five
fully equipped men to the Sikorsky's seven. Although these figures do
not compare favourably with contemporary landing craft they were at
least satisfactory given the special nature of the helicopter. The
Sikorsky Sycamore, however, was unsuited for use as an assault
helicopter. It could carry only three fully equipped men. Captain
C.J.Smith RM described the measures which were employed in order
to get 45 Commando ashore as quickly as possible:
A loaded Sycamore presented an extraordinary sight.
The back seats, side panels, and unessential fittings
had been stripped to increase the lift. The three
passengers sat on the floor, one hunched in the middle
with six mortar bombs on his lap, and the other two
with their legs dangling over the side, each holding a
106 mm anti-tank shell about three feet long. The man
in the centre was responsible for the two outboard
members not falling out. The Whirlwind was a little
more orthodox, but there were no seats, doors or
windows. The five passengers hung on to any hand
hold available 	 Communication between troops
and pilot in both aircraft was either by shouting or by
tugging at the pilot's legs.66
The extemporised nature of the helicopter lift is evident. Only two
helicopters were lost during the assault. One was grounded due to a
badly leaking fuel tank and another crashed into the sea after running
out of fuel. Fortunately, the crew and passengers were picked up
unhurt.67
Fighting in Port Said continued until dark when the link up between
the paratroops and Commandos had still not been properly effected.
Egyptian opposition consisted mainly of sniping, but isolated pockets,
notably at the Navy House, were to put up stubborn resistance. The
advance down the Canal had barely begun when news of the
65 . ADM 202/455. WO 288/76.
66 • Captain C.J.Smith, "Suez and the Commando Carrier Concept", in RUSI Journal 1963.
67 • ADM 202/455, Operation Musketeer - 45 Commando, Unit Report. ADM
116/6209.
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impending cease fire reached the troops. A last minute advance was
conducted by a mixed force of paratroops and tanks and by midnight
GMT, when the cease fire took effect, the 2nd Parachute Battalion had
reached Al Cap, 23 miles south of Port Said.68
The military expedition to Suez was a political failure. It did not
achieve the goals it was set. Indeed, far from restoring the Canal to
international control and prompting the fall of Nasser, the Anglo-
French invasion had the reverse effect. The Canal remained firmly in
Egyptian hands and was temporarily blocked. Nasser was reinforced
in his position as President, while British prestige in the Middle East
slumped to an all time low. However, Musketeer did achieve a level
of operational success. At the time of the cease fire, Anglo-French
forces were safely ashore and just beginning the breakout down the
causeway. Casualties had been relatively light and they were assured
air superiority for the duration of any hostilities. Prior to the cease
fire Stockwell was planning an advance by 16 Parachute Brigade on 7
November, supported by tanks and French airborne landings. He
hoped to secure a bridgehead at El Qantara by noon at the latest and to
be attacking Ismailia by last light. General Beaufre suggests that had a
vigorous advance been pursued then Anglo-French forces could have
reached Fayid and possibly even Suez by 8 November. General
Keightley, in his official despatch, stated that prior to the assault it
was estimated that Suez would be taken by 11 November. 69 Given the
poor performance of Egyptian troops at Port Said and in the Sinai
fighting Israel, it seems probable that this target could have been
achieved had the politicians not intervened.
The operation highlighted the extent to which Britain's amphibious
capabilities had been allowed to decline. In July there had been barely
enough ships available to lift one Commando. Sufficient ships and
craft were brought out in time for Musketeer but in the words of
Vice-Admiral Richmond:
the fact is that the craft and crews were fit and trained
on the day, but without the least attempt to achieve
68. WO 288/77.
69. Kyle, Suez, p.474-476. Beufre, The Suez Expedition, chapter 12, WO 288/77. DEFE
7/1081.
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"Rolls Royce" standards of perfection, the process
was difficult and took a long time.70
Despite the fact that the Royal Marines had recently been given
primary responsibility for amphibious warfare, no Commando unit
was ready for immediate amphibious operations. Once prepared for
combat the AW Squadron relied on ageing, outdated ships. There
were no special support craft. The headquarters ships were
inadequate. Ancient assault craft and amphibians had to be employed
in the absence of more suitable equipment. The AW Squadron lacked
LCMs or their means of carriage and this complicated the landing of
vehicles. The helicopters employed in the vertical assault were not
suited to Commando operations. In the years before Musketeer
AWHQ had pressed for action in all these areas. That so little was
done is a reflection on Service and in particular Admiralty attitudes
towards amphibious capabilities since the War.
The key problem was that neither specialist shipping nor trained
troops were available to conduct amphibious operations when the
crisis broke. Indeed, despite an official commitment to maintain an
amphibious lift for a brigade group in commission and Operational
Reserve, this lift was not fully available until the end of September.
The Admiralty must bear responsibility for this as it was their choice
not to devote sufficient manpower or resources to amphibious forces.
However, they cannot be entirely blamed. One should remember that
the Parachute Brigade was no more prepared for operations than the
Commandos and that the aircraft they jumped from at Port Said were
old and inadequate. The simple fact is that, at a time when financial
pressure forces the Services to establish priorities, the Navy chose to
concentrate on what it saw as its main responsibility, that of protecting
the sea lanes against the Soviet threat.
The British have been criticised for their meticulous but slow
approach to the planning and execution of Musketeer .71 All the
various plans bear the hallmark of World War Two assault
operations, particularly the initial plan to land at Alexandria. That
there is a major difference between conducting a landing against first
class opposition in 1943 and 1944 and the requirement for military
70 • ADM 116/6209.
71 • See Barker, Suez, p.35.
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action against Egypt is clear and the force commanders should have
appreciated this. The fighting qualities of the Egyptian soldier were
open to doubt. He had not distinguished himself in the 1948 war
against Israel. Certainly the French were more willing to be daring in
order to achieve quick military success. They had plenty of
experience fighting in North Africa and so could perhaps better gauge
the fighting qualities of the Egyptians.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities Beaufre gained authority to keep a
quick reaction force loaded off Cyprus in its amphibious shipping.
This "Plan A" allowed for the floating material to be joined quickly
from Algiers by French assault troops on board the fast battleship
Jean Bail. However, the plan was only to be implemented if Egyptian
opposition could be expected to be negligible. 72 As early as 31
October the French proposed to implement Operations Omelette , the
early use of parachute forces, in order to get some troops on the
ground. The British refused to commit airborne forces with seaborne
support so far away. However, they later agreed to Telescope , the
landing of paratroops on 5 November. 73 It is easy to criticise the
British commanders for being too timid in their use of airborne
forces. Troops dropped on 2 or 3 November would have been
without tanks or vehicles for three days. Support from the air and the
guns of the fleet might have protected them at Port Said, at
considerable cost to the town, but maintaining links with troops
dropped at Qantara and Ismailia would have been problematical to say
the least. The memory of Arnhem may have played its part in British
reticence in the independent use of airborne forces.
It is conceivable that had the landings at Port Said occurred
immediately after the air offensive had destroyed the Egyptian Air
Force, then the British and the French might have been able to secure
the Suez Canal before the pressure to order a cease-fire became acute.
What they hoped to do once they had control of the Canal is an
interesting question, but one that is beyond the scope of this study.
Had the assault forces been held off Cyprus they could have been
ready to land on 2 November when total air supremacy was assured.
The limited harbour facilities at Cyprus precluded the AW Squadron
from basing there, but the Squadron could have sailed from Malta in
72 Kyle, Suez, p.241.
73 . Fullick + Powell, Suez, chapter 9. Barker, Suez, p.114-116. WO 288/77.
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anticipation of a landing on 2 or 3 November. Unfortunately, this
would have required leaving Malta on 27 or 28 October, before the
ultimatum to Egypt and Israel was issued. This could have been done
under the thin smoke screen of a major exercise, much as Boathook
covered the move of HMS Tyne . That no-one would have been
fooled by such an obvious deception could hardly have mattered as
few foreigners believed the lie that there was no collusion between
Britain and Israel.74
There was a further difficulty. The amphibious assault group would
take six days to sail from Malta to Port Said. Unfortunately, the
group could only afford to sail for seven or eight days before putting
into harbour to re-provision and re-fue1. 75 Thus, premature
embarkation involved an element of risk. The amphibious ships and
craft could not hover off Port Said for any length of time and so any
delay in the air offensive could have caused difficulties. What was
required were fast ships capable of reaching their destination at
considerably more than six knots and, if need be, of waiting offshore
until they were needed. Old worn out War built vessels, hastily
brought out from reserve do not provide this kind of capability. Had
Britain possessed modern amphibious vessels, such as the American
Thomaston class dock landing ships, the situation would have been
transformed. Sailing at 20 knots these ships could have been off Port
Said within two days of leaving Malta and could have hovered
offshore awaiting the order to land.76
Operation Musketeer was, essentially, an old style amphibious
operation, competently conducted, with obsolete equipment and a
considerable degree of improvisation. A clearer appreciation of
political considerations might have caused the Force Commanders to
act with greater alacrity. The appointment of Keightley as
Commander-in-Chief severed the link between the force commanders,
responsible for the actual conduct of operations, and the political
factors which were to play such a decisive part in the crisis.
Keightley had a political adviser from the Foreign Office, but failed
to communicate to his subordinates any need for particular haste.
The force commanders had no idea that they might be asked to halt
74. Kyle, Suez, p.425.
75. Ibid. p.240.
76• David Steigman, "Amphibious Forces" p.110-120.
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operations less than 24 hours after the seaborne assault. In the
circumstances to risk landing parachute forces days before significant
seaborne support was due to arrive, would have constituted an
unnecessary risk. The official report on the parachute drop at Gamil
states that:
If there had been no seaborne attack to come the
advance could have been continued: especially after
the drop of the second lift at 1300 hours which
brought the mortars up to fifty rounds per gun. C
Company could have carried out another attack and
allowed A Company to pass through and seize the
docks during the night.77
With darkness approaching and a seaborne landing due the next day,
there was little reason for the paras to court further casualties by
pressing on.
Similarly, there was no need to order the seaborne landings to take
place on the evening of 5 November, or for the Commandos to be
landed at Gamil by helicopters as suggested by Vice-Admiral Power.
Amphibious operations are complex at the best of times. There was
little reason to upset the pre-arranged fire support plan and risk the
disruption of a landing at dusk, merely in prder to save a few hours.
The history of British amphibious operations is littered with failure
and short of any compelling reason to act otherwise, caution was the
best approach. The need for speed is more apparent with hindsight,
particularly as complete allied air superiority effectively cut off Port
Said from any possible reinforcement.
Perhaps inevitably the concept of creating mobile forces for cold and
limited war was given much currency in the aftermath of Musketeer.
Vice-Admiral Richmond advocated maintaining a "fire brigade"
ready to deal with trouble when it arose. He recommended
maintaining the AW Squadron at a strength of one LSH(S), three
LST(A) and four LCT(8) with a further three LST(3) and four
LCT(8) in operational reserve. Keightley placed his faith in airborne
forces. He considered that an airborne force of two brigades should
be maintained for limited war duties. InteKestingly, he recommended
that this should be supported by trooping carriers equipped with
77 . Report on Airborne Assault of Operation Musketeer Mounted on Gamil
Airfield, Port Said on 5 November 1956; AIR 20/9577.
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helicopters, and provided with air cover by aircraft carriers. All the
force commanders stressed the requirement for the Commandos and
Parachute Brigade to be available at short notice, highly trained in
their specialist roles.78
During operations at Port Said the Navy demonstrated the important
role it had to play in limited military interventions. In particular the
effectiveness of the aircraft carrier as a mobile air base had been
proven. Despite problems with one of Eagle's old hydraulic
catapults, aircraft from the three British carriers conducted a total of
1,614 sorties during Musketeer, damaging. or destroying 289 aircraft
and 150 armoured vehicles and sinking six E-boats. A total of 1,164
of these sorties were offensive, 359 were essentially defensive and the
remaining 93 were concerned with reconnaissance and transport. The
percentage of offensive carrier sorties increased from 59 per cent on
1 November to 89 per cent on 6 November as the threat of enemy air
action receded. Like their naval counterparts at sea, RAF Hunters and
Meteors maintained combat air patrols over Cyprus to defend the land
based airfields. Carrier based aircraft proved more versatile than the
shore based variety. Closer proximity to Port Said meant that carrier
based aircraft could spend longer over the target, could carry a full
weapons load, and enabled changes in armament and technique to be
effected at short notice as the situation demanded. 79 Naval Sea Hawks
and Sea Venoms averaged 2.8 sorties per operational day, compared
with an average of 1.4 sorties for land based ground attack aircraft.
Naval aircraft were responsible for destroying about 60 per cent of
the total number of Egyptian aircraft wiped out and were the mainstay
of the cab rank system of providing air support for the airborne and
seaborne landings. Four British and one French carrier borne
aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft fire during Musketeer, and one
British Sea Hawk was lost during a landing accident. 80 Although
some shortcomings were apparent in equipment and training, and in
particular the accuracy of ground attack missions was not what it
should have been, Vice-Admiral Power considered that the only
redeeming feature of the whole Suez affair was "the brilliant
performance of my carrier squadron which had exceeded all
78. ADM 116/6209. DEFE 7/1081. WO 288/77.
79. ADM 116/6209.
80 • Dept, of Operational Research - Report No.34, Carrier Operations in Support of
Operation Musketeer; in ADM 219/610.
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expectations". 81 The aircraft carrier had proven its utility in limited
war situations and this was something which the Admiralty were to
become increasingly keen to emphasise as they sought to justify
expenditure on a new generation of carriers.




In May 1955 Anthony Eden was re-elected Prime Minister. In the
hope of cutting expenditure and easing the burden on the economy he
initiated a defence review to build on the cost cutting work of the
previous administration. In July the COS outlined their `first
thoughts" on strategic factors affecting this review. They considered
that defence policy must continue to cater for four priorities: to
prevent global war short of sacrificing vital interests; to maintain and
improve Britain's position in the cold war; to win any limited war
should it break out; and to survive global war should it occur. They
considered that global war was unlikely to occur except by accident or
miscalculation. Global war, if it did occur, would be characterised by
an early and intense nuclear exchange.' Eden endorsed these
priorities. In 1956 he explained to the Cabinet Defence Committee:
The provision of this [nuclear] deterrent must have
first call on our resources. Second priority must be
given to maintaining adequate forces to carry out our
world-wide commitments and to prevent small-scale
hostilities developing into major wars. Lowest
priority should be given to the various means of
waging a global war should the deterrent fail to
prevent its outbreak.
The Prime Minister went so far as to question whether any effort at
all should be devoted to the ability to wage global war.2
This posed a problem for the Royal Navy. Since the Second World
War the Navy had based its primary rationale on the need to keep
open the sea lanes in a future battle of the Atlantic. The emphasis had
been on a large navy devoted mainly to anti-submarine forces and
backed up by a large mobilisable fleet in rtserve. The Navy's prized
aircraft carriers were devoted to global war contingencies. The 1SL,
Lord Mountbatten, had anticipated that changes would have to be
made. In 1955 he established the "Way Ahead Committee" to carry
out an "Enquiry into the structure and supporting organisation of the
Naval Service". The Way Ahead Committee undertook a thorough
1• COS (55) 176, 25 July 1955, memo by COS; DEFE 5/59.
2• D (57) mtg, 31 July 1957; CAB 131/18.
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examination of the whole future and organisation of the Royal Navy.
Its earlier findings were reflected in the 1956 Navy Estimates. The
Reserve Fleet, static and thus vulnerable to nuclear attack, was
ruthlessly cut back. A review of afloat support was underway and the
conversion of the small carriers Triumph and Perseus into a repair
ship and a submarine depot was announced.3
On 7 June 1956 the COS re-stated the defence priorities. Global war
received the lowest priority, whilst forces for limited and cold war
were to be built up. The Admiralty were well aware that under these
priorities forces devoted primarily to global war would be ruthlessly
reduced and that this would point to a Navy whose first call was no
longer to guard the sea lanes in war. In a Board meeting on 7 June
1956 the VCNS, Admiral W.W.Davis, outlined changes that would be
necessary to secure the future of the fleet. Many members of the
Board expressed concern at a proposed run-down of anti-submarine
resources in favour of greater cold and limited war capabilities.
According to the minutes:
In particular, they feared that the curtailment of anti-
submarine and minesweeping efforts involved would
be tantamount to the abandonment of the Navy's
traditional primary task of safeguarding the sea
communications of the United Kingdom in a major
war.4
The recommendations of the COS included giving the Navy greater
responsibilities for limited and cold war and this was seen as a way of
safeguarding the future of the fleet and providing a clear role for the
Navy. In view of the pressing requirement for defence cuts, the
Board reluctantly accepted the Chiefs' recommendations for future
strategy. While still expressing doubts about reducing commitments
devoted to global war, the Board concluded that:
assuming very heavy defence cuts were
inevitable....they would endorse the approach
recommended by the COS as likely to be the least
damaging to naval interests of all the possible
modifications of policy.5
3. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.174. Explanatory Statement on the Navy
Estimates, 1956-1957; Cmnd 9697.
4. Board Minute 5016; ADM 167/146.
5. Board Minute 5021; ADM 167/146.
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The Admiralty submitted their concept of the Future Role of the Navy
to the COS on 20 July. The paper acknowledged the new strategic
priorities and announced that forces intended primarily for global war
were to be reduced and the resources reallocated to cold and limited
war duties. The forces to be reduced included 75 ships of the Reserve
Fleet, the closure of the Joint Anti-Submarine School at Londonderry,
and a reduction in the number of submarines in home waters. A small
number of vessels intended for global war operations were deleted
from the new construction programme, irfcluding 50 minor landing
craft. In place of these forces a new commando carrier would be
added to the fleet, along with four destroyers and three frigates.
Aircraft carrier resources were to be reorganised so that a light fleet
carrier could be deployed in the East. The paper announced that:
The Navy's task in the Cold and Limited War is
broadly to protect British interests, support the civil
power, produce a rapid show of force in an
emergency and uphold prestige and influence. This
task grows no lighter and without an adequate Navy
we would be greatly, if not irreparably, weakened as a
World Power.
For this purpose it was proposed to establish a task group based on
Singapore, capable of launching air attacks against targets ashore and
of landing a self-supporting Royal Marine Commando. This task
group would consist of a light fleet carrier, the new commando
carrier, a cruiser and four destroyers.6
In January 1957 the new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan,
appointed Duncan Sandys as Minister of Defence. Macmillan himself
had occupied this post between October 1954 and April 1955. In his
brief tenure he had shown a determination to match commitments to
resources. He pursued the same policy as Prime Minister, removing
the existing Minister of Defence, Anthony Head, when he would not
agree to drastic defence cuts. 7 This was unfortunate for the Navy.
Head had been an officer in COHQ during the War and in 1946 he had
given a lecture on the value of amphibious forces to the Royal United
Services Institute. 8 As such it is likely that he would have been
6. COS (56) 280, The Future Role of the Navy, 20 July 1956, memo by Admiralty; DEFE
5/70
7. Alistair Home, Macmillan 1957-1986. Volume Two of the Official Biography,
(London: Macmillan, 1989) p.45-48.
8. Brigadier A.H.Head, "Amphibious Operation" in RUSI Journal, Feb-Nov 1946, p.485-494.
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receptive to the Admiralty's future plans. The appointment of Sandys
threatened to be a bad one for the Navy. As Minister of Supply
Sandys had led the fight against the Navy's aircraft carriers during the
Radical Review of defence policy in the early 1950s. He had adopted
an anti-Admiralty stance during the Radical Review, believing that
strategic bombers and air defence fighters should have the highest
priority and that land based aircraft could take over many naval roles.
On appointment as Minister of Defence, Sandys made it clear that he
was not convinced of the value of the Navy's carriers. He was an
abrasive personality who was not afraid to tackle the COS head on and
who was well suited to the task of forcing through defence cuts. With
the full support of Macmillan, he was a formidable minister and it is
fortunate that in Mountbatten the .Navy had an equally
formidablelS L.9
The Navy had invested substantial capital in its carrier force. Two
large fleet carriers (Eagle and Ark Royal ) and three light fleet
carrier (Albion, Bulwark and Centaur ) had been completed during
the last decade. A fourth, slightly larger, light fleet carrier (Hermes)
was approaching completion. The fleet carrier HMS Victorious was
undergoing an extensive modernisation, while the light fleet carrier
Warrior had completed a more limited modemisation. 10 The limited
war role offered the Admiralty one way of protecting these ships. By
emphasising the role of carriers as mobile air bases for use in limited
war, and by abandoning the recently adopted nuclear strike role,
Mountbatten successfully overcame Sandys opposition to carriers."
The 1957 Defence White Paper was a reflection of Macmillan's desire
to match commitments to resources. The reliance on large
conventional forces and on peacetime conscription was abandoned. In
its place came a smaller, all regular force. National Service was
abolished, phasing out until 1962. Both the Army and Navy were
reduced. BAOR was to be cut from 77,000 to 64,000 men and the
Second Tactical Air Force in Germany was to lose about half its
aircraft. Worse was to come for the RAF. The White Paper
9 . Geoffrey Till, "Admiral Earl Mountbatten of Burma" in Malcolm Murfett (ed.), The First Sea
Lords: From Fisher to Mountbatten, (Westport: Praeger, 1995) p.265-282. David Brown,
"Mountbatten as First Sea Lord" in RUSI Journal, June 1986 p.63-68. Grove, Vanguard to
Trident, p.92 + 197-199.
10 • Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.199.
11 • Ibid. p.199-209.
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announced that manned fighter aircraft were eventually to be replaced
by ground-to-air missiles and that light, bomber forces based in
Britain would be reduced. These cuts were counterbalanced by
increased reliance on nuclear weapons to deter war in Europe and on
increased strategic mobility to meet limited war and cold war needs.
The build up of a substantial fleet of transport aircraft was announced.
However, the existence of a political barrier of hostile countries in the
Middle East threatened to prevent the overflight of certain countries
by British military aircraft, reducing the mobility of an air
transported central reserve.12
The 1957 Defence White Paper reflected the changed role of the fleet.
While the role of the Navy in global war was declared to be
"somewhat uncertain" its role in limited and cold war was stressed.
The White Paper announced that "On account of its mobility, the
Royal Navy together with the Royal Marines, provides another
effective means of bringing power rapidly to bear in peacetime
emergencies or limited hostilities". It acknowledged the continued
role of the aircraft carrier. The main elements of the fleet were to be
based around a small number of aircraft carrier groups, with the
number of other large ships in the fleet reduced to a minimum. One
carrier group would normally be based east of Suez. 13 The
Parliamentary and Financial Secretary of the Admiralty, Christopher
Soames, explained the new concept to the House of Commons:
Our conception of the streamlined peacetime Navy of
the future consists of a number of carrier task forces,
each consisting of one carrier, armed with the most
modern aircraft and weapons that we can procure, a
cruiser, and a number of destroyers and frigates for
protection both from the air and from the sea. These
task forces will be deployed in the most advantageous
manner round the world, but would, of course, be
capable of concentrating at any given point should the
need arise.14
The Defence Committee approved the new concept for the Navy in
November 1957. 15
 Naval manpower was set at 88,000. Previous
studies had been based on the provision of 80,000 men. At a meeting
12. Defence: Outline of Future Policy 1957; Cmnd.124
13. Ibid.
14. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Session 1956-57, Volume 570, columns 56-57.
15 • D (57) 19 mtg, 18 November 1957; CAB 131/18.
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held at Broadlands, the country home of Lord Mountbatten, the 1SL
had secured the extra 8,000 men from Duncan Sandys in return for a
concession on aircraft carrier air groups. Sandys envisaged three
carrier task groups, two in the west and one east of Suez. As the
carriers in the west were to be devoted to anti-submarine duties, he
believed that they should be equipped predominantly with cheap anti-
submarine aircraft. The Admiralty strongly favoured balanced air
groups, and the First Lord, Lord Selkirk, argued in favour of these
within the Defence Committee. With air groups devoted primarily
towards ASW, the carriers west of Suez would be of limited value for
reinforcing the carrier east of Suez for limited war duties. As Eric
Grove points out, it is probable that Mountbatten realised that his
concession would have little long term effect. With fixed wing ASW
aircraft about to be replaced by helicopters, implementation of
Sandys's proposals would be delayed until about 1960. By this time a
new minister might be in office and the proposal could be reversed.16
As Mountbatten had anticipated, Harold Watkinson, the new Minister
of Defence appointed in October 1959, was receptive to calls for
balanced air groups. In December 1959 Watkinson secured
agreement in the Defence Committee for a strength of 38 Sea Vixen
fighters, enough to equip both carriers west of Suez with a full
squadron. 17
 A decision on strike aircraft was not reached until May
1961 when the Defence Committee approved Watkinson's
recommendation of a front-line embarked strength of 41 Buccaneers.
The new fighter/strike establishment stood at 79 aircraft, enough to
fill three carriers to capacity except when both Eagle and Ark Royal
were in commission. No air group was provided for the fourth
carrier which would therefore not be available to reinforce the three
operational ships. At least with the Buccaneer, which entered service
in 1962, the Fleet Air Arm at last had a modern, sophisticated strike
aircraft capable of matching its land based rivals. In order to provide
for the increased fighter and strike complements, the carriers would
carry reduced ASW and AEW complements.] 8
16 • Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.211. D (57) 10 mtg, 18 November 1957; CAB 131/18. D
(57) 14 mtg, 31 December 1957; CAB 131/18.
17 • D (59) 42, 23 December 1959, memo by Minister of Defence; CAB 131/22. D (59) 13 mtg, 31
December 1959; CAB 131/21
18 .
 D (61) 28, 16 May 1961, memo by Minister of Defence, CAB 131/25. D (61) 8 mtg, 31 May
1961; CAB 131/25.
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Deeply affected by what he considered the "tragic failure" of the Suez
campaign, Watkinson believed that if Britain was ever to be faced
with that type of operations again then it needed the capacity to act
quickly and forcefully. Unlike Sandys, he was more interested in
conventional forces than nuclear weaponry. Self consciously a
businessman, Watkinson sought to introduce businesslike practice to
the Ministry of Defence. He summed up his own approach as follows:
I was more interested in the need to achieve a
reorganisation of Britain's conventional forces under
firm businesslike central direction, coupled with a
policy which would speed up their reaction time and
create a mobile military force with a cioised capacity to
operate from land and sea bases. This seemed to me a
more important priority in 1959 than overmuch
argument about nuclear philosophical heresies of one
kind or another.19
He demonstrated a resolve to work with the COS and not against them
as had sometimes been the case with his predecessor. In particular he
maintained a close and friendly working relationship with
Mountbatten who became Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in 1959,
although he considered that Mountbatten sometimes allowed his naval
past to interfere with his impartiality as CDS. Watkinson was keen to
foster inter-Service cooperation and to avoid strife and inefficiency.
In particular he favoured the development of a joint Royal Navy/RAF
aircraft as the replacement for the Sea Vixen and Hunter fighters. He
was perhaps naive in his understanding of Service rivalry, writing,
"Once we could get an aircraft that was equally at home on land or at
sea, the colour of the uniform that the pilot wore became much less
important ".20 Watkinson was a firm supporter of Admiralty plans to
increase amphibious capabilities, seeing them as a means of achieving
his goal of an effective mobile military force.
The new emphasis on limited and cold war duties highlighted the need
to replace the existing amphibious lift. The old, slow wartime lift was
not well suited to a new concept emphasising flexibility and mobility.
Suez had demonstrated its limitations. In any case the ships and craft
were over ten years old and were becoming worn out. The problem
of replacing the wartime lift had been a major concern of





COHQ/AWHQ since 1945. In July 1955 AWHQ submitted a detailed
paper to the Admiralty outlining their recommendations for future
amphibious shipping. The paper concluded that the troop carrier of
the future would be the helicopter ship. The helicopter offered almost
unlimited possibilities for ship-to-shore lift of troops, stores and light
vehicles. Light fleet carriers of the Triumph class were identified as
suitable for conversion to this role. The size of these ships meant that
they could also be fitted out as headquarters ships. The conversion in
the United States of the escort carrier Thetis Bay to a helicopter
carrier was noted. AWHQ appreciated that sufficient helicopters were
not yet available to commission a helicopter carrier with a squadron
of helicopters. Instead they hoped that "Amphibious Warfare
Development and Training" could be added to the task of an existing
helicopter squadron.21
Operation Musketeer had disrupted the planned deployment of
amphibious resources. In December 1956 the COS instructed the
Principle Administrative Officers (PAO), in conjunction with the JPS
and CAW, to undertake an immediate study into the short term
requirement for the newly released craft. 22 The report was submitted
on 4 January 1957. 23 The report, approved by the COS on 8 January,
specified that the pre-Musketeer AW Squadron of two LSTs and two
LCTs should be kept in commission, and that four LSTs and six LCTs
should be refitted and then placed in reserve at Malta at 28 days
notice. The one outstanding LCT was to revert to its training role in
the United Kingdom. It was recommended that naval LSTs surplus to
amphibious warfare requirements should be held on a care and
maintenance basis until a decision on their future could be reached. In
September 1956 the COS had decided that the Army should be
responsible for its own maritime logistics. Consequently, a number of
landing ships and craft were transferred from the Navy to be operated
by the Ministry of Transport on behalf of the Army. In January 1957
there were 19 LSTs and 25 LCTs being operated in this role. These
ships and craft were referred to as War Department (WD) LSTs and
WD LCTs.24
21 . Folio 39; DEFE 2/1901.
22 • COS (56) 129 mtg, 4 December 1956; DEFE 4/93.




The COS instructed the JPS to prepare a report with CAW on long
term requirements for amphibious assault lift and invited the PAO, in
conjunction with CAW, to prepare a report on the Service resources
needed to meet the short term logistic requirement. Once these had
been completed the Shipping Resources Committee would be able to
complete a study of all resources, including merchant shipping, that
would be required.25
The PAO submitted their report in March and this was used by the
Shipping Resources Committee as the basis for their wider report,
submitted on 18 December 1957. The JPS report on long term
requirements was postponed to a later date. 26 This study outlined
proposals for the assault lift up to 1965. It was based on the
requirement to launch an assault of two battalions in the eastern
Mediterranean within 28 days. 1965 was chosen as the cut off date as
it was considered that by this time the existing amphibious shipping
would have completed its useful life. The report concluded that the
most satisfactory means of carrying the assault personnel was in three
LST(A) and an LST(3) with a third battalion carried in either a
troopship or warships. This was accepted as the basis for further
planning. The Admiralty was invited to undertake a technical
examination, in consultation with CAW, of the problem of replacing
the existing assault lift.27
The possibility of employing unused aircraft carriers as amphibious
warfare ships had been the subject of sporadic interest in the early
1950s. AWHQ had been closely studying American developments,
involving the conversion of old aircraft carriers to assault ships.28
The operations at Port Said in 1957 helped to illustrate the potential of
helicopter landed troops, although the decision to provide helicopter
assault ships had been taken prior to the crisis. The Navy announced
its intention to convert a light fleet carrier to carry a Royal Marine
Commando, its transport and a squadron of troop-carrying helicopters
•
25 Ibid.
26. PAO report given at annex to COS (57) 23 mtg, 22 March 1957; DEFE 4/96. SRC (57) 10,
Ships and Craft Required for the Amphibious Assault, 18 December 1957, report by the
Shipping Resources Committee given at annex to COS (58) 3 mtg, 9 January 1958; DEFE 4/103.
27. SRC (57) 10.
28 • See chapter three.
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in July 1956 under the new concept for the Navy. 29 It is significant
that the announcement of the commando carrier decision coincided
with the decision to cut 50 minor landing craft designed primarily for
old style landings on the 1940s model from the New Construction
Programme.
The Admiralty sought ministerial approval for the conversion,
submitting it to the Defence Committee in July 1957 as part of their
construction programme for the period 1958/9 to 1962/3. The
Admiralty built a strong case in favour of the commando carrier,
enlisting the support of both the Army and the RAF. The RAF had
some doubts. The CAS was warned by his Director of Plans that,
although the commando carrier would probably be of value, "The
suggestion that they should operate a squadron of troops carrying
helicopters will be the Navy's first incursion into the air transport
role."30 It was not to be the last time that the Air Ministry considered
that the Navy was encroaching on territory they considered their own.
The Board of Admiralty itself was not unanimous in its support of this
new ship. The VCNS, Admiral W.W.Davis, did not consider that it
was worth paying off a gun armed cruiser in order to convert a
carrier for use by the Marines.31
 Mountbatten was firmly in favour
of the ship, calling it "the most interesting development in amphibious
warfare since the end of World War Two ".32 He carried the Board
with him and successfully sold the idea to Duncan Sandys during the
visit of the latter to Broadlands in November 1957.33
On 8 January 1958 728 Commando Flight was formed at RN Air
Station, Lee-on-Solent, as the nucleus of what was to become 848
Helicopter Squadron embarked in Bulwark. The Flight was initially
equipped with four HAS Whirlwind Mk.22 helicopters. Trials with
the Commando Brigade started in February and the helicopters took
part in amphibious exercises and operations in Libya, Sardinia and
Cyprus. Trials were conducted with helicopters carried and operated
from an LST. The LST, which was equipped with workshops, was
able to meet all the normal servicing demands of the aircraft.
29 . COS (56) 280.
30• Brief prepared for CAS for a COS mtg to discuss COS (56) 280; AIR 8/2135.
31. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.548.
32. Ibid. p.548-549.	
'33. Ibid. p.553. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.211-212.
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Embarkation and landing was carried out With the LST beached and
by flying on to and off a Rhino Ferry secured to the bows of the ship
anchored off shore. A total of ten helicopters could be accommodated
in the tank-deck. In exercises the Commander-in-Chief s despatch
vessel, HMS Surprise , was used as a small commando carrier in the
raiding role. With a few alterations to the ship's deck layout, up to
four S.55 Whirlwind helicopters were operated from this vesse1.34
The Commando carrier offered the prospect of greatly increasing the
strength and flexibility of British forces east of Suez. The operational
concept of the ship was as follows:
HMS Bulwark is intended to support and maintain
under operational conditions one Commando, though
she could carry up to the equivalent of an additional
Commando and a Brigade Headquarters in an
emergency and depending on circumstances. The
continued presence of the carrier in support of the
Commando is normally envisaged, but under
exceptional circumstances she could be withdrawn for
a short period not exceeding 14 days.35
The carrier was intended to provide complete administrative support
for one Commando for 14 days at intensive rates, and for 42 days at
reduced rates. The Admiralty pointed out that steaming at 20 knots,
the commando carrier force could reach any threatened spot in the
Arabian Peninsula or Far East Station in less than 11 days from any
UK administered territory in the area, provided that the carrier was
operational with Commando embarked, or was lying at Singapore at
12 hours notice with the Commando disembarked. In global war the
commando carrier would be assigned for NATO use in the anti-
submarine role from D+30 and could theoretically convert to this role
within its own resources. 36 In October 1958 the COS agreed that
these Admiralty proposals were in accord with the approved defence
policy.37
HMS Bulwark was expected to be capable of landing a Commando 35
miles distant in seven hours. Vehicles and stores would require 46
34. AWHQ Information Letter No.9, 1958; copy at Royal Marines Museum (RMM),
Eastney. COS (58) 283, 12 December 1958, report by CAW; DEFE 5/87. HMS Surprise was
formerly a Bay class frigate, launched in 1945.
35. COS (58) 219, 18 September 1958, memo by Admiralty; DEFE 5/85.
36. Ibid.
37. COS (58) 87 mtg, 14 October 1958; in DEFE 4/112.
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hours. The Whirlwind helicopters were unable to lift the standard
quarter ton vehicles and thus until the more capable Wessex helicopter
could be introduced 30 light Citroen 2CVs were to be embarked.
These vehicles had dubious off road mobility and their value as
military vehicles capable of cross-country travel was doubtful. They
were, nevertheless, better than nothing. Once the Whirlwind
helicopters had been replaced by the Wessex it was anticipated that
Bulwark would be able to land a Commando at 60 miles in six hours,
completing the build-up in 33 hours.38
In January 1959 work commenced on the conversion of HMS Bulwark
in Portsmouth Dockyard. Over the next twelve months the ships fixed
wing capability was removed, as the aircraft carrier became a
commando carrier. Catapults and arrestor wires were taken out.
Eight 40mm anti-aircraft guns were replaced to provide space for
four LCA(2)s to be carried on gantries. Operations Room facilities
were modified, providing command facilities for the embarked
military force. Extensive air-conditioning was fitted, important given
the ships likely area of operations. The initial complement of 16
Whirlwind helicopters was to be replaced by a larger, more capable
complement of Wessex helicopters when these became available.
Bulwark commissioned on 19 January 1960 under the command of
Captain R.D.Franks, a former Commodore AW Squadron. 848
Squadron embarked on 10 March followed on 14 March by 42
Commando with a Naval Gunfire Support Forward Observer Party
and an Air Control Team attached, along with a full complement of
vehicles, 2CVs included.
Operational trials were conducted in North Africa. The first large
exercise carried out was "Sky Pioneer" conducted in conjunction with
the AW Squadron and 3 Commando Brigade off the coast of Libya in
April 1960. 42 Commando was landed by helicopter to "capture oil
fields" while 40 Commando was landed in the conventional manner
by the AW Squadron. The helicopter landing was successful, but the
Whirlwinds demonstrated the limitations of their payload. This was
exacerbated by the high temperature and humidity which reduced
performance. In practice it proved impractical for Bulwark's
helicopters to operate in their secondary role of anti-submarine
38 • AWHQ Information Letter No.9, 1958; RMM. COS (58) 219.
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warfare. Captain Franks described this role as "very tenuous" due to
the lack of trained personnel. However, exercises were successfully
conducted with specialist anti-submarine squadrons embarked. 39 The
problem of landing 3-ton vehicles from the carrier brought
investigations into the use of light aluminium LCMs similar to craft
built for the RAF. The idea was dropped due to the prohibitive cost
and the time it would take to implement.40
The decision to convert Bulwark to a commando carrier did not
entirely solve the problem of replacing obsolete ships and craft.
Bulwark could only embark one Commando, or at most two
Commandos for limited periods. The ship had only a limited ability
to land vehicles and support weapons without harbour facilities and no
ability to land armour in the assault. If amphibious landings were to
take place against organised opposition possessing heavy weapons
and/or armour, then more conventional amphibious shipping would
still be required. Unless the helicopter landed Commando could
guarantee to capture a harbour or an airfield in the early stages of an
operation then the ability to land supplies and reinforcements over the
beach would remain important. In many respects, the commando
carrier could only offer the same kind of assault capability as an
airborne landing, that of lightly equipped infantry.
Requested in January, and submitted in November 1958, the Technical
Examination by an Admiralty Assault Study Group reflected the
changing priorities of British defence. The examination was based on
the premise that there was no requirement for seaborne assault forces
solely for global war purposes. The rationale for amphibious forces
was now that they would be used for internal security and limited war
purposes. This meant that the ships and craft had to exist and be in
place ready for the call to action. The changing concept of
amphibious warfare required a new approach to equipment. It was no
longer enough to prepare designs and leave construction until after the
outbreak of war. With interests and responsibilities in the
39 . R.D.F.[R.D.Franks], "The Commando Carrier's First Commission" in Naval Review,
Volume 49, 1961 p.359-364. Interview with Captain R.D.Franks, conducted at Dartmouth on 8
May 1996. Desmond Wettern, The Decline of British Seapower, (London: Jane's Publishing
Co.Ltd, 1982) p.151.
413 • Ken Burns + Mike Critchley, HMS Bulwark 1948-1984, (Likeseard, Cornwall: Maritime
Books, 1986) p.29-31. AWHQ Information Letter No.11, 1960; RMM. COS (59) 32, 9
February 1059; DEFE 5/88.
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Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, long ocean
passages of 2,000 to 3,000 miles could be expected. Speed of
execution of an assault was likely to be of paramount importance. Old
fashioned short legged craft capable of less than 10 knots would
clearly not be able to fill future requirements. It was considered that
the commando carrier would be capable of dealing with any
requirement for opposed landings during internal security operations.
The largest military formation likely to be made available for
amphibious assault operations in limited war was the brigade group
consisting of a brigade headquarters and two battalion groups
supported by two squadrons of armour and two field batteries.
Amphibiously landed troops had to be prepared to operate in
conjunction with airborne forces. It was therefore considered that
assault ships should be capable of landing all the elements of a
standard brigade group in suitable proportions.41
The report considered five possible types of ship:
1. A new LCT.	 LCT(9)
2. Bow loading LST	 To be capable of beaching on a gradient
of 1 in 120 and lifting half a battalion
group.
3. Stern loading LST
	
To have the same characteristics as the
bow-loader without the beaching
requirement.
4. Amphibious transport dock	 Similar to the wartime LSD.
5. Current or projected United States ships and craft.
Based on existing sketch designs of the LCT(9), it was estimated that
an LCT would have a speed of only 12 knots and an ocean-going
capability below that required. A relatively small vessel, the LCT
would be unable to carry personnel other than vehicle crews and so
additional personnel lift would be required. As designed, the LCT(9)
could carry 60 men and six tanks or 13 three ton vehicles.
Like the LCT, the bow-loading LST was essentially just an
improvement on existing designs. The ability to land vehicles on
beaches with a gradient of 1 in 120 would be a great improvement on
the LST(A) which required a beach of 1 in 47 but was worse than the
LCT(8) which could manage a 1 in 150 beach. On steep beaches the
LST would still require the assistance of pontoon causeways. If
41 . COS (58) 254, Technical Examination of the Problem of Replacement of the
Assault Lift, 13 November 1958, report by Admiralty; DEFE 5.86.
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armour was required in the early stages of the assault and it proved
imprudent to beach a ship the size of an LST before the beach was
secured, DD tanks would be necessary. As with all LSTs, shallow
draught and the hull form would restrict performance and the vessel
would be unlikely to exceed 16 knots sustained speed in fair weather
(Figure One).
The stern loading LST offered improved seakeeping and speed but
sacrificed the ability to land vehicles directly on the shore. Infantry
and light vehicles could be ferried ashore in landing craft or
amphibians or by helicopters landed on the ship's deck. However,
heavy vehicles could only be landed by Rhino ferry. To land tanks in
the assault would require DD equipment. Unloading by ferry would
impose considerable delay, with equipment arriving in small packets.
In all but calm weather ferrying of any sort, other than by helicopter,
was liable to be impossible. The study group therefore rejected the
stern loading LST concept (Figure Two).
The Amphibious Transport Dock (ATD) combined the virtues of
good speed with the ability to land heavy equipment and tanks with its
LCUs and large LCMs. The large American LPD was considered too
big for British uses and represented a case of putting "too many eggs
in one basket". For British purposes a smaller ATD, capable of
carrying two-thirds of a battalion group plus 12 tanks, was envisaged.
This ship would have a passage speed of 23 knots and carry six LCM
in her well. DD tanks would still be desirable as the LCM proposed
only had a lift of 20 tons. If DD equipment could not be made
available then some of the LCMs could be replaced by large craft.
The delays inherent in the ferry system of discharge would affect the
ATD, but to a lesser extent than in the stern-loading LST as the ATD
could load two LCMs simultaneously. The shelter of the stern well
would reduce the effect of weather (Figure Three).
The option of procuring American ships or craft was not considered
desirable as USN ships were generally larger than was considered
suitable for British requirements. That such ships might come with
diplomatic strings attached did not escape the authors of the report.
The report noted that not even the Americans attempted to lift entire
brigade groups by ATD. It concluded that the choice appeared to lie
between the bow-loading LST and the ATD. Although bow-loading
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LSTs offered the best military solution to the problem of lifting and
landing the assault echelon of a brigade group, their slow speed
prejudiced the ability to operate in conjunction with the commando
carrier and would place the British at a disadvantage when working
with the Americans. The USN concept of operations was to have a
fast element of helicopter carrying LPHs supported by fast LPDs,
with a slower element of LSTs following behind.42
One month after the Admiralty Technical Examination, the Shipping
Resources Committee submitted their report on the replacement of
LSTs and LCTs for the logistic lift. 43 It was assumed that the prime
role of such shipping was to provide a follow up for an amphibious
assault. They would be required to lift all conventional armour,
equipment and supporting weapons required in the early stages of an
operation, although not in the assault. In line with the assumptions of
the Admiralty examination, the ships would be required to have good
speed and endurance in order to be able to undertake a 2,000 to 3,000
mile ocean passage, and they would have to be able to land all
elements of a brigade group over beaches. The emphasis could be
placed more on landing capability than was the case with the assault
lift. Inevitably, some time would elapse before civilian manned
vessels could follow on the assault so the requirement to keep pace
with the assaulting ships was not absolute. The vehicle to man ratio of
follow on echelons was higher than for assaulting forces. It would be
important to have good unloading capabilities if difficult and bulky
equipment was to be discharged without port facilities. Unlike Royal
Navy shipping these support ships would be required to conform with
statutory regulations governing construction and operation of
Merchant Navy vessels. They would also be required to perform a
useful transport role in peacetime. Thus any new ships would require
a robust hull and machinery capable of sustained peacetime operation,
making for a much heavier ship than a comparable assault vessel.
The Committee considered three possible alternative: a stern loader; a
landing ship dock; and a bow-loading LST. The stern loader was
rejected for much the same reasons as it was rejected for the assault
role. Despite offering better speed and seakeeping than a bow-loading
42. Ibid.
43. COS (58) 296, 31 December 1958, report by the SRC; DEFE 5/87. COS (59) 1 mtg, 1
January 1959; DEFE 4/115.
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LST, problems associated with discharging its load were deemed to
rule it out. Similarly, for purposes of the follow-up, the dock ship
was considered unsuitable. The Committee considered that its size
might restrict its ability to operate from small harbours and that this,
and the highly specialised nature of its design, would make it
uneconomical to operate in peacetime. There was also the possibility
that there would be some difficulty in a dock ship conforming with
statutory safety regulations. The favoured alternative was the bow-
loading LST.
The key advantage of this LST was the ability to land cargo directly
onto the shore, and its shallow draught which would facilitate
operating in small harbours. As with existing LSTs, draught and hull
form would restrict speed and seaworthiness but it was hoped to be
able to achieve a ship capable of 16 to 17 knots in calm weather. The
assault requirement to be able to land forces on a beach gradient of 1
in 120 was, however, well outside the range of a Merchant Navy
vessel. It was considered unlikely that the performance of existing
LSTs (about 1 in 40) could be bettered and therefore pontoon
causeways would be needed for landings on flat beaches. The new
LST would have a stern door for peacetime loading and unloading and
for wartime use when harbour facilities were available. The report
was approved by the COS, and the Shipping Resources Committee was
instructed to progress design studies for a new bow and stern loading
LST.44
In May 1959 the JPS submitted the report first requested in January
1957, the "Long Term Study of Amphibious Operations" . The report
studied the alternative methods of providing a long term capability of
putting ashore in the assault a brigade headquarters, three battalions
or Commandos, two squadrons of tanks and two field batteries. It was
assumed that the Middle East air/sea barrier would remain but that
Britain would retain main base facilities both sides of this barrier.
The report confirmed that sea lift would still be required to land a
balanced military force:
The speed and flexibility required of forces in cold and
limited war situations place increasing emphasis on
airborne capacity, and on the carrier borne helicopter
force which is the latest amphibious development. In
44 . COS (59) 1 mtg.
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the foreseeable future, however, neither aircraft nor
helicopters will be available to lift the heavier types of
operational equipment, and in any case the number
which they can lift would always be limited. Such
lack of organic heavy support would place airborne
and helicopter forces at a disadvantage against an
enemy established in prepared positions and/or
supported by AFVs. At the same time we do not
foresee a requirement for amphibious assault against a
heavily defended coastline.
The JPS considered that tactical nuclear weapons might one day
replace heavy support weapons but that in the type of operations
contemplated for the assault lift political considerations would rule out
their use. As one could not count on the early use of either an airfield
or port facilities it was important to retain the ship's ability to land
over a beach or in a port using their own facilities.45
Taking account of the Admiralty Technical Examination and the
Shipping Resources Committee report on the logistic lift, the JPS
considered four main types of ship for a future amphibious lift. For
the assault they considered the commando carrier, the ATD and the
LST(A). For the follow up they considered the WD LST. The
operational concept was for a landing within 28 days of notice in
order to capture a port or airfield within seven days of the assault.
The beach landings would be made within 20 miles of a port and no
operations would be conducted further than 40 miles from the beach
until a port was taken. The follow up support was to land between 24
and 48 hours after the assault, depending on the scale of opposition.
Supplies for seven days would be landed with the assault and follow
up. An all Royal Navy assault and follow up lift was considered and
rejected as too expensive in both capital and manpower. Two cases
were considered: case A - Bulwark supported by ATDs and; case B -
Bulwark and another commando carrier supported by a reduced
number of ATDs. In either case nine WD LSTs would have to be
prepositioned on both sides of the Suez barrier in order to meet the 28
days deadline, see Table One.
45 . JP (58) 24, 11 May 1959, report by the JPS given at annex to COS (59) 32 mtg, 26 May
1959; DEFE 4/118.
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Table One: Long Term Study of Amphibious Operations
CASE A	 CASE B
Royal Navy Ships
commando carrier	 1	 2
AID
	
3 small	 2 small
or 2 large
WD Ships
WD LST	 18	 18
Manpower
Royal Navy	 900*	 1390/1690*
War Department	 1170	 1170
Capital cost	 f42.9M*	 £44.3M*
* excluding manpower/expenditure for HMS Bulwark which had already been
allowed for.
Under case B, while the helicopter lift would provide added tactical
flexibility, the use of smaller ATDs would cause a shortfall of 4
Centurion tanks and 26 3-ton trucks, all of which would have to be
carried by the follow up lift. This would bring an overall shortage of
20 3-ton trucks. On the other hand, case B had the advantage of
providing one commando carrier with one ATD and nine WD LSTs
either side of the barrier. This would fulfil the requirements for
balanced forces available at short notice in cases where speed was of
the overriding importance. It also had the advantage that a second
commando carrier could be converted more quickly than an ATD
could be built. To remove the shortfall of vehicles associated with the
small ATD, a design larger than that recommended by the Admiralty
Technical Examination would be needed. This could raise the cost of
the ATD from an estimated £5.3 million to about £6.7 million, the
cost of a commando carrier with its helicopters. The JPS considered
that case B was the better solution "as it meets the limited war
requirement while permitting a better deployment of forces for cold
war tasks".
The JPS also considered possible alternatives that would offer a
reduced amphibious capability, either by dropping the necessity to
assault within 28 days or by dropping the requirement to assault at
brigade group strength. In order to land a force rapidly but at less
than brigade group strength, the JPS examined cases C,D,E, and F, see
Table Two.	 -
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Table Two: Long Term Study of Amphibious Operations
CASE C D E F
Royal Navy Ships
commando carrier 1 2 1 2
ATD 3 small
or 2 large
2 small - -
LST(A) 5 4
WS Ships
WD LST 9 9 9 9
Manpower
Royal Navy* 900 1390/1690 550 1230/1530
War Dept.+ 585 585 585 585
Capital cost* £29.4M f30.8M £29M £32.6M
* excluding the manpower/expenditure for HMS Bulwark
+ civilian crews.
The JPS preferred case C and D as these did not rely on LST(A),
which could only land DD armour in the assault. Of cases C and D,
case D was favoured as in this case, for operations at short notice, one
commando carrier, one ATD and four or five WD LSTs could be
deployed on either side of the barrier. They could lift a balanced
force for the assault but with reduced follow up compared to case B.
Cases G and H covered the reduced requirement to land a force of less
than brigade strength, no matter what the time scale. Case G catered
for a force of one commando carrier, two small ATDs and nine WD
LSTs. Only the assault element of one helicopter landed Commando
and one beach landed battalion group could be deployed world wide
within 28 days. A brigade group could be built-up within 38 days.
With two commando carriers, one small ATD and nine WD LSTs
under case H, two Commandos could be landed by helicopter and one
battalion could be beach landed, with reduced supporting arms, within
28 days. As with case G a brigade group could be built up within 38
days. For purposes of an amphibious assault over the beaches, case G
was preferable to H, although for other tasks such as cold war
operations not requiring an assault landing, case H had considerable
advantages. In all of the cases outlined by the JPS there would be an
additional manpower requirement over the existing allocation of 520
men to the AW Squadron.
The report received a mixed reaction from the Services. The Air
Ministry considered that small lightly equipped forces that could be
rapidly deployed would be of more use than larger more balanced
forces. They were thus against the provision of brigade group lift,
preferring instead a two battalion lift. Such small lightly armed
186
Chapter Six: Table Three




































Case C	 £1.71 million
Case D £3.08 million
Case C+ £0.56 million
Case D+ £0.62 million





battalions could, of course, also be air lifted. The RAF was aware
that the Army favoured the brigade group. CAS Dermot Boyle was
briefed by his subordinates that case H was. the best choice in view of
likely national needs.46 Nevertheless, in discussion on 26 May the
COS decided that cases C and D should be accepted as suitable
hypothetical bases on which to carry out detailed costings. It was
further decided that detailed studies should be started on the ATD and
the WD LST and that HMS Albion, sister to Bulwark , should be
earmarked for possible conversion to commando carrier. No firm
decision was taken on the size and composition of the amphibious
lift.47
Detailed costings of both cases C and D were completed in November
1959. In order to maintain the required number of ships in service
for each of these cases additional ships would have to be maintained in
operational reserve. Thus the full requirement for case C was for two
commando carriers, four ATD and nine LST at a cost of £45.07
million. Similarly, case D required three.commando carriers, three
ATD and nine LST at a cost of £48.58 million. As an alternative to
this expense, the Admiralty prepared cases C+ and D+. Case C+
provided for one commando carrier and one ATD in commission with
two ATDs in operational reserve. Case D+ catered for one
commando carrier and one ATD in commission and one of each in
reserve, see Table Three.48
In December 1959 the Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson,
submitted the new Naval Construction Programme to the Defence
Committee. Admiralty Long Term Costings catered for an
amphibious force based upon case D+, two commando carriers and
two assault ships, one of each type in commission and one each in
operational reserve. The first assault ship was planned to complete in
1964. Watkinson, a keen advocate of amphibious capabilities,
informed his colleagues that:
I believe that we should aim at a better amphibious
capability more quickly than under the Admiralty plan.
I am sure this will be one of the needs of the future.49
46. AIR 8/2245.
47. COS (59) 32 mtg.
48. Folio 240; DEFE 11/220.
49. D (59) 40, 22 December 1959, memo by Minister of Defence; CAB 131/22.
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Consequently, the Admiralty was examining ways in which the assault
ship might be constructed more quickly. They were also looking into
the implications of keeping all four ships in the active fleet.50
In April 1960 the First Lord, Lord Carrington, reported to
Watkinson the plans for improving amphibious capabilities beyond
those contained in the 1959/60 Costings. HMS Albion was to be taken
in hand for conversion to commando carrier in June 1961, completing
in December 1962. The ship would then be placed in operational
reserve with a reserve air group of 16 Wessex helicopters aboard.
The first Assault Ship would be ordered in September 1961,
completing in March 1964. Allowing for a trials period, this would
allow it to replace the existing AW Squadron in late 1964. A second
Assault Ship was to be ordered in September 1962. With a
completion date of March 1965 this ship would go into operational
reserve. Carrington pointed out that neither ship in reserve could be
manned and moved to an area east of Suez in under two or three
months. The programme for the commando carrier could be speeded
up by taking Albion in hand at Portsmouth Dockyard in February
instead of December 1962. 51
 Watkinson approved the Admiralty plan
to begin work on Albion in February 1962 and the Treasury gave
approval for £310,000 in order to conduct detailed planning work and
the order of equipment with especially long lead times.52
The Ministry of Transport design study for the WD LST, ordered by
the COS in December 1958, was submitted for approval in May 1960.
The new design was prepared in consultation with the Admiralty and
in accordance with a War Office staff requirement. The new LST
was to have a maximum speed of 17 knots and an economic speed of
15 knots. It would have space for 350 troops and the ability to
discharge a load of 10 tanks or 500 tons of stores on a beach gradient
of 1 in 50. On more favourable beach gradients or when employed in
the transport role the ship would be able to carry 1480 tons of stores
or 16 tanks. In all respects the design was an improvement on
existing British LSTs. Amongst the new features incorporated was a
50• Ibid. COS (60) 1, 1 January 1960, report by CAW; DOE 5/99. COS (60) 18 mtg, 15 March
1961; DEFE 4/125
51. Folio 3; DEFE 7/1677.
52. Folios 10 + 10; DEFE 7/1677.
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ramped stern opening to permit the vessel to be loaded or unloaded at
a quay on the roll-on roll-off principle. Provision was made for the
carriage of a helicopter without prejudice to cargo carrying ability
and the superstructure and deck was designed to facilitate discharge by
helicopter. A pontoon causeway could be carried in an elevated
position without interfering with vehicle carriage.53
The Shipping Resources Committee recommended that in order to
ensure timely replacement of existing ships, construction of the first
new LST should begin by January 1961 at the latest. The COS
approved the new design and authorised the development and building
of the first ship. The Ministry of Transport was invited to arrange
for a commercial shipping company to supervise the development and
construction of the first ship, and to operate it once completed.54
Watkinson continued to press his Cabinet colleagues for approval to
build the new assault ships. He reported on design for the new ship to
the Defence Committee, concluding that "the new ship's qualities of
speed, seakeeping and endurance will transform the effectiveness of
our amphibious capabilities" .55 The normal capacity of this ship
would be 15 tanks, 30 three ton vehicles and six field guns with
accommodation for 350 men. If circumstances required the ship
would be able to carry an additional 350 men. Alternately it could be
used to hold a stockpile offshore for troops operating on land.
Watkinson noted that provision had been made in current plans and
estimates to order the ship in 1960 at an estimated cost of £10 million,
including ancillary craft and stores.56
Watkinson also pushed to have both commando carriers in
commission so that at least one ship would always be available. Such a
decision would increase annual running costs by about £2 million and
would require expenditure of £3.5 million on additional helicopters.
The COS backed these proposals, recognising the need to exploit the
flexibility of these ships. In view of the time that would be needed to
crew and work up a commando carrier held in reserve such a ship
could only be regarded as a pre-planned replacement for its sister.
53. COS (60) 151, 31 May 1961, report by the SRC; DEFE 5/103.
54. COS (60) 36 mtg, 26 May 1960; DEFE 4/127.
55. D (60) 54, 2 December 1960, memo by the Minister of Defence; CAB 131/24.
56. Ibid.
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The ship could not be made available rapidly in an emergency and its
commissioning would require the paying off of other ships. An
accident aboard the operational ship could therefore mean that there
was no active commando carrier available for a period. If it was
decided to commission both commando carriers, naval manpower
would have to be increased by some 1250 men.57
On 7 December 1960 the Defence Committee discussed the feasibility
of commissioning Albion .58 The possibility of maintaining one ship
in commission either side of the barrier was raised and subsequently
the question was investigated by Watkinson and Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd. The proposal was now that the two ships
would rotate between east and west of Suez. One ship would be
constantly available fully worked up east of Suez. The other ship
would be available over one third of the time for duty west of Suez or
in order to reinforce the eastern fleet. Under these measures, running
costs were slightly reduced to £1.6 million in 1964/5. Two
Commandos would be stationed east of Suez to operate with the
commando carrier, with the remaining three west of Suez. 59 Selwyn
Lloyd accepted the need to maintain both commando carriers along
the lines outlined by Watkinson. He also agreed that the Seaborne
Support Ship (Assault Ship) should go ahead.60
One factor which swayed the Treasury towards accepting the
commissioning of both commando carriers and construction of the
assault ship was the difficulty the Army was having in meeting its
recruitment targets. 61 On 25 January 1961 Watkinson reported to
Selwyn Lloyd that:
with the disastrous outlook for Army recruitment I
really cannot defend the Government in what may be a
major political crisis if I do not have some help with
extra mobility and manpower where we can get it.
He went on to add that:
57. Ibid.
58. D (60) 12 mtg, 7 December 1960; CAB 131/23.
59. D (61) 8,20 January 1961, memo by the Minister of Defence; CAB 131/25.
60 • D (61) 17, 20 February 1961, memo by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; CAB 131/25. DEFE
7/1678.
61 . D (61) 17.
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The whole purpose of the Albion and support
[i.e.assault] ship operation is not primarily because the
Admiralty want it. Indeed, I am sure that they would
not give it over-riding priority. I must have it to plug
what may be a serious gap in our military strength and
dispositions.62
The Minister was aware of the dangers of linking, in particular, the
commissioning of the second commando carrier to the Army's
recruitment trouble. Such linkage would not only cause offence to the
Army, it would also open up a route for the Treasury to attack the
requirement for Albion once Army recruitment picked up.63
The plan to build a new assault ship to replace the AW Squadron was
announced in the 1961 Navy Estimates. 64 The design for this ship
was approved by the Board of Admiralty in March 1961. The ship
was to be 12,100 tons deep displacement with a trials speed of 21
knots, provided by a two shaft steam turbine machinery. It would
have accommodation for 700 men and could carry 15 tanks, six self-
propelled guns, 50 loaded three ton trucks and ninety tons of stores.
The ship could carry four LCA(2) at davits and embark four LCM(9)
in a stern well. By flooding the stern well, loaded LCM(9) would
float out through a stern gate in the same manner as with the wartime
LSD. Space would be provided on the after-end of the weatherdeck
for the operation of a Wessex helicopter. The ship would be fitted out
as a Naval Assault Group/Brigade Headquarters ship. The only
armament provided was four Seacat launchers with eight missiles each
and two Bofors guns. The Board directed that for any future assault
ships, consideration should be given to fitting a 4.5 inch turret in
order to provide some self-defence capability against surface attack.
The estimated cost of this vessel was £8,750,000 excluding the cost of
craft, stores, ammunition, fuel etc.65
The contract for this ship, dubbed Landing Ship Assault, was placed
with Harland and Wolff at Belfast in December 1961. It was hoped
that the ship would be complete by mid-1965. Vosper got the contract
to produce two prototype LCM(9). They were to be ready for
evaluation in 1963, so that an order for the four LCM(9) could be
62. Folio 4/2; DEFE 7/1678.
63. Folios 74-77; DEFE 7/1677.	 •
64• Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates 1961-1962; Cmnd 1282.
65 . Board Minute 5482; ADM 167/158. Memo B.1382; ADM 167/159.
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placed in time for the craft to be ready at the same time as their
mother ship. 66 The 1962 Navy Estimates noted that the first assault
ship had been ordered and announced that a second would be ordered
during that financial year. 67 The first assault ship, HMS Fearless
eventually entered service in 1965, followed in 1967 by its sister ship,
Intrepid. Capable of carrying a balanced military force on an ocean
passage in company with the commando carriers, these ships
represented a considerable improvement on the old AW Squadron.
Each ship had a flight deck with facilities for five Wessex helicopters.
In the event ,neither ship was fitted with a 4.5 inch gun. After 15
years of service with the Navy they were to display their worth by
playing a central part in the successful amphibious landings of the
Falldands War.68
It was not merely the AW Squadron that needed replacement. The
WD LSTs were equally old and worn out. 69 In May 1960 the COS
approved the initiation of a construction programme to replace these
ships. The COS study, British Strategy in the Sixties , called for a
fleet of six new LSTs, now know as Landing Ship, Logistic (LSL)
with one operational and one reserve west of Suez and three
operational and one in reserve east of Suez. 70 The contract for the
first LSL went to the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering
Company, Govan in November 1961. As part of the contract the
shipbuilders had to develop the final specification for the LSL.71
The new design was in every way an improvement on the old LSTs.
With a sustained speed of 15 knots the LSL could travel 8,000 nautical
miles. It had accommodation for 340 men and could carry 16 tanks
or 1,390 tons of stores. It could land a tactical load of 10 tanks or
500 tons directly on to a beach gradient of 1 in 50. 72 To facilitate
rapid turnaround at terminals, a number of new features were
incorporated. It had twin internal ramps to facilitate movement
66 . COS (62) 81, 21 February 1962, report by CAW; DEFE 5/124.
67 • Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates 1992-1963, Cmnd 1629.
68 • COS 109/64, 2 April 1964; DEFE 5/150. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships,
1947-1982: Part Two The Western Powers, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1983) also
see Jane's Fighting Ships.
69 . COS (61) 195, 23 June 1961, report by the SRC; DEFE 5/114. COS (62) 47, 5 February 162;
DEFE 5/124.
N. COS (62) 47.
71 • COS (62) 81, 21 February 1962, report by CAW; DEFE 5/124.
72• COS (62) 373, 12 September 1962, report by the SRC and PAO; DEFE 5/130.
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between the main hold and upper deck. A ramped stern opening
allowed the craft to be loaded at a quayside using the roll-on, roll-off
principle. The superstructure and main deck were designed to
facilitate discharge by helicopter, and provision was made for a
helicopter to be carried at all times. A pontoon causeway could be
carried in an elevated position without interfering with vehicle
carriage.73
With only six LSL planned the introduction of these ships would not
increase the total logistic lift as there would be less ships than at
present available. However, their improved characteristics offered
increased personnel lift and a quicker more flexible response to crises.
Unlike the old WD LSTs, the LSLs would be able to supply the
proper logistic support to the new amphibious groups based upon the
commando carriers and assault ships. The COS were eager that the
order for the first ship should be followed rapidly by orders for two
more. 74 The Treasury were willing to .approve an order for the
second LSL, largely because of the parlous state of the shipbuilding
industry. However, they were reluctant to agree to an order for the
third ship until trials of the first had been completed. The COS
proposed laying down both ships in April 1963, noting that they
would be barely half built by the time the first LSL completed its
trials. At this stage it should be possible to make any adjustments to
subsidiary features that experience with the first ship might indicate.
It was, after all, common practice to order batches of warships before
the completion of the first.75
The Minister of Defence, now Peter Thorneycroft, went even further.
In March 1963 he suggested that the fourth, fifth and sixth ships
should be ordered immediately, to take advantage of the difficulties of
the shipbuilding industry. The COS concluded that while there would
be a definite military advantage in accelerating the orders there was
no urgent need to do so on operational or financial grounds. 76 The
first LSL, Sir Lancelot, was laid down in March 1962, launched in
June 1963 and completed in January 1964. Five more ships followed,
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. COS 6 mtg/63, 24 January 1963; DEFE 4/151. COS 36/63, 4 February 1963, report by the
SRC; DEFE 5/134.
76. COS 88/63, 5 March 1963; DEFE 5/136.
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being launched during 1966 and 1967: Sir Galahad, Sir Belvidere, Sir
Geraint, Sir Tristram, and Sir Percivale. These ships were similar in
size and capacity to Sir Lancelot but had increased vehicle stowage
and improved flying facilities. The LSLs were operated by the
Ministry of Transport until 1970 when they were taken over by the
Royal Fleet Auxiliary. 77 Like the two assault ships all these vessels
participated in the 1982 Falklands conflict.
During the later 1950s the Royal Navy was forced to re-evaluate its
key rationale. The traditional role of defending the sea lanes in a
major war against the Soviet Union was undermined by changing
strategic factors. Although the defence of the United Kingdom and of
Europe remained the top priority, this function was now to be
fulfilled primarily by the nuclear deterrent. With the role of
conventional forces in global war accorded only a very low priority,
the Navy was forced to re-evaluate the emphasis it had placed on
limited war and cold war duties. The Board of Admiralty therefore
agreed to a shift in priorities away from their more traditional role in
order to preserve core capabilities. This approach was adopted
reluctantly as the path "least damaging" to naval interests. The limited
war role called for new amphibious ships to replace existing worn out
lift. These new ships were different from their predecessors. They
were fast, long-legged, thoroughly modern vessels offering a far
better amphibious capability than the ships they replaced.
Unfortunately, it takes time to design and build new ships. It was not
until the mid to late 1960s that the new ships were available. In the
meantime, with the exception of the commando carriers, Britain's
amphibious lift was still provided by old LSTs and LCTs.
As Ministers of Defence both Watkinson and Thorneycroft were keen
to promote amphibious capabilities which offered mobility and
flexibility to British forces, allowing the Ministry of Defence to place
less emphasis on fixed bases and garrisons. Since 1945 amphibious
warfare had never been an important political issue. Interest in
Parliament had been limited to occasional questions from retired
Royal Navy and Royal Marine officers. 7g It was not an issue that
77. Jane's Fighting Ships.
78. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Volume 480, Session 1950-51, Column 1339-1343.
Volume 513, Session 1952-1953, Column 319. Volume 529, Session 1953-1954, Column 1327-
1328. Volume 524, Session 1953-1954, Column 1980-1981.
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aroused fierce debates. From 1956 there was a greater awareness of
the value of amphibious capabilities and the growing interest of the
Navy in amphibious warfare was reflected in the House of
Commons. 79 Nevertheless it was not an issue divided along party
lines. There was general cross-party support for amphibious
capabilities, as there was general inter-Service agreement on their
value. While generally in favour of improved amphibious
capabilities, the War Office was to grow wary of attempts to expand
this lift at the expense of the Army. Attempts by the Ministry of
Defence to justify increasing amphibious capabilities because of the
difficulties of Army recruitment were to fuel a growing suspicion of
Admiralty motives. The Air Ministry were initially concerned that
the commando carrier concept represented an incursion of the Navy
into the air transport role. In the 1960s they were to become bitter
opponents of the Admiralty's plans for seaborne task forces,
advocating instead their own strategy of land based air power and air
mobile troops. In the 1950s the foundatiOns of future inter-Service
conflict were being laid.
79 . Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Volume 570 to 619.
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Figure lb. Bow Loading LST.
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Figure 2c. Stern Loading LST.
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Figure 3a. Amphibious Transport Dock.
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Figure 3b. Amphibious Transport Dock.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SEABORNE/AIRBORNE CONCEPT
The adoption by the Admiralty of the limited war role changed the
way amphibious capabilities were viewed. They were now part of a
wider intervention strategy designed to allow Britain to play a part on
the world stage. A new generation of fast, capable amphibious
warfare vessels was on order. This encouraged renewed thinking
about amphibious warfare. In 1960 Basil Liddell-Hart wrote that in
the existing situation of nuclear stalemate, amphibious capabilities
were necessary as a counter and a deterrent to limited and local
aggression. He believed that while airborne forces were useful,
seaborne forces could not be ignored as they provided a flexibility
denied to aircraft operating from fixed bases. While airborne forces
were desirable, seaborne forces were essentia1. 1 In his conclusion to
The War at Sea , published in 1961, Stephen Roskill strongly
emphasised the historic value of amphibious forces. 2 In The Strategy
of Seapower, published one year later, he considered that, after
providing the nuclear deterrent, the creation of powerful amphibious
forces should be the top priority for British defence policy. Clearly
supporting current Admiralty plans, he called for the provision of two
joint Service amphibious task forces capable of landing and supporting
a brigade group at short notice.3
Operation Musketeer had demonstrated the limitations of using old
equipment and outdated techniques in limited military interventions.
The old concept of amphibious operations on the wartime model was
not suited to the requirements of cold and limited war. A new
concept of operations, designed specifically for limited war
contingencies, was required. Consequently, a new operational
concept, the seaborne/airborne concept was developed. 4 Designed to
make full and efficient use of sea, land and airborne forces as an
integrated whole, this concept replaced older, outdated views of
1• B.H. Liddell-Hart, "The Value of Amphibious Flexibility and Forces", RUSI Journal, 1960
p.483-492. also see, B.H. Liddell-hart, Deterrent or Defence. A Fresh Look at the West's
Military Position, (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1960) p.110-129.
2• S.W.Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945. Volume 3, Part 2 - The Offensive,
(London: HMSO, 1961) p. 387-409.
3. S.W.Roskill, The Strategy of Seapower. Its Development and Application,
(Aylesbury: John Goodchild Publishers, 1986) p.253-255.
4. Alternately known as the seaborne/airborne/land concept.
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amphibious operations. Almost as soon as the concept was developed
it was put to the test. In 1961 Britain responded to a perceived threat
from Iraq to Kuwait by implementing reinfo. rced theatre plan Vantage
, the build up of land, sea and air forces in defence of Kuwait. In
contrast to the response to the Suez crisis the military reacted quickly
and effectively as the situation demanded. The operation was deemed
a success and taken as evidence both of the validity of the
seaborne/airborne concept and of Britain's continued role east of Suez
in general.
The new concept of operations had been examined by AWHQ and the
JSAWC in 1960. It was presented and discussed at the Staff Colleges,
at the Staff Training Wing of the JSAWC and at appropriate
operational commands. 5 Reflecting the new emphasis on cold and
limited war operations, the concept stressed the need for seaborne and
airborne forces to operate in concert in order to provide a mobile and
flexible intervention capability. The need to respond quickly to crises
meant that most of the initial forces employed would be provided
from the particular theatre. Follow-on forces would come from
adjacent theatres and from the United Kingdom. Some land forces
would remain afloat although the bulk of troops from the United
Kingdom would be air transported. Heavy equipment such as tanks
would continue to be transported by sea. Air transported follow-up
forces would rely heavily on stockpiles which would be established in
likely areas of operations. It was appreciated that opposition could
vary in intensity but assaults against heavily defended coastlines were
not contemplated.6
The details of the new concept were set out in 1962 by the Joint
Warfare Staff:
In the present concept of limited war our forces must
be ready to counter sudden enemy intervention in a
country that is neutral or friendly to us. The enemy
will have the initiative and will be able to strike at the
time and place he chooses, even if his moves can be
foreseen, our forces may not be able to land before his
active intervention, for political reasons. The
requirement is for a force that can act quickly and is
ready to fight immediately in an area that may be far
from its base; and that has the hitting power and
5 . COS (61) 12, 13 January 1961, report by CAW; DEFE 5/110.
6• COS (61) 180, Seaborne/Airborne/Land Concept, 8 June 1961; DEFE 5/114.
205
mobility to take offensive action and get quick results,
to prevent the war from extending or from escalating
to global war.
It was anticipated that a properly balanced force was unlikely to be
achieved unless airborne and seaborne forces operated in unison:
In this concept of joint seaborne/airborne operations,
the amphibious and air transported forces are part of a
single team, sea and air providing those elements of
the force best suited to their characteristics and to the
kind of operations expected.
The requirement to land troops as quickly as possible would
sometimes conflict with the requirement to land balanced forces. It
was recognised that as the air transported force and the seaborne force
might arrive at different times or land far apart they needed to retain
the ability to operate independently, at least in the initial stages of an
operation. In summary:
The seaborne/airborne concept envisages amphibious
and air transported troops landing at short notice and
operating as a single team. each providing the forces
best suited to its means. They will land
simultaneously if possible, but each force must be
balanced to enable it to operate independently for a
while; and both forces must be ready to fight their way
in.7
Responsibility for the development of the seaborne/airborne concept
had rested with AWHQ and the Land/Air Warfare Committee.
AWHQ was responsible for the seaborne side and the Land/Air
Warfare Committee for the airborne side. Although the JSAWC and
the School of Land/Air Warfare at Old Sarum maintained very close
liaison, under existing arrangements seaborne/airborne operations
were not examined together as one joint concept by all the parties
concerned. At the request of the COS, the JPS studied this
arrangement, reporting in June 1961. They considered that the main
weakness in the existing system was the lack of any joint authority to
promulgate and direct the new policy. They considered that there was
"no substitute for a fully integrated inter-Service approach.".8
7. DEFE 2/2074.
8. COS (61) 22 mtg, 28 March 1961; DEFE 4/134. COS (61) 180.
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Examining what changes were necessary to rectify this situation, the
JPS recommended disbanding AWHQ and the Land/Air Warfare
Committee and proposed the creation of a joint Service organisation
directly responsible to the COS for all matters concerning
seaborne/airborne operations. The possibility of establishing a
separate joint independent headquarters, on the lines of the wartime
COHQ, was considered and rejected as unnecessary in peacetime. The
JPS believed that it was more appropriate for all executive power to
be exercised by single Service Ministries. Instead they recommended,
and the COS approved, the establishment of a standing committee,
called the Joint Warfare Committee, composed of senior
representatives of the Services and of the Minister of Defence. This
committee was charged with the direction and coordination of joint
tactical doctrines, techniques, procedures and training requirements
and for all aspects of seaborne/airborne operations short of global
war, excluding essentially single Service matters.9
The Joint Warfare Committee (JWC) was duly established and AWHQ
and the Land/Air Warfare Committee were disbanded. The JWC held
its first meeting on 17 January 1962. 10 In February 1962 the COS
approved proposals by the JWC for the formation of a small Joint
Warfare Staff (JWS) and the following sub-committees to serve the
JWC: the Offensive Support Sub-Committee; the Air Transport
Support Sub-Committee; and the Amphibious Warfare Sub-
Committee. 11 The JWS was formed on 2 April 1962. This staff was
small and inter-Service. It's first director was Major-General
R.D.Houghton, until lately employed as the last Chief of Amphibious
Warfare. The JWS acted as the secretariat for the JWC and the
Director, Joint Warfare Staff was to submit annual reports to the JWC
who would forward these reports to the COS in much the same way
that CAW had previously been required to do.
The Amphibious Warfare Sub-Committee of the JWC was responsible
for advice and recommendations on the development of policy,
techniques, tactical developments and joint Service training. It was to
advise on the collection of intelligence required for amphibious
9. COS (62) 12, 4 January 1962, report by the JPS; DEFE 5/123.
10. COS (62) 84, 28 February 1962; DEFE 5/124. COS 365/63, JWC - Terms of Reference,
8 November 1963; DEFE 5/144.
11. COS (62) 84.
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operations and was to ensure standardisation and compatibility of
equipment whenever possible. The responsibilities of AWHQ had in
some respects been more wide ranging than those of the JWC,
including responsibilities in the field of material and logistics. While
it was intended that the JWC should maintain close ties in this field,
these responsibilities reverted back to the relevant Services.12
A Joint Warfare Establishment replaced theISAWC and the School of
Land/Air Warfare. This establishment was created by amalgamating
the Amphibious Warfare School with the School of Land/Air Warfare
at Old Sarum. The Amphibious Training Unit, Royal Marines and the
Trials Section remained at Poole administered by the Navy. The
establishment was responsible for formulating and teaching the tactical
doctrine, procedures and techniques required for joint warfare. The
JWC was responsible for the policy and overall functioning of the
Joint Warfare Establishment, while the administrative backing at Old
Sarum was provided by the Air Ministry. The Commandant of the
establishment was responsible to the JWC and the post was to rotate
between the three Services.13
At first glance there seems little new about these developments. The
rejection by the JPS of the concept of an independent organisation
such as COHQ was reminiscent of similar Admiralty proposals dating
back as far as 1943. Similarly, the main proposal of the 1953 Parker
Working Party had been the amalgamation of the Amphibious
Warfare Centre with the School of Land/Air Warfare at Old Sarum.
What had changed was the context in which amphibious warfare was
now viewed. In the 1940s the Admiralty were keen to have COHQ
downgraded to the position of an inter-Service committee in order
that they could control what was perceived as a nuisance organisation,
a loose cannon that was a burden on already overstrained resources.
In 1962 the situation was quite different. Amphibious operations
were no longer seen in the context of global war. The new
seaborne/airborne concept called for much closer tri-Service
cooperation than before and introduced an air element, something that
AWHQ had not been responsible for. Amphibious warfare was now
central to the future of the Navy. The Admiralty representatives
•
12. Ibid.
13 • COS (62) 68 mtg, 30 October 1962; DEFE 4/148. COS (62) 426, report by the JWC; DEFE
5/131.
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could be expected to do all they could to enhance amphibious
capabilities. Under these conditions the future of amphibious warfare
was better served by senior Admiralty representatives, backed up by
the full authority of their Service, than by the independent
representatives of AWHQ.
In August 1959 the COS decided to move the AW Squadron to Aden
in conjunction with the move of a squadron of tanks and a Royal
Marine Commando. 14 The move received Ministerial approval in
October 1959. The ships of the AW Squadron were fitted with air
conditioning at Chatham and Malta and the squadron moved to its new
station in June 1960. 15 The key rationale for the move of the AW
Squadron was for the support of Operation Vantage , the
reinforcement of Kuwait. Kuwait was of particular importance to
Britain. British Petroleum, an oil company owned by the British
Government, held a 50 per cent share in the Kuwait Oil Company and
in 1960 Kuwait had provided some 50 per cent of Britain's oil
supplies. 16 Under the terms of the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty,
Britain had been responsible for the foreign policy and defence of
Kuwait. In June 1961 this treaty was terminated, being considered
"inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait.".17
On 19 June 1961 an Exchange of Notes was signed that defined the
new relationship between Britain and Kuwait. This Exchange of
Notes recognised Kuwait as a sovereign and independent state and
established Britain's readiness to come to its assistance if requested.
As a successor state of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq had always claimed
Kuwait as its own. This claim pre-dated General Kassim's rule but
the Iraqi coup of 1958 which removed the pro-British government
brought with it the heightened possibility of Iraqi military action to
secure what it considered to be a part of the Basra province.
Supported by an influx of Soviet weaponry, the Iraqi armed forces
were considerably larger than their Kuwaiti counterparts. The army
was believed to be equipped with about 110 Centurion tanks, 40 US
M-24 tanks and possibly between 100 and 150 Soviet T-54s. Their
14 • COS (59) 49 mtg, 5 August 1959; DEFE 4/120.
15. COS (59) 60 mtg, 24 September 1959; DEFE 4/121. COS (60) 63 mtg, 13 October 1959;
DEFE 4/121. COS (59) 230, 22 September 1959, note by the War Office; DEFE 5/95.
16. Darby, British Defence Policy, chapter six.
17. Ralph Hewins, A Golden Dream. The Miracle of Kuwait, (London: W.H.Allen, 1963)
p.284-285.
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airforce was equipped with British Hunters and Soviet MiG 17 and
MiG 19 aircraft. 18 To meet this, Kuwait could only field one large
regimental group, including half a squadron of Centurion tanks. 19 In
order to counter the threat of internal subversion within Kuwait or of
an Iraqi attack, Commander-in-Chief British Forces Arabian
Peninsula (BFAP), prepared reinforced theatre plan Vantage , in
October 1959. The plan catered for the rapid deployment to Kuwait
of a reinforced brigade group with air and naval support under a
variety of circumstances. It was assumed that Iraqi forces would not
have entered Kuwait prior to British intervention and that four days
warning of an Iraqi attack would be received. Vantage came into
force in November 1959. Its movement appendices were revised in
December 1960 to cater for the reinforcement of BFAP.20
A key part of this reinforcement was the stationing of a squadron of
tanks and the AW Squadron within Middle East Command. Under
Vantage , the primary task of the AW Squadron was to provide follow
up lift for troops transported by air. Although no strongly opposed
landing was anticipated, the squadron was to be prepared to face
minor opposition either on the beaches or ashore, before the sea
landed elements could meet up with the airborne element. It would
take nine days for a slow LST to sail from Aden to Kuwait and so it
was decided to keep one LST with half a squadron of tanks
permanently on station in the Persian Gulf. The two Royal Navy
LSTs were to maintain this Seaborne Tank Force for as long as
practicable. A WD LST could meet this requirement during periods
when a Royal Navy ship was not available. In order to provide the
necessary lift of vehicles and stores from the military stockpile at
Bahrain to Kuwait, the LCT(8)s Bastion, Redoubt and Parapet were
permanently based at Bahrain.21
The state of readiness prescribed in Vantage was relaxed to four days
in July 1960. It was assumed that in order to attack Kuwait, Iraq
would need to move a brigade of armour from the Baghdad area to
Basra and that this would provide at least four days warning. The
18 . Neville Brown, Strategic Mobility, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963) p.9!-
19 Hewins, A Golden Dream, p.287.
20• COS (61) 378, Report by the Commander-in-Chief Middle East on
in Support of the State of Kuwait in July 1961, 18 October 1961; DEFE
(62) 58, Examination of the C-in-C's Report, 15 February 1962; DEFE 5/124







most recent British assessment of the Iraqi threat, dated 12 June 1961,
stated that it was unlikely that Iraq would risk an attack on Kuwait and
that for political reasons an attack would probably be preceded by an
attempted insurrection. 22 On 26 June, within a week of Sheikh
Abdullah becoming a fully sovereign ruler, the Iraqi leader, General
Kassim, publicly claimed that Kuwait was a part of Iraq and that the
Sheikh was the Governor of the Kuwait district of Iraq. Kassim
rejected the new British Treaty with Kuwait but stopped short of
issuing an ultimatum or threatening annexation. 23 In Britain this was
perceived as a prelude to an Iraqi attack. At this critical moment a
reassessment showed that the Iraqi forces already in the Basra region
were adequate to seize Kuwait and that they would probably not wait
for armour from Baghdad before launching an attack.24
In response to the perceived threat, on 28 June Rear-Admiral Fitzroy-
Talbot, Flag Officer Middle East (FOME) based at HMS Jufair in
Bahrain, ordered the commando carrier HMS Bulwark to proceed
directly from Karachi to Kuwait. In Aden, HQ Middle East
Command ordered all forces for Vantage to be brought to the
required state of readiness and the staffs in Aden began promulgating
the necessary amendments to movement tables. Bulwark , with 42
Commando embarked, had been on passage to the Persian Gulf to
conduct hot weather trials and was not part of the forces committed to
Vantage. The ship was deployed to the region to be available in case
of conflict between Kuwait and Iraq. 25 During the night of 28/29
June an assessment received from the British Military Attaché in
Baghdad concluded that Kassim was probably preparing "crash
action".26 At that time British forces within Middle East Command
consisted of:
Royal Navy
The frigates Loch Alvie at Bahrain, Loch Ruthven in East African
waters and Loch Fyne in dock at Karachi. The AW Squadron,
consisting of HMS Meon, HMS Striker and the LCTs Redoubt, Bastion
22. COS (61) 378.
23. Hewins, Golden Dream, p.285.
24. COS (61) 378.
25. Interview with Captain R.D.Franks.
26. Ibid. Unless otherwise stated the following discussion of Operation Vantage is based on the C-
in-C's report (COS (61) 378) and on Air Chief Marshal Sir David Lee, Flight from the Middle
East. A history of the Royal Air Force in the Arabian Peninsula and adjacent
territories 1945-1962, (London: HMSO, 1980) chapter 9.
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and Parapet, was at Bahrain. The LST(A) Striker had embarked a
half squadron of 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards)
equipped with Centurion tanks. By chance Striker was due to be
relieved on 4 July by the WD LST Empire Gull which was already in
the Gulf with a further half squadron of 3rd Carabiniers, preparing
for the handover. In addition to these ships and craft there was HMS
Bulwark which had already been ordered to Kuwait.
Army
The 11th Hussars and 3rd Carabiniers were stationed in Aden. Two
companies of the 2nd Battalion, Coldstream Guards were at Bahrain
as the normal internal security detachment, 'while HQ 24 Brigade with
the 1st Battalion, the King's Regiment and the 1st Battalion, The Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers was in Kenya. Although outside the command,
the Parachute Regiment was based at Cyprus. In addition 45
Commando was in Aden.
Royal Air Force
Numbers 8 and 208 Hunter Squadrons were at Aden and Nairobi
respectively. No.37 Squadron consisting of four Shackletons was
based in Aden. Air Forces, Middle East had a medium range
transport force of 12 Beverleys and six Valletas and a short range
transport force comprising five Pembrokes and 16 Twin Pioneers.
Heavy equipment was stockpiled in Kuwait and Bahrain. At Kuwait
eight Centurion tanks and ammunition were stockpiled for British use.
At Bahrain the much larger stockpile included armoured cars and
vehicles, aircraft equipment, guns and ammunition, tents, rations and
stores of all varieties, sufficient to meet the immediate needs of
British forces deployed in Kuwait. The majority of the stores
required to build up and maintain forces in Kuwait were held at Aden.
Following the discouraging news from Baghdad, HQ Middle East
Command ordered further preparatory moves. HMS Meon and
Striker were ordered to sail to Kuwait but to remain out of site of
land. Crews for the tanks on board the Empire Gull were ordered to
proceed to Bahrain as soon as possible. No.208 Squadron flew from
Nairobi to Bahrain where it was joined by No.8 Squadron, the
Tactical Air Commander and Tactical Wing HQ. From Bahrain the
Hunters were in a position to give limited air cover over Kuwait.
Two Shackletons of No.37 Squadron were also deployed at Bahrain in
order to provide a night reconnaissance capability. The Bahrain
'
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stockpile and emergency camps at Aden and Bahrain were activated.
Further afield, the Ministry of Defence ordered the aircraft carrier,
HMS Centaur , to sail from Gibraltar to the eastern Mediterranean.
Another carrier, HMS Hermes , sailed from the United Kingdom but
did not proceed beyond Gibraltar. The Ministry ordered a Canberra
squadron to redeploy from Germany to Sharjah, two battalions of 24
Brigade to move to the concentration area and 29 Field Regiment
Royal Artillery, less one battery, to be brought to strength in the
United Kingdom. Middle East Command was informed that the
carrier, HMS Victorious , which had been en route to Hong Kong, had
been ordered to Bahrain and was expected to arrive on 8 July.
On 30 June Sheikh Abdullah formally requested British intervention
and that evening Air Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy, Commander-in-
Chief, Middle East Command, was instructed to implement Vantage.
Elworthy considered that as an Iraqi attack seemed imminent it was
important to get as many fighting "teeth" forces into Kuwait as soon
as possible, if necessary at the expense of building up balanced forces.
Elworthy hoped to have a force comprising two battalions of infantry,
a squadron of tanks, an armoured car squadron and two squadrons of
Hunters established in Kuwait by dawn on 2 July. An unexpected, but
not unforeseeable, difficulty presented itself. Both Turkey and Sudan
refused to allow RAF aircraft carrying troops for Kuwait to overfly
their territory. Neither country had previously had any objections to
the overflight of RAF aircraft and Turkey was formally allied to
Britain through NATO. Elworthy was informed of the ban during
the night of 30 June11 July. The immediate consequence was that the
Parachute Regiment could not deploy from Cyprus to Kuwait via
Turkey (and Iran). The amphibious ships assembling off Kuwait were
not subject to the political sensibilities of neighbouring states. The
only troops that Elworthy could guarantee to have in Kuwait
throughout 1 July were 42 Commando from Bulwark and the half
squadron of tanks embarked in Striker.
The helicopters of 848 Squadron landed the first Commandos from
Bulwark at Kuwait New Airport shortly after 09.00 on 1 July. Poor
visibility made this task difficult but high winds enabled the
helicopters to embark full loads while the ship was at anchor. The
helicopters were immediately followed by ten Hunter fighters of No.8
Squadron which landed at Kuwait New Airfield and assumed
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immediate readiness. Soon afterwards a Beverley brought in the
Tactical Air Commander, the Wing Leader and the necessary RAF
ground crews and other personnel. The landing of tanks from HMS
Striker was hampered by the fact that the previous week the
designated landing "hard" had been demolished. An alternative
landing site was found but, as it was not suitable for the LST to beach,
Striker had to discharge its load by Rhino ferry.
Five Britannias, originally intended to lift a parachute battalion from
Cyprus, were flown to Aden via the El Adem-Nairobi-Aden route,
carrying RAF personnel and a Parachute Regiment Light Battery. It
was decided that in order to get as many troops as possible into
Kuwait to support the amphibious forces, 45 Commando, 11th Hussars
and the two companies of Coldstream Guards at Bahrain should be
given the highest priority. British forces in Kuwait by the end of 1
July consisted of only 42 Commando, the half squadron of tanks
landed by Striker , two companies of Coldstream Guards brought
forward by air from Bahrain and a Royal Marine Platoon from the
frigate HMS Loch Alvie which was offshore alongside Bulwark and
Meon . The air contingent consisted of No.8 Squadron and a
detachment of Twin Pioneers. By nightfall troops had begun to
deploy along the Mutla Ridge, a defensive 'feature to the northwest of
Kuwait City already occupied by Kuwaiti troops. These forces were
hardly of sufficient strength to repulse a determined Iraqi attack.
Poor visibility caused by blowing sand precluded air reconnaissance
by Hunters and Canberras and would have ruled out any ground attack
missions. Reconnaissance flights were flown by Twin Pioneers and
Kuwaiti Austers.
During the afternoon of 1 July Elworthy was informed that both
Turkey and Sudan had agreed to lift the overflight restrictions.
However, the former was only prepared to allow flights by night.
Turkey withdrew this permission after 4 July when news that this
route was being used leaked out. The restriction to night flying
caused difficulties and delay but was certainly better than nothing.
The result of the loosening of restrictions was that Transport
Command aircraft began to arrive in Middle East Command in
adequate and then later in ample numbers. By 4 July Transport
Command had committed 14 Britannias, 12 Beverleys and 27 Hastings
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to Vantage . These supplemented the 12 Beverleys and six Valletas of
the AFME force.
According to Elworthy, in these initial stages his plan was to:
deploy two battalions along the Mutla Ridge,
supported by British and Kuwaiti tanks and artillery,
to hold a further battalion with a squadron of British
tanks as a counter-attack force, to keep a fourth
battalion in Kuwait Town as a mobile reserve, with a
fifth in Bahrain. The screen between the Ridge and
the frontier was to be provided by British and Kuwaiti
armoured cars.
This land force was to be supported by two squadrons of Hunters and
the Twin Pioneers at Kuwait New Airfield, the Canberra squadron at
Sharjah and the Shackletons at Bahrain.
45 Commando began to arrive on 2 July, completing the move from
Aden the next day. On 2 July the Parachute Light Battery arrived,
less mortars and vehicles, as did a squadron from the 11th Hussars.
HMS Bastion and Redoubt landed equipment, stores, ammunition and
armoured cars from Bahrain. The half squadron of tanks was landed
from Empire Gull. The following day 2nd Parachute Battalion began
to arrive by air and the crews for the stockpiled tanks arrived. The
build up was not complete until 9 July, by which time there were
4,112 Army personnel, 596 RAF personnel and 960 Royal Marines
ashore. This military force was under the tactical command of
Brigadier D.G.T.Horsford, officer commanding 24 Brigade. With
the arrival of the 24th Brigade by air, the two Commandos were able
to fall back from the Ridge and form a reserve. The Coldstream
Guards returned to their internal security duties at Bahrain on 6 July.
Naval forces played a key part in Operation Vantage. The helicopter
landed Commando of HMS Bulwark was the only complete unit in
Kuwait until the early hours of 3 July, when 45 Commando completed
its airlift from Aden. Prior to 3 July, when the crews for the tanks
stockpiled in Kuwait arrived, the only British tanks in Kuwait were
those landed by Striker and Empire Gull. After landing their tanks
these two LSTs joined the three LCT(8)s of the AW Squadron and the
WD LSTs, Empire Grebe and Empire Skua , in lifting personnel and
equipment from Persian Gulf bases to Kuwait. In the absence of
normal RAF/Army facilities the LSH(S), HMS Meon , played a vital
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role, acting as a communications link between the Army in Kuwait
and Bahrain. The frigate, Loch Alvie , acted as Naval Gunfire
Support Ship, despite the inadequacy of its armament for this role.
This was a particularly useful role as the Army had no artillery in
Kuwait. At night the frigate undertook anti-MTB/Dhow patrols
across the Shatt el Arab to stop any Iraqi seaborne attacks. After
landing her Commando and its transport, Bulwark remained off
Kuwait in administrative support of the Commando. As a fully air
conditioned ship, Bulwark was used to provide 24 hours rest and
recuperation for parties of 200 men at a time, enabling them to "sleep
in air-conditioned spaces, have their laundry done, and generally refit
themselves".
The frigates, Loch Fyne and Loch Ruthven , arrived off Kuwait on 5
and 7 July respectively. The aircraft carrier HMS Victorious arrived
on 9 July with the frigate Lincoln and destroyer Cassandra. Further
Naval reinforcements for the Gulf included HMS Centaur, which
arrived off Kuwait on 31 July. to relieve Victorious. The destroyers
Camperdown, Finisterre and Saintes and the LST Messina
accompanied Centaur to the Gulf. The frigate Loch Insch was
brought forward from the Mediterranean and the frigates Llandaff
and Yarmouth were sent from the Indian Ocean to the region. 27 The
108th Minesweeping Squadron sailed from Malta, arriving in the
Persian Gulf on 21 July.28
Elworthy had always planned to command Vantage from Bahrain
rather than Aden. This had a dual advantage. Firstly, the closer
proximity to Kuwait cut the communications load between the Gulf
and HQ Middle East in Aden. Secondly, it allowed him to co-operate
with the Political Resident, Persian Gulf. The location of FOME and
the Military Committee, Persian Gulf at Bahrain offered a ready made
nucleus for an operational headquarters. Elworthy moved to Bahrain
with a small secretariat on 2 July, accompanied by Major-General
Robertson (GOC). Air Vice-Marshal Lee (AOC) remained in Aden
until 5 July to ensure that the air lift went smoothly. HMS Jufair was
27 • Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.248. ADM 53/155427, HMS Centaur, Ship's Log.
ADM 53/156513, HMS Saintes, Ship's Log. ADM 53/155339, HMS Camperdown,
Ships' Log. ADM 53/15571, HMS Finisterre, Ship's Log. ADM 53/156858, HMS
Victorious, Ship's Log. ADM 53/156061, HMS Llandaff, Ship's Log. ADM
53/157032, HMS Yarmouth, Ship's Log. ADM 53/156095, HMS Loch Insch, Ship's
Log.
28 . COS (61) 378.
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placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief and a small joint
headquarters was established to control the whole operation. A Joint
Operations Centre was set up in Bahrain but only operated as an
information centre. Tactical command was exercised in Kuwait by
Brigadier Horsford and Air Commodore Beresford. Captain Franks
in Bulwark was the Naval Force Commander until the arrival of
Victorious with a flag officer on board. Captain AW Squadron was
Senior Naval Officer Kuwait and as such 'supervised the running of
the port. The command system worked well. The Commander-in-
Chief and his three subordinates were close enough to Kuwait to allow
for daily visits, in order to keep in touch with events while still
operating from a centre with superior communications to Aden and
London. Such difficulties as arose were largely the result of the
inadequate communications facilities rather than the command
organisation.
Communications facilities between Kuwait and Bahrain, and between
the Persian Gulf and Aden and London had been overloaded.
According to the AOC at the time, it had long been known within the
Command that communications facilities throughout the Arabian
Peninsula were inadequate and that in the event of Vantage they
would be severely tested. Even in the preparatory stages of the
operation, the communications system became overloaded as signals
were issued with unnecessarily high precedence in an endeavour to get
them through. A semblance of control was maintained by the
introduction of an emergency censorship procedure known as
Minimise but the situation was such that Air Vice Marshal Lee had to
resort to sending bundles of Immediate signals to Bahrain from Aden
by special aircraft. In Kuwait the climatic conditions allied to
blowing sands did much to degrade battlefield communications.
Unserviceability of radio sets was not helped by the fact that many had
been stored in Bahrain in unsuitable conditions. Differences in
equipment and procedures between the three Services caused further
difficulties and called for a measure of improvisation. The role of
HMS Meon as a Communications Relay Ship between Kuwait and
Bahrain was a vital one.29
'
29 . Lee, Flight from the Middle East, p.180-182.
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The operation was disadvantaged from the outset as Vantage was
essentially outdated. A revised concept was in the course of
preparation when the crisis broke. The new plan, Bellringer, was not
due to come into effect until September 1961 and there were a
number of discrepancies between Vantage and existing operational
instructions and arrangements made in anticipation of Bellringer. 
Air Marshal Elworthy considered that had Bellringer been in force,
the mounting of the operation would have been less complicated. In
fact, the operation as mounted was closer to Bellringer than Vantage.
In his report to the COS, Elworthy concluded that once a plan was no
longer considered to be the best to meet requirements, a new one with
complementary operational instructions should be issued as quickly as
possible.
The situation regarding air defence was particularly worrying. Prior
to the crisis Kuwait possessed no radar. The only transportable RAF
radar that existed in the theatre was a Type Sc 787. This was a light
weight equipment which had limited performance, lacking a height
finding capability. This equipment was flown forward from Bahrain
at an early stage and manned by an operating crew from the United
Kingdom. The equipment was pressed into service before its planned
date and before essential test equipment had arrived. Not
surprisingly, difficulty was experienced in bringing it to operational
standards and the radar did not become fully operational until 18 July.
From 1 July RAF Hunters operating from Kuwait offered a limited
daylight air defence capability, directed by HMS Bulwark's radar.
Bulwark could provide early warning out to 80 miles. A full air
defence capability was not achieved until HMS Victorious began
operations on 10 July. In the opinion of Air Marshal Lee, prior to the
arrival of Victorious the problem of air defence "could have posed
almost insuperable problems for the two Hunter Squadrons" .30
Victorious' s complement of Sea Vixens directed by the ship's Type
984 3-D radar "provided for the first time a reasonably sophisticated
day and night air defence for the forces in Kuwait". 31 The ship's
Scimitars complemented the RAF Hunters in the ground attack role,
although lack of wind in the Gulf meant that they could not take off
carrying long range fuel tanks and this limited their time over the
30 • Ibid. p.180.
31 . COS (61) 378.
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operational area to about twelve minutes. Due to dust conditions
ashore, the Type 984 radar proved not to be effective over land and
so an air defence frigate was stationed closer inshore to provide cover
with its Type 960 radar, which gave "excellent cover" •32
The forces in Kuwait were heavily dependent on air support in order
to offset their lack of artillery or anti-tank weapons. This air support
was to be provided by RAF Hunters and Canberras and Royal Navy
Scimitars. Unfortunately, conditions in Kuwait made the operation of
aircraft extremely difficult. Air Marshal Elworthy acknowledged in
his report that the effectiveness of ground attack aircraft would have
been severely limited by the poor visibility experienced in the early
days of June. 33 While it is true that Iraqi aircraft would also have
been affected by these conditions the Iraqis were not so dependent on
air support as their potential enemies. Without close air support, the
lightly armed troops defending the Mutla Ridge would have had little
with which to disperse enemy concentrations of armour.
The delays caused by the overflight restrictions imposed by Turkey
and Sudan confirmed the existence of a Middle East "air barrier". It
showed the fallacy of the belief that a strategic reserve could be held
in Britain and airlifted to trouble spots by the long range aircraft of
Transport Command. As Elworthy concluded, for air reinforcement
to be viable either sufficient aircraft would have to be stationed either
side of the barrier, or Britain would have to resort to deliberate
overflight without permission. For Vantage Transport Command had
eventually proven equal to the task in hand. However, the required
lift had only been achieved with the load of three Royal Rhodesian Air
Force Canadairs and the charter of 17 civil airliners.34
One problem associated with air transported troops was that of heat
exhaustion. Contemporary commentators laid great stress on the fact
that troops airlifted from outside the Persian Gulf and Aden suffered
from higher incidents of heat exhaustion. than acclimatised troops
already deployed in the region. Phillip Darby quotes a report by the
Army's Operational Research Establishment which showed that
although heat casualties were negligible amongst men already
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Darby, British Defence Policy, p.247.
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stationed in Aden and the Persian Gulf, they increased appreciably for
troops transported forward from Kenya and Cyprus. Reportedly,
some ten per cent of troops transported directly from Britain to the
Persian Gulf were out of action due to heat disorders within the first
day. 35 Elworthy considered that the incidence of heat exhaustion was
greatly exaggerated by the Press. He reported that all cases in hospital
during this period were mild. 36 Sir David Lee agreed that the
incidence of heat exhaustion was exaggerated by the Press at the time.
He recalls the usual cure for heat exhaustion being a few hours in an
air conditioned room and liberal doses of salt. 37 Operation Vantage
highlighted the difficulties of conducting operations in extreme
climates without fully acclimatised troops. Had soldiers and airmen
been exposed to the rigours of actual combat one must assume that
problems with the heat would have been exacerbated.
A strong naval force was eventually concentrated within Middle East
Command. However, it took some time to assemble. Air Marshal
Elworthy considered that had hostilities broken out, a decision would
probably have been reached before all reinforcing ships reached the
Gulf. Under Vantage , the reinforcement of a carrier group from the
Far East was envisaged. It was ten days after the initial landing
before HMS Victorious arrived with her escorts. The need to sail at
22 knots to preserve fuel and to enable the slow frigate HMS Lincoln
to keep up delayed the arrival of these ships. 38 There was only one
escort with Bulwark until the arrival of Loch Fyne on 5 July. This
was inadequate to deal fully with the threat from Iraqi MTBs and thus
Bulwark was forced to withdraw southward each night. The
minesweeping force was particularly slow to arrive. No
minesweeping resources were held in the Gulf. The presence of the
AW Squadron had been planned to cater for precisely such an
emergency, but it was sheer luck that Empire Gull was in the Gulf
when the crisis broke.
As an exercise in foreign policy Operation Vantage was a great
success. Five years after the debacle over Suez Britain had
demonstrated an ability to intervene rapidly in support of a friend and
35. Ibid. 248. Hewins, Golden Dream, p.297.
36. COS (61) 378.
37. Lee, Flight from the Middle East, p.182-183
38 • Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.248.
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ally. The Iraqis were seen to be deterred. Even if General Kassim
had had no intention of intervening in Kuwait, and there is no
evidence that he did, Britain had demonstrated a firm resolve to
defend its interests in the region. The operation demonstrated the
value of amphibious capabilities as a potent deterrent to hostile
military action and provided a chance to truly test the new
seaborne/airborne concept. Captain Franks, commander of HMS
Bulwark, was glad of the opportunity to demonstrate the utility of his
ship:
I could not be more grateful to General Kassim; the
operation was tailor made to our requirements. The
whole concept of the commando ship and our eighteen
months of intensive training was proved to be exactly
what was required. We were able to put a small but
efficient unit down in the right place at the right time
and support it with all its requirements, which
undoubtedly helped to souse this particular brush
-fire .39
The Minister of Defence saw the operation as a vindication of his
support for amphibious capabilities.40 At a meeting of the Cabinet on
3 July he stressed the role that amphibious forces played in Operation
Vantage , telling his colleagues that:
The operation had demonstrated both the value of
amphibious forces in providing military assistance at
relatively short notice and the political difficulties
which might be expected in obtaining overflying
rights, even from allies, when there was a risk of
actual hostilities.41
Despite the apparent success of the operation, in many respects it was
fortunate that no Iraqi attack materialised.. During the first few days
of Vantage the forces deployed within Kuwait cannot be considered
sufficient to have repelled any serious assault. Not until ten days after
the initial landings was there a sophisticated air defence capability
available. The troops ashore had no artillery or anti-tank weapons
and did not complete their build up until 9 July, nine days after
Britain received the request for intervention. This represented a
considerable improvement on the response time for Operation
39. R.D.F [R.D.Franks], "Kuwait", in Naval Review, Volume 50, 1962. p.39-42.
40. Watkinson, Turning Points, p.134-135.
41 • CC (61) 38th Conclusions, Cabinet meeting held on 3 July 1961; CAB 128/35 (part one).
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Musketeer but would hardly have been adequate to deal with a rapid
and determined Iraqi thrust into Kuwait. In addition the forces for
Musketeer had to prepare for an opposed landing. In July 1961
Vantage represented a build-up operation rather than an assault. In
his official report Air Marshal Elworthy. acknowledged that the
response to any future threat would have to be much quicker.
The JPS examined Elworthy's report and their subsequent report was
endorsed by the COS on 16 January 1962. 42 The JPS supported most
of Elworthy's conclusions. In particular, they stressed the need to
either station sufficient aircraft on the appropriate sides of any air
barrier or accept the need to overfly without permission. Both the
JPS and the COS agreed that for Vantage air transport had performed
well. The JPS echoed Elworthy in requesting the provision of suitable
air-transportable anti-tank weapons for the Army and effective air
transportable radar. They concluded that:
Operations Vantage was 	  a success in that its
political objective, to deter an Iraqi attack on Kuwait,
was achieved. It was also highly successful as a
military exercise in that it fully tested, under
operational conditions, our capability to concentrate an
effective military force over considerable distances in a
very short time. At the same time certain logistic
weaknesses were disclosed which could have proven
serious if fighting had started.43
In particular, the JPS were concerned that no artillery had been
available within Kuwait until 4 July when the move of the Parachute
Light Battery was completed. They noted that this deficiency would
not have arisen had Bulwark been provided with its own artillery
contingent. Nevertheless the COS approved the concluding remarks
of the JPS that:
The success of this operation supports our current
seaborne/airborne concept of limited war operations,
in which full advantage is taken of the flexibility
provided by both sea and air transport.44
•
The Royal Navy had played a leading part in this success. The first
British troops and tanks ashore had been landed from the sea. The
42. COS (62) 58. COS (62) 5 mtg, 16 January 1962; DEFE 4/142.
43. COS (62) 58.
44. COS (62) 58. COS (62) 5 mtg.
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Navy provided radar cover and artillery support when none could be
provided ashore. HMS Meon provided a vital communications link
between Bahrain and Kuwait. It was not until the arrival of HMS
Victorious that the air defence situation became adequate. Like
Musketeer, Vantage demonstrated the central role of the aircraft
carrier in limited war operations. A naval Commander-in-Chief
might have stressed this point more strongly in his official report.
The RAF could take comfort from the acknowledgements of the role
of Transport Command and air transported forces. The cooperation
of the Navy and RAF during Vantage , in conjunction with the Army,
had shown the viability of the seaborne/airborne concept. Both
Services could feel confident that their intervention capabilities would
improve with the introduction of new equipment. Unfortunately, the
development of these capabilities was to be the cause of conflict and
not cooperation. This reflected the differing priorities that the
Services gave to the development of national strategy compared with
the preservation of their own capabilities.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE SIXTIES
Harold Macmillan's famous "Winds of Change" speech, delivered in
Cape Town in February 1960, heralded a rapid process of British
decolonisation in Africa. It did not indicate any desire for Britain to
relinquish its world role. The Conservative government remained
committed to the deployment of military forces outside Europe,
particularly in the Indian Ocean region. In 1963 the Labour front
bench reversed previous policy and accepted the world role and the
commitment of forces east of Suez.' Operation Musketeer had shown
that military bases overseas were often unavailable for use in a crisis.
Libya, Jordan and Ceylon had all refused to allow Britain to use bases
in their countries for operations against Egypt. The continuing
withdrawal from Empire meant that Britain could not rely on the
existing string of sovereign bases forever. By developing a modern
amphibious capability, the Admiralty hoped to offer Britain the ability
to deploy flexible military forces across the Indian Ocean with
minimum reliance on overseas bases. The Air Ministry hoped to do
the same by relying on air-transport and land based airpower,
deployed from a limited number of island bases. A rivalry developed
between the two Services as both sought acceptance for their own
concepts of overseas intervention, and thus gain funding for their
favoured projects. Although the RAF had not opposed Admiralty
plans to expand their amphibious capabilities, the decision of the
Admiralty to push for a new generation of aircraft carriers, built
primarily for operations east of Suez, brought the Air Ministry into
open opposition as the two Services competed for limited funding.
In 1960 the COS undertook a study of Military Strategy for
Circumstances Short of Global War based on the conclusions of the
Brook Committee on Future Policy. The conclusions of the study
were discussed by the Chiefs and the Defence Committee and formed
the basis for a later paper entitled "British Strategy in the Sixties" .
This COS report on strategy short of global war was based upon
1. Darby, British Defence Policy, p.215.
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political and financial assumptions, and general objectives laid down
by the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. Macmillan directed that
Britain would have to rely on all-regular forces of about 390,000 to
400,000 men. Annual overseas defence expenditure (excluding
Germany) was to be reduced as soon as possible by £35 million.
Britain would maintain an independent nuclear deterrent. He
acknowledged that the tenure of overseas bases and facilities could not
be relied upon and that similarly, increasing difficulty must be
expected in securing staging and overflying rights from unsympathetic
governments .2
Based upon the Prime Minister's directive the following criteria were
adopted for strategy short of global war:
1. land forces would nowhere be engaged on a scale
greater initially than a reinforced brigade group.
2. no major operation (up to brigade group level)
would be undertaken in more than one theatre at a
time, and not more often than once in a period of two
years in any one theatre.
3. any period of intense fighting was unlikely to be
prolonged, possibly a matter of weeks rather than
months.
The final criteria had a direct bearing on amphibious warfare and
deserves full quotation:
The circumstances in which our forces might have to
intervene could vary from occasions when points of
entry, and possibly local facilities, would be available
to us to occasions when the points of entry would be
in hostile hands, requiring us to face opposition to
establish ourselves. We do not, however, believe that
we would, at least without allies, attempt to intervene
in the face of heavy opposition requiring us to mount a
full-scale assault.3
Independent assault operations against heavy opposition were
therefore discounted, although the requirement to be able to land on a
hostile shore remained.
2• COS (62) 1, British Strategy in the Sixties, remains closed to the public. However, it is
possible to gain much of the information contained in this document from other sources, notably
DEFE 7/2231, DEFE 7/2234 and DEFE 7/2235. For Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of
Global War see PREM 11/2946.
3 . COS (61) 499, 20 December 1961, digest report of COS (62) 1; DEFE 7/2235. COS (62) 49, 31
January 1961, digest of COS (62) 1; DEFE 7/2235.
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In May 1961 an Admiralty presentation was arranged at the request of
the Minister of Defence to outline the shape and cost of the Navy
under the following circumstances: if Britain retained its current
bases; if the Navy ceased to have an operational role east of Suez; and
if the role east of Suez remained but no bases were available except
those in Australia. Three alternative fleets were outlined, Fleets A,B
and C respectively. Under Fleet A the Navy remained as currently
projected, with four aircraft carriers (with three air groups), two
commando carriers and two assault ships. Aircraft carriers were
central to this fleet and it was considered that future carriers would
have to be of about 50,000 tons in order to enable them to operate
high performance super-sonic aircraft. It was accepted that there
would be no role for aircraft carriers or amphibious ships in Fleet B
and that the large carriers would not need replacing. The case for
Fleet C offered the most demanding challenge to the Navy. With no
bases east of Suez except Australia, the Admiralty proposed to deploy
military strength from a Joint Services Seaborne Force. This force
would be able to put ashore a balanced brigade group, against
opposition if necessary. In order to ensure the permanent availability
of the military force, two powerful amphibious groups would be
required. This "Double Stance" approach would require a total of
four commando carriers and four assault ships, two each to each of
the amphibious groups. By rotating these ships a strong military force
could be poised off a trouble spot almost indefinitely. In order to
support these amphibious groups a total of six aircraft carriers were
required, with four air groups ensuring the constant availability of
two strike carriers to each amphibious group. The combination of
strong military forces and powerful airgroups would give Britain the
capability to bring pressure to bear in most conceivable trouble spots.4
In his concluding remarks the 1SL, Admiral Caspar John, was at pains
to stress that the Joint Services Seaborne Force was an inter-Service
concept and that he was not trying to claim that the Navy could "go it
alone". He wanted to develop a partnership with the other Services.
In particular, he emphasised that he considered that sea and land based
4 . Presentation of Alternative Long Term Naval Programme, 17 May 1961; ADM
205/192.
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air were complementary. He did not claim Britain could do without
bases east of Suez but rather was trying to show that a seaborne
strategy offered the means of making do with a reduced number.5
The COS study British Strategy in the Sixties , completed by the end
of 1961, anticipated that Britain's major military role in the 1960s
would be intervention in trouble spots in Africa and Asia. 6
 The COS
continued to believe that war in Europe was unlikely. 7 In order to
make up for a likely reduction in overseas bases, forces would have to
be flexible and mobile. West of Suez it was not intended to provide
forces locally to meet possible operational commitments. Footholds
would be maintained in the Mediterranean and Caribbean and
reinforced from the United Kingdom as necessary. East of Suez
reliance was placed primarily on theatre forces based at Singapore and
the Persian Gulf. These forces would be capable of mutual
reinforcement. For this purpose a fully effective Amphibious Group
was to be provided. In order to ensure constant availability of the
required shipping, and to maintain a tank force permanently poised at
sea ready to intervene in Kuwait, it was recommended that both
commando carriers and the two new assault ships should be
maintained in commission east of Suez. The "double stance" strategy
of two large amphibious task forces, each capable of mounting major
operations, was considered the most desirable strategy for the next
decade in view of the uncertain tenure of many of Britain's bases.
Unfortunately, it was deemed to be beyond available resources. No
specialist amphibious capability was required in the West.8
The "double stance" would have provided an effective, constantly
available intervention force. Under this strategy an amphibious
brigade group could be held off a trouble spot indefinitely. The
combination of amphibious troops and carrier borne airpower would
have been a very potent one. Had the "double stance" strategy been
adopted it would have represented a new and very powerful capability
for the Royal Navy. However, despite being accepted as the most
desirable strategy for the future its expense ruled it out. With limited
5. Ibid.
6. DEFE 7/2235.
7. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.249.
8. COS (61) 499. D (61) 1 mtg, 12 January 1962; CAB 131/27.
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resources available to the defence budget, expensive ideal solutions
were unlikely to be adopted.
The 1962 Defence White Paper reflected the decisions reached in
British Strategy in the Sixties and enunciated the new concept of
operations. The replacement of AWHQ and the Land/Air Warfare
Committee by the Joint Warfare Committee was announced. The
paper stated that:
We must insure against the loss of fixed installations
overseas by keeping men and heavy equipment afloat,
and by increasing the air and sea portability of the
Strategic Reserve.
A fully effective joint Services amphibious task force was to be
permanently maintained east of Suez for cold and limited war
purposes. Amphibious warfare was now a central part of British
strategy. 9 The Naval Estimates placed an even greater emphasis on
amphibious capability which was identified as being at the centre of
the balanced fleet. The primary role of the Royal Navy was now the
conduct of amphibious operations in limited war:
The commando ships and the assault ships put ashore
the spearhead of the land forces with their guns, tanks
and vehicles. The aircraft carriers provide
reconnaissance and tactical strike ahead of the landing;
air defence for the seaborne force; and close support
for the troops ashore - especially when this cannot be
done, either adequately or at all, by land-based aircraft.
Cruisers and escorts reinforce the air and anti-
submarine cover, direct our aircraft and give warning
of the enemy's and use their guns for bombardment if
required. Submarines provide additional protection
against hostile submarines and carry out
reconnaissance and minelaying. The minesweepers
clear a way to the land. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary
tankers and store ships keep the whole seaborne force
supplied. 10
Admiralty enthusiasm for amphibious warfare is understandable. The
great advantage of amphibious warfare for the Royal Navy was that in
order to support an amphibious task force the full range of naval
capabilities were required. Amphibious warfare capabilities justified
9 . Statement on Defence 1962: The Next Five Years; Cmnd 1639.
1 °• Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates 1962-1963; Cmnd 1629.
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the maintenance of a large balanced fleet equally suited to operations
against Soviet ships and submarines in the North Atlantic or limited
war activities in the Indian Ocean. The 1962 Naval Estimates made no
mention of any other role.
The Royal Marines had an important place in the new amphibious
Navy. In 1956 the Way Ahead Committee had investigated the future
of the Royal Marines. Consideration was given to proposals to
abandon the Corps or to transfer it wholesale to the Army. These
proposals were rejected. The Committee, calculating that there was a
future for the Corps within the Royal Navy, directed the CGRM to
make proposals on the future role, function and size of the Royal
Marines. These proposals were endorsed by the Committee and
accepted by the full Board of Admiralty in December 1961." The
CGRM recommended that the role of the Marines should remain
basically unchanged, the provision of: detachments to serve in HM
Ships; Royal Marine Commandos; landing craft crews and special boat
units; personnel for such other services as the Board of Admiralty
may require; and bands for HM Fleets and certain Marine and Naval
shore establishments. He considered that by reorganising the Corps in
the United Kingdom a fourth Commando could be raised without
increasing the total manpower requirement. A brigade of two
Commandos plus the brigade headquarters would then be deployed
overseas, with two Commandos at home. Total manpower under the
88,000 man fleet would stand at 8,366, a reduction of 1,620 on the
existing figure.12
In 1957 Sandys directed that the long term naval manpower
requirement should include no less than 5,000 men employed on
military and Commando purposes. This was a natural response to the
Navy's increasing responsibilities in limited war. Sandys was also
motivated by a desire to relieve the pressure on the Army which, with
the decision to abandon National Service, was expected to experience
recruitment problems. It was in these terms that he justified the
increase in Naval manpower from 80,000 to 88,000:
11.Board Minute 5071; ADM 167/146.
12. Memo B.1117; ADM 167/146.
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The primary justification for raising the ceiling of the
Navy and the marines is to provide additional military
power to help in Imperial policing, internal security
duties and limited war operations, in the event of the
Army being unable to fully meet all its commitments13
In a similar manner, Harold Watkinson justified the requirement for
improved amphibious lift on the grounds that he needed the extra
mobility this would provide to counter balance the failings of Army
recruitment. 14 The War Office was somewhat nonplussed by this
attitude. The Army were quick to point out that there was no
suggestion that they would fail to recruit satisfactorily for teeth arms.
The recruiting problems would hit the supply and logistics
organisation. The concept of using Royal Marines to replace Army
units was thus misguided, as the Marines could only replace that type
of unit which the Army was likely to have in sufficient strength
anyway. 15 The Army suspected the Admiralty of seeking to build up
the Royal Marines at their expense. In June 1957 the CIGS Sir Gerald
Templer wrote to Mountbatten outlining the feeling of suspicion that
had arisen over the issue. Noting the proposals that Royal Marines
should be used in the place of Army units he wrote:
A feeling has sprung up, which, though it may be
wrong, is there nevertheless, that this idea has perhaps
been fostered by the Admiralty and that in consequence
the Army will suffer greater damage and further loss of
traditional units.16
One advantage of these fears was that they caused the Army to support
the view that the Marines should be used primarily as a mobile
amphibious force, and not be tied down in static garrison duties.17
The Royal Marines entirely agreed with this view. Anticipating no
recruitment problems they were now planning on the basis of two
Commando brigades. One brigade, consisting of a headquarters and
three Commandos, would be based overseas, with the second brigade
of two Commandos and a headquarters stationed in the United
13 . D (57) 28, 14 November 1957, memo by Minister of Defence; CAB 131/18.
14 • See chapter six, page 191-192.
15. WO 216/927.
16. Folio 2; ADM 205/115.
17. WO 216/927.
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Kingdom as part of the strategic reserve. 18 In 1958 the Admiralty
presented their plans for the future deployment of the Commandos to
the COS.'9 They outlined the Royal Marine proposals for two
Commando brigades. Under the plan a fourth Commando would
begin to form in April 1960, and the fifth in December 1962. With
two Commandos in the UK, one Commando would be stationed with
the AW Squadron, at this time still in the Mediterranean, while the
remaining two Commandos would be linked to HMS Bulwark and
stationed east of Suez. The Admiralty considered that a force of less
than two Commandos would not give sufficient operational capability
to justify the expense of the commando carrier. 20 The COS approved
these plans in October 1958. 21 With recruitment buoyant, 41
Commando was raised in 1960, and 43 Commando was raised in
1961.22
By the 1960s the position of the Commando forces had changed. They
were no longer intended primarily as raiding forces for use in major
war. Although the Commandos retained responsibility for amphibious
raiding, they now had an important role to play in limited war and
cold war operations outside Europe. This called for some alteration
in the composition of each Commando to enable them to meet the
different challenges likely to be faced in this new role. In August
1961 the COS approved Admiralty proposals to increase the size of
the Royal Marines by 500 men. Of these, about 350 were to go to the
Commandos on a basis of one officer and 70 men to each of the five.
These would provide each unit with an air control team and a naval
gunfire support section, and would enable it to operate more support
weapons. The remaining 150 men were to form two sets of
Administrative Group Elements, one stationed either side of the Suez
barrier. These Group Elements would include transport, medical and
administrative facilities and were designed to relieve the burden on
Army support facilities posed by the Royal Marines when operating
ashore. It was recognised that it was neither practical nor economical
for the Royal Marines to become entirely independent of the Army
18 . Folio 5; ADM 205/115.
19 • COS (58) 219, 18 September 1958, memo by Admiralty; DEFE 5/85.
20. Ibid. Memo B.1222 + B.1223; ADM 167/152.
21. COS (58) 87 mtg, 15 October 1958; DEFE 4/112.
22. Moulton, The Royal Marines, p.121.
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support apparatus when operating out of range of their parent ship.
The Commandos would always need to look to the Army for some of
its second and third line support. Despite the backing of the COS and
the Minister of Defence, the Treasury were unwilling to sanction the
expense which these extra men represented.23
The possibility of using the mobility and flexibility of the Royal
Marines to make up for deficiencies in Army recruiting continued to
prove attractive to the Ministry of Defence. At a Defence Committee
meeting in October 1961, Watkinson advocated the raising of a
further (6th) Commando as an insurance against Army recruiting
difficulties. The Defence Committee approved this proposal but as the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd, had not been present at
the meeting he refused to be bound by the decision. 24 Royal Marine
recruiting had increased to a healthy 900-1000 per annum with high
re-engagement rates, however it was considered unlikely that a sixth
Commando could be trained and operational before early 1965.
Under these circumstances the Minister of Defence was advised by
Mountbatten to concentrate first on gaining approval for the additional
500 men. Treasury approval for these men was forthcoming at a
meeting held on 23 October and the decision to increase Royal Marine
manpower by 500 was announced in the 1962 Navy Estimates.25
The Commando organisation was reformed to enhance flexibility and
striking power. Each Commando now consisted of 680 men,
organised into three rifle companies of 109 men, a support company,
an anti-tank troop, a heavy weapons troop and a headquarters
company. The strength of the Commandos was further enhanced by
the embarkation in the commando carriers of 105mm pack howitzers
which for the first time provided the Commandos with their own
integral fire support. The provision of such support had been one of
Air Marshal Elworthy's recommendations in his report on Vantage.
In 1962 29 Regiment, Royal Artillery embarked in Albion , becoming
29 Commando Light Regiment, Royal Artillery. The 29 Regiment
was followed by the 95 Regiment which embarked in Bulwark as 95
23. COS (61) 50 mtg, 3 August 1961; DEFE 4/137. Folio 25 + passim; DEFE 7/1681.
24. Folio 26 + 41; DEFE 7/1681.
25. Folio 41; DEFE 7/1681. Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates 1962-
1963.
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Commando Light Regiment, Royal Artillery. 26 These reforms gave
the Commandos more staying power and greater offensive potential,
increasing their value for use in limited war as opposed to the raiding
operations for which they had originally been designed.
The Admiralty's first priority in 1962 was to ensure support for its
maritime strategy based upon the amphibious task force. In January
1962 the VCNS, Vice-Admiral Vary! Begg, submitted a minute to
Caspar John outlining the necessity of obtaining Army support for this
strategy. He noted that in order to gain their support the Admiralty
would have to convince the War Office that this strategy was not just a
cover to gain more ships and more Royal Marine Commandos. Vary!
Begg feared the creation of an "unholy alliance" between the War
Office and the Air Ministry in opposition to Admiralty plans. He
recommended disbanding one Royal Marine Commando and inviting
the War Office to organise two battalions as Army Commandos. This
would tie the Army firmly into the maritime strategy and would allow
for a redistribution of Royal Marines into ships detachments,
increasing the overall flexibility of the Fleet. The Director of Plans
supported these proposals. VCNS discussed the issue with the Vice
and Deputy CIGS in February. He was informed that the Army had
no desire to form Commandos of their own but was left with the firm
impression that the War Office viewed the provision of five
Commando with some misgiving, regarding it as an expansion at the
expense of the Army.27
The CGRM, Lieutenant-General Cartwright-Taylor, was opposed to
any reduction in the number of Commandos, particularly at the behest
of the War Office. On 9 April he informed VCNS of his views:
I do not believe that the War Office will become more
sympathetic to the Corps, or the navy, as a result of
our agreeing to abolish one of our operational
Commandos overseas. I think they would interpret
this as a sign of weakening and might take it as
encouragement to them to make further inroads into the
rightful responsibilities of the marines.
26. Neillands, By Sea and Land, p.322-323.
27. ADM 205/185.
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Cartwright-Taylor considered that the Commando role was now the
basic raison d'être of the Corps. He objected strongly to a situation
where the strength and deployment of the Royal Marines could be
directed by the "whims" of the Army.28
The vital importance of securing War Office support in Whitehall
overrode the objections of the Marines. In addition, the Board of
Admiralty was keenly aware that if agreement was not reached, the
War Office could counter-attack with a bid to take over the Royal
Marines entirely. CGRM was instructed to prepare counter arguments
to such a bid but the Admiralty considered that their overall position
was somewhat weak. 29 Bowing to War Office pressure, the Admiralty
concluded a deal which put the active Commandos under Army
command when they were ashore and agreed to the reduction of one
Commando in due course. 30 In January 1963 the Admiralty submitted
proposals to the COS outlining a requirement for only four
Commandos: two overseas and allocated to the commando carrier,
with one operational and one training commando based in the UK.'
The COS took note of this paper but did not forward the conclusions
to the Minister of Defence. 32 It did not take the Admiralty long to
begin regretting the agreement. It had been driven entirely by the
need to placate the War Office. By October 1963 Vice Admiral
Frewen, Varyl Begg's successor as VCNS, considered that the
agreement with the Army was "a thoroughly bad one for the country".
There was a general feeling that the Royal Marines were being
"mucked about". In a brief to Caspar John, Frewen and Cartwright-
Taylor noted that:
The paradox now is that when the fifth Commando is
reaching full strength and when the Minister is calling
for a sixth Commando, we and the War Office are
about to carry out a self-imposed agreement to reduce
the number of active Commandos from five to three.33
28. Ibid.
29. Board Minute 5563; ADM 167/160.
30. ADM 205/191.
31. COS 1/63, 3 January 1963, memo by Admiralty; DEFE 5/134.
32. COS 3mtg/63, 15 January 1963; DEFE 4/151.
33. ADM 205/191
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In 1964 a new deal was struck which addressed this problem. The
Army accepted the maintenance of five Royal Marine Commandos,
with three based east of Suez. In return the Navy acknowledged that
the Marines were specialist assault troops, and that while they were
also trained as conventional infantry they were less suited to this role
than infantry battalions. It was agreed that it would be wrong to make
infantry battalions redundant by using Commandos in a purely land
role, or to make Commandos redundant by excessive employment of
infantry at sea. 34 An increasingly bitter battle was being waged within
Whitehall between the Air Force and the Navy, both pressing for
acceptance of their own concepts for intervention east of Suez. The
Admiralty could not afford to alienate the War Office by being seen to
be trying to "go it alone" with their plans for amphibious intervention
forces. The agreement reduced Army fears that the Marines were
expanding at their expense, while avoiding the need to disband the
fifth Commando. With the future of the Navy's aircraft carriers in
the balance, the loss of the sixth unit was a concession the Admiralty
were willing to make.
According to the Admiralty's May 1961 presentation to the Minister
of Defence, only if the Fleet was to have no operational role east of
Suez would there be no requirement for aircraft carriers. 35 The COS
study, Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War, had
recommended the permanent deployment of two carriers east of Suez.
The Defence Committee initially rejected this, preferring the existing
deployment of only one. 36 Nevertheless, in 1962 it was decided to
maintain two carriers east of Suez and following the deployment of
the second ship, one carrier was usually maintained within seven days
steaming of potential trouble spots in the Middle East or Far East.37
The Board of Admiralty continued to see aircraft carriers as central to
the future of the Fleet, although not unanimously so. VCNS Varyl
Begg questioned the utility of large vulnerable carriers, which took up
a large part of the Navy's resources. He wondered whether some
tasks at present performed by carriers might be performed more
34. COS 133/64, The Royal Marines and the Requirement for Royal Marine
Commandos, 15 April 1964; DEFE 5/150.
35. ADM 205/192.
36 • D (61) 28, 16 May 1961, memo by the Minister of Defence; CAB 131/25.
37. Mountbatten to C-in-C Far East + Middle East; ADM 1/29638.
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cheaply by other means. This was not the unanimous view of the
Board and both Caspar John and the First Lord, Lord Carrington,
were firmly behind the requirement for carriers.38
The Air Ministry was naturally reluctant to endorse the role of the
aircraft carrier in limited war. They considered that the air support
of the Army east of Suez was an RAF and not a Naval responsibility.
Acceptance of a new generation of aircraft carriers would
simultaneously strain the defence budget and undermine the role of the
RAF east of Suez, opening it up to further cuts. The CAS, Air
Marshal Tom Pike, submitted a memorandum to the COS arguing
against relying solely on seaborne forces east of Suez. He was anxious
to have it accepted that Britain could only conduct small scale
operations, operations relying primarily on air transport. He
considered that with the development of vertical take off and landing
(VTOL) and short take off and landing (STOL) technology the
aircraft carrier of the future should be a multi-purpose ship similar to
the existing commando carriers. Such a ship could be used, according
to requirements: for the conveyance of troops; as a platform for ASW
aircraft and defensive fighters; or as an advanced landing ground with
limited servicing facilities for land based close support and fighter
aircraft. 39 It would lack the capabilities of a true aircraft carrier.
A joint Admiralty/Air Ministry study group was set up to examine the
proposals for a dual-purpose carrier. The CAS viewed this ship as in
essence a temporary home for land based aircraft. Under these
conditions he considered that the Fleet Air Arm would cease to exist.
The squadrons concerned would be provided by the RAF and would
consist of both Royal Navy and RAF aircrew, with RAF ground crews
ashore and Naval crews afloat. The RAF would be responsible for all
training. This harked back to the policy adopted between the wars
when the Navy had been responsible for the carriers, and the RAF was
responsible for the embarked aircraft. This had been a wholly
unsatisfactory arrangement and entirely to the detriment of seaborne
airpower.40 Aware of the sensitivity of this issue, Pike warned his
38. Board Minute 5468; ADM 167/158.
39. COS (61) 358, 29 September 1961, memo by CAS; AIR 8/2328.
413 . Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945. A Historical Survey,
(London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1979) passim.
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subordinates not to raise the future of the Fleet Air Arm with the
Admiralty 41
The study group considered a vessel capable of operating 24
VTOL/STOL aircraft based on a hull ranging in size from 35,000 tons
to 40,000 tons. In all cases the vessel would be far less capable than a
fleet carrier. Caspar John saw little merit in this dual purpose carrier,
dubbed the Pike ship . He noted that such a ship would be much
bigger and costlier than was necessary for the commando role and that
as an aircraft carrier it would be entirely inadequate. He considered
that the idea was a "non-starter" :
in their basic role this carrier and its aircraft would not
be a viable military unit; they could not "ensure the
safe and timely arrival of a seaborne military force"
they could not even provide their own effective fighter
defence; they would be strictly an adjunct to an
indefinite number of conveniently placed shore bases.
He was not slow to point out that the availability of these shore base
could not be relied upon.42
By the end of November 1961 Pike was forced to concede that the
joint study group was unlikely to reach agreement on the basic concept
for the dual purpose carrier. He emphasised that the Air Ministry
considered this ship to be preferable to expensive fleet carriers which,
given the capabilities of shore based aircraft, were not required for
the kind of operations Britain was likely to undertake. 43 John
disagreed:
I conclude that in the 1970s and 1980s carriers will
continue to be vital to the strategy of this country as
mobile air bases for the provision world-wide of a
military presence as a deterrent to limited war; for the
protection of seaborne forces and for the provision of
the air support required by the Army overseas."
The Air Ministry and the Admiralty could not agree on the dual
purpose carrier concept as essentially they differed on the role of
41. Aide memoir setting out Pike's views, 11 October 1961; AIR 8/2328.
42. John to Pike, 23 November 1961; AIR 8/2328.
43. Pike to John, 28 November 1961; AIR 8/2328.
". COS (61) 475, 5 December 1961, memo by 1SL; AIR 8/2328.
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carrier borne airpower. The RAF considered that, given the limited
potential of Britain's likely opponents east of Suez and the high
performance of shore based RAF strike and bomber aircraft, it would
be possible to reduce air opposition to any operation to a very low
level. The main air defence of a seaborne convoy would be provided
by an attack on enemy airfields conducted by shore based aircraft.
The residual threat which the carrier would have to cater for would
thus be small, and in this role its VTOL aircraft would be supported
by the surface to air missiles of escorting ships. During the assault
phase land based aircraft would be responsible for keeping any
remaining air threat in check. In this way the aircraft of the dual
purpose "close support" carrier would be freed for close support,
reconnaissance and interdiction duties. Under these conditions
Britain's intervention capability would be limited to those areas and
those opponents against which land based airpower could be
effectively brought to bear.
The Admiralty, on the other hand, believed that the role of the
aircraft carrier was "to provide air support of land and maritime
forces in places or at times when shore based aircraft cannot do so,
either adequately or at all" . They doubted the ability of shore based
aircraft to do all that the RAF claimed of them, and were alive to the
possibility that a forced reduction in overseas bases for political
reasons could undermine the ability of such air power to provide
adequate cover. The Admiralty therefore envisaged the next
generation of carriers having the full capabilities of a large fleet
carrier.45
As the Admiralty and Air Ministry were unable to reach agreement,
the COS decided to refer the issue to a neutral party: Field Marshal
Festing. Festing examined the case and came down in favour of the
specialist carrier:
The minimum requirement is for an aircraft carrier
which can provide air defence for an amphibious task
force and a measure of initial close support for the
troops when put ashore. For this purpose, something
approximating to the light fleet carrier in displacement,
cost and aircraft carrying capacity would be sufficient.
45 . Ibid.
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He rejected proposals to combine the capabilities of the commando
carrier and the aircraft carrier in one ship. Further, Festing doubted
the requirement for sophisticated aircraft such as the RAF TSR.2. He
considered that a single type of aircraft should fill the light bomber
and strike/fighter roles east of Suez, whether the aircraft were sea or
shore based. He recommended abandonment of the TSR.2 project and
the adoption of the Navy's Buccaneer 2 as the common aircraft.46
Festing had first hand experience of the value of aircraft carriers in
support of amphibious operations as he had commanded a brigade
during Operation Ironclad, the invasion of Madagascar in 1942. Air
support for Ironclad had been provided exclusively by the fleet
carriers, HMS Illustrious and Indomitable.
On 13 December, in a memo to the CDS, Lord Mountbatten, the CAS
reluctantly admitted defeat. He noted that he continued to believe in
the dual purpose carrier, "[however] I do not wish to press this point
any further because it is quite clear that I am alone in this thinking".
The outline of future battles was drawn, as Pike questioned the
feasibility of developing an aircraft which could provide for close
support, air defence, reconnaissance and long range strike. He
considered that the first three were possible in one aircraft, but not the
requirement for long range strike, he argued that the Admiralty
should abandon this role.47
The hulls of all the existing aircraft carriers had been laid down
during the war. Victorious was the oldest ship and would reach the
end of its useful life in 1970. In order to replace that ship by then,
work on a replacement was required immediately. British Strategy in
the Sixties included £120 million in its costings for the construction
of aircraft carriers which would commission after 1970. These
carriers were intended primarily for cold and limited war tasks,
although they would be allotted a role in global war. The ships were
not intended as "capital ships" as such, but rather as "floating
airfields" capable of operating both Royal Navy and RAF aircraft.48
46. Future Air Strike Policy in Limited War Outside Europe, memo by Festing; AIR
8/2328.
47. CAS to CDS, 13 December 1961; AIR 8/2328.
48• D (62) 1 mtg, 12 January 1962; CAB 131/27.
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The future requirement for aircraft carriers to "provide floating
airfields from which British air power can be operated irrespective of
whether this power is provided by the Royal Air Force or the Fleet
Air Arm" was endorsed at a private meeting of the COS on 14
December. The proposal to combine the role of commando carrier
and aircraft carrier in one ship was specifically ruled out. In order to
provide the maximum flexibility for future air complements, it was
agreed that replacement carriers would be approximately the same
size as HMS Ark Royal. The COS also agree that as soon as possible
a joint RAF/Naval aircraft should be provided to fill the requirements
of fighter, ground attack, strike and reconnaissance. In order that
RAF crews should be able to operate from aircraft carriers without
constant practice in such operations these aircraft would have to be
either VTOL or V/STOL (vertical/short take off and landing). It was
aimed to provide the aircraft by 1975-1977. As an interim step an
effort was to be made to produce a common fighter/ground attack
aircraft with a supersonic performance on the lines envisaged in the
NATO requirement NBMR 3. Such an aircraft would have a limited
strike capability, with a radius of action restricted to about 400
nautical miles. However, it would provide a carrier borne supersonic
fighter earlier than was otherwise likely. It was thought that this
aircraft could be introduced into service in about 1969/70. 49 In
January 1962 the Defence Committee authorised initial design work to
be undertaken for a replacement of HMS Victorious. This decision
did not represent authority to actually build the ship.50
The Admiralty undertook a number of design studies to determine the
size and shape of the new carriers. The American Forrestal class
ships and the French carriers Clemenceau and Foch were looked at.
The former was too expensive whilst the latter were considered too
unstable and were too small to embark the necessary size and number
of aircraft.51 In all about 40 studies were made. Serious attention was
given to four designs, catering for ships of 58,000 tons, 55,000 tons,
53,000 tons and 52,000 tons, see Table One.
49 . CDS/P(61) 12 mtg, 14 December 1961; AIR 8/2354.
50• D (62) 2 mtg, 31 January 1962; CAB 131127.
51 . Memo B.1414; ADM 167/154.
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Table One: Design studies for a new aircraft carrier
Design Study N.58 A ship of 58,000 tons capable of
operating 40 fighter/strike and 4 AEW
aircraft plus 2 SAR helicopters. Costing
between £60 and £65 million.
Design Study No.55 A ship of 55,000 tons capable of
operating 30 fighter/strike and 3 AEW
aircraft plus 2 SAR and 5 ASW
helicopters. Costing between £58 and
£63 million.
Design Study No.53 A ship of 53,000 tons capable of
operating the same complement as the
No.55 but with inferior machinery.
Costing between £55 and £60 million.
Design Study No.52 A ship of 52,000 tons capable of
operating 32 fighter/strike and 4 AEW
aircraft plus 2 SAR helicopters. Costing
between £55 and £60 million.
In June 1962 the Board accepted Design Study No.53 as the best
compromise between capability and expense. As a ship of this size
would be too big to dock in any existing Royal Dockyard without
major works, the Ship Characteristics Committee recommended that a
new dock should be built at Portsmouth to accommodate this ship.
The existing dock at Portsmouth was already too small to
accommodate either Eagle or Ark Royal .52
Aware of political considerations, the Civil Lord, Ian Orr-Ewing,
considered that a smaller carrier of about 40,000 tons and capable of
carrying 24 aircraft should be considered as this would stand a better
chance of seeing the construction programme completed. He noted
that the introduction of VTOL aircraft might allow the air group to be
increased. Caspar John represented the majority opinion when he said
that to adopt a "second rate design" would be short sighted,
particularly as these ships would have to operate three generations of
aircraft during their lifetime. Carrington was later to claim that he
52. Memo B.1421; ADM 167/160.
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favoured a smaller carrier but there is no evidence to show that he
expressed this opinion to the Board. With the exception of the Civil
Lord who dissented, the Board approved Design Study No.53 and
agreed that the case for this ship should be presented on a broadly
inter-Service basis and not as a purely naval interest. It was decided
that the price must be held at £50 to £60 million and that additional
equipment and weapon systems that threatened to increase costs could
not be accepted.53
Despite the agreement of the COS on 14 December 1961 the question
of aircraft carrier replacements remained a lively one. The RAF saw
the tactical strike role as exclusively their own, and continued to attack
the need for aircraft carriers to have this capability. In September
1962 Carrington submitted a paper to the Minister of Defence, Peter
Thomeycroft, stressing the future role of carriers and the problems of
relying on shore based airpower. 54 At this time the RAF were
unwilling to engage in heated argument with the Admiralty. Both
VCAS and his Private Secretary advised Pike to avoid controversy,
but to quietly give Thomeycroft as much indirect support as possible
in his critical scrutiny of Carrington's paper. Air Commodore Major
suggested adopting a "more in sorrow than in anger" approach,
believing that lack of money would do the talking when Thomeycroft
came to consider the Admiralty's case. 55 Accordingly, on 4 October
Hugh Fraser, the Secretary of State for Air, sent a rather subdued note
to the Minister of Defence acknowledging Carrington's paper.56
Thorneycroft had resigned from his post as Chancellor of the
Exchequer in 1958 because of Macmillan's failure to endorse his
proposals to cut back on public expenditure. While on the
backbenches he had remained a firm supporter of tight fiscal policy.57
The Air Ministry may have hoped that, given this history,
Thorneycroft would naturally oppose expensive aircraft carriers. If
so, they were to be disappointed.
53. Board Minute 5535; ADM 167/160. Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p.161.
54. Carriers and National Commitments in the 1970s; AIR 8/2354.
55. Minute by Air Commodore Major, 11 September 1962; AIR 8/2354.
56. Fraser to Thomeycroft, 4 October 1962; AIR 8/2354.
57. Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume Two, p.70-79.
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At the request of Thorneycroft, Hugh Fraser submitted a second paper
on 18 October, this time outlining the Air Ministry's concept of the
Island Stance •58 This strategy was primarily inspired by the dual
constraints of economic pressure on the defence budget, and political
pressure overseas which made future tenure of bases and transit
facilities uncertain. According to Fraser:
The so-called island strategy is simply a logistical
concept of island airfields to enable us to avoid
restrictions on the employment of our existing rights
and facilities.
The basis of the concept was that the UK would be the only complete
base for waging war, but that retention of certain secure island
airfields would allow Britain to retain a limited ability to intervene
east of Suez. The concept rested primarily on the use of long range
air power and air transported troops. The Air Ministry was shrewd
enough to stress that this concept was in no way an attempt to dispense
with naval forces. They considered that there would be a continuing
need for submarines and escort cruisers in addition to logistic ships.
Aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships did not figure in this
concept. Fraser considered that with some stockpiling east of Suez the
planned strategic airlift would be capable of lifting a brigade group at
fighting scales. Air cover for military operations would be provided
by land based TSR.2 and P.1154 aircraft. The new strategy was
capable of continuous development from current planned deployment
to the fully developed Island Stance. The first stage, the development
of island staging posts, would in any case be required to ensure a
politically secure reinforcement route to Singapore and Aden. Should
it become clear that Britain would in future be denied the use of these
bases, then alternative mounting bases could be developed.
The Island Stance provided for an intervention of a parachute
battalion and an infantry brigade group less tanks. Assault operations
would be limited to a battalion assault as only the parachute troops
would be trained for airborne landings. Similarly, any assault
operations would be limited in range to within the operating distance
of the short range transports from which the troops could land. The
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military forces would be deployed in the UK along with their light
scales. Heavy equipment was to be stockpiled east of Suez. Small
detachments of troops and tactical transport would be maintained at
island bases to form a small rapid intervention capability. RAF
strategic and tactical transports would be based in the UK and the
TSR.2 squadrons would be based there and in Cyprus. These aircraft
could concentrate rapidly east of Suez in response to a crisis. It was
originally intended that the P.1154 aircraft would also base west of
Suez but it was later conceded that their limited range would preclude
their deployment east in a crisis and so it was accepted that they would
have to be retained in theatre.
Staging posts would be required at Ascension, Gan and Aldabra. A
staging post would also be required at Cocos if Australia was used as a
base. Aldabra was to be developed as a base suitable for mounting
internal security operations. Masirah was to be more extensively
developed as a mounting base to service fighting scale operations,
capable of supporting virtually the whole task force at once. A
stockpile would be maintained either in Thailand or at Manila and use
of facilities there would be sought for SEATO purposes, see Map One.
The Air Ministry anticipated that with four days warning a force of
one parachute battalion and one infantry battalion could be deployed
to an airhead within 1,000 miles of the nearest base in ten and a half
days. Long range strike aircraft were to reduce the enemy air threat
to very small proportions prior to the initial assault. Following this
P.1154 aircraft with drop tanks and in flight refuelling would provide
what air defence and ground attack support was still required, backed
up by hand held infantry weapons. Immediately following the assault,
a squadron of P.11 54s would be flown to the airhead and these would
be joined by air mobile early warning and control radar as quickly as
possible.59
On 27 November the CAS submitted a paper to the COS attacking the
carrier programme. He stressed the vulnerability of these ships and
questioned their ability to meet the requirements of rapid intervention.
Pike echoed Fraser when he claimed that the planned strategic airlift
59. Ibid. Briefing notes on the Island Stance, from D.Air Plans to VCAS; AIR 8/2354. Also see
AIR 20/11425.
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would be capable of delivering a brigade group, with air support,
1,000 miles forward of a mounting base and of supporting it there for
a month. Sea supply was to have a place, but would not be relied upon
absolutely:
I foresee.. ..a break away from reliance on sea supply
for all but the most protracted operations; but even in
these there will be no valid case for carriers.
The Air Ministry case rested on the belief that only operations of
limited scope against weak opposition could be undertaken. They
rejected the requirement to cater for more ambitious undertakings.
The Island Stance concept had a number of weaknesses. It could
provide only a very limited intervention capability. The assault was
limited to one parachute battalion, operating without tanks or heavy
artillery support and possibly at the extreme range of land based air
cover. Unlike at Port Said in 1956, there would be no amphibious
assault force steaming inshore to relieve them should the going get
tough. This force would be too weak to take on anything but the most
insignificant opposition. Experience during Operation Vantage had
shown that, even with an airfield on site, continuous air cover and
support could not be relied upon. Without such cover lightly
equipped air transported troops would be extremely vulnerable to
enemy counter-attack. No commander could lightly contemplate
putting such a weak force into action against organised opposition
1,000 miles from support and reinforcement. Should the paratroops
encounter unexpected opposition, or more particularly should they fail
to seize an airfield in the initial stages of the operation, they would
find themselves stranded 1,000 miles from the nearest base, running
out of food and ammunition and, unlike an amphibious force, with no
means of re-embarkation and escape. The strategy could also be
questioned on political grounds. Although Ascension and Aldabra
were sovereign British territories and Cocos was the property of the
Australian government, both Gan and Masirah were leased properties
and thus subject to the same potential restrictions and difficulties as the
bases which the Island Stance sought to replace. Even with the full
range of bases and staging posts the Island Stance gave cover to a fixed
6°. COS (62) 457, 27 November 1962, memo by CAS; DEFE 5/132.
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and geographically limited area. The loss of only one of the airfields
due to political pressure would have undermined the entire system. It
lacked the capability and the flexibility offered by an amphibious task
group supported by an aircraft carrier.
The one key advantage of the Island Stance was its cost. In November
1962 a combined Admiralty/Treasury/Ministry of Defence costing
estimated that the cost of a programme of four 53,000 ton aircraft
carriers plus their aircraft would be £620 million, with each
individual carrier costing £58 million. If increased Ministry of
Aviation research and development was also included the price was
nearer to £700 million and if the Buccaneer replacement was taken
into account the capital cost might reach £800 million by 1980.61
Against this the Air Ministry estimated that their Island Stance would
cost between £30 and £40 million to set up. 62 This was not a reliable
figure as it had not been independently scrutinised. This was not the
fault of the Air Ministry. The Admiralty were well aware that a full
and fair costing of the Island Stance would exceed the Air Ministry's
estimate but that it would certainly fall well short of £620 million.
Under such circumstances, it was better to allow the Air Ministry to
underestimate the costs of their strategy and to deny them the
legitimacy that independent costing would bring. The Air Ministry on
the other hand claimed they would welcome an independent costing.
Faced with the opposition of both Mountbatten and Thorneycroft they
were denied the opportunity.63
Caspar John submitted his response to this strategy on 10 December.
He highlighted the flaws in the Air Ministry case. He stressed that
Britain could not discount the possibility of meeting opposition which
would require armour and other heavy equipment. An island base
strategy would leave Britain bound to these bases and would preclude
the flexibility required to contend with unforeseen contingencies. In
particular, he doubted the ability of air power alone to sustain and
support operations on the scale suggested by Pike. As pre-emptive air
strikes were often politically unacceptable, he noted that any
61. DEFE 7/1804.
62. COS 25/63, 17 January 1963; in AIR 8/2354.
63. Private Secretary to CAS, 7 November 1863; XIR 8/2354. Thorneycroft to CAS, 27 March
1963; DEFE 25/40. ADM 205/194. 	 /
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intervention was likely to have to cater for at least a moderate air
threat and that this would have to be met by an existing airfield on the
spot. In other words, by an aircraft carrier. In his view a brigade
group could certainly be lifted and supported 1,000 miles from its
mounting base, but this could only be considered a movement exercise
and certainly not an operation of war. As regards cost he was quick
to point out that the total cost of the Navy's Buccaneer force would be
£7.7 million spread over 15 years compared to £28.75 million over 12
years for the RAF's TSR.2. Finally he rejected the CAS's claim that
the carrier was particularly vulnerable: "In a properly constituted
force it is hard to pinpoint, hard to hit, and even if hit, extremely hard
to disable" .64
Caspar John's appreciation differed fundamentally from that of the
Air Ministry. He advocated maintaining a flexible intervention
capability, able to respond to unforeseen circumstances. Unlike the
Air Ministry, he did not reject the possibility of landings requiring a
balanced military force which could only be supplied by a
combination of air and seaborne forces. He saw no alternative to
aircraft carriers for the flexible deployment of tactical air power
worldwide and concluded that the carrier programme should go
ahead. Rather than trying to economise by cutting the carrier
programme he advocated effecting economies "by making seaborne
and land-based air power truly complementary" •65
In January 1963 Carrington forwarded a paper to Thorneycroft
outlining the Admiralty's views on the Island Stance. The paper,
prepared by VCNS Vice Admiral Frewen, considered that the strategy
failed as a valid concept on three major grounds: those of strategic
reality, political feasibility and military practicality. 66 The strategy
was not realistic because it was inflexible. Being tied to static bases it
would be unable to adapt to meet new threats in different areas.
Designed only to meet current commitments, the strategy did not
provide the world-wide military options needed to match changing
circumstances. The political feasibility of operational bases overseas
64. COS (62) 376, 10 December 1962, memo by 1SL; DEFE 5/132.
65. Ibid.
66. Carrington to Thorneycroft, 9 January 1963; AIR 20/11423.
247
was also questioned. Facilities in Masirah, Aldabra and Thailand were
vital to the strategy. The continued use of facilities at Masirah after a
withdrawal from Aden was at best doubtful, likewise the willingness
of Thailand to allow Britain to develop a stockpile there was
questionable. Frewen anticipated that any move to develop facilities in
Aldabra would provoke a hostile reaction among Afro-Asian nations
and would be interpreted as a threat to the newly independent East
African countries. This might result in increased Chinese or Russian
influence in the region.
The VCNS pointed out that the military feasibility of going into battle
at ranges of up to 1,000 miles was untried and was dependent on there
being no worthwhile opposition in the air. The vulnerability of
transport aircraft dictated that any airborne assault would require
undisputed command of the air. This could not be ensured unless the
force was protected by fighters and ground attack aircraft. Fighters
were required to stop enemy air attack and ground attack aircraft
were necessary to subdue anti-aircraft fire. Long range interdiction
was not sufficient on its own:
Even if (which is unlikely) political approval were to
be forthcoming for long range interdiction strikes in
advance of a landing, these could not by themselves be
expected to establish command of the air in the landing
zone. During a period of tension, a potential opponent
could withdraw his air squadrons to airfields remote
from Island Bases. Alternately, in the future, with
VTOL aircraft which can readily be dispersed, the
effectiveness of interdiction strikes would be largely
nullified; moreover, it should not be overlooked that
current intelligence shows that Egypt, Iraq and
Indonesia, for example, are all acquiring surface to air
guided weapons for point defence of towns and
airfields.
In the absence of carriers, fighter/ground attack aircraft could not be
flown forward to the landing zone in any state of readiness, nor could
a radar environment be established. Even under the most favourable
conditions, with four days warning, it would still take between eight
and ten days to undertake the unopposed airlift of a brigade group
1,000 miles forward. There was little difference between this figure
and the reaction time for a seaborne lift. The air transported troops
would have the additional disadvantage of arriving unacclimatised.
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With few land and air forces permanently based in the theatre the
strategy would also lack the physical deterrence associated with
seaborne forces. Frewen stressed that the Admiralty did not advocate
a purely seaborne strategy anymore than it could accept a purely
airborne one. They considered air and naval power as
complementary; the one balancing the weakness inherent in the
other.67
At the request of Thorneycroft, a panel of scientists had been set up in
September 1962 to consider the relative merits of the Island Stance
policy and the aircraft carrier replacement programme. The panel
was under the chair of the Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) Professor
Zuckerman, with Dr. J.C.Kendrew as his deputy. The other members
of the panel were Professor H.Bondi from King's College, London,
Sir Edward Bullard and Dr. M.H.Hill from Cambridge, Sir William
Cook from the Atomic Energy Agency, and Professor R.V.Jones from
Aberdeen University. Pike was reminded by his PUS that both
Bullard and Bondi had worked in the Admiralty during the War and
that although Jones had worked in the Air Ministry this had done
"little to develop his love for the Air Staff" •68 He could also have
added that Zuckerman had worked under Mountbatten in the wartime
COHQ.
The Zuckerman panel heard evidence from the three Service
Ministries and completed its report in April 1963. 69 The panel
concluded that the most likely case of intervention would be at the
invitation of a threatened regime or for internal security reasons. It
was therefore reasonable to expect that an airhead would be available
and that initial opposition would be slight. Such intervention did not
require carriers, nor did it require the full range of bases projected by
the Air Ministry. It did, however, require maintenance of the present
planned RAF strength of transport and fighter/ground attack aircraft.
As the level of opposition rose, it would become more difficult to
establish the essential airhead until a point was reached where the
carrier solution was the most effective and enduring. The panel
67 . Ibid.
68 • PUS to CAS, 28 September 1962; AIR 8/2354.
69 • Report of Enquiry into Carrier Task Forces, 22 April 1963; AIR 8/2354 and AIR
20/1124.
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recognised that such operations against "moderate opposition" were
the least likely forms of intervention, but considered that,
nevertheless, the Government should still be prepared to carry them
out. Moderate opposition was defined as:
opposition which would be supported by Russian type
equipment though not of the latest patterns. The
opposition the enemy might dispose, either directly or
indirectly, would be of conventional equipment up to
the level of MiG 21s together with the radar
environment necessary for the operation of such
aircraft.
The carrier solution was more acceptable in these more demanding
circumstances for two reasons. Firstly, the aircraft carrier provided
for a more effective air defence and air support in the early stages of
an operation, and, secondly, the panel doubted the possibility of
retaining into the 1970s the number of mounting bases required by the
Island Stance. Operations against strong opposition were discounted,
except in association with United States forces. The Panel concluded
as follows:
We advocate the retention, as long as possible of such
bases and airfields overseas as we possess, or can
readily obtain, to enable the present planned Air Force
strength to intervene in what are likely to be the most
frequent cases - against no opposition, or within the
capabilities of the Force to overcome.
If the Government wished to intervene against
moderate but not strong opposition, we believe the
carrier replacement programme should go forward to
provide not less than two carriers east of Suez. Failing
provision of these, Her Majesty's Government would
be restricted to a policy of using existing carrier forces
and bases for as long as they lasted; as time progresses
the Government would be more and more limited
militarily in the interventions which they could make.
The Air Ministry were unhappy with Zuckerman's paper, considering
that it had a pro-carrier bias and that it laid too much emphasis on
operations against moderate opposition. 70 Certainly, the paper
supported the Admiralty in its bid for a minimum of four fleet
carriers, in order to keep two east of Suez at any one time. The
ability of the Island Stance to counter anything but the most limited
". AIR 20/1124. M.E.Quinlan to CAS, 24 April 1963; AIR 8/2354.
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opposition had been largely discounted. Although it had been stated
that operations against moderate opposition were the only rationale
for these carriers, such operations were regarded as the least likely
contingency. The Air Ministry were to emphasise this point in future
battles.
It appears that Mountbatten was becoming increasingly frustrated by
the impasse over the aircraft carrier question. In a telephone
conversation with Caspar John he spoke of knocking the 1SL' s and
CAS's heads together to stop the running fight. Caspar John was
somewhat exasperated by Mountbatten's attitude. He noted that only a
month earlier the CDS had advised him not to compromise with Pike
and to 'fight him to the death" . John stressed that the large carrier
had been endorsed "unanimously" by the entire Board [not entirely
true] and that he could not adapt it to a "Pike Ship" policy on his own
initiative even had he wanted to. Nevertheless, he was keen not to
make Mountbatten's life unnecessarily awkward by perpetuating the
"warfare" in the COS Committee and promised to "do some thinking"
on the issue.71
At a meeting held in Mountbatten's office on 21 January 1963, Pike
outlined his view of the future of carrier aviation to Caspar John.
Aware of Mountbatten's desire for compromise, the CAS appears to
have been willing to accept a role for carrier aviation. He specifically
pointed out that in his opinion there was no question of the RAF
launching a take over bid for the Fleet Air Arm. Pike's main point
was that the Fleet Air Ann should abandon the tactical strike role.
This would avoid duplication of effort with the RAF and would allow
fewer Buccaneers to be purchased. It would also allow the Buccaneer
to be phased out earlier and would remove the need for a successor.
The Navy could be equipped solely with VTOL P.1154 fighter/ground
attack aircraft in common with the RAF. This would represent a
financial saving in itself and would lead to less sophisticated and
therefore cheaper carriers.72
71 • John to CDS, 16 January 1963; ADM 205/197.
72 • John to Pike, 22 January 1963; ADM 205/194.
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John welcomed Pike's assurance over the future of the Fleet Air Arm
but at this stage he was unwilling to give up the tactical strike role.
The two Chiefs were able to agree that the Fleet Air Arm and the
RAF should achieve compete flexibility between ship and shore
operations in the Army support role. Although Pike and John could
agree in principle on the requirement for a common fighter/ground
attack aircraft, Naval and RAF requirements were not entirely
compatible. The P.1154 was planned as an advanced supersonic
VTOL aircraft. Whereas the RAF wanted a single seat low level
strike and ground support aircraft to replace the Hunter, the Navy
wanted a heavier two-seater to replace their fighter, the Sea Vixen.
The Naval aircraft had to be capable of being catapulted, it would
need a good rate of climb and endurance at high level, and would be
equipped with radar.73 Nevertheless, John noted that there would be
nothing to stop VTOL RAF P.! 154s operating from carriers without
the benefit of catapulting, although obviously they would not be able
to carry the payload of their naval counterparts.74
Faced with the need to compromise, John outlined a scaled down
programme of carrier replacement to a weekend meeting of the
Defence Committee at Chequers in early February. An essential
feature of this programme was the abandonment of the tactical strike
role which would allow for smaller carriers and would remove the
requirement for the Buccaneer replacement, O.R.346. In addition, the
carrier replacement programme would be spread over a period of
years and, with the abandonment of the tactical strike role, smaller
carriers could be accepted. It was estimated that by 1976 a reduced
programme on these lines would show a capital saving on carriers and
aircraft of some £200 million yet would still preserve many of the
military options offered by current Admiralty proposals.75
Following the Chequers meeting the Admiralty developed this idea.
The "Clipped Wing Navy" approach catered for a reduced
programme of two new 43,000 ton aircraft carriers to replace
Victorious and Ark Royal with two more carriers, Eagle and
73. Wettern, The Decline of British Seapower, p.224.
74. John to Pike, 22 January 1963; ADM 205/194.
75. Carrington to Thorneycroft, 12 February 1963; DEFE 7/1804.
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Hermes , kept in service to about 1980. This would allow a decision
on their replacement to be delayed until 1971. The tactical strike role
would be abandoned and the Fleet Air Arm would adopt the P.1154 in
common with the RAF. The overall cost of this programme was
estimated to be £370 million. The cost of reprovisioning the Navy
with sophisticated missiles, should aircraft carriers be discontinued,
was estimated to be £320 million and so the Admiralty could argue
that for a mere £50 million the Royal Navy could retain a world-wide
intervention capability and preserve the balance of the fleet. The First
Lord and 1SL were advised not to lose hope of getting a 53,000 ton
ship as under these "build-two/stretch-two" proposals the difference
in cost between this and a ship of 43,000 tons was only £20 million.76
On 15 April the Board of Admiralty met to consider three papers that
emerged after the Chequers meeting. Paper A was an Admiralty
investigation of an offshore support ship concept proposed at
Chequers by Thorneycroft. Paper B, entitled "The Navy Without
Aircraft Carriers" was produced at the request of Thorneycroft and
aimed to show the measures necessary to make the Navy viable in the
1970s without aircraft carriers. The limited war intervention role
would remain the primary role of the Navy and it would retain
commando carriers and offshore support ships. As early as January
1963 ACNS, Rear-Admiral Hill-Norton, had been urging that the
Admiralty should emphasise the cost of re-provisioning the navy with
missiles, should aircraft carriers be abandoned. 77 Consequently,
Paper B stressed the very great expense that a switch to an all-missile
navy would entail. It pointed out that the Navy would be abandoning
a field in which it was ahead of its likely opponents (seaborne
airpower) and would be relying for a surface attack and long range
air defence capability on a field in which the opposition had a ten year
lead. In any case, the paper concluded that seaborne fixed wing
aircraft would remain essential for tactical reconnaissance, AEW
surveillance, probing air and surface contacts and the destruction of
stand-off jammers. For this there was no alternative to the provision
of an aircraft carrier. In reality the paper did not represent an
attempt to show the requirements of the Navy without aircraft
76. ADM 205/194.
77. ACNS to 1SL, 8 January 1963; ADM 205/194.
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carriers. Rather, it represented another salvo in support of those
ships.78
Paper C was entitled "Aircraft Carrier Replacements" and elaborated
on the proposal to build only two carriers during the 1960s. The
paper asserted that there was no viable alternative to the maintenance
of orthodox aircraft carriers if the Navy was to fulfil its expected
roles. It proposed finding savings in the defence budget by the
rationalisation of tactical airpower east of Suez. 79 Under this proposal
two carriers would be stationed east of Suez and the total number of
aircraft in the region would be reduced by the adoption of common,
inter-operable tactical aircraft for sea and shore based operations,
making full, mutual reinforcement possible. The proposal could be
implemented with Buccaneers and P.11 54s as soon as the latter became
available, or if the Air Ministry could not accept Buccaneers in the
place of TSR.2, the scheme could be partially implemented with
P.1154s. With an allocation of 20 aircraft to each of the two carriers
and 60 more distributed between the bases at Aden and Singapore, the
total aircraft deployed east of Suez would number 100, as opposed to
the current figure of 150. The saving of fifty aircraft would be made
possible because of the ability of the aircraft to achieve mutual
reinforcement. The Board were concerned that the proposed
rationalisation of aircraft represented too great a concession.
However, the package was reluctantly accepted as being the least likely
to experience delay and the most likely to gain financial acceptance.80
At the Chequers meeting of the Defence Committee Thorneycroft had
raised the possibility of providing air support for Army intervention
from off-shore support ships using V/STOL aircraft which would
normally be land based. On 26 February the COS approved the broad
staff requirements for such a ship. 81 The purpose of the Off-Shore
Aircraft Support Ship would be to provide facilities for refuelling,
rearming and first line servicing of P.1154 aircraft in support of
intervention operations. A maximum of twelve aircraft would operate
from the ship at any one time. The ship would not be capable of
78. Memo B.1451; ADM 167/161.
79. Ibid.
80• Board Minute 5581; ADM 167/162. Carrington to Thorneycroft, 9 May 1963; DEFE 7/1804.
81 • COS 16mtg/63, 26 February 1963; DEFE 4/52.
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independent operations; it was merely an adjunct to land based
airpower. 82 In accordance with instructions, the Admiralty studied
the feasibility and cost of providing such a ship, which they dubbed
the off-shore garage, or alternately the Thorney craft .83 The
resulting study was Paper A, considered by the Board of Admiralty on
15 April.
In line with previous investigations into the Pike ship , both Bulwark
and Albion were considered too small to combine the roles of
commando carrier and off-shore support ship. In any case by the time
this vessel was required both these ships would be approaching the end
of their useful lives. Similar considerations ruled out HMS
Magnificent and HMS Centaur, the only other light fleet carriers that
could be considered. The two assault ships under construction could
provide spots for only two VTOL aircraft and space for the support
envisaged could only be provided at the expense of the primary
function of these ships. Conversion of these was therefore discounted.
Conversion of a 19,000 ton Fleet Replenishment Ship would partially
meet the requirement, providing eight spots for P.1154, although
there would be no space for the transport of helicopters. Constructed
to merchant ship standards, the ship would be extremely vulnerable to
damage in action. In addition, it would be dependent on escorts for all
warning and control functions except launch and delivery, and for
almost all forms of defence. The cost of such a conversion would be
between £15-18 million, excluding the original cost of the ship.
The Admiralty considered that the required characteristics could be
met by new construction, creating a ship of 20-22,000 tons at a cost of
between £17 and £20 million. The possibility of a dual purpose escort
cruiser/offshore support ship was rejected as operationally
impractical. The wide ranging responsibilities of the escort cruiser
would be prejudiced by the need for the support ship to operate from
a specific mounting base and to be readily available to train with shore
based squadrons and to support the Army in a given geographical
area. A newly built ship could combine both the role of commando
ship and offshore support ship, but this vessel would be about 40,000
82• COS 97/63, 6 March 1963; DEFE 5/136.
83 . ADM 205/194.
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tons and would cost between £33 and £38 million. Indeed, such a
large ship might warrant extra defensive measures which would raise
the cost beyond £40 million. While such a ship could be made to
work, it was noted that in either role it would operate to something
less than the efficiency of a single role ship.
Of all the possibilities, the Admiralty considered that the most
economical would be to construct three new purpose-built single role
ships at a total cost of between £51 and £60 million. This would allow
two to be permanently based east of Suez, one at Singapore and one at
Aden. The Admiralty felt compelled to include a footnote to their
report in which they outlined their opposition to the "offshore garage"
concept. They considered that this ship could only be a partial
substitute for carriers as it was designed to fill only one role, that of
support for the Army ashore. The seaborne convoy of which it was a
part could not meet a surface or air threat unless it also contained
conventional aircraft carriers. They doubted the wisdom of being
able to provide only first line servicing for an aircraft 1,000 miles
from base. Unserviceable aircraft that could not be repaired on board
would either pile up on the ship or have to be ditched overboard. The
size of the ship would prejudice stability and would contain no stretch
for the operation of future generations of aircraft. The Admiralty felt
unable to recommend building a warship of over 20,000 tons with
virtually no self defence or mutual defence capabilities and with a bare
minimum of conventional equipment. To remedy this would require a
much larger ship costing about £30 million.84
The Air Ministry considered that the Admiralty were deliberately
exaggerating the costs and weaknesses of the off-shore support ship in
an attempt to strengthen their carrier case. They considered the off-
shore support ship/commando carrier combination a "useful and
flexible vehicle" •85 Air Vice Marshal Wykeham, the Director of the
Joint Warfare Staff, agreed with his parent Service, considering that
the Admiralty were unduly pessimistic about this ship. 86 The Army,
the Service which these ships were designed to support, were much
84• COS 176/63, 9 May 1963, report by Admiralty; DEFE 5/138,
85. Brief for CAS, 14 May 1963; AIR 20/11423. AIR 8/2354.
86. Note by Wykeman to CDS; ADM 205/192.
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less convinced. The Minister of War, John Profumo, minuted
Thorneycroft outlining the Army's interest in the issue, which was
based on the need for air support for amphibious assault operations.
Accepting the Admiralty case, he gave the War Office opinion that "a
solution which allowed the continuation of fixed wing carriers would
be welcome in the Army" •87
When the COS discussed the Admiralty report on 14 March, John
made it clear that, although the off-shore support ship was feasible, it
did not effect the case for carriers as these would in any case be
required to ensure the safe and timely arrival of the naval force of
which the offshore support ship was a part. He accepted that there
might be some benefit in investigating the use of VTOL aircraft from
commando carriers and the Admiralty was invited to examine the
provision of facilities for this in present and any replacement
commando carriers. The Thorney craft idea was allowed to drop.88
Air Ministry acceptance of the Thorney craft concept implied tacit
acceptance of the fact that land based air alone could not offer
adequate air support 1,000 miles from base. Similarly, Pike's
apparent willingness to compromise at the January meeting in
Mountbatten's office might have been prompted by his realisation of
the weakness of the Island Stance concept, hence the proposals for
small carriers capable of providing local air defence and carrying out
ground attack missions.
Economic factors remained the key constraint on defence
procurement. In June 1963 Reginald Maudling, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, stressed that it was vital that the defence budget was kept
within seven percent of GNP if economic failure was to be avoided.89
In such a climate it was going to be difficult to gain approval even for
the truncated carrier replacement programme. To make matters
worse for the Admiralty, on 19 June the Defence Committee decided
that:
It would.. ..be right to base future planning on the
assumption that by 1970 we shall not undertake by
87 • Profumo to Thorneycroft, 24 May 1963; ADM 20/1124.
88 • COS 33mtg163. 14 May 1963; DEFE 4/154.
89• D (63) 21, 16 June 1963, memo by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; CAB 131/28.
257
ourselves to mount assault operations against
entrenched opposition and that any operations of this
kind would be undertaken, if at all, as part of an allied
campaign.90
This was hardly a new development. It had never been suggested that
Britain should undertake independent assault operations against
entrenched opposition and the Zuckerman Panel had specifically ruled
out such operations. However, much depended on the interpretation
of the word "entrenched". It would be possible to argue that this
ruled out all assault operations, except those of a very minor nature
which the Island Stance was best designed to meet. This development
had been anticipated by the Admiralty, hence the emphasis being
placed on the cost of re-provisioning with missiles. It is noteworthy
that when Thomeycroft put the case for new aircraft carriers to his
Cabinet colleagues he emphasised the requirement as being a general
one rather than tying it specifically to the need to support assault
operations 91
Thorneycroft put the carrier replacement programme to the Defence
Committee on 2 July. He noted the plans to adopt common aircraft
and to rationalise the deployment of aircraft east of Suez. No doubt
mindful of Treasury opposition he proposed placing an order for only
one new aircraft carrier, leaving the decision for the second carrier
open for later discussion. 92 As was perhaps inevitable, the Treasury
opposed this new ship. 93 The Air Ministry launched a rearguard
action against the carrier, throwing in their lot with the Treasury and
stressing the cost and supposed vulnerability of aircraft carriers.94
On 23 July in a meeting within the Ministry of Defence, Thomeycroft
secured the approval of CIGS and Caspar John for his proposed
programme. Pike demurred, believing that while it would be
militarily desirable to have three carriers available in the 1970s he
was unsure if Britain would be able to afford this force. 95 The
90• D (63) 8 mtg, 19 June 1963; CAB 131/28.
91 • D (63) 9 mtg, 10 July 1963; CAB 131/28.
92• D (63) 2 July 1963, memo by Minister of Defence; CAB 131/28.
93. D (63) 24, 5 July 1963, memo by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; CAB 131/28.
94. D (63) 29. 23 July 1963, memo by Hugh Fraser; CAB 131/28.
95. Note of a meeting held on 23 July 1963; ADM 205/199.
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Minister of Defence remained firm in his advocacy of new carriers.
On 24 July he declared that:
A decision to dispense altogether with aircraft carriers
would result in very considerable financial savings
but, except for the Polaris submarines force, would
mean the end of the Royal Navy as a fighting force.
He noted that carriers were vital for the current strategy and, in what
was possibly an attempt to intimidate the Army and Air Force, he
pointed out that should it be decided to abandon any major
commitment they would also need to examine the future of
programmes such as the new transport aircraft, TSR.2, and the role of
the Gurkhas. 96 John Boyd-Carpenter, the Chief Secretary of the
Treasury, rejected the claim that without aircraft carriers the Navy
would cease to exist as "plain nonsense" , and recommended
abandoning plans to replace existing carrier and their aircraft.97
The programme Thorneycroft now proposed was for the construction
of one new carrier to replace Victorious and Ark Royal by 1972 at
the latest, with Hermes and Eagle stretched to last throughout the
1970s. This force of three carriers was the absolute minimum that
could still provide two ships operational east of Suez. In total this
revised programme would cost £285 million. He emphasised that a
decision to abandon aircraft carriers would not only mean that the
Fleet would be unequal to its major roles, but due to the need to
reprovision with missiles there would be little or no financial benefit.
He rejected calls by the Treasury and the Air Ministry to undertake
further studies into the issue, believing that the question had already
been thoroughly examined.98
Despite the emphasis being placed on re-provision costs and the
central role which the carrier had to play in the Fleet, the requirement
was still linked directly to intervention operations east of Suez. With
only three carriers there could be no operational carrier based west of
Suez if the minimum of two was to be maintained in the east. The
Navy as a whole might need carriers in the 1970s but only that portion
96. D (63) 11 mtg, 24 July 1963; CAB 131/28.
97. C (63) 133, 22 July 1963, memo by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury; CAB 129/114.
98• C (63) 141, memo by the First Lord and Minister of Defence; CAB 129/114.
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of it which was stationed east of Suez would actually be getting these
ships. The Western Fleet would have to do without, although they
would enjoy the protection of RAF operated land based air.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer finally removed Treasury opposition
to ordering the new carrier on the grounds that not to do so would
require abandoning a major role and at present there was no question
of doing this.99 On 17 July the Board of Admiralty approved the
sketch designs of a new aircraft carrier to replace Victorious . Based
on Design Study No.53, the ship would be 53,000 tons with a
maximum speed of 28 knots. It was to embark at least 30 new
fighter/strike aircraft, four AEW aircraft, two SAR and five ASW
helicopters. The cost was to be in the order of £55 to £60 million.100
On 30 July the Cabinet agreed that the carrier fleet should be
maintained at the level of three ships during the 1970s and that a new
carrier should be built to replace Ark Royal . This made the
requirement for the ship slightly less urgent than it would have been if
it was to replace Victorious which was due to expire in 1971, one
year earlier than Ark Royal .101 That afternoon, Thorneycroft
announced to the House of Commons the decision to build one aircraft
carrier of about 50,000 tons at a cost of around £60 million. The
question of aircraft carrier replacement had aroused much speculation
in the House. In particular the Labour Party had been concerned that
the government was contemplating a large carrier on the lines of the
78,000 ton American Forrestal class. In his response to
Thorneycroft's statement, the opposition spokesman, Denis Healey,
expressed relief that this had not proven the case. There was general
cross party agreement in the House for the decision to build a new
carrier, but only because it was intended primarily to provide air
support for amphibious operations and was not a strike carrier on the
American mode1.102
The Admiralty clearly did not believe that aircraft carrier
construction would be limited to one ship. On 31 July Carrington
99. CC (63) 50th Conclusions, Cabinet meeting on 30 July 1963; CAB 128/37.
100.Memo B.1456; ADM 167/161.
101. CC (63) 50th Conclusions.
102. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Volume 682, column 237-238 + 992-994.
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informed the House of Lords that the new ship was only the first step
towards an eventual class of carriers. w3 The Admiralty gained the
Queen's approval to name the new carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth.
Anticipating further construction they had already decided to call the
second ship HMS Duke of Edinburgh , in the tradition of naming big
ships after the reigning monarch and their consort. 104 On 8 February
1963 a prototype VTOL aircraft, the P.1127 Kestrel, undertook the
first ever vertical landings and take offs at sea from the carrier Ark
Royal •105 Difficulties creating a satisfactory naval version of the
P.1154 saw the project cancelled. In the 1960s V/STOL technology
was still in its infancy and the technical difficulties of producing a
supersonic V/STOL aircraft proved insuperable. Thirty years later
there is still no such aircraft. Instead, in February 1964 the decision
to procure supersonic Phantom jets from the United States was
announced. Equipped with Rolls Royce Spey engines, the Phantom
was an outstanding fighter aircraft. Together with the Buccaneer,
which first entered service in 1962, the Phantom offered the Fleet Air
Arm a first class fighter and strike capability, able to match the
performance of their land based counterparts.106
In contrast to the general support for the new carrier in Parliament,
the whole aircraft carrier/Island Stance debate had been conducted
with great acrimony in Whitehall. Lord Carrington recalled being
told by Hugh Fraser that he so loathed the bitterness and unseemliness
of the quarrel that it made him ill. The debate aroused animosity and
suspicion between the Navy and the RAF, which Carrington
characterised this in humorous terms:
I think that a number of air marshals could hardly go to
sleep at night without making sure there wasn't an
admiral under the bed, and vice versa.107
The Air Ministry were very suspicious of Mountbatten. Both Air
Marshal Boyle and his successor as CAS, Air Marshal Pike, were
103. Crowe, Policy Roots, p.163.
104. ADM 1/29044.
105 • Wettern, Decline of British Seapower, p.214.
106 • Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p.258. Paul Beaver, The British Aircraft Carrier,
(Wellingborough: Patrick Stephens, 1987) chapter 18.
107 • Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p.160.
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convinced that as CDS Mountbatten abused his position to obtain
advantage for the Navy. Harold Watkinson also felt that Mountbatten
had a naval bias, certainly he strongly opposed Waticinson's favourite
project, TSR.2, in favour of the Navy's Buccaneer. When 1SL,
Mountbatten had been committed to the carrier programme, and this
commitment may have interfered with his impartiality as CDS. The
refusal to support the RAF's requests for an independent costing of the
Island Stance would seem to support the claims that Mountbatten
favoured the Royal Navy over the other Services.108
Intense feelings were aroused because the issues involved struck at the
very heart of each Service. Since the demise of the battleship after the
Second World War, aircraft carriers had been the Navy's capital
ships. They embodied at once the Navy's main offensive and
defensive strength. While it is not true to say that the decision to
dispense with carriers would have meant the end of the Navy as a
fighting force, such a decision would have radically altered the shape
of the fleet, limiting its ability to operate in the face of sophisticated
air attack away from land based air cover. RAF opposition to a new
generation of aircraft carriers went beyond the traditional suspicion of
seaborne airpower. Weakened by the decision of the 1957 Defence
White Paper to reduce Fighter Command and cut the tactical air
forces based in Germany, the RAF sought to emphasise its role in
limited war. The RAF was further undermined by the cancellation of
the air to ground missile, Skybolt, in December 1962 and the decision
that in future Britain's nuclear deterrent would be seaborne, with
Polaris submarines replacing V-bombers. This at once removed a
major role of the RAF and threatened to further strain the defence
budget. A decision to build new aircraft carriers could prejudice RAF
procurement plans by monopolising limited resources and by reducing
the need for long range strike aircraft east of Suez.
The debate over future intervention capabilities east of Suez was
slightly artificial. The Admiralty and Air Ministry sought to gain
acceptance for their own strategies based on amphibious seapower and
land based airpower respectively. The Air Ministry case rested on the
108. Ziegler, Mountbatten, p.586-587. Watkinson, Turning Points, p.140-141. Till, "Earl
Mountbatten of Burma" p.265-282. Brown, "Mountbatten as First Sea Lord" p.63-68.
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need to maintain only very limited intervention capabilities, similar to
those which had enabled Britain to air lift Paratroops to Jordan in
1958 to meet a perceived threat to King Hussain. The Admiralty
maintained that a higher level of capability was required, and that this
could only be provided by an amphibious task group supported by an
aircraft carrier and backed up, where necessary, by land based
airpower. However, both sides in this dispute had another agenda, for
which the east of Suez debate was something of a foil. Amphibious
warfare was very useful to the Admiralty, as it enabled them to
support the construction of a new generation of aircraft carriers, ships
they would have wanted anyway but which could only be justified
through their utility in supporting amphibious assaults in limited war.
Likewise the Island Stance enabled the Air Ministry to support
procurement of the advanced TSR.2 aircraft and to push for a major
new role for the RAF. These were issues which both Services
considered to be vital.
Both sides in the dispute were willing to accept a degree of
compromise. Caspar John was a moderating influence, acknowledging
that even with a new generation of carriers, land based air would be
required for any credible strategy east of Suez. The Admiralty never
claimed that seaborne forces alone could suffice. They advocated a
partnership with the RAF in order to achieve a credible strategy.
Likewise, the Air Ministry were willing to contemplate small, multi-
purpose aircraft carriers such as the Pike ship or Thorney craft.
However, the Admiralty were unable to compromise on the
requirement for large, modern aircraft carriers, and the RAF
consistently found this unacceptable. Carrington stated that he
believed that the Navy should have been willing to consider the
compromise proposals for island bases and multi-purpose carriers. He
believed that in general the Navy should have been more willing to
investigate the possibility of procuring greater numbers of cheaper
and less sophisticated ships. Such ships might be less capable and less
flexible than more expensive vessels but could be of value in support
of a single role, that of military intervention east of Suez. It could be
argued that one did not need the full range of modern naval
capabilities to meet the level of threat likely to be encountered in this
theatre. At that time the only other navy operating in any strength in
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the region was the United States Navy, and that was not considered a
likely opponent. Carrington notes that the Admiralty were opposed to
the idea of procuring cheaper, less capable ships. They emphasised
the need for a technologically advanced "first eleven" navy, able to
meet the full range of threats which it was likely to meet. The
Admiralty did not want a large unsophisticated fleet well suited to
intervention in limited war but unable to defend the sea lanes against
sophisticated Soviet attack.109
Attitudes towards amphibious warfare had come a long way since Suez
and amphibious capabilities were undergoing a transformation, with
the construction of new shipping and the conversion of Bulwark and
Albion . However, it is difficult to assess to what extent this
represented a real change in Admiralty attitudes. The Board only
reluctantly accepted the shift in favour of limited war in 1956 as it
was "likely to be the least damaging to naval interests" of all possible
modifications of existing policy. In 1960 Harold Watkinson had
specifically told Selwyn Lloyd that he supported the case for
commando carriers and assault ships not because the Admiralty
particularly wanted them but rather because he needed them to plug
gaps in military strengths and dispositions. In 1963, at a time when
the aircraft carrier debate was at a peak the Admiralty agreed to
disband one Commando and not to recruit another in order to gain
War Office support in Whitehall. They downplayed the possibility of
adopting the Pike Ship, a vessel whose performance would have been
limited to support of amphibious operations in conjunction with the
RAF. Their main interest was in getting a proper fleet carrier, the
centre piece to a modem "first eleven" navy. The first priority of the
Admiralty in the 1960s was the same as it had been in the 1940s, that
is the maintenance of a powerful, modem, balanced fleet.
1 °9 . Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, p.160-161.
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CONCLUSION
The post-war organisation for amphibious warfare was established by
the RAW Committee in 1944. Reporting only 23 days after the
Normandy landings, the committee was heavily influenced by recent
operational experience. The organisation proposed was designed to
prepare Britain's peacetime armed forces for large scale operations
similar to those recently conducted in Europe. This called for an
independent, inter-Service organisation, responsible for maintaining
and promulgating existing knowledge of amphibious warfare and for
developing new techniques. It also required widespread training
facilities and the maintenance of a permanent peacetime amphibious
fleet. The possibility of giving the Royal Marines primary
responsibility for amphibious warfare was considered and rejected.
Under the existing concept of operations, amphibious warfare was an
inter-Service responsibility. Only the three Services operating in
partnership could provide the level of forces required for the large scale
operations envisaged. The committee did not believe that amphibious
forces would be required in circumstances short of major war. Royal
Marine responsibility for amphibious warfare was limited to the
provision of Commandos and landing craft crews. This immediately
removed one reason for Admiralty support for amphibious capabilities.
If the Royal Marines had been given special responsibility for
amphibious warfare, Admiralty support for this role would have
bolstered the independent status of the Marines, protecting them from
claims that they should either be disbanded or incorporated into the
Army.
Following 1945 harsh economic realities brought rapid cuts in defence
spending. Facing manpower shortages and the requirement for strict
economy, the Services were forced to concentrate resources on high
priority projects. The Admiralty sought to maintain its ability to secure
command of the sea and attempted to limit the resources devoted to
other responsibilities. In this climate it was inevitable that amphibious
capabilities would suffer. Early plans for two large Combined Training
Establishments had to be abandoned, and the creation of an Assault
Training Force capable of lifting a brigade group, although accepted as
policy, never took place. However, a Combined Operations Centre was
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established in North Devon and the independent, inter-Service
headquarters was maintained in London. The Army were keen to
maintain amphibious capabilities and supported COHQ to this end in
the COS Committee.
The Admiralty were much less keen on Combined Operations. They
were responsible for providing most of the men and material required
for Combined Operations while the Army was seen as the main user.
The Navy had been suspicious of COHQ ever since Keyes first moved
his headquarters out of the Admiralty building. This suspicion was
exacerbated by a natural reluctance to divert resources away from the
conventional fleet and towards something that was essentially a support
role for the Army. In 1948 Commodore J.A.Grindle, a director in
COHQ, illustrated the way his parent Service viewed Combined
Operations:
Combined Operations has achieved a reputation of
being a Black Art practised, at least so far as the
Navy is concerned, by a crowd of undisciplined and
usually bearded men who like to call themselves
sailors and have the privileges of the sailor, but who
dress themselves as untidy caricatures of soldiers.'
In the period between 1944 and 1950 the Admiralty made no less than
six attempts to either abolish COHQ or to undermine its independent
status.
Lack of resources and lack of priority meant that there was little
opportunity for widespread amphibious training. The only Army unit
to receive regular training was a territorial Beach Brigade. Even the
Commando Brigade had to go long periods without exercising with
landing craft and was frequently employed on static garrison duties.
The requirement to keep in commission sufficient lift for a brigade
group was never met, although from 1952 the Admiralty did maintain a
small AW Squadron in the Mediterranean. Similarly, lack of priority
saw new construction of amphibious material limited to a small number
of minor craft and the conversion of three LST(3) to LST(A). In these
circumstances it was inevitable that the assault fleet, made up of ageing
1• J.A.Grindle, "The Development of Combined Operations Material and Technique", RUSI
Journal vol.93, No.573, Nov 1948 p.237-250.
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war built vessels, would become inefficient and obsolete. While the
United States pressed ahead with new approaches and developed a
modern amphibious capability, British equipment and techniques
remained wedded to the past.
During the 1950s the increasing availability of weapons of mass
destruction and the development of the hydrogen bomb brought about a
general strategic reappraisal. The concentration of resources which
large scale amphibious assaults required promised to provide a
tempting target for nuclear attack. As the result of an examination by
the JPS, in 1954 the COS specifically ruled out any requirement to
conduct large scale assaults either in cold war or in the early stages of a
major conflict. What was now required were small standing forces
capable of reacting promptly to a situation as it arose. Overturning the
accepted wisdom of the previous decade, the COS decided that the time
was right for the Royal Marines to play the predominant part in the
development of amphibious warfare. The Amphibious Warfare Centre
was moved from Fremington to Poole where it amalgamated with the
Amphibious School, Royal Marines to form the Joint Services
Amphibious Warfare Centre. AWHQ remained in London until it was
replaced by the Joint Warfare Committee in 1962. However, from
1955 it was the Admiralty and not AWHQ who controlled the destiny
of amphibious warfare.
By the mid-1950s it was appreciated that major war in Europe was
unlikely, but that there was an increased possibility of small scale
conflicts outside Europe. This posed a problem for the Royal Navy.
Since the War the Navy had based its primary rationale on the need to
keep open the sea lanes in a future battle of the Atlantic. The emphasis
had been on a large navy devoted mainly to anti-submarine warfare and
backed up by a large mobilizable fleet in reserve. The Navy's prized
aircraft carriers were devoted to global war contingencies. Under new
defence priorities forces designed to fight a major war were accorded
lowest priority whilst forces for limited and cold war were to be built
up. The Admiralty was compelled to readjust its own priorities and to
emphasise the cold and limited war role in order to safeguard the fleet.
They submitted their new concept for the future of the Navy to the
COS in July 1956. Forces intended for global war were reduced and
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resources reallocated to limited and cold war capabilities. Before this
new concept could be implemented the Navy was required to take part
in a joint airborne and amphibious assault at Port Said in November
1956. Although a military success, the time taken to mount the
operation contributed to its political failure and demonstrated the
weakness of Britain's intervention capabilities. The failure to maintain
sufficient ships and craft in an appropriate state of readiness and the
overall neglect of amphibious warfare since 1945 was a major factor in
this weakness.
An important part of the Navy's new strategy of providing forces for
cold and limited war, amphibious capabilities underwent a renaissance
after the Suez crisis. The old wartime lift was replaced by conversion
and new construction. Two small aircraft carriers were converted into
commando carriers and plans to build two new assault ships and six
logistic landing ships were approved. The decisions taken in the early
1960s on the future amphibious capability were to determine the shape
of amphibious forces for over thirty years. The specialist assault
shipping deployed in the 1982 Falklands conflict and still active in the
1990s had its origins in the decisions taken during this period. The
Admiralty built a case for an intervention strategy centred on powerful
task groups of amphibious forces backed up by aircraft carriers. By
1962 the Navy based its case for the full range of modern capabilities
on the need to support these task groups. In particular, a requirement to
build a new generation of large aircraft carriers was justified in terms
of their use in support of amphibious operations in limited war. This
brought the Navy into conflict with the RAF who had developed their
own intervention strategy centred on land based airpower. In the
debate that followed, the ability of seaborne task forces to offer a
higher level of capability ensured Ministry of Defence, and later
Cabinet approval of the Admiralty case.
Post-war Admiralty attitudes towards amphibious warfare were a
reflection of the teaching and experience of the Royal Navy. The
Navy's wartime experience of amphibious operations was largely that
of acting in support of the Army in order to initiate of support a land
campaign. The specialist craft and equipment needed to conduct such
operations drew men and resource away from the fleet, and the
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requirement to provide naval support for amphibious assaults diverted
scarce shipping away from other important duties. Amphibious
warfare had done little to promote the war at sea in the European
theatre and was accepted by the Navy more as an onerous duty than an
opportunity to be grasped. The existence of an independent and inter-
Service COHQ did much to promote expertise in amphibious
operations but tended to further alienate the Admiralty from this mode
of warfare. In the immediate post-war years Britain's precarious
financial position dictated the need for strict economy and this was
reflected in a series of cuts in defence spending. In this environment
the Admiralty was forced to concentrate resources on what it
considered to be top priority projects. Highest priority was given to the
core task of providing the equipment required to maintain control of the
sea lanes in a future battle of the Atlantic. The inter-Service
requirements of amphibious warfare were accorded a low priority and
suffered accordingly.
The Royal Navy had traditionally been Britain's deterrent. Possession
of a powerful fleet, and the knowledge of what that fleet could do, had
been a fundamental component of British power. The maintenance of a
strong amphibious capability after 1945 could conceivably have acted
as a powerful new deterrent on a would be aggressor. The strategic
potential of modern amphibious forces had very recently been
demonstrated both in Europe and the Pacific. The post-war Soviet
naval build-up can be interpreted as a reaction to the threat that this
posed. Such a strategy would certainly have appealed to supporters of
the traditional "British way in warfare" . However, the Royal Navy
was ill-equipped to provide such a force. In the 1940s British defence
planning was based on a strategy of retreat, mobilisation, and only
pushing back a Soviet advance once they had been weakened by an
allied air offensive. If this was the case, then the initial priorities
would, as in 1940, be air defence and defence of the sea lanes.
Opportunities for amphibious operations would be limited to small
scale raids. Plans for anything more ambitious could be left to a later
stage. The Admiralty properly concentrated on the need to maintain
command of the sea and allocated their limited resources accordingly.
Modern amphibious operations required a great deal of specialist
manpower, equipment and shipping. The men and resources required
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to provide anything more than a nucleus capability in peacetime were
simply not available.
Although a limited amphibious capability was maintained, amphibious
forces continued to suffer from neglect until the Suez crisis highlighted
a new role for such forces in limited war. Even before the operation at
Port Said it had been decided to shift the emphasis away from
preparing for large scale operations on the Overlord model towards the
maintenance of small specialist amphibious forces prepared for raiding
and small scale assault. The associated decision to place prime
responsibility for amphibious warfare in the hands of the Royal
Marines at last gave the Admiralty a stake in amphibious warfare,
making it largely a single Service rather than an inter-Service concern.
Faced with a declining emphasis on fighting a conventional war in
Europe the Admiralty needed to find fresh justification for the
maintenance of a large fleet. The limited war and cold war power
projection role was embraced as a means of doing just that. The Navy
developed the concept of amphibious task forces supported by aircraft
carriers operating in support of British interests east of Suez. The
beauty of this scheme was that it required a full range of naval
capabilities, from minesweepers to strike carriers, therefore offering the
Navy a powerful rationale for maintaining a modern, well equipped,
multi-purpose fleet. Amphibious capabilities were central to this new
strategy and during the early 1960s the obsolescent wartime assault lift
was replaced by capable modern ships.
The study of amphibious capabilities suggests that rather than
conforming to a particular "British Way in Warfare" , Britain's
defence policy has been reactive, adapting to new challenges in a
manner perceived as appropriate in the light of existing circumstances.
In the 1940s and early 1950s amphibious capabilities were maintained
as part of a Continental strategy. While the Army supported the case
for maintaining amphibious forces, the Royal Navy, with little at stake
in those forces, sought to reduce a commitment that diverted scarce
funding and limited manpower away from the fleet. Later, when
changing strategic reality brought a shift in priorities, the Navy
embraced amphibious capabilities as an integral part of a new maritime
strategy designed to enable Britain to maintain a world role. This did
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not represent a decisive shift towards a traditional British way in
warfare. It was rather that a greater reliance on nuclear weapons in
Europe and a realisation that major war was unlikely, allowed more
resources to be devoted to other contingencies.
Amphibious warfare had changed from being an auxiliary function of
seapower, something the Navy did on behalf of the Army, to being a
core function of the fleet. In 1964 the Royal Navy was primarily
geared towards operations east of Suez with the Navy's capital ships,
the aircraft carriers, justified in terms of their use in support of
amphibious assaults. The main reason for this change was that while in
the 1940s amphibious capabilities diverted resources away from the
fleet, in the 1960s they were an important means of justifying further
resources. This is not to say that the Admiralty were not committed to
the intervention role east of Suez, rather, that facing the spectre of cuts
in forces devoted to global war a new role was sought and that
amphibious forces were central to this role. The response of the
Admiralty to challenges posed in the 1950s and 1960s is very similar to
the approach adopted by the Navy in the 1990s.
In 1964 the Admiralty was planning on the basis that in 1966 an
Amphibious Group consisting of three operational amphibious ships
would be permanently maintained east of Suez. During operations the
Amphibious Group would normally be supported by an aircraft carrier,
the necessary escorts, a replenishment group, and the LSLs. 2 The
Navy's role in limited war was clearly demonstrated in January 1964
when 45 Commando conducted a helicopter landing from the aircraft
carrier HMS Centaur in order to put down an army mutiny in newly
independent Tanganyika. 3 With construction of the new assault ships
already underway, and approval gained for a new aircraft carrier the
future of the Navy's intervention capabilities looked assured. The
position looked less stable in 1966. Far from approving the
construction of a second or even a third aircraft carrier, the Labour
administration of Harold Wilson announced the cancellation of the first
2. COS 109/64, 2 April 1964, memo by Admiralty; DEFE 5/150. COS 26mtg164, 2 April 1964;
DEFE 4/167.
3. Lt-Col T.M.P.Stevens, "A Joint Operation in Tanganyika", RUSI Journal, vol.637, February
1965 p.48-55. ADM 1/29063; Operations in East Africa.
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carrier, CVA-01, in the 1966 Defence White Paper. The White Paper
declared that:
only one type of operations exists for which carriers
and carrier borne aircraft would be indispensable;
that is the landing or withdrawal of troops against
sophisticated opposition outside the range of land-
based air cover. It is only realistic that we, unaided
by our allies, could not expect to undertake
operations of this character in the 1970s.4
The government did not believe that a carrier force of three ships
would provide "sufficient operational return for our expenditure".
Facing the need to cut defence expenditure, the Minister of Defence,
Denis Healey, had reversed the decision taken by the previous
government in 1963 and decided to rely on the cheaper, but less
satisfactory alternative of land based aircraft operating from a string of
island bases east of Suez. Even that decision was short-lived as within
two years it was announced that Britain would withdraw its military
forces from east of Suez, concentrating in future on NATO
commitments.
This could have had ominous implications for the new amphibious
ships which had been built largely to cater for limited intervention east
of Suez. However, unlike CVA-01, the ships had already been built
and represented a significant investment of capital. The amphibious
ships and the Commandos found a new role within NATO, once again
being directed towards major war contingencies. Troops that had
previously been dedicated to limited war operations in the Indian
Ocean found themselves rapidly switched to the role of Arctic warfare
in support of NATO's northern flank. Far from being neglected and
allowed to fall into disrepair as had happened in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, amphibious capabilities continued to be an important part
of the modern Royal Navy. The assault ships were retained as were
two commando carriers. HMS Hermes was converted to this role in
1973 to replace Albion which was withdrawn from service in 1976.
HMS Bulwark was eventually paid off in 1976 and Hermes
abandoned the commando carrier role and was re-equipped as an ASW
carrier. In 1979 Bulwark was reactivated after a refit to operate as an
4 . Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966; Cmnd 2901.
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ASW carrier in the time between the decommissioning of the last
conventional aircraft carrier, HMS Ark Royal, and the arrival of the
new Invincible class VSTOL carriers. Bulwark returned to
Portsmouth dockyard to be taken out of service in March 1981. 5 This
was unfortunate as only thirteen months later this old amphibious
veteran could have provided a useful third deck in Operation
Corporate, the battle for the Falldand Islands.
The 1982 Falklands War provides some useful insights into the debates
about amphibious capabilities in the 1960s. The amphibious ships
employed for Operation Corporate were all built as a result of
decisions taken during the early 1960s and operations in 1982 allowed
them to prove their worth in testing circumstances. The core of the
amphibious fleet was provided by the assault ships HMS Fearless and
Intrepid. These were supported by the RFA operated LSLs and by a
large number of Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT). Together these
ships carried an initial landing force consisting of 3 Commando
Brigade, reinforced with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Parachute
Regiment, and successfully landed them in an unopposed assault at San
Carlos on 21 May. This would not have been possible without the
specialist assault ships. The landing craft carried by these ships played
a vital role in unloading troops and equipment not only from the
amphibious ships but also from the STUFT. Following the initial
landing the amphibious ships provided the land force with tactical
mobility; landing troops at Teal Inlet, Fitzroy and Bluff Cove helping
to mitigate the loss of heavy lift helicopters which were sunk with the
Atlantic Conveyor on 25 May.6
The performance of the two VSTOL carriers employed for Corporate,
HMS Hermes and Invincible ,sheds some light on the 1960s debate
over the replacement of aircraft carriers. These relatively small ships,
carrying a maximum of only 25 Sea Harriers between them, were able
to provide enough air cover to allow the landings to take place and for
the successful prosecution of the land campaign. The Harriers were,
however, unable to achieve total air superiority and, hampered by the
5. Burns + Critchley, HMS Bulwark, p.100-105.
6. Julian Thompson, No Picnic. 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic 1982, (London: Leo
Cooper, 1992) p.59 + passim. David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, (London:
Arrow Books Ltd, 1989) passim.
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lack of airborne early warning aircraft, they were unable to stop the
Argentine Air Force from inflicting significant casualties on the task
force. The amphibious assault had to be conducted at a time when air
control was disputed. Julian Thompson estimated that it was not until
26 May, five days after the initial landing, that the enemy air force was
subjected to such attrition that it no longer posed a threat to land
operations and as late as 8 June the Argentinian Air Force was able to
launch successful attacks against two LSLs in Bluff Cove and the
frigate, HMS Plymouth ,in San Carlos Water.7
The campaign showed that small aircraft carriers operating
VSTOL/STOVL fighters could provide a significant air defence and
ground attack capability, although not to the level offered by a large
strike carrier. Admiralty reluctance during the 1960s to consider a ship
smaller than 50,000 tons contributed to the great cost of the carrier
replacement programme and thus ultimately to its cancellation. HMS
Invincible proved that a ship of only 20,000 tons could offer a
significant and versatile STOVL capability. However, it is fortunate
that the 28,700 ton HMS Hermes had not yet been replaced by an
Invincible class ship. The old carrier embarked twice as many Harrier
jets as was possible in the new ship, significantly boosting the task
force's air defence capability. 8 A 50,000 ton carrier such as CVA-01
would have been able to employ larger, heavier aircraft in greater
numbers than the existing ships, and by providing the fleet with an
airborne early warning capability it would have offered the task force
greatly improved air defence. In the event the Navy was forced to rely
on its anti-aircraft missiles to make up for the inadequacy of the fighter
cover. In the 1960s the Admiralty had claimed that by giving up the
fixed wing capability and relying on missiles they would be
abandoning a field in which Britain enjoyed considerable expertise for
one in which she was a newcomer, and in which potential enemies had
years of experience. 9 The loss of missile armed ships to enemy air
attack during the Falklands conflict would seem to validate this opinion
or at least to demonstrate the limits of contemporary missile
technology.
7. Thompson, No Picnic, p.61.
8. Hermes embarked a maximum of 15 Sea Harriers and 6 RAF GR3 Harriers. Invincible carried a
total of 10 Sea Harriers.
9. See chapter eight., page 246
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The Falldands experience demonstrated the strength of the Admiralty's
concept of amphibious task groups supported by aircraft carriers
operating in limited war. It was precisely such a task group which
retook the Falkland Islands, although with weaker air assets than
anticipated in 1964. In comparison the Air Ministry's Island Stance
does not look so good. The presence of even large numbers of TSR.2
strike and reconnaissance aircraft at fixed bases would have done little
to deter Argentine aggression as these aircraft would have been
powerless to intervene in the South Atlantic. The nearest friendly
airfield to the Falklands was on Ascension Island, almost 4000 miles
from Port Stanley and well beyond the effective operating range of
strike aircraft. The RAF did manage to launch a small number of
strikes against Port Stanley airfield from Ascension but these had
minimal impact on the course of the war. On 1 and 4 May a solitary
Vulcan bomber, supported by no less than eleven tanker aircraft
undertook a 7,860 mile round trip in order to conduct a high level
bombing attack on the airfield. 10 The attacks were ineffective, failing
to close or seriously damage the airfield. Later in the war a Vulcan
conducted two SHRIKE anti-radar attacks on Port Stanley. These were
also ineffective and after the second attack the Vulcan was forced to fly
to Brazil due to a technical fault and therefore could not undertake
further operations.11
An important part of the Island Stance argument had been the claim
that enemy air activity could be controlled by long range strikes against
their airfields and operating bases. The Admiralty had questioned the
willingness of any government to sanction pre-emptive strikes during
any limited operation and this was borne out by experience in 1982.
No attacks were launched against airfields on the Argentinian mainland
and any attempt to do so would have represented a significant
escalation of the conflict. Close fighter cover was vital to the success
of the operation and could only be provided from the deck of an aircraft
carrier. A makeshift airstrip was established ashore by 5 June, 16 days
after the initial landing. Although useful as an auxiliary airfield,
lengthening the range of combat air patrol and increasing the readiness
10 • Commander Ward, Sea Harrier over the Falklands, (London: Orion Books, 1995) p.186.
11 . Brown, Falklands War, p.258-259 + 277.
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for ground support missions, it was not really an independent airfield
capable of sustained operations. 12 In the event it was possible to
conduct a brigade level amphibious assault without total air superiority,
and to support the land force in its subsequent operations ashore.
However, the Navy paid a heavy price in lives lost and ships sunk. If
the Argentine Air Force had concentrated on attacking the amphibious
ships rather than their escorts, or had they succeeded in sinking one of
the carriers the result might have been much less satisfactory.
Amphibious warfare remains an important part of the Royal Navy in
the 1990s. Decisions taken in the 1960s still largely determine the
shape and size of Britain's amphibious capability. The core of the
amphibious fleet are the two old assault ships and the LSLs. In
addition to these, the three Invincible class aircraft carriers can be used
to carry units of an amphibious force for operations of limited duration,
landing the embarked troops by helicopter. These carriers also provide
any amphibious task force with indigenous air power. 13 The Royal
Marines maintain a Commando Brigade of three Commandos, and
these troops still provide Britain's amphibious spearhead. The launch
in 1995 of a new helicopter assault ship, HMS Ocean , and the
declared intention to replace the two assault ships with new
construction is a clear indication of the Navy's continued interest in
amphibious warfare.14
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Britain faces a reduced
threat of a major conventional war in Europe. The inevitable calls for a
"peace dividend" have brought sharp reductions in the strength of all
three Services. In this environment the Navy has again sought to
emphasise the power projection role as a means of justifying its share
of the budget. Once again amphibious forces are central to this
strategy. In 1995 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine was
published. The first ever public statement of maritime doctrine, it was
approved by the Navy Board and represents an attempt by the Navy to
outline their role in the post-cold war environment. The new doctrine
highlights the fact that while there is a reduced threat of a major war in
12 • The loss of the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor, with much special equipment embarked,
delayed the construction of the airstrip.
13.The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, BR1806, (London: HMSO, 1995)
14.Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995: Stable Forces in a Strong Britain; Cm 2800.
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Europe there is a growing potential for more limited conflicts
elsewhere. It claims that in order to face the challenge to British and
Western interests posed in this new environment, Britain needs to
maintain global reach and the ability to project power. Amphibious
capabilities are identified as one of the means of projecting power
overseas.15
The Navy's response to the challenges of the post-cold war world in
the 1990s is very reminiscent of the response to similar challenges in
the late 1950s. Much of what is written in the Maritime Doctrine of
1995 could easily have been taken from an Admiralty document
completed almost forty years earlier. It would seem that when the
Navy's main role in defence of the Atlantic sea lanes is threatened by a
change in priorities, then the Navy exploits the flexibility of
amphibious seapower and adopts the role of overseas power projection.
In this way amphibious warfare remains one of the core capabilities of
the fleet.
The extent to which the Services will go to defend their share of the
budget is clearly demonstrated by the fate of amphibious warfare
during the period 1945-1964. In the first decade after the war the
Admiralty jealously protected its budget from unnecessary spending on
peripheral tasks such as amphibious operations. However, once naval
interest in amphibious capabilities was aroused, and plans were made
to develop these capabilities, opposition from both the Army and the
RAF was encountered. Army fears that the Royal Marines were
expanding at their expense brought about a deal where the Admiralty
agreed to set the level of the Commandos artificially low in order to
secure War office approval for their plans. 16 RAF opposition was more
entrenched. Facing the spectre of severe cuts in land based airpower
the Air Ministry fought a hard and bitter campaign against Navy plans
for amphibious task forces supported by modern strike carriers east of
Suez. The Navy were equally determined to defend what they
considered to be an important capability. With both the Navy and the
RAF seeking approval of expensive new equipment programmes some
conflict was unavoidable. It was an unfortunate fact of life that defence
15 • British Maritime Doctrine.
16 • See chapter eight, page 226-228.
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policy could be governed more by the inter-play of competing interests
in Whitehall than by any rational long term planning process. In the
current climate of defence cuts and retrenchment it is perhaps
inevitable that similar conflicts of interests may arise today.
The history of amphibious warfare in Britain during the period studied
shows that the fate of any capability is determined by the level of
priority accorded to it by the parent Service. A serious, modern
amphibious capability would have proven no less useful to Britain in
the 1940s and 1950s than it did in the 1960s. Such a capability would
have allowed Britain to make a contribution to American operations in
Korea, including the Inchon landing. It would have offered Britain
military options during the Abadan crisis of 1951 and could have
transformed the outcome of the Suez crisis. However, during this
period the Admiralty was primarily concerned with the problems of
maintaining sea control in a war against the Soviet Union, and neither
COHQ/AWHQ nor the Army were able to force them to devote much
priority to amphibious capabilities. It was probably inevitable that with
one Service (the Navy) expected to provide equipment largely for use
by another Service (the Army) to the detriment of their own
programmes little was achieved. Once the Royal Navy had a stake in
amphibious capabilities the situation was transformed. These
capabilities now served the interests of their parent organisation as well
as the national interest, the result was the creation of the modern
effective amphibious warfare ships which even today provide the
backbone of Britain's amphibious assault capability.
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Air Defence Control Ship
Attack Cargo Ship (later LKA)
Attack Transport (later LPA)
High Speed Transport (later LPR)
Amphibious Transport Dock





Landing Ship, Emergency Repair (Landing
Craft)
Landing Ship, Emergency Repair (Landing Ship)
Landing Ship, Fighter Direction
Landing Ship, Gantry
Landing Ship, Headquarters
Landing Ship, Headquarters (Command)
Landing Ship, Infantry
Landing Ship, Infantry (Hand Hoist)
Landing Ship Logistic
Landing Ship, Medium
Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket)
Landing Ship, Personnel
Landing Ship, Stern-chute
Landing Ship, Support (Rocket)
Landing Ship, Tank
Landing Ship, Tank (Assault)
Landing Ship, Tank (Carrier)




Maintenance Ship (Landing Craft)
Maintenance Ship (Landing Ship)
Motor Transport Ship
Wireless Tender

















































Landing Craft, Assault (Hedgerow)
Landing Craft, Assault (Obstacle Clearing)
Landing Craft, Control









Landing Craft, Personnel (Ramped)
Landing Craft, Personnel (Survey)




Landing Craft, Support (Rocket)
Landing Craft, Tank
Landing Craft, Tank (Emergency Repair)
Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket)
Landing Craft, Utility
Landing Craft, Vehicle
Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel
Landing Vehicle, Tracked
Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armoured)
Motor Launch
Motor Landing Craft
Naval Landing Vehicle Tracked (Experimental)
The designation (S), (M) and (L) following the name of the ship or craft means
small, medium or large respectively. For example, LSI(M) is a Landing Ship.
Infantry (Medium) while LCG(L) is a Landing Craft, Gun (Large). The number
following the name of the ship or craft indiates the particular version of the vessel.
For example, an LCT(8) is a Landing Craft Tank, mark eight.
For ease of reference standard American nomenclature has been used for landing
craft throughout this work. This system was not adopted by the British until
1942. Prior to this; LCT were known as Tank Landing Craft, LCM were called
Mechanised Landing Craft, and LCA were Assault Landing Craft. In the
















































Adviser on Combined Operations
Airborne Early Warning
Air Forces, Middle East
Air Officer Commanding






Amphibious Warfare Signal School
Amphibious Warfare Experimental Establishment
British Army of the Rhine
British Forces, Arabian Peninsula
British Joint Services Mission
Chief of the Air Staff
Chief of Amphibious Warfare
Commodore, Combined Operations (December
1941 to March 1942)
Chief of Combined Operations (from March 1942)
Chief of Combined Operations Representative at
BJSM
Chief of the Defence Staff
Commandant General, Royal Marines
Chief of the Imperial General Staff
Chief of Combined Operations Staff
Combined Operations Development Centre
Combined Operations Headquarters
Combined Operations Joint Planner
Combined Operations Liaison Officer
Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander
Co-ordinator of Experiments and Development




Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff
Director of Combined Operations
Director of Combined Operations Material
Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Inter-Services Training
Sub-Committee
Director of Naval Construction
Director of Experiments and Staff Requirements
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Appendix Two: continued
FOME	 Flag Officer, Middle East
GOC	 General Officer Commanding
ISTDC	 Inter-Services Training and Development Centre
HQEF	 Headquarters Expeditionary Force
JFSC	 Joint Fire Support Committee
JOC	 Joint Operations Centre
JSAWC	 Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Centre
JWC	 Joint Warfare Committee
JWE	 Joint Warfare Establishment
JWS	 Joint Warfare Staff
NATO	 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PAO	 Principle Administrative Officers
RAW	 Responsibility for Amphibious Warfare
RAC	 Royal Armoured Corps
RAF	 Royal Air Force
RNVR	 Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve
RTR	 Royal Tank Regiment
SAR	 Search and Rescue
SRC	 Shipping Resources Committee
STOL	 Short Take Off and Landing
STOVL	 Short Take Off and Vertical Landing
USMC	 United States Marine Corps
USN	 United States Navy
VACTC	 Vice Admiral, Combined Training Centre
VCAS	 Vice Chief of the Air Staff
VCIGS	 Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff
VCNS	 Vice Chief of the Naval Staff
V/STOL	 Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing
VTOL	 Vertical Take Off and Landing
WD LST	 War Department LST
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APPENDIX THREE 
Part One: Military Figures 1945-1964
First Sea Lord
	
1943-1946	 Sir Andrew Cunningham (Viscount Cunningham
of Hyndhope)
	
1946-1948	 Sir John Cunningham
	
1948-1951	 Bruce, Lord Fraser of North Cape
	
1951-1955	 Sir Rhoderick McGrigor
	
1955-1959	 Louis, Earl Mountbatten of Burma
	
1959-1960	 Sir Charles Lambe
	
1960-1963	 Sir Caspar John
	
1963-1966	 Sir David Luce
Chief of the Air Staff
	
1940-1946	 Sir Charles Portal
	
1946-1950	 Sir Arthur Tedder
	
1950-1953	 Sir John Slessor
	
1953-1956	 Sir William Dickson
	
1956-1960	 Sir Dermot Boyle
	
1960-1964	 Sir Thomas Pike




1948-1952	 Sir William Slim
	
1952-1955	 Sir John Harding
	
1955-1958	 Sir Gerald Templer
	
1958-1961	 Sir Francis Festing
	
1961-1965	 Sir Richard Hull
Chief of Combined Operations/Amphibious Warfare
1940	 A.G.B. Bourne (Adviser on Combined Operations)
1940-1941	 Sir Roger Keyes (Director of Combined
Operations)















1951-1955	 Winston Churchill (Conservative)
	
1955-1957	 Anthony Eden (Conservative)
	
1957-1963	 Harold Macmillan (Conservative)
	


















1946-1951	 George, Viscount Hall
1951	 Francis, Lord Pakenham
1951-1956	 James P.L.'Thomas, Viscount Cilcennin
1956-1957	 Quentin, Viscount Hailsham
1957-1959	 George, Earl of Selkirk
1959-1963	 Peter, Baron Carrington
1963-1964	 George, Earl Jellicoe
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